Da Wei, Director of the Center for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University in Beijing, joins us to discuss tariffs, the prospects of a trade deal, Russia’s global role, and the coming multipolar order. *The Trialogue Podcast is hosted by the Stimson Center and produced by University FM.
Da Wei, Director of the Center for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University in Beijing, joins us to discuss tariffs, the prospects of a trade deal, Russia’s global role, and the coming multipolar order.
*The Trialogue Podcast is hosted by the Stimson Center and produced by University FM.
(Transcripts may contain a few typographical errors due to audio quality during the podcast recording.)
[00:00:00] Peter Slezkine: I'm Peter Slezkine, Director of the U.S.-Russia-China Trialogue Project at the Stimson Center. Since the middle of the 20th century, relations among the United States, Russia, and China have had an enormous impact on each country separately and on the world as a whole. The purpose of the trialogue is to better understand this extraordinarily complex and consequential relationship by directly engaging with experts from all three countries.
Today, our guest is Da Wei, Director of the Center for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University. I think we've had 23 episodes so far. You're our first second-time guest. So, thanks so much for making another appearance on the show.
[00:00:50] Da Wei: Thank you, Peter. Thank you for having me for the second time.
[00:00:53] Peter Slezkine: So, let's begin by talking about tariffs. That's the obvious hot topic at the moment. So, during Trump's first term, he imposed tariffs on China. Biden kept most of them, and then Trump spent the entirety of his presidential campaign promising yet higher tariffs on China. So, Beijing, obviously, had many years to prepare and expected something of the sort, but did China realize that it would get this bad this quickly?
[00:01:24] Da Wei: Sometimes, I also ask my colleague this question, are we facing something that we were not expecting or we were not prepared for? I don't think so, to be honest. Actually, I think President Trump has been consistent on the tariff issue. And on the campaign trail, he, of course, talked a lot about the tariff. And I think after the inauguration, very soon, we know that the Trump administration is assessing the tariff issue and they are going to announce something in early April, and it will be a pretty high tariff on a lot of countries, including China. So, I think all these messages were heard in Beijing. And I won't say it's a big surprise.
Having said that, when you see the, you know, so high tariff and also targeted at so many countries, you will still feel, kind of, shocked. It's a very big event, a big development in today's world politics, not only between China and the United States, if it's being implemented. I would say it's a, kind of, complete change of the international economic and also possibly, maybe, political relationship among all the countries. So, that's something big. When you see something big happening, of course, you will feel a little bit surprised, even though you heard of that. And I think China has been prepared for that for a while, but it's still a big event, big shock.
[00:02:55] Peter Slezkine: So, Trump began with tariffs on Canada and Mexico, which he rescinded, then reapplied. And then on Liberation Day, he hit, essentially, every country and island in the world with reciprocal tariffs, but then he paused most of them with the idea that he would negotiate deals over the next 90 days with most of those countries, but he kept them and raised them on China.
Do you think that he is also in search of a deal, ultimately, with China to rebalance trade, but it's just the most complicated relationship so therefore the approach is a little bit different? Or is he really intent on a total decoupling, in which case no deal would be on the table?
[00:03:42] Da Wei: On the one hand, I think President Trump and the Trump administration will seek a deal with China. I think, maybe if we are fortunate enough, we can... I mean, when we say “we,” I mean both China, U.S., and maybe the whole world. If we are fortunate enough, I think the two sides may maybe scale down the scale of the tariff to some extent.
For instance, currently, we have a tariff on the U.S. I mean, China has a tariff on the U.S. at the level of about 125%. The U.S. is even higher. I won't be very surprised if we can scale off to, let's say, the level of 50% or 40%. I think that's something possible, but I don't think it will return to the day like before April the 2nd back to the level of about 20% or even lower. I don't think that's likely.
And on the other hand, yeah, the U.S. is negotiating with many countries now, but I personally don't think it's very likely that the Trump administration will remove all the tariffs on those countries he announced on April 2nd. The reason is I don't think the goal of the Trump administration is to decouple with a particular country like China. I think the Trump administration wants to fundamentally adjust the U.S. economic relations with the rest of the world. I think this is based on the MAGA thought, like a high tariff with the rest of the world is only part of that, meaning rebuilding the manufacturing sector and also attracting other countries and companies to invest in the United States. I think they have a set of goals in that regard. So, unless they feel the domestic economic situation in the United States is not affordable, I think they will continue to pursue that goal. So, China will be a target, but China won't be the only target.
[00:05:50] Peter Slezkine: So, there's clearly an overarching goal to reduce the American deficit and to re-industrialize at least in certain sectors, both for security reasons and for economic reasons. And as part of a general MAGA political approach, as you say, that is supposed to favor blue-collar workers or make up for the pain that they suffered during globalization.
But it's unclear to me in Washington whether China is just bigger by degree or treated as a qualitatively different case, because to the extent that we are going to now have 10% or whatever permanent tariffs against the entire world, that is part of an attempt to re-industrialize and to reduce the deficit. But there's also talk of China as the big economic and technological competitor, the geopolitical adversary going forward. So, that then dictates a different relationship where a more severe decoupling might be necessary.
And I can't exactly tell what approach the Trump team is taking, again, whether it's total decoupling over time or decoupling in certain sensitive spheres, but otherwise, an attempt to make a deal that would allow trade to rebalance. So, you are one of China's preeminent experts on the U.S. What sources do you look at? How do you try to determine what the Trump administration's objective actually is and then tailor a response accordingly?
[00:07:21] Da Wei: This is a very difficult question to answer or to tell. I mean, which goal is true for the Trump administration and for President Trump? Of course, I think my colleagues also follows all the public information that we can have, from the presidential speeches, his social accounts, and of course, the government documents and also including, of course, reading the mainstream media and also talking to my friends when I was in the United States or when my American colleagues visited China.
The challenge here is there is so many information on social media no matter which platform. And many of them, you know, first, they are just opinions. Secondly, some of the information is not accurate, I will say, or maybe there could be some kind of information warfare there, so a lot of manipulation in the social media, information manipulation.
So, I'm a little bit worried that, in this time of social media, the quality of the information we rely on, we read every day, probably won't be very accurate. So, this is a challenge of the time. I think the Chinese analysts are also facing similar problem. So, that increased the difficulty that we are facing to tell the real intention of the U.S. side.
[00:08:49] Peter Slezkine: Do you think the U.S. side has a clear intention and overarching plan? So, they launched these reciprocal tariffs, then paused many of them, and increased them on China. And Bessent, I think, that very day, said that we laid a trap for China, China walked into the trap. But now it seems like they're walking back from this statement and hinting at the fact that they're ready to do a deal. So, do you believe that these are steps in a plan that was devised earlier or that they are reacting to circumstances?
[00:09:28] Da Wei: Well, of course, I don't believe that's a well-planned trap, then the Trump administration is waiting for China to be a victim. I don't think so. I tend to view all this as some chaotic situation in the Trump administration and also in its process of making the policy. I would say the U.S. politics is always, kind of, chaotic, and it's particularly so for this administration, I think — of course, maybe better than the first term. But I mean, I think President Trump is, kind of, dominating this administration. He is the one who makes the policy. And we all know that President Trump changes his mind very quickly.
So, again, I don't think it's well-designed. I think it's sometimes changing the mind, sometimes his reaction to the situation they see. For example, after China retaliated against the very first 34% of the tariff, the U.S. side made its retaliation. So, I don't think it's designed. And I think the negotiation decision to postpone the tariff of many other countries for 90 days, I think it's, kind of, a response to what is happening in the bond market. I think that's also not something designed. But of course, this is my personal view.
I think you are correct that there are two views in this administration. I'm still waiting to see which viewpoints will become, kind of, dominating in, let's say, one year later. One is just, let's say, targeting China, viewing it as an adversary and competitor, trying to weaken China, isolate China. I think this is one school of thought. The other is changing the relationship with the rest of the world, and China is just the biggest country in that world, but it's not targeting China only.
So, I think President Trump, himself, belonged to the second school, but I don't know if that will still be true, let's say, after several rounds of the action reaction between the two countries. I don't know if that will change his mind. And also, I don't know if that will be true, let's say, by the end of this year or maybe after the midterm election. He could change, but personally, so far, I think President Trump still wants to change relations with the rest of the world, not targeting China only. And he is still controlling the policy, I think. This is my interpretation, but of course, in China, many people have different ideas. I won't say I'm a majority, but there are different views.
[00:11:57] Peter Slezkine: Well, I think that, in Washington, in the broader Trump coalition, both objectives are present. Oren Cass, who is not part of the administration but seems to be an influential voice outside of it, just wrote an essay the other day, in which he suggested, sort of, a phased decoupling from China, that, with the rest of the world, trade needs to be rebalanced, but with China, decoupling, total decoupling is the ultimate goal.
There are others who seem to want a deal, a rebalancing, with China as opposed to decoupling. So, if those are the two possibilities, is there anything that China can do to shape the course of events? Because you were talking about the midterm, about other domestic occurrences that might change Trump's mind one way or another. But if China prefers presumably a deal to decoupling, then is there anything that China can do to try to influence Washington along that course?
[00:12:55] Da Wei: I think, first and foremost, the level of the tariff of the United States is an internal affair of the United States. Changing that level of tariff is a sovereign decision of the United States government. So, you can hardly do anything to stop them, right, no matter if you like it or not. This is the Trump administration's decision.
If the Trump administration believes this is a key step to make America great again, how can we persuade the Trump administration to say, "Okay. Can you abandon your primary goal of these four years?" I don't think we can do that, but at the same time, what China has done so far after April 2nd is, "If you want to have a trade war, let's have it," and then to show the consequence to the Trump administration, maybe help the Trump administration to understand how serious the consequence we could have if we go along this direction.
I think this is what China is doing. China, I think, of course, we hope that the Trump administration can realize this could be a lose-lose situation. And at the same time, I think China also can, of course, when the time is proper, be flexible enough to step into a kind of negotiation. This morning, I just read the announcement of the Chinese Ministry of Commerce basically saying the Trump administration has expressed their willingness to talk to China several times, and they also reached out to the Chinese government.
So, we are assessing the situation. And I think this announcement is, kind of, a prelude to some kind of talks and negotiations between China and the U.S. on the tariff issue. So, of course, I think... This is the Chinese side's announcement. The U.S. side may have different stories, but I mean, I think all this shows that both sides still want to show flexibility and step into a negotiation. So, no matter who made the first step, I don't think that's very important.
The more important thing is that both sides, I think, have a chance to negotiate maybe soon and to cool down the temperature, but again, my expectation of that negotiation is not very high. I think we need to be realistic. A tariff of 125%, 145% is meaningless, right? But for me, even a 45% tariff is still too high for a meaningful trade between the two countries. But having a good start to talk, I don't know what kind of content they will reach. Tariff is maybe one thing, and other issues, something like what we have done in the first term, the Phase One agreement, that kind of thing, I think, is something at least on the table that we can talk to each other about.
[00:15:49] Peter Slezkine: But some incremental steps. China agrees to purchase American soybeans and airplane parts, maybe some high tech. Is there any chance of large-scale Chinese investment in the U.S.?
[00:16:05] Da Wei: To be honest, I don't think purchase is something as important as, in the year 2020, Phase One agreement. So, at that time, the balance of the trade is something... I think that the Trump administration wants to balance the trade. So, you can continue to export your products to the U.S. so long as you purchase, let's say, 100 billion a year, then it's okay, but I think that kind of balance of the trade is not... I don't think it's a real balance.
I think you said that in the Trump administration, many people want to rebalance the economic relations maybe with China, maybe with the world, but it's a comprehensive rebalancing, not just purchasing something, right? I can purchase something this year or maybe for the next three years. Can I purchase U.S. products for the next 100 years or 50 years?
I don't think we can do that. So, we probably need something more or we can say a real rebalancing and investment. Of course, a lot of Chinese companies want to invest in the United States. And before the inauguration, and even before the April 2nd, I will say, a lot of experts in China and in the U.S. were talking about the future possibility of more green-field investment in the United States from Chinese company, but to be honest, I think what had happened in the past one month, I will say, really, really destroyed people's confidence of investing in the United States.
Yes, maybe one day, the two governments will say, "Yeah. We can reach a deal, and the U.S. will welcome Chinese companies' investment." If I were a, you know, senior executive of a Chinese company, I wouldn't do that. I think that's too risky. So, what if, one day, the Trump administration, or, you know, whatever administration, changes policy to China targeting my operation in the United States?
Watch what is happening with TikTok and some other Chinese company. They may say, "Oh, maybe one day, when I make profit in the United States, I will be targeted." So, I think what has happened after the April 2nd really, really hurt, damaged the confidence of many Chinese companies, maybe not limited to Chinese companies, but I talked to a lot of Chinese companies here in China.
I think, I will say, it damaged their confidence in the U.S. economic policy and also the predictability and then also stability of the market. So, I think that's not in the U.S. interest. My hunch is that's not something that only happens in China, I think, because the Trump administration's policy is actually to the rest of the world. So, so many countries have been influenced. So, I think everybody will think twice before investing in the United States.
[00:18:48] Peter Slezkine: Well, they might think twice and then realize that there's no alternative, but it's different if we're talking about Europe or Canada or Mexico. Obviously, Chinese investment is seen with great suspicion within the U.S. And if, as an attempt to rebalance trade, China were to offer a large-scale investment, then the United States would probably require special controls along the lines of what China required of Western companies who were doing business in China in years past, so maybe some kind of technology transfer, some special controls in sensitive areas. Is that something that we could see, or do you think that's unrealistic on one or both sides at this point?
[00:19:35] Da Wei: I think that's possible. I mean, I agree that Chinese companies have been viewed with more suspicion in the United States. And even if some kind of agreement on investment happens in the future, I think there could be some kind of precondition for that investment. So, that's possible, but then it's a business decision for the companies to make if they will go or not.
If I don't invest in the United States, I'll lose a very good market, that's true, but I also don't want to lose my operation in the United States after several years of investment, right? So, that's also something bad for my company. One month ago, if you asked me my view on the investment issue, I would be more, kind of, optimistic. I will say that's something... a promising area in our bilateral economic ties, but today, I'm very, I will say, cautious. I think even if the two governments can reach a deal, I don't think the amount of the investment will be great. And I think the Chinese company will become much more cautious.
[00:20:46] Peter Slezkine: What about a revaluation of currencies or a stimulation of domestic Chinese demand?
[00:20:55] Da Wei: I think the RMB is actually sticking to the U.S. dollar. So, the U.S. dollar is devalued now. So, RMB actually follows the U.S. dollar's devaluation. I don't think this is something we want, but because the currency regime follows the U.S. dollar, some people also in China are discussing the possibility to maybe change that regime, maybe, kind of, follow a basket of the currency rather than the U.S. dollar to increase the share of the other currencies. But those are options under discussion in China.
And domestic consumption, that's the most important issue, I will say. Probably, the Trump administration is forcing China to do something right. I mean, if you cannot export to the U.S. market, you have to increase your own domestic consumption. Also, what is happening in trade with the U.S. could maybe slow China's GDP this year to, let's say, 1.5%. So, if you want to keep your economy growing like last year... And last year was not very good, but at least you need to keep that level. And if you want to achieve that, you have to increase your domestic consumption. You have no other choice.
[00:22:19] Peter Slezkine: That's a good thing anyway, just on its own terms.
[00:22:23] Da Wei: Of course. I think that's a good thing. If you ask the economists in China, I don't think you can meet any serious economist in China who will say increasing domestic consumption is a bad thing. I think everyone agrees that increasing domestic consumption is a good thing. And they all agree that it's too low. I mean, the share of the consumption is too low. The problem is how to achieve the goal to increase consumption.
And it needs something... quite fundamental changes in China's economic policy and also social security policy and other things, like state-owned enterprises reform. It's not easy, but I think what the Trump administration is doing, probably, will force the Chinese government to do the right thing.
If so, I will say it's good, it's good, though, it's painful in the short term, but in the long run, if China's market can become equivalent to the U.S. market, that will be extremely important for China's long-term economic development and also China's influence in the world. If the whole world, I mean, the rest of the world, believe Chinese market is something they need to enter, they need to rely on, then China will become more influential actually.
We are the biggest trading partner with more than 120 countries, but among those 120 countries, we export a lot of products to those countries. So, if China, one day, can become the largest market for more than 100 countries in the world, I think China will be much more influential than... for our foreign policy. That's very good. So, it's both this...
[00:24:09] Peter Slezkine: Well, wait. And this seems like this would require not just a restructuring of the Chinese economy but also a fundamental change in the party's priorities because this imbalance isn't just a product of natural forces or the trajectory of development but of a choice, right, a political choice to focus on industrial output and export and a political choice also to raise social benefits that could have been done at any time. It's obviously complicated to carry out, but it's not as if it was structurally impossible.
[00:24:46] Da Wei: I don't think the government or the party have to rely on exportation. Why should they? I mean, so long as you can maintain the economic development, so long as you can improve the living standard, I mean, the government and the party will be welcomed, I mean, domestically. This is not the only option. They can change.
[00:25:08] Peter Slezkine: And so, why haven't they changed? Because they clearly have chosen an export-driven policy at the expense of domestic consumption. And now, you're saying that the U.S. may force the government to enact changes that are actually beneficial, but why weren't those changes enacted voluntarily?
[00:25:24] Da Wei: I think for several reasons. First, of course, we discussed this is not an easy reform, right? You have been already on that track for many years. I mean, after China entered the WTO, China's economy has been based on... I mean, exportation has always become a major engine for the Chinese economy. So, you rely on that path. This is one thing. Secondly, I think the Chinese government wants to make China, not only a rich country, but a powerful country, a strong country. So, then you need technology.
You need manufacturing. You need to make breakthroughs in, let's say, industrial area, right? You can produce 5Gs. You can make ships. You can make airplanes. China does not want to be a rich but weak country. So, this is a, kind of, balance if you want to make your country more powerful, and in the short term, I mean, in 10 years, in 20 years, have some kind of industrial policy encouraging those important sectors of the economy to grow faster. I think, of course, this is a choice.
And the last thing I will say was because of the so-called strategic competition, all the pressure from the United States, so if you cannot produce chips, and then the U.S. will say, "I have a restriction over this advanced chip," then you have to invest your money in, right? Then the U.S. will say, "I want an AI competition with China. This is something... the most important industry in the future. And we have a competition. And I have a ban on Chinese companies to access any resources," then China has to invest in that kind of industry.
So, this external pressure also stimulates the Chinese government to invest more in those areas, but I mean that's not for exportation. That's for a, kind of, strategic competition. You can say it's just like during the Cold War, when the Reagan administration started the Star Wars, the missile defense system, then the Soviet side being dragged into, kind of, competition.
And that already happened to some extent in China. Like, in Tsinghua, once, I talked to the EMBA program. So, all the members of the program are, kind of, the leaders of the company, startups. One of the members was a... I think he's a CEO from a bubble tea company. And many of them are from, like, AI or semiconductor, this kind of thing. So, we have this discussion in the classroom: is bubble tea company important or not? Bubble tea is not a chip, it's not AI, but I think bubble tea is important because it can create jobs, it pays tax. And also, it makes people happy, right? So, I think that's extremely important, but when the government only has limited resources and you are facing very severe competition from the U.S. and maybe the Western world and you only have $1, will you invest in bubble tea or invest in AI?
I think the answer is quite obvious. So, for all those reasons, I think China has been, kind of, trapped into that old development model. So, now, the Trump administration may force China to jump to the other track because you have no choice, right? You have no choice. So, it's, kind of, a shock therapy, not only to the U.S. but also to China maybe, but it will be very painful. Actually, to be honest, to rebalance U.S.-China economics… I won't oppose rebalancing China-U.S. economic ties. I think that could be good for both sides.
But the approach that the Trump administration has adopted is something I feel very worrisome. I mean, unilaterally announcing high tariffs. And then if you go to talk to the Trump administration, President Trump said, "They are kissing my ass." So, how can you expect the Chinese government to do that? So, the goal could be reasonable, I think, but the approach is, for me at least, problematic.
[00:29:27] Peter Slezkine: But you were just saying earlier that it doesn't matter who initiates trade talks. So, obviously, a country of the status of China cannot be seen to be kissing ass in any circumstance, but nonetheless, if there is a sense that rebalancing is best for both countries and in China's own national interest, and if a certain discount is made for Trump's well-known style, then you can ignore the circus somewhat and seek the Chinese classical win-win.
[00:30:04] Da Wei: Yes, I agree. So, again, I think, this morning, in that announcement, obviously, the two sides... again, no matter who made the first move, but the two sides have already been working toward that direction. So, that shows that no matter who kisses whose ass, both sides showed flexibility. I think that's not bad, right?
[00:30:25] Peter Slezkine: I think to kiss each other's ass at the same time, you'd have to be very flexible. So long as we have acrobats on each side, we'll all end up happier. Do you think there's a way? So, it's hard enough to rebalance the economic trade even if that were best for both parties just because of the level of asymmetry. As you said, it's not just a matter of China buying up a bunch of American goods.
You could never rebalance trade that way. There'd have to be a total adjustment to the Chinese economy, which can't be done overnight. Is there a way for trade talks to be combined with the Taiwan issue, that the U.S. would make some adjustments on Taiwan, that China would appreciate some new communiqué or reassertion of the One China policy, a statement about not opposing future peaceful reunification, maybe pulling back some military trainers and, in return, get something immediate on the economic front that Trump could declare domestically to be a big triumph, or are these two issues separate in the eyes of Beijing and then should not be combined?
[00:31:43] Da Wei: I would say I will be very, very surprised if we can make any progress in that regard, I mean, to link the two issues together. I think it's very unlikely for many reasons. One of the reasons, I think, is that Taiwan is not something you can buy. And also, Taiwan has its own agency. So, yeah, maybe, one day, the Trump administration may say, "Yeah, let's sign a communiqué." I think, basically, it's unlikely. It's impossible.
But let's imagine if, one day, they say, "Let's sign a communiqué, a new communiqué, then you give me some compromise on the economic side," I think, first, the U.S. can change the communiqué version. So, after this administration, it's, you know, something with the executive branch. So, this executive branch can do it, but the next administration could change it. So, it's not very trustworthy. And also, even if we do that, does that really mean we can make major progress to reunify China with Taiwan? I doubt it.
I mean, there are 23 million people living on the island. So, winning the hearts and minds is the most important thing. Of course, if we can reach agreement with the U.S., that's good from our perspective, but that's far from enough. Generally speaking, I don't think that geopolitical issues are something negotiable both for China and the United States. It's too difficult. So, a link to an economic talk to Taiwan, I think, is too complicated. And I think, just from the view of the U.S. domestic politics, I also think this is impossible.
[00:33:30] Peter Slezkine: Just because you think that the U.S. wouldn't be able to make any conciliatory gestures regarding Taiwan at this stage in the relationship.
[00:33:38] Da Wei: There are so many people who have a very hardline position on that issue in the United States. So, again, President Trump could make some announcements and maybe create an opening for a new debate or discussion in the United States. Think about the Congress. Think about the overall strategic community. I think that's something that will be there for a very long time. President Trump will be there for four years, but those people will be there for a very long time.
[00:34:11] Peter Slezkine: Makes sense. Although that makes the picture on Taiwan fairly bleak if China is convinced that the U.S. is just going to increase support for the island no matter what, but as far as you're concerned, the policy is still to win hearts and minds, not to storm the channel and surround the island.
[00:34:33] Da Wei: No matter which approach to reunify the island, the ultimate goal is to win the hearts and minds of the people right there. So, no matter if you use a peaceful way, if you win the hearts and minds, then you reunify the island. That's, of course, I will say, the ideal sequence. But it's also possible that, one day, you will have to use military force.
And then after that, you gradually win hearts and minds, but that will be more difficult, but you still need to win. So, that's something, for me, of course, that's always the most important goal, is to win the hearts and minds, but I'm not sure. I don't want to equal that to peaceful reunification. I hope it's the same but not necessarily. It could be the same thing, yeah.
[00:35:20] Peter Slezkine: Well, the Russians hoped to win hearts and minds with the help of a few tanks and seem to have miscalculated, but now they've gone about as far as they can get. We'll see what they'll do over the next few months, but there seems to be the potential of a meeting of the minds between Putin and Trump. Does that unsettle China at all to see Russia and the U.S. potentially normalizing relations?
[00:35:50] Da Wei: Of course, that's an issue a lot of people discuss here, like, reversed Kissinger effect. I personally don't worry about that at all. I think there is a zero chance of a reversed Kissinger effect for several reasons. First and foremost, I think, if we go back to history, it's not Kissinger or Nixon who split China and the Soviet Union.
And actually, China and the Soviet Union split first from the late 1950s through the whole 1960s, and we had two border conflicts with the Soviet Union in 1969. Actually, the sound of the gong in the Amal River actually sent a signal to the U.S. decision maker that there is a chance that the U.S. can maybe try to normalize its relations with China.
So, in today's situation, China-Russia relations are still very solid. I think the two sides, two economies, are, kind of, very much integrated. And the relations between the two leaders, two governments, has been quite robust. And in the process that the U.S. and the Trump administration will talk to each other, I think we are, basically, being briefed by the Russian side. They think about that very well. And also, I think President Xi is going to visit Russia soon this year.
[00:37:17] Peter Slezkine: He's going on May 9th for Victory Day, right?
[00:37:19] Da Wei: Yeah, I think so. So, anyway, the Sino exchanges, Sino ties, are still very strong. And I don't think Russians are so naive to say, "Okay. Now, the Trump administration is improving our relations. Let's abandon China." I think Russians are very sophisticated in terms of their strategic approach. I think they are very good geopolitical players. I think they will improve their relations with the U.S. but at the same time maintain their strong tie with China.
And also, in the U.S., it's a little bit like our discussion earlier about the Taiwan issue. I think there is a strong distrust, mistrust, toward Russia in the United States. So, I think that kind of mistrust will be there for quite a long time. So, if we look back to the history of the Russian Revolution, so it's already more than 100 years past, how many years of the good, healthy relationship between the two countries we have, maybe only after the collapse of Soviet Union and some years of Boris Yeltsin and maybe sometime, earlier time of Putin movement after September 11th. I mean, altogether, maybe 10 years of good time.
[00:38:36] Peter Slezkine: And also, a few years during World War II when they were fighting on the same side. That shouldn't be forgotten. And then when they founded the United Nations together.
[00:38:42] Da Wei: Yeah, that's true. So, altogether, let's say, maybe 15 years of good time, then maybe 90 years of bad time. So, it's very deeply, deeply rooted, you know, the difficulties between the two countries. So, again, I think there is a seeding of the improvement of U.S.-Russia relationship. And I think there is also a strong tie between China and Russia.
And I even want to go further. I want to say Russia is a big country. I think Russia should not be forced into a corner diplomatically. And it's hard to imagine Russia only having good relations with China or relying on its relation with China. I think, of course, Russia wants to change that situation. And I think a very close, too close, China-Russia relationship, and at the same time, a very hostile Russia-U.S. relationship is not in China's interest, to be honest. I hope Russia, U.S., China, and maybe Europe and maybe India all can be independent players on the world stage. No country has to rely on the other one.
So, our policies on a certain set of issues could overlap, but our policy on the other issues could be different, even conflicting. I think this is a multipolar world. I think the improvement of Russia-U.S. relationship will give Russia bigger space and make them feel more comfortable and then will make China feel more comfortable, I will say.
If the old trajectory continues, then I think the trend is that we'll see two blocks in the world, one leading by the U.S., then with Europe with other western countries, then the other led by China, and Russia may be in that block. And so, that's not in China's interest. I don't think that's in China's interest.
I don't want to see the two blocks of politics in the world, and within those two blocks, China and the U.S. become, you know, U.S. is a tit and China is a tat, then we have the tit-for-tat reaction, an overreaction between China and the U.S. I think it's bad for China, bad for the U.S., bad for Russia. So, I think improving U.S.-Russia's relationship, to some extent at least, I think it's good for everyone.
[00:41:02] Peter Slezkine: So, the U.S. clearly wants Russia to be more autonomous, less dependent on China because it fears that a Russia dependent on China will strengthen in the competition with the U.S., but you're saying, from China's perspective, a more independent Russia is also perhaps preferable because if Russia is tied too tightly to China and is too dependent on China, then it may get uncomfortable and anxious and start causing problems in this position.
[00:41:32] Da Wei: First, I have to say, this is my personal view. This is not China's perspective. I cannot represent China. And also, I don't think I'm mainstream. Probably, I'm a minority on that issue. But back to your argument, this is what I mean. If China-Russia become very close, and then at the same time, U.S.-Russia are, kind of, hostile, then the U.S. pressure on Russia will be also put on China. Secondly, I don't think Russia can really help China greatly if our relations with the U.S. is really bad.
Let's imagine if we have a military conflict or we have a long-term Cold War-style competition with the U.S., what benefit can Russia bring to China? Maybe some. Yeah, they can supply stable energy to China, and they may support China diplomatically, but what else? I don't think Russia is an asset. Of course, Russia is a partner, is a good neighbor, but I don't think China should view Russia as an asset to compete with the U.S.
And I also don't want Russia to be, kind of, a liability of China. I think Russia is a big power. And sooner or later, they will claim that room. I think Russia diplomacy has been very, very active and is trying to create a bigger space. When I say that Russia should play, need to play, and will play an independent role, the basic reason is actually, I think, I respect Russia as an important country in the world, on the world stage.
So, I hope China-Russia can be good neighbors to each other and that we have a strong, robust relationship — economic, diplomatic, and strategic. That's good. But I also hope that Russia can be an independent player. And I'm quite sure they will have to. I'm not sure if now, but, sooner or later, they will have to.
[00:43:26] Peter Slezkine: Well, so you just described a multipolar world where, instead of blocks, there is a balance among the large countries — Russia, China, India, the U.S., maybe some others. How is that different from what Trump is aiming to create? Because there's clearly a turn away from the liberal order that Biden and many of his predecessors, maybe all the way back to 1950, promoted. So, there's a new framework for U.S. foreign policy.
To what extent do you think it ultimately aligns with what China prefers? Obviously, there are going to be all sorts of difficulties in arriving if we ever do at this new world order because there's plenty of inertia, the U.S. block is built a certain way, conflict is already brewing between the U.S. and China, and active between the U.S. and Russia, but nonetheless, do you think there is a way for this Chinese vision of the world than the, sort of, more Trumpian or, sort of, post-liberal vision of America to align?
[00:44:30] Da Wei: Ironically, I think the worldview of the Trump administration is, I'll say, quite similar to China's, particularly around this concept of a multipolar world. I think the Trump administration also used that term. Of course, we could mean different things with the same concept, but we all believe that, first, this is the basic reality that there are several important players on the world stage, so not only the U.S., not only China, Russia, Europe, India. So, we could see more.
I mean, this is a reflection of the reality. So, it's not a one-country or two-country-dominate world. Secondly, the Trump administration, I don't know if they are intentionally doing that or unintentionally, but what they have done shows a fundamental change. This fundamental change is related to value, to norm.
So, you mentioned the liberal international order. In the past, I will say, let's say, the Western world believed that they share the same value, same liberal value, and U.S., Europe, and also the Western country believed that they are on the right side of the history and China, Russia, maybe some others, are on the wrong side of history.
And probably, many developing countries or third parties, I don't know. I mean, it's a very complicated picture, but maybe some of them may also believe that the West is on the right side of history. But anyway, there are two sides of history, the wrong side of history and the right side of history. So, it's, kind of, black and white, correct and wrong.
But now, I mean, the situation has become more complicated. I think it's very funny when I saw the voting in the UN general assembly on the resolution condemning Russia's invasion of Ukraine, this time, I think, U.S., Russia and North Korea, Israel, among others, I think about less than 20 countries, I guess, voted against that resolution and China abstained. Many other countries supported that. So, you can see the change of the camps.
[00:46:53] Peter Slezkine: And the United States is leaving the camp that it had created.
[00:46:56] Da Wei: Yeah.
[00:46:56] Peter Slezkine: This latest vote in the UN assembly, the U.S. already did not vote to condemn Russia; whereas before, it had been attempting to mobilize as much of the world as possible.
[00:47:08] Da Wei: Exactly. And then Vice President JD Vance went to Munich telling Europeans that, "You have different values from us." So, all these changes are very fundamental. So, I don't know. I think it's very much dependent on the U.S. domestic politics. So, I don't think I should draw a conclusion too early, but, I mean, I don't know what will happen four years later. But I think at least the Trump administration's thoughts are reflecting at least 50% of America's view on all those issues. So, that means, on the norm issue, on the value issue, there are different values now, even among the Western countries.
So, that's a real multipolar world, right? Multipolarity should not only refer to the distribution of power. Distribution of power is one side of multipolarity. The other is, probably, our views are different. As I said earlier, they may agree with each other on one side of the issue, and they may disagree with each other on the other side of the issue. So, it's a very complicated situation.
So, I think we are moving towards that multipolar. Though I don't like the term, we are moving towards a multiplayer world. It's still different from 19th century European politics. I think it's still different. But we are moving towards that direction. I think it could mean more conflicts, even wars. It would be a more dangerous world when China has advocated for a multipolar world for many years, but I don't think China really wants a war or wants a chaotic world.
When we call for a multipolar world, you know, from the '90s, we advocate for multipolarity, it's just to show our dissatisfaction with the unipolarity. So, can we really handle the dark side of the multipolar world? I mean, this is the task that we are facing, China, U.S., and others are facing. No matter what multipolar world is, a good thing or bad thing, whether you like it or not, we are facing it. So, we have to manage it. It could be very dangerous.
[00:49:17] Peter Slezkine: But could China become powerful enough that it would provide the single-world ordering poll? Is that part of China's ambitions?
[00:49:27] Da Wei: I don't think so. First, when you say whether China is powerful, I mean, the most important power is intellectual, I would say. It's intellectual power. It's, can you envision international order, which is good for most of the people in the world, and also something practical that you can implement, you can build? And it should be better than the past war. It should be a fair war. It should be a justified international order.
I don't think we have that idea, so far. Also, of course, I don't think China's material power is and will be big enough. I don't think so. The U.S. is still the most powerful country in the foreseeable future. And I think other countries are also emerging and Europe is still important.
I don't think China has that dominating power, material power to do that. And I don't think China has the intellectual power to make China ready for that. So, I think, if so, China should first learn from other countries, be humble, and also talk to each other. I think the government needs to talk to each other and the intellectuals need to talk to each other together.
[00:50:40] Peter Slezkine: I think you said that China didn't have the power to dominate the world and didn't necessarily have the conceptual wherewithal to devise a perfect or preferable world order, which I think is a message that will be very reassuring to a Washington audience. But one final question. You mentioned Vance going to Europe and telling his audience that perhaps the U.S. and Europe were functioning now according to different values. So, if you had to predict, in the next four years, will the transatlantic relationship rupture or will the Western block continue to cohere?
[00:51:24] Da Wei: I think the transatlantic relationship will be quite difficult in the upcoming four years because of what the Trump administration has done and has said. I think, obviously, it's already making the European countries very, very uncomfortable and, I will say, panicked. And I think the Trump administration will continue in that direction. I think they will talk in that way seriously. This is what they are thinking.
But the question is not if they will have a problem. The question is how far can two sides go and how bad could the relationship be in the next four years? And then what if, after four years, the Democrats or some other president changed the trajectory? Will the transatlantic relationship recover back to normal? I think those are the two questions I'm asking. I'm listening to my colleagues in the U.S. and in Europe.
I think there will be a limit in this friction between the U.S. and Europe because Europe, of course, they are very, very unhappy. They are very angry. I think they are angrier than, let's say, 20 years ago when the U.S. launched the Iraq War. They have a dispute between this old Europe and the U.S. And I think there are, of course, frictions in the first Trump administration, but this time I think it's even deeper, bigger.
And the EU has already decided to build up their own capability. But I think, first and foremost, again, it's an intellectual, conceptual issue. I think Europe has talked about strategic autonomy for a very long time. But to be honest, still with respect to my European colleagues, I think the European side still has a long way to go to be intellectually autonomous, I will say.
Now, it's the Trump administration showing that autonomy from the old concept, old thoughts, in Western liberal world. I don't think European countries are ready for that. So, they just still stick to the old days. And then in the material side, I will say, if they want their own defense military security power, it's a long way to go. They need to build their industry. They need to build their troops. They may need to fight a war even one day.
Are the Europeans ready to do that? I doubt it. And obviously, no need to mention, the EU is a very complicated entity. I think our expectation to their collective action will be limited. But again, this is something more serious than 20 years ago or eight years ago. I think we'll see more frictions across the Atlantic, but I don't think it will become, at least in the next four years, I don't think it will become a completely, kind of, I don't know if decoupling is a good word, but I mean, at least intellectually decoupling.
I don't think that will happen in the next four years, but if this trend continues, because I also ask the question, "What about four years later?" If, four years later, this trajectory continues, then we may see more and more profound differences between Europe and the U.S. But I'm not so sure about the second question.
[00:54:39] Peter Slezkine: Yeah, of course, they're mad because Trump is embarking on a fundamental revision of the transatlantic relationship, but I, like you, am quite skeptical of any possibility of a united EU outside of the American umbrella. The EU, as an institution, is entirely too complex and unwieldy.
[00:55:04] Da Wei: Yeah.
[00:55:04] Peter Slezkine: The bigger countries are of two similar sizes to re-arm together. France obviously wants to produce all the weapons for the entirety of the EU, but would Germany and Poland and Britain accept that? I mean, Britain's not in the EU, but in NATO. I doubt it. So, we'll see. I think either they remain united under the U.S. umbrella or the whole thing fractures into the old, divided continent that it was for so long. But we wish ill on no one, hope for win-win-win across the board.
[00:55:38] Da Wei: Yeah.
[00:55:38] Peter Slezkine: So, thank you so much for joining me a second time.
[00:55:41] Da Wei: Thank you, Peter, for having me. It's a great pleasure. Thank you very much.
[00:55:47] Peter Slezkine: Thanks for listening to the Trialogue Podcast. Make sure to subscribe to the show, so you don’t miss out on any episodes.
The Trialogue Podcast is hosted by the Stimson Center and produced by University FM.