My guest today is DA Wei, Professor of International Relations and Director of the Center for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University. We discuss Wei’s time at CICIR and Tsinghua, his recent visits to the US and Russia, Taiwan and the South China Sea, and the potential positives of partial decoupling, among other subjects.
My guest today is DA Wei, Professor of International Relations and Director of the Center for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University. We discuss Wei’s time at CICIR and Tsinghua, his recent visits to the US and Russia, Taiwan and the South China Sea, and the potential positives of partial decoupling, among other subjects.
*The Trialogue Podcast is hosted by the Stimson Center and produced by University FM.
**The first twelve episodes of this podcast were published by the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.
(Transcripts may contain a few typographical errors due to audio quality during the podcast recording.)
[00:00:00] Peter: Hi, I'm Peter Slezkine, Director of the Monterey Trialogue, a program hosted by the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey. Since the middle of the 20th century, relations among the United States, Russia, and China have had an enormous impact on each country separately and on the world as a whole. The purpose of the Monterey Trialogue is to better understand these extraordinarily complex and consequential relationship by directly engaging with experts from all three countries.
Today, our guest is Da Wei, Professor of International Relations and Director of the Center for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University.
Hello, Wei. Welcome to the podcast!
[00:00:45] Da Wei: Hello, Peter. Thank you for having me. Really, my great pleasure.
[00:00:49] Peter: Thank you so much for joining so late in the day in China. You got your PhD from the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, otherwise known as CICIR. Then you stayed there and worked for many years, ultimately becoming director of CICIR's Institute of American Studies. Can you tell us a little bit about CICIR? What is it? How does it fit into the Chinese think tank ecosystem? What part of the government is it most closely associated with?
[00:01:15] Da Wei: Yeah. CICIR is probably one of the biggest think tank focusing on international studies in China. They have about 200 researchers there and also another, maybe, 200 staffs. So, that's quite a big think tank. And it's a think tank in the government and funded by government.
I already left CICIR for seven years, so maybe a lot of things have changed. I don't know. But what I said is based on my time there. So, we spend a lot of time writing policy papers to the senior leaders. And besides that part, we also write a lot of academic papers published on academic journals or we also wrote a lot of comments on media.
I think that's the reason today I can work in the university because I really published a lot of academic papers on the journals. And CICIR also had a very extensive communication and dialogues with foreign counterparts, including many from the U.S. and other countries. Of course, now, we all know that China-U.S. relations has been deteriorated a lot and international exchanges, I think, shrinked to, for many Chinese think tanks, particularly with the United States and the Western countries. But it's not only something happened in CICIR. I think it's happened in many Chinese research think tanks and research institutes.
[00:02:44] Peter: Right. So, CICIR, part of its work is to produce public material, academic material, and part of it is internal for government. How does the government side work, roughly speaking? What's the division of labor among these different government-affiliated think tanks?
[00:03:03] Da Wei: I don't think they have a division of labor. They are, kind of, competitors. So, in Chinese system, a lot of the institutes doing something similar. All of them can write papers for the government. So, it depends on the quality. And sometimes, when you do international studies, it also depends on the timing. You need to submit your paper on the right timing. That could be sometimes maybe CICIR is more influential, but sometimes maybe, on some other topics, maybe CASS or other institutes, they did a better job.
[00:03:37] Peter: So, as director of the Institute of American Studies, what about America was the focus of your studies? U.S. foreign policy, of course, domestic politics, to some extent, the business environment.
[00:03:53] Da Wei: I think, at that time, again, I don't know the condition there now, but at my time, I think we mainly focus on five things — the U.S. politics, the U.S. foreign policy, U.S. military and security policy, U.S. economy, and lastly, China-U.S. relations.
[00:04:13] Peter: So, how has your job changed since you've been transitioned to Tsinghua. Obviously, now you teach, it's more of an academic position, but you're also director of an institute that does policy work for the government, and you have exchanges and relations with think tanks abroad. So, just describe your new position to us briefly.
[00:04:30] Da Wei: Yeah, I think you already described my new job quite precisely. I have two hats at Tsinghua. One is a professor, so I teach in the Department of International Relations. So, that's a lot of job. At the same time, I'm directing the Center for International Security and Strategy. That's a research institute in the university. Actually, it's a small research institute, but what we do is quite similar to what I did in CICIR, to be honest. The only thing is we don't do any classified research, but still we write a policy paper for the government agencies and senior leaders.
I also have much bigger freedom to choose the topic, because we are not in the government, so, nobody give us contract or give us guidance. So, I just write what I want to write. And if I'm fortunate, I can get it on senior leaders’ desktop, then they may read some of our papers. And we also got some feedback from our leaders and also other government agencies, like foreign ministry and other ministries in China's system.
[00:05:43] Peter: Can you give us an example or two of reports that you have written in this position at Tsinghua that have been well-received in government, where you got good feedback, where maybe it even affected policy, to some extent?
[00:05:57] Da Wei: You know, in Chinese system, it's very hard to know what kind of policy impact you have. So, one of the criteria, we believe that it has some impact is the feedback thing. I mean, if you get some feedback from a government agency or some senior leader, usually we think, at least, this is something they read carefully, and if they give you a positive feedback, probably, that means they feel what you said is interesting and useful. And sometimes, they may, based on those feedbacks, they may also invite you for further discussion. But you still don't know what policy is made with your help or shaped by your advice. You can imagine that this year, we need to write a lot of things about the U.S. election, and of course, impact on U.S. domestic politics, and also, on U.S.-China relations.
So, we did wrote something on that and got a lot of feedback, from senior leaders and also the foreign ministry. And in past few years, we also wrote a lot of things on the war in Ukraine. That's something I think the Chinese leader and our foreign ministry has paid a lot of attention to. Again, we also got some feedback on those topics, but I don't know which policy is shaped by us or which policy is not.
[00:07:23] Peter: But can you tell us what you proposed or how you presented the war in Ukraine or the U.S. elections, the stakes in each case for China, as far as you saw them?
[00:07:34] Da Wei: For instance, on the war in Ukraine, of course, first, we needed to analyze the impact on China and on the international order. So, these are not advices, these are just analysis. What are the impact? Is that good for China or bad for China? And what changes is happening in terms of the international order?
And of course, we also suggested that China should play a bigger role in the, maybe not mediation, but try to bring peace to the two countries to end this, this war in Ukraine. And we also suggested that China can play some role in humanitarian aid, in food security, and nuclear safety. I think those are issues that we believe, maybe we cannot end the war overnight, but at least we can do some concrete thing to mitigate the suffering of people and reduce the impact of the war.
On this election in the U.S., we will analyze the different scenarios, because we don't know who will win the election. But of course, we will tell the decision-makers about the, the scenarios and what could happen if someone win this election. And then what should we do? Like President Trump said he will add a 60% of tariff on Chinese products. So, if that happened, what should we do? And what will happen if Kamala Harris wins the election? I think these are the research that we are doing here.
[00:09:03] Peter: So, you were just in D.C. for a short visit not too long ago. What did you learn when you were in D.C.? And did you have a chance to talk to people close to both potential administrations?
[00:09:13] Da Wei: To your second question, I did not have a chance to talk to people who work directly with both candidates. I think they are very busy. And also, I think that could be quite sensitive. So, I need to constrain my curiosity. Of course, it will be good to talk to them, but China-U.S. relations is not in a good shape, so I'd rather keep a distance and watch development in the U.S. rather than talking to them directly. And probably, they won't, or they are not able to talk to me. I don't know. So, I didn't try.
And in terms of the U.S. domestic politics against the backdrop of the action, I don't think there are dramatic changes comparing with, for example, last year. I think the U.S. is very divided, and people have very strong view about the two candidates. So, it depends on to whom I talk. In D.C., it seems to me that most of my interlocutors are in favor of Democratic Party, but that's not the news. I think D.C. is a place of the establishment, and also a liberal city. But when I had a chance to talk to people from other regions, from the South, I think that's a totally different situation. So, this country is very divided. And the policy of the two candidates, I think, are very different. Not only in the domestic policy, I think even their China policy, a lot of people say, “Ah, no matter who win the election, their policy to China will be very similar.” They mean that strategic competition policy. I agree that framework will be there, but my feeling is, actually, though in that strategic competition framework, their policy will be very different. So, they have different focus and also could have different consequences.
[00:11:16] Peter: What is an example of some of the key differences, other than, of course, the Trump tariff, which seems like a big difference?
[00:11:23] Da Wei: I think the tariff, per se, could be very big because it's not a 10% tariff. It's 60%. So, that will be huge. Of course, maybe President Trump may change his idea. Maybe he will impose a, I don't know, 30% or maybe 100%. Who knows? But anyway, it's a big increase of the tariff that could have a strong impact on China-U.S. economic ties. Some people, also, are talking about the restriction over investment — inbound and outbound investment. So, the economic ties could be weakened. I think, if President Trump win election, probably, the current mechanism of dialogue between the two governments will be suspended, I guess, because it's a new party, new president.
So, we have about, I don't know how many, but maybe 25, 26 dialogues between the two governments. I think it's played a role to stabilize the bilateral relations. But when you have a new administration, I mean, you know, if it's Kamala Harris, I think probably we will have a very strong continuity. But if it's President Trump, a new president, a new administration, maybe they will suspend those dialogues. I don't know for how long, but probably, next year or the first six months of the administration, we won't have any dialogue between the two countries. And then you will have more difficult situation on economics side. I think that will bring a lot of challenges to China-U.S. relations. So, it's very different.
[00:13:01] Peter: You said that D.C. was an establishment city, a democratic city. To what extent would that be a force for continuity, even if Trump were to win? Or do you think that, this time around, he will bring in a fully new team and change the status quo dramatically?
[00:13:18] Da Wei: Of course, he will always face the restraint from the establishment. But based on the U.S. media coverage, I think President Trump is determined to bring more loyalists to his second term team. In the first term, probably those establishment, the Republicans, have some different idea, so, was, kind of, restrained to his first term. So, if he can have second term, I think he will definitely bring in more of his loyalists. I think they will implement their agenda in, maybe, a deeper level than the first term. And some people are talking about changing those professional appointments in the government or replace some civil servants in the federal government. If that happened, I think there will be some chaos there. I mean, if you try to replace some people in Chinese, we say ironborn. When you have ironborn, you have the jobs safety, right? Job security, but suddenly you lose that. I think that will be problematic.
[00:14:26] Peter: Is chaos in the U.S. good or bad for China?
[00:14:30] Da Wei: Yeah, it's hard to say. It's hard to say. I think, if you believe, China and the U.S., enemy or rival and have a zero-sum competition, chaos in the U.S. could be good for China. but at the same time, China and the U.S. are two countries that still have very strong interdependence.
So, chaotic U.S. could have some impact on the world, and maybe also on China, but chaotic U.S. could mean a more chaotic world. So, is that good for China or bad for China?
So, what will happen in the U.S. you have a very peaceful transition of power, or you have a more chaotic one, both scenarios will have its bright side and dark side. It depends on how you view the situation. I am the one who don't view the U.S.-China relations as a zero sum game, so I don't think, if the U.S. suffers then China benefits. I don't buy that theory. So, I hope that the U.S. can have a stable, peaceful election transitional period and the peaceful first year of next administration.
[00:15:49] Peter: Well, thank you for your well wishes. To go from the particular to the more general, what are the principal sources of U.S. China competition? Is it just the fact that there are now two big economies battling it out in the world? Is it strategic military competition in the Asia Pacific? Is it ideology? Is it a function of domestic politics in one or both places? Something else, all of the above?
[00:16:16] Da Wei: Yeah. Look, we do have a lot of competitive elements in this bilateral relations, which is inevitable, I will say, or cannot be solved easily. For instance, the two economy have some competition. For example, if China sell more EVs to the U.S., U.S. automobile industry may suffer. So, that's a competition. Who can bring better EVs? Is that a UID or Tesla? That's a competition. And we have competition on technology. For instance, artificial intelligence. China, U.S. are the two leading countries. So, because AI is such an important technology which could be a game changer for future economy, so we are competitor in that regard.
We also have competition between the two militaries — which armed forces are the stronger one? Because China, U.S. have differences, different idea, different belief about, for example, Taiwan issue. So, who have a stronger military would be important.
Having said all this, I will say, I have to say the competition thing we are talking or you read from media every day is exaggerated or inflated.
[00:17:36] Peter: Is it exaggerated in the Chinese media as much as the U.S. media, as far as you're concerned?
[00:17:40] Da Wei: I think both. For instance, I don't think we have strong ideological competition. We have different ideologies, that's true. But I don't think China want to bury the U.S. system like the Soviet Union want to do. There's no such competition. And also, I don't think China can provide a competitive ideology to the third country as the U.S. I don't think we have the competition over the global or international order. This is a view very popular in the U.S., believing China is building an alternative international order to replace, to displace the U.S. I don't think this is our policy. And I don't think we are doing that, and I don't think China has that capability to do that.
But I don't think we have competition in different geographic regions, like, if you read the U.S. national security strategy, it seems that both China and the U.S. have competitions everywhere. So, we have competition in Africa. We have competition in the Middle East. We have competition in Europe. I think that's too much. China and the U.S., both countries are big countries, so we have interest in different regions. That's true. But those interests are not necessarily conflicting. For instance, do we really have conflicting interests in the Middle East? I doubt. Do we really have very strong conflicting interests in Africa? I doubt. So, I think there are a lot of things that we can do together, and I don't think China want to dispel the U.S. from a region, want to monopolize one region. Oh, that's too much.
[00:19:24] Peter: So, in terms of Africa, I suppose the argument that is made in the U.S. is that, if the competition is about, say, EVs, those batteries require certain components that resources in the world are limited, many of them are in Africa, so this is by definition a zero-sum competition for limited resources. So, what do you say to that?
[00:19:46] Da Wei: That's economic competition. It's from the battery, from the resources to an EV, to a car. No matter it's on the U.S. market or it's from some mineral in, in Africa. But when I say China-U.S. competition in Africa or in the Middle East is, it's, it’s a geopolitical thing. Like, some people believe that China want to dominate a region, and China want to, through the Belt and Road Initiative, China want to become the hegemon in some region. I think that has gone too far. That's not our plan. And I don't think the U.S. want to dominate those regions. So, actually, yeah, we have some concrete specific differences, but I mean, there are also a lot of things we can cooperate. But today, because we have this big strategic competition framework, that makes many people in both countries believe we are having a comprehensive competition. We are competing on everything. I don't agree with that concept. At least, in China, many people believe that, when the U.S. talking about strategic competition, that means the U.S. will try to press China down, try to strangle China's possibility to become a high-income country, or try to have a competition like the U.S. and the Soviet Union.
So, that competition, if that was a competition, one side of a competition died, right? The Soviet Union collapsed. So, are we having that kind of competition? I mean, no matter U.S. or China, are we expecting the other side to collapse?
[00:21:29] Peter: Well, and collapses aren't always final. The communist bloc did disappear, but Russia remains the largest country in the world, and U.S.-Russian relations are not at their best. So, you were in Moscow from what I understand in July. What did you see there? How did that color your impression of Russia's capabilities, the war in Ukraine? Did you notice a growing interest in China from people who are not China experts? What sort of questions did people ask you?
[00:22:03] Da Wei: Yeah, it's true that I visited Russia and gave a lecture to the summer school a university to the students from China, Russia, and other countries, some European countries and Asian countries. I also talked to some Russian colleagues.
Observing a country is very, very important. But sometimes, observing a country outside could also be superficial. I'm not sure if my observation in Russia is deep enough, but what I saw was, or what I heard was, the life in Moscow and St. Petersburg are quite normal, I will say.
The only thing I felt different from my previous visit was you can hardly use GPS Moscow because of the drone attack of Ukraine. I think Russian people I talked to has become more patriotic because of the war. I don't know if they agree with the war or they disagree, but if you, your fellow citizen died if you are in a war, so, maybe you will become more patriotic. I think that's something quite natural. The economy I saw was pretty good, I will say, at least, normal. But of course, some people told me that if you go to some other places to the, you know, rural area or to some places, you're far away from the big city, the economy or the daily life, not so good. So, what I saw was a normal life of the Russian people there in the big city. I think the intellectuals there I talked to, also, I think their view are also changing to comparing with several years ago, I think those pro-Western views are diminished. Including those intellectuals who got their education in the United States and in Europe, I think their view has already changed. The younger generation is emerging, and they are quite patriotic, and the older generation are fading away because of the war and also because of their age.
[00:24:14] Peter: So, your previous visit to Moscow or to Russia had been before the beginning of the war in Ukraine?
[00:24:20] Da Wei: Yeah, before the war, I, went there several times. After the war, I went there twice.
[00:24:26] Peter: So, in your visits since 2022, have you sensed more of an interest in China, in yourself? Were there more people trying to talk to you, get meetings with you? Did you sense that Russians, or at least the Russian expert community, was better informed about China than they had been? previously.
[00:24:45] Da Wei: I think so. I think I'm not someone who research on Russia, but I go to Russia this year and last year. So, that already shows that there are more, at least, academic exchanges between the two countries. There is also a demand from Russian side for Chinese experts, Chinese intellectuals to work with them. Just as a trade of the two countries increased after the war, I think the people-to-people tie is also increasing. I think, for example, to get a tourist visa to Russia is, now, it's easier in China. So, I guess more people will go there for tourism.
I think the Russian colleagues, also, are very interested in China and China's economic policy, foreign policy. So, they have the looking, the East policy now. So, I think they are more interested in China. That's true. So, from the fact that, in the past, maybe only those scholars who studied Russia have a lot of opportunity to visit the country. But now, I think more and more experts can have opportunity to visit Russia.
And we also get interested in that country. We need to understand, we try to understand, this is our neighbor, right? And Russia had, for a very long time, had very big influence over China in our history. And it's in a special period of a war, so of course we want to understand this neighbor.
[00:26:15] Peter: So, how would you characterize Sino-Russian relations now?
[00:26:19] Da Wei: China-Russia relations is good. We are strategic partner. This is the official definition of the bilateral relations. And some experts argue that we should have a good neighbor policy with Russia. So, I think, at the lower level, we are good neighbor. That's quite important because we have very long border. We have very complex history. I think that will be good if we have a peaceful border and with the prosperous neighbor. That's good. But of course, China and Russia also have a lot of cooperation on other things, on economy and at strategic level, a lot of collaboration.
So, the two countries are getting closer. At the same time, I think the people-to-people tie is not close enough and the economic ties, actually, is not strong enough, though it's increasing. But we can compare that with China-U.S. relations. China-U.S. relations have very, very difficult strategic and political relations, while China-Russia have very good one.
But China-U.S. have very strong people to people tie. Those suffered from pandemic, but I think it's recovering. So, like, we're almost 300,000 students studying in the United States. So, we don't have so many students in Russia. So, the economic tie between China and the U.S. is also very, very close. Though, a lot of difficulties, but we still have $600 U.S. trade last year. China-Russia trade is increasing, but it's still one-third of China-U.S. China-Russia, China-U.S. are just the opposite bilateral relationship.
[00:28:02] Peter: So, which variable drives the other? What do you see the future course being in relation to these two countries? In other words, will the good strategic and political relations with Russia result in increased people-to-people contact in economic exchange and the growing problems with the U.S. end with decoupling and the departure of all these students? Or basically, are the connections between the U.S. and China in the interest of both, and whatever the politicians do this connection will prove strong for at least the near term?
[00:28:40] Da Wei: On the U.S.-China side, I don't think we can take it for granted that this economic ties or people-to-people ties will naturally continue. I think there is a strong need in both countries to maintain economic ties or even strengthen economic ties and people-to-people because this is two big economies and also two big countries. Particularly, for many Chinese, they do want to go to the U.S., visit the U.S., study in the U.S., do business in the U.S. I think the need is there, but let's imagine if we have some high tariff next year, the economic tie will be influenced seriously. And if the U.S. restrict the visa policy, then the educational exchanges will be influenced dramatically.
I think it's not easy to fully decouple for China and the U.S., but I think it's true that we have that possibility. On China-Russia side, I will say, yeah, I don't think the strategic or political relations will naturally increase the people-to-people and economic ties because there are natural limits there.
I mean, for instance, the Chinese students who want to study Russian, much, much, lower than those who can speak English and who want to speak English. So, that will limit the enthusiasm of Chinese students who study in Russia. On the economic side, Russia is a much smaller economy comparing with China and the U.S. We still have some potential, but I will say the potential is not very big. The good strategic and political relationship will not necessarily translate into P2P ties and also economic ties.
[00:30:35] Peter: To what extent do you think COVID is responsible for the deterioration in U.S.-China relations? I mean, that cut off people-to-people contacts almost entirely. It also showed problems with the supply chain, not even for ideological reasons but for purely pragmatic reasons, people were suddenly concerned about the way trade was organized internationally.
So, do you think that we were on track for deterioration in relations before COVID and we were going to end up where we are, or do you think that that was really a moment of rupture?
[00:31:07] Da Wei: I think COVID, of course, played a role in the deterioration of China-U.S. relations, but the bilateral relations started to deteriorate before the pandemic. I think, at least from 2018, that was a year of the trade war between the two countries. But I can even trace back to, let's say, 2014, 2015. In the second term of Obama's administration, I think the bilateral relations already had a lot of problems at that time. But of course, after 2018, we have so-called trade war, we have so-called technological war. I think the two countries, I don't have the statistics, but I guess the people-to-people tie at that time already decreased. But of course, pandemic further pushed this deterioration of the bilateral relations. And I think the important thing is, before the pandemic, everybody basically think the U.S.-China interdependence is something we need. It's something to the interest of the two countries.
But after three years of the pandemic, people realized, particularly people in the U.S. and in the West, realized, “We can live without China. We don't have any interaction with China during those three years, so we still have our lives. So, why should I rebuild that connection with China?” I mean, this change make the rebuild of the people-to-people tie quite difficult, quite slow. Of course, we also have some other very concrete reasons that are hindering us from the return to the pre-pandemic period. I think it could be possible we can one day return to the level of 2019, but I think it's very hard for us to return to the level of 2014 in terms of people-to-people tie and the trust between the two countries.
[00:33:06] Peter: Do you think that there's a golden mean that, perhaps, before these two very large, very different countries were almost too intimately intertwined, that, during COVID, the rupture was also too total, and that, perhaps, some amount of strategic decoupling will produce a more harmonious relationship? Or are you more in favor of the greater the ties, the better?
[00:33:29] Da Wei: I think, in terms of people-to-people, I think the more the better. If we have more students in two countries, we can know each other better. If we have more tourists to the other countries, we will know the other side with our eyes. And if we have more marriage between the citizens from two countries, we'll have very strong bond, like you.
[00:33:52] Peter: Well, I can attest to that.
[00:33:53] Da Wei: Yeah, yeah, yeah. Of course, I think that's very good. But for the economic ties, to be honest, my mind is changing. I think it's quite impossible for us to return to the, let's say, the first decade of the century. At that time, the two countries were called Chimerica. The two countries intertwined so closely, and it's a product of the hyper-globalization. So, it's good for the economic purpose, that kind of interdependence really have some shortcomings. For example, you need to rely on the other side. You may lose some job opportunity in one countries. And also, in that kind of relationship, one day, when we have some security conflict or when we have some political disputes, you will feel unsafe. So, you will lack the sense of security.
The two countries are rebuilding our economy separately. Both of our two countries want to have a more complete economic system in our territory, in our country. So, in the past, we intertwined, but now, we want to build our economy. China want an independent economy, and the U.S. want an independent economy. So, the U.S. don't want to rely on China. I don't think the U.S. want to rely on, let's say, Mexico, Canada, or Europe. You want to build your own economy. We are the same thing.
So, certain level of decoupling or derisking, I think, is not a bad thing, but I don't think we should go too far. If we move to a complete decoupling, that will be a disaster for everyone. We hope we can have a limited decoupling. So, make both of us, two sides, feel safe or comfortable. I think that's something, yeah, I, I have to admit that I'm changing my idea. So, I, two years ago, three years ago, I opposed any kind of decoupling, but now I am becoming more and more acceptable to the decoupling.
[00:36:02] Peter: So, now, we're all living in a suburban neighborhood with yards and fences. We just need to decide who gets which size, yard, how high the fence is.
[00:36:11] Da Wei: Exactly. I want to stabilize the position of the face. So, actually, I don't care too much about if the yard is big or small. I think a relatively stable position of fence will create the sense of predictability and the sense of security. Then, we can still cooperate, collaborate outside of the yard, right? But if you keep on moving the fence every day, every month, every year, everybody will feel nervous. You don't know, where is the boundary? So, you will do nothing with such a strong sense of unpredictability. So, I really want to hope that the two sides can stabilize the position of the fence.
[00:36:57] Peter: Well, I'm afraid, given the nature of the American political system, you'll have to live with unpredictability for at least another couple of months.
So, final question, Taiwan and South China Sea, is there a compromise that you can offer your interlocutors in D.C. that you think they could sell politically in D.C. and that you think China could live with?
[00:37:17] Da Wei: I don't think there is an advice that I can give to my American colleagues and they can sell it in D.C.
[00:37:24] Peter: Well, I don't mean that you would plant the fifth column. I just mean, is there a room for compromise?
[00:37:29] Da Wei: Yeah. Okay, okay. That's much easier because the atmosphere in D.C. is so toxic towards China. So, if you say anything publicly, say, let's have a commendation on Taiwan or South China Sea, I think it will be killed immediately.
[00:37:45] Peter: Well, presumably, in Beijing also, there are many things you can't say publicly about Taiwan and South China Sea.
[00:37:51] Da Wei: Yeah. Yeah. Yeah, I agree. But I do think it's possible for us to get some compromise. For instance, on South China Sea issue, I think the two sides can… we really lack the trust. I think on South China Sea issue, you divide the territory thing under the economic right thing. So, on the territory thing, you can never solve it. And China occupies some features. So, Filipinos occupy some, Vietnamese occupy some. So, you can never change it. So, if we keep it there and then China and the other claimants, we can negotiate about the economic rights. For example, fishery, right? Who can do fishing? You know, which countries fishermen can go where. This is something China and the other claimants, we can talk to each other. And all natural resources, I think it's similar.
So, the U.S., I think it will be great that, if the U.S. can encourage China and other claimants to solve the part that we can solve and to freeze the part that we cannot solve. I think it's good for both China, U.S., and other claimants, but I don't know if the American side can do that or not. I think my American interlocutors, more or less, view the situation from the U.S. and its allies. The U.S. could not lose its credibility, facing China's pressure. So, I think it's difficult.
On Taiwan, I think we are facing a situation. I don't know if my American colleagues agree with me or not, but sometimes, when I mentioned this, I think they, maybe, they are very polite to me. They didn't rebuff what I said. But I think the near-term threat, near-term danger, or mid-term danger is, I think the Taiwan authority, now they have a new leader, a pro-independence leader, I think he is doing something quite dangerous, not only for us, for Beijing. It's also, I think he's doing something with the U.S. One China policy. So, if he continue to do that, he will drag the U.S. into a conflict with China. So, the U.S. will face the tail wag dog situation. Particularly, this leader in Taiwan only have 40% of approval rate when he was elected. It could decline in the next two or three years. So, when he tried to get re-elected, how can you be reelected if you only have 20% of the supporting rate? Probably, he may create some trouble, some crisis, then under China, under the mainland side, then mobilize his base.
I think that will be a very dangerous moment for China and the U.S. It's too hard for China and U.S. to cooperate on this, but I think there is some space that China and the U.S. doing something separately towards the same direction. That is to keep the very dangerous figure, very dangerous action in the box. I think this is something both sides can do peacefully, quietly, but I don't think we can co-manage the situation. We don't have that political environment, both in Beijing and in D.C.
[00:41:23] Peter: So, your American interlocutors, when you present them with this tail wags dog scenario, what do they say?
[00:41:29] Da Wei: I think most of them just kept to silence. Theoretically, they agree with that. But ask them to admit to agree with a Chinese interlocutor? Maybe that could be difficult, I guess. So, I don't know.
[00:41:44] Peter: Well, silence is sometimes a sign of wisdom. Whether they agreed with you or not, we don't know. Let's leave a little bit of mystery. Thank you very much for joining me today on the podcast.
[00:41:53] Da Wei: Thank you. Thank you, Peter. Thank you for having me. That's really interesting interview. Thank you.
[00:42:00] Peter: Thanks for listening to the Monterey Trialogue Podcast. Make sure to subscribe to the show, so you don’t miss out on any episodes. I’m Peter Slezkine. The Monterey Trialogue Podcast is hosted by the Middlebury Institute of International Studies and produced by University FM.