This week, our guest is Akram Umarov, First Vice Rector at the University of World Economy and Diplomacy and Deputy Director of the Institute for Advanced International Studies in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. We discuss Central Asian politics, Uzbekistan’s attitude toward the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the country’s relations with Russia, China, and the USA, among other subjects.
This week, our guest is Akram Umarov, First Vice Rector at the University of World Economy and Diplomacy and Deputy Director of the Institute for Advanced International Studies in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. We discuss Central Asian politics, Uzbekistan’s attitude toward the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the country’s relations with Russia, China, and the USA, among other subjects.
*The Trialogue Podcast is hosted by the Stimson Center and produced by University FM.
**The first twelve episodes of this podcast were published by the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.
(Transcripts may contain a few typographical errors due to audio quality during the podcast recording.)
[00:00:00] Peter: Hi, I'm Peter Slezkine, Director of the Monterey Trialogue, a program hosted by the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey. Since the middle of the 20th century, relations among the United States, Russia, and China have had an enormous impact on each country separately and on the world as a whole. The purpose of the Monterey Trialogue is to better understand these extraordinarily complex and consequential relationship by directly engaging with experts from all three countries.
My guest today is Akram Umarov, First Vice Rector at the University of World Economy and Diplomacy in Tashkent, Uzbekistan.
Akram, welcome to the podcast.
[00:00:44] Akram: Thank you, Peter. I'm very delighted to be part of this podcast series. Thank you for the invitation.
[00:00:51] Peter: Well, thank you for joining me from across the world in Tashkent. Could you begin by telling us where you were born and where you grew up?
[00:01:00] Akram: I was born in an ancient city of Samarkand, which is also located in Uzbekistan. And I also grew up there. Then I started my education at the University of World Economy and Diplomacy, where I'm currently working. And this university is based in Tashkent, the capital of Uzbekistan.
[00:01:20] Peter: What did your parents do for a living? Or what do they do now, if they're not retired yet?
[00:01:25] Akram: My parents are part of intelligence. They both worked for many years at the higher education system. So, they were staff members at the Samarkand State University. They served in both capacities of teaching and also conducting some administrative duties.
[00:01:47] Peter: So, you are continuing in the family tradition.
[00:01:49] Akram: Indeed. My grandparent was also dean of one of the schools at the Samarkand State University.
[00:01:56] Peter: So, what languages did you speak, growing up?
[00:01:59] Akram: So, Samarkand is a very multilingual city and multiethnic city. So, from my childhood, we used to speak Uzbek, for sure, Russian, and Tajik as well. Then, I also learned English.
[00:02:15] Peter: So, English was a school subject, and Russian, Tajik, and Uzbek were languages that you spoke outside, at home?
[00:02:22] Akram: Indeed, indeed.
[00:02:24] Peter: Were Russian and Uzbek and Tajik all taught in school, or was school only Uzbek?
[00:02:31] Akram: In Samarkand, you can find schools in Uzbek language instruction, and Tajik and Russian as well. My school was Uzbek school. I studied everything in Uzbek.
[00:02:41] Peter: And at what point did you start learning English?
[00:02:43] Akram: So, from my first year at school, I started learning English, but then I also had some extra classes with one of the teachers who lived nearby our house.
[00:02:54] Peter: So, English was your fourth language, the one that you studied formally, on top of the three that you knew from very early on. But then you attained the wonderful, fluent heights that we hear now. And from what I understand, you went off to England at some point for an M.A. degree.
[00:03:12] Akram: Yes. In 2018, I decided to slightly widen my area of expertise. So, I mainly studied before international relations, security studies, political science. Then, I decided to deepen my knowledge in public policy area and development studies, in general. So, I decided to take a second master's degree at the University of Sussex, that is Institute of Development Studies.
[00:03:44] Peter: And you also did a Fulbright in Pittsburgh in the U.S.
[00:03:48] Akram: Indeed. In 2021, end of pandemic, I started my Fulbright Visiting Scholar Program at the University of Pittsburgh at the amazing Center for Governance and Markets. I was under the supervision of Professor Jen Murtazashvili, who is a great scholar and very kind person.
[00:04:11] Peter: So, you must be the first generation, right, to have really gone off and received higher education in the West. Your older colleagues, presumably, studied in Uzbekistan, in Soviet Union, and came out of that system. So, you're the first generation to have mastered English and gotten degrees in the West?
[00:04:31] Akram: Yes, predominantly this is true, but I have few even senior colleagues who did their master's and Ph.D. degrees abroad in 1990s. There was a state-sponsored program which was called Umid, which we can translate it as a hope. And many Uzbek, young, talented people, received education in the Western countries using this opportunity.
Even before that, our current director, he's at the same time first deputy chairperson at the Uzbek Senate, higher chamber of parliament, he had a one-year visiting program at Harvard University back in 1990. So, we have good experience sending people abroad and then appointing them in different positions in public institutions.
[00:05:20] Peter: But it didn't entirely supplant the connection to Moscow. It was just a way of rounding out the educational experience. Your first book, I think, was written in Russian, is that right?
[00:05:33] Akram: Yes, I wrote it in Russian. So, my Ph.D. thesis was written in Russian. But my all recent publications were mainly in English.
[00:05:45] Peter: And that's the trend, in general, that Russian is no longer considered as important a language for academic purposes, that you want to be in international publications that are part of the citation system recognized throughout the world, and that means writing in English.
[00:06:03] Akram: Yes, this is mainly, I think, linked to the fact that, for being acknowledged, for better engagement with your colleagues abroad, of course, English is providing more opportunities. But in general, Russian is still widely used in Uzbek academia, especially with colleagues from older generation. They still use a lot of Russian in their publications. But for younger generation, of course, English is, kind of, a must if you want to be published abroad. If you want to have some recognition and be engaged in different international projects, you have to know English, obviously.
[00:06:43] Peter: So, can you tell us a little bit about the institute in which you are deputy director?
[00:06:50] Akram: So, idea was to bring together various research centers, which university had for many years under one umbrella, for the purpose of better coordination and more efficient usage of resources. And at the same time, we felt the lack of important bridging between academic world and policy making. This is, I think, very widely distributed issue across the world. And especially now, when Uzbekistan is conducting many reforms and have very dynamic foreign policy, we felt that the academic world should be more engaged in solving relevant issues of Uzbekistan's development, foreign policy construction.
What makes us different from many other research institutes and think tanks, at least in our perspective, that, what we produce almost fully available online. I used to work in other think tanks which has direct affiliation with different ministries or other public agencies, relationship, not everything on which they conduct research might be available publicly. So, we are trying to build different type of institution, publicly accessible information, engaging with the community, and open to international partnerships.
So, we have very wide geography of partnerships. So, starting with the U.S. and ending with Japan. In between, we have many other partners in Europe, in Russia, in Iran, in Pakistan, in India, in China, so, in the United Arab Emirates, Qatar. So, you can see it on our website that we have very dynamic, very vibrant, and very diversified relations with different institutions.
[00:08:51] Peter: Of course, that sounds nice on the website to say that you cover the whole world, but the world is large. There are certain countries that matter to Uzbekistan more. A lot of the ones you listed are either neighbors or they are Turkic countries or Islamic countries, or the U.S., which is ubiquitous around the globe. So, what are the countries with whom you have the closest relationship or the most frequent meetings?
[00:09:17] Akram: So, in recent years, we've had joint projects with different partner institutions in the United Kingdom, in Germany. UN system is very active, UN organizations, Japan, Korea. The main countries which we worked very closely and on a daily basis and we conduct joint research and joint research projects.
[00:09:45] Peter: You said Japan.
[00:09:46] Akram: Yes.
[00:09:47] Peter: So, what is the association between Uzbekistan and Japan? I don't think that would be obvious to the audience.
[00:09:54] Akram: Japan is actually very engaged in regional affairs in Central Asia. It was one of the first countries who established this C5+1 format, which now became a very fashionable one.
[00:10:09] Peter: C5 referring to the five Central Asian countries?
[00:10:11] Akram: Yes, five regional countries plus someone else. So, Japan and Korea were the first countries who established similar formats in 2000, mid-2000. Then, it became fashionable to establish this kind of platforms with Central Asia.
From that time, Japan is one of the biggest donors of development aid to Uzbekistan and also had many investments into Uzbek economy. So, we have very deep relationship with Japan. In the case of our institute, we cooperate with Nippon Foundation in Japan who supports different social initiatives and research projects in Uzbekistan.
[00:10:53] Peter: And essentially, it's an economic interest. Japan sees Central Asia and Uzbekistan, in particular, as a potentially fertile ground for investment.
[00:11:03] Akram: Yes, Japan is interested to also diversify its trade links. And economic interests are very important. And also, I think Japan has some global vision to become a reliable partner and investor in the development of other countries. So, I think these are the main ideas behind Japan's quite close engagement with Central Asian countries, especially with Uzbekistan.
[00:11:30] Peter: Well, so, let's focus now on the C5 before we get to the various plus ones. So, Central Asia is very young in terms of population. The leadership has also been renewed, relatively recently, in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan where the old Soviet leadership has been, more or less, refreshed. So, can you tell us a little bit about the place of Uzbekistan within Central Asia, what it's strategies are, for the region?
[00:12:01] Akram: Yeah, Uzbekistan, of course, perceives Central Asia as its priority foreign policy area. I think Uzbekistan did a lot in the recent years for enhancing environment of cooperation in Central Asia by proposing having this high-level regular meetings between the heads of state in 2017. Now, we can see that this kind of engagements are happening on a lower level as well, between foreign ministers, between ministers of culture, tourism, transport, and etc.
[00:12:37] Peter: But so, practically speaking, what are the avenues for cooperation, integration that seem most promising or that are priorities specifically for Uzbekistan?
[00:12:47] Akram: I think we have very careful approach and official statements using the phrase of integration. So, in all official statements, you probably will see the words like “regional cooperation,” “partnerships,” “collaboration,” “engagement,” but very rarely “integration,” because I think, at the current stage, the priority is not very much full-scaled or full-fledged economic integration. Its priority is at least to improve bad relations which we had before. We were quite successful in reaching this objective.
[00:13:26] Peter: And bad relations specifically with Kyrgyzstan, sometimes Tajikistan. What are the specific conflicts?
[00:13:32] Akram: Almost all of our neighbors, we had some issues in our bilateral relations. So, in case of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, this was water distribution and border issues. In case of Kazakhstan, there was a lot of misunderstanding and there was a feeling that there is some competition between the countries. And with the case of Turkmenistan, as well, water was an issue and border demarcation was discussed a lot a long time before.
But in the recent years, we could solve, first of all, the biggest challenge in the region, the border delimitation issue. So, we had, as I mentioned, we had border issues with almost all of our neighbors. But in the recent eight years, we could successfully solve all border delimitation issues. So, there is no border issues left between Uzbekistan and any other Central Asian country. The only issue which we have in the region yet, this is the delimitation of Kyrgyz-Tajik border. But it seems it's going well, currently, negotiations around this topic between these two countries. And other Central Asian countries are quite supportive in making them successful .
[00:14:49] Peter: So, the border, the limitation is going well, and that's been the center of the process and the greatest success. So, what about, you mentioned perceptions of competition between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan? Is there much of a tug of war over Central Asian leadership? Kazakhstan is big and rich and has tons of national resources. Uzbekistan has a large and growing population and is also dynamic in its growing economy. So, who is the leader of Central Asia? And how do you determine that?
[00:15:19] Akram: I think, any, at least, official discussion, between the countries, our leadership would be harmful for our cooperation. In the recent years, I don't have feeling that there is a competition between these countries. I see mostly cooperation between them. Why I'm saying that? First of all, more the issues were solved between the countries. Trade amount increased substantially in the recent years. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are investing into each other sides. We have now Tenge Bank and Kazak chain of supermarkets. Magnum is now widely presented in Uzbek retail market in this way. Uzbek companies, Artel and a few other ones, are now also represented in Kazakh market and have their offices, dealers. So, you wouldn't see such developments, for sure, 10 years ago.
At the same time, we… in 2023, we signed an alliance agreement between the countries. So, I emphasize on this. It was not declaration. It was not memorandum of understanding. It was specifically called as an agreement. And this is a very symbolic act that we signed, such alliance agreement that says the level of relationship is very high. Of course, there are always some issues between the countries due to the different understanding of affairs in the world or due to some other in parallel commitments. So, let's say, Kazakhstan has its own understanding as now active member of Eurasian Economic Union and Collective Security Treaty Organization. Uzbekistan is not part of these international institutions.
[00:17:10] Peter: And just to clarify, those are two institutions, more or less, managed from Moscow. I mean, Russia is the dominant partner in both. And Uzbekistan is not a member, Kazakhstan is.
[00:17:22] Akram: Yes. In this case, Uzbekistan is not part of this institution. Uzbekistan has observer status in the Eurasian Economic Union. So, it may create some obstacles in bilateral trade regimes and economic exchanges, but it seems we are finding some ways, even within this parallel commitments of our partners, to deepen trade and economic exchanges. And I, I hope, soon, accession of Uzbekistan to World Trade Organization will be also important in further increasing this economic cooperation between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.
[00:18:02] Peter: And you still want to get into the WTO. It seems like the global economic system is fracturing, but you still have dreams of becoming part of a unified larger club.
[00:18:15] Akram: Because I think, World Trade Organization, at least in my humble understanding, for Uzbekistan has, not just simple meaning of receiving some trade benefits in our contacts with partners. I think this is also about choice of values. That we would like to choose to be part of more globalized world with better access to markets, promoting some free market ideas and cooperation between the countries.
[00:18:54] Peter: It just seems that that ideology has slipped a bit from its unquestioned status in the ‘90s and early 2000s. Even in Washington, the Washington consensus no longer lives up to its name. Uzbekistan is not a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, nor is it a member of the Eurasian Economic Union, but it is a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which is very large, but in many respects, centers on Central Asia and was formed, from what I understand, to deal with the security problems, the terrorist threats emanating from the region, from Afghanistan, specifically. So, can you tell us what the meaning of the SCO is now and for Uzbekistan? How does it see its place within this structure?
[00:19:38] Akram: I think the primary interest to SCO, you mentioned correctly from Uzbekistan side in, back in 2001, was about security issues to focus more on common security response to many challenges which arose in those years. Primarily terrorism, drugs issues, and separatism. Later on, SCO evolved and is now trying to cover many other areas, including economic cooperation, transport, infrastructure, cultural cooperation, and etc., etc.
But for Uzbekistan, I think it's important to be part of this, you know, big international community where many countries represented and try to get benefits. At least, there are a few very well-working agreements with the NSU, especially if it's accessible transportation between the countries. So, for the countries like Uzbekistan, it's very important to have this kind of agreements. But I personally also feel that SCO probably is expanding both in terms of number of its members and in terms of areas of coverage too quickly, in my understanding. And I think we need to slightly slow down and absorb first which, what we reached until now, how to efficiently organize the work of SCO institutions, and then think how to fully engage its members for reaching some joint benefits from this membership in this organization. I think this is truly important, because we have many other experience, let's say, the organizations like Commonwealth of Independent States. It has some good agreements, let's say, free trade zone agreement.
[00:21:37] Peter: And that’s the former Soviet states.
[00:21:39] Akram: Yes, former Soviet states, which was adopted in 2011. And it works quite well. But at the same time, it has so many different institutions, subnational institutions, and so many signed agreements, declarations, which, in reality, are not working. I think SCO should learn this experience and avoid to be too wide and not focused organization. In my view, it would be important to focus in the areas where SCO has an advantage on security, let's say, and economic cooperation, transportation, and then think about of other areas of cooperation later on, maybe.
[00:22:21] Peter: But do you see it ultimately, perhaps, becoming this regional organization that really ties the different countries together, or it's still best suited as a practical forum to address specific issues? So, terrorism, perhaps, at one moment, transportation at another, economic trade relations when necessary, and among certain members for whom that would be beneficial, and not necessarily all of them?
[00:22:48] Akram: And, of course, it depends from the countries. You know, these international organizations never exist themselves. It's their member countries who build them up, who construct their organizational structures, and who build their daily agendas where to evolve further. From the perspective of Uzbekistan, at least in my understanding, we would be interested in having very efficient organization focusing on specific issues. It's not in the interest of Uzbekistan, let's say, you know, to discuss very wide and distant issues to Uzbekistan on international platforms. Of course, as a member of international community, we have some concerns on developments in other parts of the world, but, of course, for us, priority is always regional development, regional sustainability, and security. And SCO, for many years, used to be a regional organization with focus on Central Asia, but I don't think it's anymore true. Considering its geography, it now covers almost all Eurasia. Maybe from this perspective, this was, kind of, a loss for Central Asian countries because we are not anymore the main priority. We are just one of the regions of SCO.
[00:24:09] Peter: So, now, let's turn to Russia, China, and the U.S., specifically, since that's the framework for this program as a whole. And maybe let's do it in that order. So, Russia was, I mean, Uzbekistan was part of the Soviet Union, for a period before that. Obviously, the influence of Moscow has substantially decreased since independence, but there are quite a few Uzbeks who work in Russia. There's a great deal of economic exchange. There's still the Russian language and cultural connection, even if it is decreasing. So, could you describe how this relationship looks from Tashkent?
[00:24:50] Akram: You always should take into account geography. So, the location where you are based always matters in elaborating priorities of your foreign policy. And obviously, Russia is a neighbor of Central Asia, like China, like India, like Pakistan, like Iran. And it's truly important to have good relations with your neighbor. It's part of, you know, Uzbek mentality and traditions. We have a saying in Uzbek. It's better to have a good neighbor than a very distant relative. So, this neighborhood concept is part of, you know, Uzbek mentality and long history. And I think this reflects on our relationship with Russia. Considering this neighborhoodness, we have very deep economic trade exchanges. And, for many, you mentioned the role of Russian language, it might be decreasing, to some extent, but still is quite strong, strongly represented in Central Asia. Russian TV is quite popular, especially among medium-aged and senior people. And the cultural exchanges are quite active. So, all these ties matter, in my understanding.
You also mentioned migrants. And Uzbekistan has many foreign labor migrants, which are working in Russia. The numbers can be different depending on the source, from three to five, six million people, but it's substantial number of workers. But I would disagree with many colleagues who used to say, you know, this labor migrants is a leverage for Russia to Central Asian countries. I think it's, it's not dependency of Central Asian countries, it's rather than interdependency between Central Asian countries and Russia. I don't think Russian economy could be so resilient and have such economic growth in the recent decades without this labor force provided from Central Asian countries. Even currently, it’s highly dependent on these labor migrants. Even after tightening the Russian legislation for two labor migrants, still, I think the number of these migrants will not decrease substantially because the Russian economy is highly dependent on this.
[00:27:28] Peter: So, there right now in Russia is a, an acute labor shortage on one hand. On the other hand, there is a growing concern about Islam in Russia, which is becoming more and more apparent. And there is a reaction against that, the way there is in the Western world, in Europe, And there is a concern about corruption in labor migration. So, new laws are being written as we speak. How has that seen from Tashkent? Is this something that has worked out on an intergovernmental level? What is the Tashkent perspective on the legal revisions in Moscow concerning the migrant labor market?
[00:28:08] Akram: I think, first of all, the current changes in labor migrants regulations and tightening some legislation towards them is part of response from Russian government to the tragedy which happened in March in Moscow.
[00:28:27] Peter: In Kharkiv city, the concert hall.
[00:28:28] Akram: Yeah, yeah, the attack to Crocus Mall and its consequences. And there was a demand from Russian society to somehow respond to the situation to prevent…
[00:28:40] Peter: And the shooters, at least as far as we can tell, were Tajik but associated with Central Asian migration, in general.
[00:28:48] Akram: Yeah, they're, in general, associated with Central Asian migration. And then there was a demand from society and the Russian government made some actions to respond to this situation. And the current issues are related still to that tragedy in Crokus Mall. But there is also a good cooperation between governments of Russia and Uzbekistan on labor migration issues.
It's also in the interest of Uzbekistan to have this labor migrant flows to Russia more coordinated and official because it will be beneficial for the people who are starting their work in the Russian market. So, if you are their official registered, they have some benefits. They will have some insurance. They will have the protection of their rights. So, it's, it’s also in the interest of citizens of Central Asian countries.
But of course, these procedures should be clear, transparent, and not very complicated. So, if people express the will to work in some Russian markets and would like to move there as a labor migrant, they need to know clear procedures how to do this. Then, it should be obvious how to proceed from there. Because otherwise, it will create a, a very unnecessary environment for either violating the regulations or for some corruption in both ways.
[00:30:20] Peter: So, Uzbekistan, at the governmental level, is providing input to its Russian counterparts about how it would prefer to regulate this migration process.
[00:30:31] Akram: Of course. This labor migrant issue, considering the number of Uzbek citizens who are based in Russia right now, is always top agenda of negotiations with Russian government, to create better facilities, better opportunities to them and make this labor migrant flows legal and transparent.
[00:30:52] Peter: What about sanctions? So, Russia has been sanctioned from every side. Uzbekistan is a big trading partner of Russia. How do sanctions affect you guys? Is it only a detriment? Are there ways that you might benefit from the situation?
[00:31:09] Akram: Of course, sanctions made our trade and economic connections with Russia more complicated. And because Uzbekistan is complying with sanctions regime and working in coordination with the countries who impose sanctions towards Russia… and I had meetings with official representatives of the countries who introduced sanctions to Russia and I haven't heard any substantial complaints about Uzbekistan's compliance with sanctions regime. But compliance with sanctions regime also shouldn't prevent us from our traditional economic cooperation with Russia because it's important for Uzbekistan's economy. It's important for our sustainable development. So, Uzbekistan tried to find ways beyond the sanctions in compliance with sanctions regime. There were just very minor couple of cases when Uzbek companies were also put under some monitoring due to some minor violation of sanctions. But these were just a couple of incidents. But in general, all partners of Uzbekistan, let's say, in European Union, U.S., Japan, and a few other countries, they’re all quite happy with what… how Uzbekistan is complying with sanctions regime.
Again, this is, you know, this is very related to our foreign policy priorities, which is multilateral foreign policy, having good relationship with all our partners. So, it's again in the genes of Uzbeks. For many years, we used to be in this, you know, crossroads. So many cultures, people, civilizations crossed this part of the world, and we had to find some common language with all of them for our prosperity, for our development. And I think this traditions are still kept in our genes and we are trying to do our best to use these skills in the contemporary situation.
[00:33:24] Peter: Although if you take that idea to its logical conclusion, then, as a country that has long been at the crossroads, you should favor mobility of all kinds. And right now, there are certainly some of your partners who are aiming to prevent flows in very particular directions. So, you have, as a country, skillfully managed to please all partners despite what are clearly competing and contradictory interests.
[00:33:57] Akram: Yeah. You can see it from, even, you can monitor in news. You can see how this foreign policy is constructed in the regional countries. So, if we will, we have high-level visit from Russian officials one day, a few days after, weeks after, there will be high-level summit with European Union officials or U.S.
[00:34:22] Peter: Right. So, just to ask a specific question. So, I understand that, even though China is trading more with Russia, after the beginning of the Ukraine war, there are serious impediments to commercial transactions because Chinese banks are terrified of secondary sanctions. So, that is a very noticeable break on relations between China and Russia. So, are there concrete difficulties in executing commercial transactions with Russian partners now because of sanctions? Has that really created an obstacle in the trade between the two countries?
[00:34:58] Akram: Of course, of course, as I mentioned. The same applies to Uzbekistan. Any transactions in U.S. dollars or Euros are very complicated with Russia. Of course, I don't know all the details, but I assume that the trade in national currencies exchange increased substantially in the recent two years because of the sanctions regime. And this is one of the ways how to keep high trade amount due to the sanctions regime. But Uzbek banks are also very sensitive in compliance with sanctions regime. And there are many restrictions in transactions to Russia. And also, Russian citizens, at the beginning of war in Ukraine, used to arrive in Uzbekistan and easily open bank account. This is not anymore an issue because the Uzbek banks established a new regulation which puts specific conditions for opening bank accounts, not just for Russian citizens, but for any foreign citizen, you should be based in Uzbekistan, you should have some job or earning in Uzbekistan to be able to open bank account, but not, like, living somewhere in other foreign country and just visiting Uzbekistan to open a, a bank account. This is a normal regulation.
[00:36:26] Peter: So, what about China? What does the Belt and Road Initiative look like in Central Asia? It was first announced by Xi Jinping in Kazakhstan, but all of Central Asia was a primary focus early on. There's much written about the Belt and Road in the U.S., but it is, perhaps, poorly understood. So, Central Asia as the initial focus of this project, understands it, however many years since its first declaration.
[00:36:51] Akram: Belt and Road brand is now used less than it used to be a few years ago. China understood that this BRI concept was spoiled, let's say, by Western media and was, and had, kind of, some negative branding due to the many publications on this issue in media outlets and academic journals.
So, now, I think China is now focusing more on these global initiatives. But BRI is still, they didn't express any statement saying that BRI is not relevant. But I think, in my understanding, expectations in Central Asia from BRI were higher than they actually were delivered because expectations were about very substantial investments into the transport infrastructure in Central Asia. Yes, investments happened, but at least in my humble understanding, not at the level which we expected. And we couldn't finalize all projects due in the planned schedule. Let's say, this China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, they finalized feasibility studies agreed on the scheme of funding and just started construction stage. But actually, it was planned to do a few years ago. The same applies to many other projects.
So, maybe this is also due to change in Chinese understanding conceptualization of BRI because they don't want anymore to invest highly in projects which, where they do not see a, kind of, very important commercial benefits. So, this, if the project is commercially feasible, China is expressing interest in investment, but if it's more about, kind of, politics and spending some amount of money to appease some countries, I think they are now acting more carefully than they used to do so several years ago. Maybe it's a pragmatic choice from Chinese side, but in general, there is a huge need in Central Asia for the investments into the infrastructure because, again, we can talk a lot about regional cooperation, but without proper roads, without railway transportation, without accessible border checkpoints, this will not happen. And all these forums and discussions will not be successful without this proper, simple infrastructure, which will make connections between the countries easy and reliable.
[00:39:47] Peter: The BRI is a massive Chinese project. PR push seems to have failed or at least been moderated both because of Western reaction and because it didn't quite meet the expectations that arose in Central Asia. But now, the new form of economic interaction has gone to a more practical level of mutual benefit. And there is hope that these transportation networks that are needed will be constructed through Chinese investment.
[00:40:17] Akram: Yes. For example, this middle corridor, which is now widely discussed, it complies with the general idea of BRI, but it's a new proposal from China, which also matches with the European Union's, you know, Global Gateway Initiative. But I think this kind of projects, which has clear mutual interests from all sides, can be successful, but not the projects which are solely driven by one of the partners, let's say China or EU. But Middle Corridor is, of course, in the interest of China, EU, Central Asian countries. So, it has some potential for success.
[00:41:02] Peter: Has there been a large jump in the number of Chinese coming to Central Asia in the last 10 years, on the business level, on the government level, on the think tank expert level? Do you visit China? Do you have students or colleagues who are learning Chinese?
[00:41:18] Akram: Yes, I think the frequency of contacts increased substantially in the recent years on all levels. So, there are a lot of available scholarships to Uzbek students to study in China. There is a lot of Chinese language training which is happening in the region. So, we have, for example, at our university, we also have Chinese language training which we consider is very important. And this kind of exchanges are happening on all levels, not just on students level, but also there are programs for exchange visitors for public officials from different ministries, agencies to learn, let's say, Chinese experience in different sections. Or for higher educational institutions or managers of higher educational institutions for experts. So, they have quite diverse programs for these exchanges for better knowing of China and better understanding of our cooperation.
And we can obviously see the increase in trade amount between the countries and interest from Chinese companies in Uzbekistan. And there are huge presence in Uzbek market. So, now, for example, in Uzbekistan now, Chinese electric vehicles are very trendy. So many people are buying. And you can see widely on the streets a lot of Chinese electric vehicles. And they're, they’re very good quality and price comparatively to other competing car industry companies .
[00:42:53] Peter: But they're also cool. So, it's not just that it's an economical purchase, but they now have a certain cachet that it's actually cool to be seen driving a Chinese electric car.
[00:43:03] Akram: Yeah, because it has a lot of advantages in comparison to other car manufacturing companies. Even, even the ones which are produced in Uzbekistan, of course, they are not able to match with specifics provided by Chinese car companies.
[00:43:21] Peter: But would everybody still want to drive a Mercedes if they could? Or are the Chinese BYDs now almost as hip as a BMW?
[00:43:30] Akram: Oh, Mercedes and BMW, for sure, are still very highly respected brands on Uzbekistan. But the price is quite high for Uzbek market. And they’re similar, of course, not in terms of brand, but similar specifics. Chinese cars would cost twice or three times less than BMW or Mercedes.
[00:43:57] Peter: Well, so, from cars to a slightly more complicated issue. How important is the Uyghur question in Uzbek-Chinese relations? The Uyghur language is very close to the Uzbek language. They're related people. Is that a problem in Chinese-Uzbek relations?
[00:44:13] Akram: There is a big Uyghur community in Uzbekistan. And actually, among the Turkic nations, Uyghurs, at least in my understanding, and I heard also it from few historian colleagues. Uyghurs are the closest Turkic nation to Uzbeks. And we have very deep historical, cultural, and language links. But Uyghurs who live in China, at least from the Uzbek government perspective, is a domestic issue of China. And so, Uzbekistan has a position not to intervene in the domestic affairs of, not just China, but other countries of the world. So, I don't think this Uyghur issue is part of official negotiation between the governments of two countries.
[00:45:03] Peter: Very good diplomatic answer. You can see a vice rector at work. So, final two questions. In the U.S., you occasionally see hope for a schism of sorts between Russia and China, and there are various issues or regions where friction in the future is predicted. And Central Asia is one of them. There's this idea that China and Russia have competing interests in Central Asia, that each wants to be top dog, only one can be that China is now rising, Russia's positions are diminishing, and that Russia and China are maybe competing over you guys. So, how likely do you think that is? And what is the role of Central Asia within this?
[00:45:48] Akram: It's not for sure in the interest of Central Asia to be part of any great games. We're actually tired of all these great games between the countries. And I always emphasize in my discussions with colleagues from different countries that you should be interested in Central Asia not because of some other countries which are neighboring to us. Otherwise, this interest will not be honest and sustainable.
I think we should try to see in Uzbekistan a potential great model of transformation. If we succeed in our current reforms in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, in transformation from this, you know, Soviet system to modern, more developed, and democratic regimes in Central Asia, we could be a very good model. Not, not many countries were successful in this past. And also keeping secularity and while having a Muslim majority.
[00:46:52] Peter: But to get back to Russia and China, there's obviously an Uzbek interest in having mutually beneficial arrangements, not being the site of some great game, perhaps, even being a model for others to emulate. But how likely do you think this China-Russia conflict in Central Asia might be? I mean, do you think that it is now on track to be mutually beneficial? Or do you see the seeds of some great conflict, whether you like it or not, between the so-called Dragon and the Bear?
[00:47:25] Akram: I think the war in Ukraine even made Russia's and China's relations in Central Asia closer. So, they have now more coordination and cooperation than they used to have before the war in Ukraine. So, I don't think in the… especially in the current conditions, we can expect any kind of clashes between Russia and China in Central Asia.
[00:47:49] Peter: So, you would tell American analysts not to make a bet on pitting these two big countries against each other in your neighborhood.
[00:47:59] Akram: At least until the end of war in Ukraine. I don't think it will happen.
[00:48:03] Peter: So, what about the U.S. to end? So, you talked a lot about Uzbekistan as a historical crossroads, about the feeling of neighborhood. The U.S. is very distant, indeed. But of course, its influence and power extends very widely. So, Central Asia may not be a primary interest of the U.S., but the U.S. has many interests. How would you describe the U.S. presence in Central Asia and Uzbek relations with the U.S.?
[00:48:32] Akram: Uzbek relations with the U.S. is very good now and actively enhancing. You can feel it even from the diplomatic representation of the U.S. on the ground in Central Asian countries. So, in the recent years, I think diplomatic staff of U.S. embassies increased in all regional countries. There is more engagement, more cooperation in different areas. A lot of now exchange programs are happening with Uzbekistan. I can see it even from the university, that so many offers are coming from different U.S. organizations, U.S.-based organizations on organizing exchange programs, on establishing cooperation, on having a collaboration between the universities. And we are seeing a lot of study tours from various prestigious U.S. universities. Just recently, we received a delegation from Yale University. Before, there was a group of students and scholars from Johns Hopkins, from Stanford, from Tufts University, and et cetera, et cetera. So, it's become a, kind of, a tradition. So, I think it's also a sign of deeper cooperation.
But in terms of Uzbekistan interests, again, we would like to see more cooperation in support of reforms in Uzbekistan. U.S. is one of the major partners in this WTO accession, which I mentioned earlier. Europe and the United States are actively supporting it. What we are still lacking, I think, more higher economic exchange, political cooperation. Cultural, educational, security is actively evolving. Of course, there is some increase in economic exchange as well, but probably, this will take some more time, considering geography, distance, and issues related to development in Central Asian countries. But the fact that we had this presidential level summit last year and the C5+1 becoming more active and more sophisticated is also a demonstration of mutual interest from both sides.
[00:50:54] Peter: I made my own contribution over a decade ago as a Fulbright teacher in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. So, some of those kids who came to the U.S. for high school must have been indoctrinated by yours truly. But I don't know how it's been developing in the 10 years since.
So, yeah, thank you very much. I think with spokesmen such as yourself, there is a very good chance that Uzbekistan and Central Asia will survive and thrive and even present a model for the world.
[00:51:22] Akram: Excellent, excellent. For sure. We will do our best to be friends with everyone .
[00:51:28] Peter: Well, thank you very much, Akram, my friend. It was great having you on the podcast.
[00:51:33] Akram: I am also very glad to have you as a good friend. Thanks a lot for this kind invitation and for the interesting conversation.
[00:51:44] Peter: Thanks for listening to the Monterey Trialogue Podcast. Make sure to subscribe to the show, so you don’t miss out on any episodes. I’m Peter Slezkine. The Monterey Trialogue Podcast is hosted by the Middlebury Institute of International Studies and produced by University FM.