This week, our guest is Dmitry Novikov, Deputy Head of the School of International Relations at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow, Russia. We discuss the difficulties of being an Americanist in Moscow, the sources of US-Russian conflict, and Russia’s future as a “Eurasian” power, among other subjects.
This week, our guest is Dmitry Novikov, Deputy Head of the School of International Relations at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow, Russia. We discuss the difficulties of being an Americanist in Moscow, the sources of US-Russian conflict, and Russia’s future as a “Eurasian” power, among other subjects.
*The Trialogue Podcast is hosted by the Stimson Center and produced by University FM.
**The first twelve episodes of this podcast were published by the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.
(Transcripts may contain a few typographical errors due to audio quality during the podcast recording.)
[00:00:00] Peter: Hi, I'm Peter Slezkine, Director of the Monterey Trialogue, a program hosted by the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey. Since the middle of the 20th century, relations among the United States, Russia, and China have had an enormous impact on each country separately and on the world as a whole. The purpose of the Monterey Trialogue is to better understand these extraordinarily complex and consequential relationship by directly engaging with experts from all three countries.
Welcome to the podcast.
[00:00:36] Dmitry: Hello? I’m glad to be here.
[00:00:38] Peter: You are Deputy Head of the School of International Relations at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow, Russia but you are also trained as a historian of the United States. What is it like being an Americanist in Russia right now? You aren't able to go easily to the United States to do research. So, what kind of research and analysis do Americanists produce at the moment? What is particularly in demand?
[00:01:05] Dmitry: Well, that's a very broad question.
[00:01:07] Peter: Like your title.
[00:01:09] Dmitry: I would say that to be a U.S. expert in Russia always was a challenge because you have to balance between an official line and research objectivism. In Soviet time, the best people went to American studies because United States of America were considered as a key enemy, which we need to destroy or coexist, depends on the era. The government actually invests quite a lot in development of expertise on the United States of America.
But at the same time, there was always a dilemma, because from one hand, it was like a Marxism-Leninism, right, the official ideology. Today, there is no such a thing, but anyway, it's always some kind of indoctrination, which goes from the official political approach, but at the same time, it's just life, right? You have to understand what it means.
[00:02:15] Peter: What do you mean by indoctrination?
[00:02:17] Dmitry: Well, in Soviet time, it was, of course, ideology. Now, we don't have a doctrine in many respects, but we still have a narrative that the United States of America, first, it's a declining power, second, it is an enemy, and it is objective enemy. And the American policy is hegemonic by its own nature. It's not a political theory, but it’s a discourse which you cannot avoid if you prepare some kind of research materials for the government, for instance.
To some extent, we, U.S. experts, we came back to Soviet times because there is a, kind of, preambular. Yeah, the United States of America, it's enemy, we have to fight them, and so on, so on, so on. There you come up with some kind of more substantial part, right? Because, of course, objective information is also something that is necessary. It's very sensitive, politically sensitive. You have to focus your research on, mostly, security, strategic studies, arms control. You have to go within this narrative that, yes, America is a hegemonic power. It's a threat. You cannot go and tell to anybody that it is not a threat.
[00:03:46] Peter: So, you begin with ideological throat-clearing about the United States as the essential adversary, and then you move to more concrete, practical subjects like arms control.
[00:03:57] Dmitry: Then you have to figure out what's going on in domestic politics, for instance. That's what you have to do by objective research methods. It's not something which is strictly related with anti-hegemonic policies.
[00:04:14] Peter: That is one of the subjects that is most in demand here is analysis of U.S. domestic politics.
[00:04:22] Dmitry: I think that, honestly, that's something we lack. Historically, the political struggle inside the United States influenced the foreign policy quite fundamentally. During the Cold War, domestic politics was in the center of academic research in Russia, because this Marxist research framework with class struggle and so on just made researchers focus on it.
And I think that the Americanists of the previous generation, they knew United States of America much better than we do today, even despite they didn't have an opportunity to go to the United States. But they always can say, you know, this senator from this state, he has this position and that position.
[00:05:10] Peter: So, the Marxist ideological or theoretical framework forced the focus on the U.S. domestic political scene.
[00:05:17] Dmitry: I think so. And the paradox when the Soviet Union actually collapsed and we became much more informed about what's going on, we had an opportunity to go to the United States, to talk to people, the idea was that, well, you can go to Washington just to talk to people and get some insights.
During 30 years of open relations between the United States of America and Russia, our government, our elites just jump to conclusion that, we, more or less, understand how it works. This is the first thing.
Second, Russian government elites, partially expert community have a lot of skepticism about how this political system actually works. To some extent, our understanding of American political system became oversimplified. And this is a tendency of the last 10, 15 years.
I think that it is a part of Russian political culture which drove this process of oversimplification because, first, Russian political system became more centralized—or, let's say, authoritarian, if you want to use this word. And as a result, we start to understand other communities through the prism of our own political system and our own political culture.
As soon as we are governed by some kind of centralized power, we start to understand that, in the United States of America, there should be something like that. The institution, the deep states as a network of decision-makers, elite groups control everything. And from this perspective, you know, it makes us think, at least the Russian elites, that we are equal in terms of morality and ethics. Just 30 years ago, when the Soviet Union just collapsed, it was a strong feeling in Russia about some kind of moral superiority of the West because, yes, they have democracy, they have freedom, their community is much more advanced in comparison with us. We need just to copy.
[00:07:28] Peter: When did that change?
[00:07:28] Dmitry: Well, I think it was step by step for the last 20 years. So, in 2000s, this feeling, still, was dominating, but I think that, at the beginning of 2010s, the skepticism about the moral superiority of the U.S. political system, Western political system, started to decline pretty visibly, especially in the official narrative and among the intellectual elites of a more conservative views, let's put it like that.
This idea is that, okay, Russia have more primitive political system. We don't have institutions. And due to weakness of institutions, we have to replace it with a leader. He stays in the center of our political system. Americans have a set of institutions, which also control them. But in both of the cases, we have, centralism. And the politics continue to be the same. It's like dictatorship in both cases. Yes, our political system is more archaic, but actually, by function, it's the same. So, how the hell you can lecture us how to live? And I think that this is a very, very strong source of contradictions and misunderstandings between West and Russia.
[00:08:44] Peter: On that same subject, it seems to me that realism is a very popular theoretical frame in Russia, one that Putin himself seems to use, that might accomplish the same goal because it makes every state an actor within an international system and domestic political variety disappears to some extent. So, is that part of the same logic? How do you explain the popularity of realism here. It seems like Russians are most comfortable with Kissinger as an interlocutor and keep hoping to find somebody in that mold to engage with again.
[00:09:23] Dmitry: This is true. We like Kissinger, we respect Mearsheimer. I think that's truly the strategic culture of Russia, is very realist. I think it's very easy to explain. There are two sources. The first one is disappointing in any ideology, because when the communist ideology collapsed, people feel like partially betrayed, partially just puzzled. So, the idealism of communist ideology appeared to be a fake. And when disappeared the doctrine which actually drove you for many, many years, there are actually two options: to come up with another doctrine, but it is very difficult because you have to reshape your mind; or easier option, become a cynic.
Russian elites, at first, I think, tried to reshape themselves to a new doctrine, to a liberal one. If you remember the times of Kozyrev, for instance, which is now cursed and is considered to be almost a betrayer. Yet, he tried to come up with a super liberal understanding of Russian foreign policy—we are part of the West, so on, so on, so on. This is 1991, 1996, right? Well, even Gorbachev, actually, despite he was a communist, but he also tried to play with liberal ideas.
[00:10:51] Peter: Right. So, from the late Soviet period through the early years of the Russian Federation, there is an attempt to find a place within the liberal order, so to speak.
[00:10:57] Dmitry: Yeah, absolutely. Not only to find a place in the liberal order, because you can try to find a place within the liberal order by realist means, thinking that, “Well, it's profitable for me to be a part of the Western world.” But I think that, the first half of the ‘90s at least, it was not only about finding a place, it was also about trying to accept this liberal logic, to reshape your doctrine, your vision of the world. But in the second part of the ‘90s, and especially with Putin coming to power, this process just stopped. Truly, the realist tendencies started to dominate.
[00:11:47] Peter: But in this new realist frame, there was still an interest-based effort to find a place within the Western order.
[00:11:51] Dmitry: Yeah. Russia still try to find a place within the West. This is absolutely true, till, I think, the Ukrainian crisis of 2014. And to some extent, even after that. I think that the last moment when Russia stopped finding a place within the West is the beginning of war 2022, right? Before that, the whole policy of Russia was about finding a privileged respectful place in the West, which might be profitable, both politically and economically. Resets under Medvedev and Obama administration. Putin’s two first terms when he openly says that we want to be a part of Europe, West, and actually the first foreign policy initiative he came up with when he was elected president was, could we join NATO, actually. But it was not about values anymore. I think it was more about interest-based approach.
[00:12:55] Peter: Were these efforts doomed from the start? Could Russians have ever become truly liberal, or could Russia, in a more pragmatic sense, have ever found a spot within the West? Or was the West too different, Russia too big, and some kind of conflict inevitable?
[00:13:14] Dmitry: It's a difficult question. I think there are three basic explanations why it all failed, why Russia first moved from attempts to be liberal to interest-based approach in relations with the West, but still friendly relations. And then it moved to sovereignty, separation from the West, and even confrontation with the West. Why it happened? Some people explain it through personality. That when Yeltsin was in power, then it was liberal, when Putin became leader, it became totally different. I'm skeptical about that, because even late, Yeltsin administration, there were some anti-Western sentiments, especially after Yugoslavia, and more importantly, it's not only about the leader.
It's also about the elites in a broader sense the second explanation is that it's everything about Western policies. That bombing of Yugoslavia disappointed Russian elites then invasion to Iraq. There is some part of truth here, but only part of truth.
[00:14:17] Peter: The expansion of NATO is presumably on that list.
[00:14:18] Dmitry: Of course, expansion of NATO is a key line, because we talk about moral superiority of the West, right? When you look at your partner, think that, well, he's so ideal, he's democratic, he have totally different approach and then you see expansion in NATO as just an attempt to expand the sphere of influence, like in 19th century, of course, it was a very strong source of skepticism and realist approach in Russian foreign policy thinking.
[00:14:49] Peter: In the sense that it provoked this kind of realist reaction.
[00:14:53] Dmitry: Yes. And this is official line because if you ask Putin or Minister of Foreign Affairs Lavrov about the sources of Russian conduct today, they would explain you in these categories, that's it's a reactionary policy, it is a reaction to the Western policies and the hegemonic very, very interest-based actions of all the American administrations, actually, it's resulted in Russian countermeasures, which finally move us to this dramatic events in Ukraine.
[00:15:27] Peter: One point of contention between the Russian side and the American is that the Russians, at some point, decided that American ideology is an instrumental cover for realist interests, they do not believe in the sincerity of American democracy promotion.
[00:15:43] Dmitry: Absolutely. Well, I think that, in the eyes of our government today and in the eyes of many intellectuals in Russia, it's total bankruptcy of the American political elites of the ‘90s and 2000s, of people like Biden, Pelosi, and all the people who actually influenced American policy for the last several decades.
[00:16:08] Peter: But bankruptcy in what sense?
[00:16:10] Dmitry: Well, bankruptcy, I mean total disappointing, because they say that they promote democracy to make the world better, but they worry only about, sometimes, even not national interests, but about their pockets, right? And of course, it's changed attitudes quite a lot. And I think that Putin and his administration, they just consider their actions as totally legitimate, if not legally, then morally.
[00:16:42] Peter: When Biden and Blinken talk about democracy and autocracy, do the Russian elites believe that they are insincere or that they are just misguided?
[00:16:53] Dmitry: I think that they believe that it's a total hypocrisy, because there are allies of the United States who are quite autocratic, and nobody cares about it. And I believe that the Russian elites today strongly believe that they could become a part of the West or at least a privileged ally of the United States of America, even being autocratic, tyrannic, whatever, if the current American elites would consider it to be a part of their interests. Their policy of Russia in 2000s and in 2010s was about making America think that we are valuable assets and that without us, without Russia, it is simply not possible to pursue American interests in wide range of fields.
From Russia point of view, it's just a group of mafia bosses in Washington, a gang, which we want to be a part of. We want to be a part of this gang. But they don't want us to come. And as a result of that, we just start a street war, right? This is, of course, a drama because this is a result of mutual misunderstanding in quite a fundamental level. But you asked before why Russia separated from the West. And I said there are three explanations. The first one is a personal, the second one is the West is responsible for that.
But I think the last explanation is structural. You're right, Russia is too big. It's very difficult to engage Russia and make it a geopolitical part of the West. Then what is the role of Russia in the West? We can speak a lot about the cultural attachments, about, I don't know, Russian literature is, in many respects, a part of the Western literature and so on, so on, so on. But if we're speaking in a more concrete categories, it was very difficult from the very beginning to give Russia a role in the Western mechanisms of governments, of global government, and so on. They tried, of course, giving Russia a place in the G8, but it was not enough for Moscow. Moscow consider itself, I don't know, like Great Britain in the ‘40s and ‘50s, a special ally of the United States, which is almost equal, and which have some kind of opinion about everything, and this opinion should be respected. Of course, this is something what nor America nor its allies could grant to Russia from the very beginning. From this perspective, it was a dead end.
[00:19:49] Peter: So, to what extent is this a story of unmet expectations? If Russia had not hoped for a special relationship with the United States, membership in the Western Club, would some sort of peaceful coexistence have been possible?
[00:20:05] Dmitry: I think that the current geopolitical state of Russia as a Eurasian state, which is not a part of the West but also not a part of the East, is an objective reality. From the very beginning, it was quite unavoidable, because as we discussed, well, structurally, it was very difficult to integrate Russia to the West.
And we need to include here another very strong argument. The rise of Asia, right? When Russia understands that there is another market, just in a different direction, of course, it understand that the West Europe does not have any monopoly on Russian economic, political, even institutional development. Because for centuries, actually, Russian relations with the West were about this modernization cycles. We get something from the West, modernize ourselves, then we have bad relations with the West, right? Then, once we need a new modernization impulse, we, once again, start a dialogue, get closer, and so on.
Now, in the eyes of Russian intellectual and political elites, Europe and the West, in a broader sense, just lost this role on Russian development. We can actually use China or, maybe, even India in 20 years. Look at Chinese cars, right? In Moscow, there are a lot of them now. And I would say that there are no so much worse than European and American ones. From this perspective, I think that Eurasia-ization, if we can use this word, of Russian strategic culture in the foreign policy and even domestic understanding who we are was quite unavoidable.
But the question is how it happened, because this natural process could be peaceful, right? This process, I mean, Russia becoming a Eurasian state, it could be much more peaceful in terms of foreign policy, let's put it like that. We have, at least, three big conflicts between Russia and the West, which had a strong military component. Russia and Georgia war, 2008, then Ukraine 2014, and now, once again, Ukraine 2022.
[00:22:31] Peter: Well, and Syria, also, indirectly.
[00:22:32] Dmitry: And Syria, yes, we can… okay, four, right? At least, four. Of course, I think that with, maybe, different Western approach towards Russia, with different more cautious Russian foreign policy, we probably could avoid it. But we are where we are.
[00:22:51] Peter: Let's dig into that. So, you say that there are certain structural global transformations that explains Russia's gradual reorientation toward the East, that Europe is no longer the center of modernization at the forefront of technological progress. Now, Asia is, perhaps, the new center of gravity and will become ever more so into the future.
[00:23:18] Dmitry: I would say alternative center of gravity.
[00:23:20] Peter: Even better, alternative. So, Russia is destined to become a Eurasian power in that regard, but Eurasian implies a central point between Europe on one side and Asia on the other. But Russia's pivot to Asia, first of all, is not complete. On the other hand, wasn't really started until the rupture with the West. So, it took a decisive rupture with the West for Russia to be forced to seriously look East.
[00:23:50] Dmitry: I'm skeptical about this kind of view. We see a very strong impulse, even in 2014, when there was the first package, big package, of the Western sanctions on Russia. Russia started to rethink quite fundamentally its relations with all Asian states, came up with this greater Eurasia concept, that we need to construct some kind of Eurasian community as an alternative to the Euro-Atlantic community, where China, India, Southeast Asia, Iran, parts of Middle East, all can coexist and live together in peace and develop themselves and so on, so on, so on.
Yes, conceptually, politically, confrontation with the West influenced Russian pivot to the East and to Eurasia. But, actually, even officially, Russia proclaimed the beginning of the pivot to the East in 2012 during the APEC summit in Vladivostok. It was President Putin who said that it was a reaction to the American pivoting to Asia, which was a part of the Obama administration regional policies.
But still, chronologically, the start point is there. And I think it's just a reflection of a very natural process, which I described before, geo-economic, technological rise of Asia creates an alternative pool of...
[00:25:23] Peter: But the irony is that both the United States and Russia saw this evolution and each side declared its own pivot to Asia. Nonetheless, the focus remained on one another. The confrontation is much hotter in Europe, in the case of the United States, than it is in Asia. So, in both cases, the pivot was declared but not accomplished. Although, I suppose it's gaining steam in Russia now that the rupture with the West has been completed.
[00:25:53] Dmitry: I think I can agree with that. But look, let's not focus on five, ten years perspective. Let's look at the world in 2050,. Quite unavoidably, Asian countries would contribute to the global GDP much more, in comparison with the current state of affairs.
I think that, from this perspective, this state of Russia as a power-rich state between the East and the West is very natural once again, right? You have different pools of development, sources of technologies, modernization. Russian role in this process is a source of raw materials and logistics, because we are a natural bridge between Europe and the East. Like it used to be, by the way, many, many centuries ago, these Silk Roads, which went through the Middle East, through Central Asia, and countries, states, which were a part of this Silk Road, they benefited from it. It was a source of their own development. And from this perspective, this is the natural role of Russia, geoeconomic and geopolitical one.
[00:27:03] Peter: Well, that sounds ideal, but that would require Russia to find a modus vivendi with the West.
[00:27:09] Dmitry: Yeah, absolutely. And by the way, if you look at what Russian leadership was talking about, I don't know, 15 years ago, even 20, it was pretty the same, right? Once they started to be disappointed about Russia as a part of the West project, let's put it like that, they started to think, “Maybe we just transit power,” meaning that it is a transit between East and the West, logistical trades, and maybe even civilizational, cultural. And if we speak about the confrontation with the West, of course, it's a problem of implementation of this reality.
There is a structural process, which is natural and probably unavoidable. And this is… well, let's put it like this, operational level. Operational level is where the conflicts could appear on the way of this huge mega trend.
[00:28:08] Peter: So, you're saying that, looking through that lens over the long term, the major factor is the relative rise of Asia. So, Russia, naturally, would turn from an almost full focus on the West, eastward and southward.
If, eventually, its natural space is as a giant Eurasian landmass sitting between the West and the East, that, of course, requires a certain larger global harmony that produces a flow of goods and ideas from east to west, from west to east.
Right now, we seem far away from that. There is the new dividing line between Russia and West in Europe, not to mention the brewing confrontation between the U.S.-led West and China. So, if China-European trade decreases, Russia's significance in that respect does as well. So, how do you see that very clear geopolitical problem being overcome in favor of these longer structural adjustments that you find natural?
[00:29:16] Dmitry: You mean the balance in Russia-China relations?
[00:29:20] Peter: That you can look at a map, you can look at material factors and say that Russia should occupy a certain spot within this system. But it seems not to. During the Soviet times, it was enormous and unavoidable. Nonetheless, there was an iron curtain on one side, and then the relations with China went off a cliff. Now, after an opening, a desperate desire to become part of the Western club, they've been forced to turn east, not purely for structural reasons, but also, because of very clear political clashes and incompatibilities. So, at what point do these structural factors prevail and harmony become established?
[00:30:03] Dmitry: Well, I mean, I would not say that it is about harmony. You say it's idealistic. I would say that, like any concepts, it's always a fake. Yes, looking at the map, just as you said, it seems to be natural. Not only looking at the map, but looking even on economy, right? Russian economy does not generate economic pull like in Soviet times, which can create some kind of socialist camp during the Cold War. It's not like a lot of countries in the world want to join a Russian-led alliance and become a part of Russian economic model. Belarus, probably. But if you speak with Central Asian states, they would say that, “We will prefer to have diversity. We want to have good relations with China and trade.” And by the way, trade of China with Central Asian states surpass Russian trade quite significantly. It's about $70 billion, while Russian trade over with Central Asian states is about 40 billion, which is quite a lot, of course. But Russia has no monopoly in economic relations, even with neighbors.
[00:31:27] Peter: So, the outlook looks bleak. Where do you go from here?
[00:31:30] Dmitry: Well, I think that we don't need to think in this categories because Russian foreign policy thinking was based on the idea that, as soon as Russia is a great power, it always needs a sphere of influence, it needs some kind of geoeconomic infrastructure around its borders, like satellites, I don't know, privileged economic partners, some kind of field where we can express our political and economic great-powerness.
But I think that the reality of the upcoming decades is that Russia is a huge and, yes, great power. We're still a huge country with nukes, with military technology, not only military, still quite a big economy because of raw materials and so on. But power without this traditional sphere of influence component with neighbors, which are rather partners than satellites or whatever. And we don't need to be a center of some kind of project. Imperial Russia was a center of, I don't know, Orthodoxy and Pan-Slavic world, tried to become.
Soviet Russia tried to be a center of global communist project. Russia of today is just mega-regional or multi-regional great power and is huge by itself. It could play a significant role, just fulfilling this role of bridge between East and West. Logistically, Russia, quite unavoidably, could be a part of this process. Of course, trade between Asia and the West have different roads. There are sea road, which is a key one. There are speculation about northern roads through the Arctic. It could become a perspective in the future because of global warming. But now, of course, it's relatively small. It's, of course, landscape, logistics, where, once again, there is a number of roads. But still, Russia would play a significant role, unavoidably, even if Russia would do nothing, because of geography. Of course, if we do something, developing partnerships with our neighbors, proposing some multinational projects, which would satisfy economically, not only us, but others, it will be even more successful.
It might be a strong source of national development in the upcoming decades, logistics plus the raw materials trade and a source of security. And here, of course, the military campaign in Ukraine declined this component of Russian structural power in the region because, yes, of course, Russia have a lot of experience, quite highly trained military and counter-terrorist practices. And from this perspective, Russian voice in Eurasian security, because logistics is one thing, but you also need to secure everything to keep political stability. As soon as America is withdrawing, there is somebody else to replace it. And it's not Russia itself. It's Russia, China, India, somebody else. And within this structure of many great powers and middle powers, Russia can play a very significant role. Of course, here…
[00:35:08] Peter: As a security provider.
[00:35:09] Dmitry: As a security provider. But of course, here, we stuck with Ukraine because after the beginning of the war in Ukraine, there is a lot of skepticism about Russian potential role in this aspect, because Russia is considered by some of the nations as a source of threat than a security provider. Of course, we have to acknowledge it. But I think we will be able to overcome this aspect, too.
[00:35:36] Peter: On the matter of logistics, you say that it's, unavoidable if you just look at the Russian territory, but the Arctic route is not very feasible now and will be a difficult proposition for years into the future. It seems it's not an easy transit route, even as ice begins to break up. There are, obviously, lots of goods just go by the sea route, through the Suez Canal, as you mentioned, avoiding Russia entirely. There are efforts, although they are complicated, to create land routes through Central Asia across the Caspian, through Turkey into Europe, in order to avoid Russia, once again. And whatever would go through Russia requires the creation of logistical infrastructure across an enormous territory that is lacking in that infrastructure.
[00:36:26] Dmitry: Yeah, you're right. We lack logistical infrastructure, this is true. But I would say that this is something towards the Russian government pay a lot of attention, especially now. I think that, after 2022, they paid even more attention to it. They construct a railroad between Moscow and Kazan, which, Kazan is a city in the south of, of Russia, right? It could potentially be a part of this logistical roads, which they didn't want to start for decades. I think the first speculation about that started in 2014. Finally, they started it.
There are a lot of logistical project in Central Asia supported by China, supported by Russia. And I think that what China and Russia try to do is to find a synergy between Chinese project, which are unavoidable. We understand that we cannot say that China don't go to Central Asia because it's like our yard, right? So, we try to find a synergy.
I am not very much worried about trans-Caspian roads and roads which tend to avoid Russia. You know, it's a political game. Maybe it's because I'm historian. I think in categories of decades or even centuries. It's a political game of the current period, concretely. And well, if we move to some technical problems, then I don't think that they could replace Russia as a logistical corridor. It could be an alternative, but definitely only one of the alternatives.
Strategically, I think it could not create a lot of problems. I never said that Russia would be a monopoly in terms of logistics between East and the West. It could be one of the corridors, which would have its own advantages and disadvantages. And this is good, because having different alternatives is always good, because once you have bad relations with one country, you can always have alternative in logistics, in raw materials.
[00:38:41] Peter: So, what would be the order of operations, in terms of pivoting to Asia, constructing infrastructure, logistical, and otherwise within Russia, resolving in some sense the Ukrainian crisis or lessening tensions with the West, some kind of ideological transformation where Russians go from wanting to be liberals or wanting to be Westerners to a cynical position to, now, something else, a civilization state, a Eurasian power, some kind of bridge people?
[00:39:17] Dmitry: If we speak about order of actions, let's put it like that. You raised up very fundamental questions. Honestly, I think that the top Russian intellectuals are thinking about all that stuff and still don't have a proper answer, probably. But I will try to come up with at least some kind of framework, or, as you said, possible order of actions.
I think, that, of course, some kind of stabilization of relations with the West would go first in the current situation, simply because the picture which we draw before that, Russia is a balancer and a transition state between East and the West, is based on ability to maneuver between these two big strategic and civilizational and geo-economic forces.
From this perspective, yes, I think that relations with the West go first, especially taking the consideration that, still, I don't know whether we have to mention it, Russia is a nuclear power and the United States of America is also a nuclear superpower. So, it's not only about geopolitics and geopolitical concepts, right, but it's also about a very concrete danger of clash and of potential escalation.
How Ukraine could be solved? I think the way to some kind of freezing this conflict, it started, but I think, still, the Russian and Western and Ukrainian understanding of the configuration of this peace or freezing, still quite different. I think it would be a very difficult process.
But of course, if you ask what I would recommend to Russian government, I would never recommend it just to give up everything. Once you are engaged in the fight, was it a right decision or was it a not right decision? Unfortunately, there is a political logic which you cannot avoid. Of course, Russia would have to bargain a lot. It would have to try to achieve, at least, something from the very basic demands. It's announced at the beginning of this conflict. Russia hardly would be able to change the European security system. But, at least, some kind of security guarantees from the West, which might stabilize the security relations in Europe.
For Russia, the key security challenge is the expansion of NATO, of course. It's a stabilization of expansion of NATO to the post-Soviet space, I think that would be very critical. Probably, additionally, there should be some kind of dialogue about arms control in Europe, including, not only strategic arms control, but also conventional forces, too, because it's very important to avoid a major arms race in Europe, like it used to be during the Cold War in the next decade, I think. That's, at least, my personal understanding of the situation.
I think that continuation of confrontation with the West, is pretty unavoidable by the political logic, of course. You cannot just say, “Well, okay, conflict is over.” We think that we can do business as usual. But at least, a stable cold peace in the West, for Russia would open a way for implementation of the initiatives and projects I mentioned before, this continuation of turn to Eurasia, because you said that West Russia confrontation make an impulse to Russian turn to the east, right?
But it also creates a lot of barriers, because, even in terms of financial infrastructure, for Russia, it is sometimes very difficult to develop the trade relations with, even, neighbor countries. Even the Chinese companies are reluctant to develop relations with Russian companies sometimes because of sanctions, because of their general political climate. When a country is at war, this economic and geo-economic initiatives, it's very difficult to implement, simply because your partners just think, “Well, what's going on with this country? Maybe it's going to be defeated or whatever. You never know.”
[00:43:47] Peter: Well, and resources are required in one particular area and cannot be redirected elsewhere.
[00:43:52] Dmitry: Yes, sure. Yeah, and we see the structural changes in Russian economy because more military equipment, we now suffer from lack of labor force because of that. And it's all anomalies which are created by the wartime period.
Of course, if we freeze up the confrontation in West, probably, it will open a way for a more effective implementation of this turn to the East. And I think that the ideological story should be part of the recommendation, partially, because it's necessary to find out a new identity of Russia. For centuries, we consider ourselves as a Western country.
Yes, it created conflicts, because Russians always puzzle themselves, right? We are Westerners, but we are like abnormal Westerners.
So, from this perspective, I think that, yes, for Russian society, it would be quite important to come up with an idea that we are not Westerners anymore and it does not mean that we are anti-Westerners. That's important.
In Russia, for centuries, if you're not Westerners, you're anti-Westerners. We generate our identity through relations with the West. And there were two, absolutely, opposite poles. So, from this perspective, this understanding that non-Westernists doesn't need anti-Westernists, that Russia could be just Russia, a huge country between East and West, Eurasian country, right? Eurasia is something huge, which is not Asian, not European, but at the same time, both, right? It’s…
[00:45:40] Peter: Also, not a self-evident idea. So, on one hand, you can define yourself against the West, as part of the West or rejection of the West. But defining yourself as being between Asia and Europe is also not a simple task and also doesn't provide its own content. You're, neither X nor Y, neither hot nor cold. So, where do you get the ideological substance?
[00:46:07] Dmitry: It’s a difficult question. I think that I cannot answer to your question in a complex way, because I honestly don't have this idea in my pocket. But what the government do, officially, and what society do, just naturally, because there are changes in the heads of simple Russians, which are probably even more fundamental than all that political narratives. And we will find out what they generate in their heads, right?
[00:46:41] Peter: I'm going to China in a couple days. The Chinese, many of my interlocutors there are convinced that Russia is fundamentally, essentially, a Western country, and that there are internecine battles that occur often, but that as soon as there is an opening back to the West. As soon, perhaps, as this Ukrainian conflict is resolved, Russia will come crawling back to Europe and forget about China.
[00:47:08] Dmitry: I think that they still cannot forget the Boxer Rebellion and our role in it. That's why they say that we are Western country. Well, it’s a joke.
But I think that they partially are right, because, of course for us, Europe is much more understandable than China, let's be honest. Because of language, because of culture. Majority of population, they perfectly know who is Frank Sinatra or Byron, right? But they could hardly tell you any Chinese writer and any Chinese, except for Xi Jinping, probably. From this perspective, I think that, culturally, Russia would be still pretty much attached to Europe. But it totally doesn't mean that, you know, the cultural attachment should copy the geo-economic and the geopolitical attachment. Look at Central Asian states, for instance, right? They're much smaller and they also develop this Central Asian or Eurasian identity. People from Kazakhstan, from Uzbekistan, they would rather speak English and they would understand the intellectual background of Europe in a much better way than of Asia, for instance, even despite from Western point of view, they are Asians.
[00:48:32] Peter: Well, perhaps. I mean, Central Asia is arguable. They're much more of a crossroad. They are part of the Islamic world.
[00:48:38] Dmitry: But Russia is also a part of the Islamic world. In 2050, at least one-third of the Russian population will be Muslims, maybe even more, because of demography. And from this perspective, it would be very difficult to say that Russia is just a Christianic country. Yes, Christianity was a very important part of Russian identity. This is a great question, by the way, because it's not even about geopolitics, it's about our domestic affairs, how we will develop this new identity.
[00:49:13] Peter: That it will just occur naturally as a result of demographic shifts.
[00:49:18] Dmitry: Yeah, it's a result of demographic shift. Three decades ago, Muslim society was only in the Caucasus and in some other southern regions of Russia. And it was a total minority, of course. And from this perspective, yes, Russia was a Christianic country. The president, always, was in the cathedral, at all the holidays. But now, the situation is changing quite fundamentally and all the demographic prognosis says that the share of the Muslim population in Russia would grow dramatically in the upcoming decades.
[00:49:54] Peter: So, this could create a new Eurasian synthesis.
[00:49:57] Dmitry: Yes.
[00:49:57] Peter: Or it could lead to a national crisis if these groups prove to be incompatible once the numbers shift.
[00:50:02] Dmitry: This is true. This is true, yes. If it is a inter-religious conflict inside Russia, like it used to be, for instance, in India, and still, relations between Muslims and traditional population in India is quite difficult, right, it could be a challenge, not only for Russia, but for the whole region because it might pose a destabilization.
So, from this perspective, the creation of some of this new, you can call it Eurasian, you can call it whatever, right? The new identity. We still have discussions about what kind of identity should be. It’s a task, not only for geopolitical orientation or reorientation, right? But it's also a task for domestic transformation and domestic peace.
That's another argument, that Russia could not consider itself only Western world. Because it might be a huge challenge if we want to consider ourselves Western in a progressive point of view. Because, of course, the Muslim traditionalism and the postmodern Western progressivism, well, it's a very, very contradicting story, right? And from this perspective, it would be very difficult for Russia to develop its identity from these two perspectives.
[00:51:23] Peter: We've gone off on a few tangents. So, we try to get back to the discussion about the order of operations. So, first step is, somehow, resolve or freeze the kinetic conflict in Ukraine and embed that within some larger security architecture, which is necessarily going to be a compromise and not fully satisfactory for the indefinite future. That will allow Russia to further pursue its geo-economic pivot to the East. Meanwhile, Russia's identity transforms to reflect this new more balanced Eurasian position. And then, momentum takes over and everybody lives happily ever after.
[00:52:20] Dmitry: Well, I don't think that the reality is so positive. We have a conflict with the West, which is a hot conflict. It creates vulnerability. We need, somehow, at some point, of course, finish it.
The Russian political leadership, of course, wants to finish it on a more privileged conditions. We will see what would be the reality. But anyway, it could not continue for the whole eternity. And somehow, we need to work with it. And this is the highest priority.
Another challenge is, of course, the transformation of Russian foreign economic ties and geo-economic orientation. The process which started in 2012, as we mentioned, this pivoting to the East, should continue, of course. This is a second option.
And the third challenge, yes, this is about identity, and it make us think about some kind of new ideology or, I don't know, some kind of, at least, understanding who we are. But we have a lot of risks, because, for instance, if we speak about relations with the West, it's very idealistic that, well, we freeze up Ukraine, and then it will be some kind of stable, almost peaceful relationship, like it used to be in the ‘70s, for instance, after they signed the Helsinki Accords.
I think it would be much more vulnerable. And the source of this vulnerability, from my point of view, is very simple. West and Soviet Union were able to stabilize their relations in the ‘70s, not because Russia threat the West by nukes and American elites terrified by the Cuban Missile Crisis, decided, “Oh, they're so crazy, we need peace,” right?
No. It was a very complex story. I think that the key driver of the Western readiness to have stable relations with Soviet Union, like it used to be in the ‘70s… and in Russia, it's still considered to be an ideal relations with the West. ‘70s, it's like a model of our dream of our relations with the West. They respect us, even fear us, right? And we have peace.
But the problem with that, it was not only about nuclear story. I think the more important story that the West just understood that the Soviet Union is going to be a part of reality for quite a lot of time. Because before that, in the ‘40s and in the '50s, there were still ideas that, “Well, we don't know how the political system is going to work. Stalin is going to die. What, what's going to be next,” like George Kennan said.
And it was still a lot of speculations about Soviet economy after World War II, right? Devastated, well, after the huge damage produced by war, how they're going to survive. In the ‘60s, it became already understandable that, okay, they can somehow transfer power. They have a more or less sustainable economy. They're not going to disappear, right? And they produce arms. They can actually produce equal number of nuclear capacities, conventional capacities, even surpasses in some spheres, and do not collapse once again. Well, I think that we need to negotiate, right?
In the current state of affairs, I don't see understanding in the West that they consider the current Russia, as a part of reality which could not disappear at some point.
I think that, in the current Western understanding, at least in the foreign policy establishment in Washington and Brussels, the idea that, well, it's Putin's Russia, once he, I don't know, die or just retire, what's going on with Russia? Maybe it collapses, like it collapse in 1991. Nobody knows what is going on with Russian economy. We put sanctions on them, right? Now, they grew 3% of GDP. What's next? Maybe indicates Russian economy would suffer so much, that, once again, it’s going to collapse.
So, there is no total assurance that Russia is going to sustain as a great power. It will not disappear, of course, but it can decline pretty dramatically. And we have such an example just several decades ago.
[00:57:03] Peter: And so long as there is a hope in the West that Russia might collapse.
[00:57:07] Dmitry: Yeah. Why you need to negotiate with a power which can just decline or disappear or whatever, right? We need just to wait. The more we wait, the more chances that it’s going to collapse. I think that the logic is like that. I think that, in Russia, there is no such an understanding of this aspect, because the lessons we got from the Cold War is that, once we use nuclear threatening and once we use military capacities, the West, feared and terrified by this perspective, start to negotiate with us. There was a Cuban missile crisis and they started to move toward some kind of negotiations and then agreements. There was a Russia-Georgia war and they start resets and try to come up with a new formula with Russia.
I think that this is a huge source of possible escalation and possible vulnerabilities in Russia-West relations, because truly, Russia think that it demands about its status, about its security, about its possible, even, small sphere of influence, like, Belarus, maybe some, some other closer states. If not sphere of influence, at least security belts, right? They are legitimate. The West should respect them. And if the West don't want to take it, then we will try to terrify the West.
While the West thinks that the demands are totally not legitimate, because even if we give it to Russia, it can just collapse. So, why do we need to satisfy these demands? And Russia thinks that the Western unreadiness to compromise, is a result of foolishness or arrogance. It's not a result of some kind of analytical calculations. “The West is just arrogant. They do not consider us serious. Then, we need to go hard, right?” Even more. And finally, at some stage, they will take us seriously.
I think that's a very dangerous story. And when you ask me what kind of problems could be in implementation of this idealistic picture, Russia, Eurasian state between East and the West, I think this is one of the key problems. Russia-West relations are still trapped by its very difficult history and very complicated strategic relations.
[00:59:48] Peter: That the West keeps waiting for Russia, at least, Putin's Russia, to collapse; whereas, Russia keeps waiting for the West to take its threats and military actions seriously.
[01:00:00] Dmitry: Yeah, not only keeps waiting, but do something to make this process faster, right? The West, of course, think that if it pressures Russia more, then we can speed up the process of Russian decline because Russia is a declining power. And Russia think that, if we escalate, continue, for instance, war in Ukraine, continue nuclear escalation, then it can speed up Western understanding of Russia, right?
Finally, finally, I think we unavoidably reached some kind of compromise because that's a very simple story. Russia would not disappear, right? And the West, well, the West is not so foolish, I think. And at some stage, it will just understand that dealing with Russia is much more effective strategy than just pressuring.
But what would happen when we reach this situation? It depends on politicians. And we see that there is a high possibility of a lot of, let's say, black swans, especially taking into consideration the huge domestic struggle, both in the United States of America and in Europe.
And possibly, domestic struggle in Russia in 15 years, right? Because our system is very centralized and personalistic, but Vladimir Putin is not eternal. We also have to take it into consideration, right? These struggles just open a way for bringing chaos to relations between Russia and the West, which I consider to be the key security threat.
[01:01:48] Peter: Let's end on chaos, then.
Thanks for listening to the Monterey Trialogue Podcast. Make sure to subscribe to the show, so you don’t miss out on any episodes. I’m Peter Slezkine.
The Monterey Trialogue Podcast is hosted by the Middlebury Institute of International Studies and produced by University FM.