This week, our guest is Dmitry Stefanovich, a research fellow at the Center for International Security at the Russian Academy of Sciences. We discuss recent revisions to Russia’s nuclear doctrine, deterrence during the war in Ukraine, Russian red lines, and the evolution of Chinese nuclear policy.
This week, our guest is Dmitry Stefanovich, a research fellow at the Center for International Security at the Russian Academy of Sciences. We discuss recent revisions to Russia’s nuclear doctrine, deterrence during the war in Ukraine, Russian red lines, and the evolution of Chinese nuclear policy.
*The Trialogue Podcast is hosted by the Stimson Center and produced by University FM.
(Transcripts may contain a few typographical errors due to audio quality during the podcast recording.)
[00:00:00] Peter Slezkine: Hi all! A quick announcement before we start the episode. Some of you may have noticed slight changes to the podcast name, intro, and logo, and that we haven’t released many episodes in the last couple of months. I’ve been in the process of moving from Middlebury to the Stimson Center, where I’m now a senior fellow and director of the Russia program and of the Trialogue Project.
I’d like to express tremendous gratitude to Middlebury for helping to launch this podcast. And at the same time, I’m very excited to have Stimson host this show, going forward.
One final note: if you’re in the extended Stimson network and have just discovered the Trialogue podcast, please take the time to look through the library of existing episodes. We’ve published interviews with 12 fantastic guests from the U.S., Russia, China, and one from Uzbekistan. And we mostly discussed broad trends rather than current events. So, none of the episodes should be past their expiration date.
With that, on to the episode.
I'm Peter Slezkine, Director of the U.S.-Russia-China Trialogue Project at the Stimson Center. Since the middle of the 20th century, relations among the United States, Russia, and China have had an enormous impact on each country separately and on the world as a whole. The purpose of the trialogue is to better understand this extraordinarily complex and consequential relationship by directly engaging with experts from all three countries.
So, today, our guest is Dmitry Stefanovich, research fellow in the Center for International Security at IMEMO in the Russian Academy of Sciences. Welcome to the podcast.
[00:01:32] Dmitry Stefanovich: Hello. It's an honor to be here with you. And I hope I will be able to tell someone something interesting.
[00:01:39] Peter Slezkine: Fantastic. So, just to clarify, we are doing this virtually. I am in D.C. — actually, Western Virginia. You are in Moscow. So, let's begin, as we typically do, with the origin story. So, were you born in Moscow? Where did you grow up? And how did you get interested in nukes, missiles, rockets, and so forth?
[00:01:59] Dmitry Stefanovich: Well, in fact, I wasn't born in Moscow. I was born in Odesa, which is now, clearly, a contested territory, to put it bluntly. But I studied at the International Relations Institute at the Moscow Engineering Physics Institute, which might sound a bit strange, but the idea was to, basically, get people that have education, both in international affairs and also in some technologies.
And then, eventually, I got interested in, like, international security. I've spent some time not doing anything related to international security after my graduation. I was involved, for example, with the Sochi Olympics. And that also let me broaden my, well, perspectives on international arena and got quite acquainted with a number of foreign experts.
[00:02:54] Peter Slezkine: What were you doing at the Sochi Olympics?
[00:02:56] Dmitry Stefanovich: Well, actually, I was involved in transport services. Personally, I was in charge of governmental relations. So, I was like an intermediary between different stakeholders. But then, when I once again became involved in public expertise, I was cooperating a lot with the Russian International Affairs Council and I've got involved in a lot of track two dialogues and stuff like that. And then, around 2019, I've decided to switch to academia full-time.
[00:03:29] Peter Slezkine: So, to backtrack a bit to the biographical beginning, when did you leave Odesa?
[00:03:35] Dmitry Stefanovich: It was almost immediately after my birth. My father was studying in Odesa and he met my mother there. So, it was, like, in the ‘80s.
[00:03:42] Peter Slezkine: Do you have relatives on your mother's side who still live in Odesa?
[00:03:47] Dmitry Stefanovich: There are my family, friends, and so on. But before 2020, before COVID, my mother still visited, and even my wife and my kids went there. And before 2014, I personally went there every year. So, all these current situation has a very direct personal dimension.
[00:04:08] Peter Slezkine: You, in your formal studies, must have read a lot about deterrence theory, but now, in the last three years, we have had quite a bit of practical experience with major war, involving a nuclear power directly and others indirectly. So, how has this war changed your understanding of nuclear deterrence?
[00:04:29] Dmitry Stefanovich: Well, actually, I'm in the camp of those who believe that it still works, but it's not a magic wand. It's not a silver bullet. It cannot solve all of your problems. And another thing is that it works both ways. So, while Russian nuclear capabilities deter our adversaries from doing some stuff, their nuclear capabilities also deter Russia from doing some good stuff.
And it's not a bug, it's a feature. It's, by design, it works this way. And it's quite understandable that there are people who are not happy with how it is working because they would like it to be more effective for you and less effective for your adversary. But again, it will never happen.
The interesting thing is that how, like, added layers of deterrence work and how they will evolve, like, strategic deterrence, non-nuclear deterrence things, integrated deterrence, as our American counterparts now call it. Because, clearly, there is an… there should be, at least, a re-evaluation of what can and cannot be achieved through non-nuclear capabilities, no matter how strategic you perceive those capabilities, because we've had, like, an example when a strategic non-nuclear attack led to achieving political goals in former Yugoslavia from the native perspective.
[00:05:55] Peter Slezkine: Wait, how do you define a strategic non-nuclear attack? What does that mean for laymen?
[00:05:59] Dmitry Stefanovich: It's basically when you use long-range precision fires to take out strategic infrastructure of your adversary, like, military infrastructure and also some industrial capabilities, transport infrastructure. You achieve some sort of strategic effects that basically changed the course of the conflict dramatically. And like in Yugoslavia, NATO achieved it in Iraq, to some extent. But if you look, for example, in Syria where there was also plenty of strategic long-range strikes, it was not that impressive. In Ukraine, clearly, while there are quite significant consequences of Russian employment of the things that were called strategic non-nuclear weapons, the effects are, I wouldn't call them marginal, but they are… given that there are no end to this conflict, to this day, at least when we are recording this podcast, clearly, it is not as strategic as people have perceived these capabilities.
[00:07:03] Peter Slezkine: And you're referring mostly to strategic strikes on energy infrastructure.
[00:07:08] Dmitry Stefanovich: On energy infrastructure, yes. Clearly, on some of the military infrastructure, military production. Actually, there have been a lot of debates on the Russian side. There are questions that probably will remain unanswered for decades on what was the concept behind how Russian long-range cruise missiles and ballistic missiles were used in the conflict throughout all these 1,000-plus days. Like, what was the task of the strikes in this period of time, in that period of time? To some extent, probably, these long-range strikes helped to blunt the Ukrainian counter-offensive in 2023, because clearly, they were aimed at some stockpiles and so on.
But still, it is clearly quite hard to deter something from happening through strictly non-nuclear means because non-nuclear weapons do not produce such immediate destructive effects as nuclear weapons. The main difference is not, like, the total scale of destruction, but the time frame of this destruction. And like one thing, is, if you destroy a city in a month, in several months, or in half a year, you will be destroying it, and then you can destroy it in a blink of an eye. So, this is why nuclear weapons have much greater deterrent effects. And I hope that no charge, at least, has any doubts that there is this difference.
[00:08:39] Peter Slezkine: Do you think we were ever really close to nuclear use at any point in the last three years? Or when were we closest?
[00:08:49] Dmitry Stefanovich: I think that it’s really hard to find a point because we were closed even before 24th, but after 24th of February, we switched to another stage of coming closer to nuclear threshold on this fictional letter. Then, after 24th of February, 2022, I think that there were several cases when officials from both Russian side and Western side started to talk about nuclear stuff. For example, in spring 2022, with all these… from my perspective, not very dramatic, but very impressive for the Russian leadership comments from, I think, from Leo Strauss from the UK, they should really like to press the button. And then Russian switched to this so-called special mode of combat duty. Then, I'm still not sure what happened in autumn 2022, because there was this, well, I would call it hysteria, especially in the Western media, about possible Russian nuclear use. It might have been related to those successes from the Ukrainian side. And under such circumstances, I can imagine that some people had some evidence and some conference rooms in Russia were discussing, like, maybe this offensive can be blunted by nuclear use, because it's their task to consider all options.
And clearly, the decision was made that, now, it shouldn't be the case. Actually, we can refer to other cases like in the Gulf War. The U.S. also thought about nuclear use. In the Vietnam War, in Afghanistan, from the Soviet Union, also, like, nuclear use. It was an option that was, like, people thought, like, you have this capability, let's think, maybe we can use it. And the answer was, you can't use it.
Then we've also had other events that made people nervous. For example, the discussions, the ideas from the French about possible deployment of troops. There were also, with Finland and Sweden joining NATO, now, there was, like, reactivation of talks about possible blockade of the Gulf of Finland or routes between Russia and Kaliningrad. But at the same time, now, we have a very specific provision in a revised nuclear doctrine or fundamentals of state policy on nuclear deterrence about blockade of certain regions of the Russian territory. It’s definitely related to all these talks that we've heard.
[00:11:30] Peter Slezkine: You just mentioned the revised nuclear doctrine. So, let's address that directly. So, not long ago, a new Russian nuclear doctrine was issued. What are the major changes or innovations that you see?
[00:11:44] Dmitry Stefanovich: I think I'll start with the continuity. So, it's not as dramatic as, definitely, some people would like it to be, both in Russia and elsewhere. There are a lot of similar formulas there as they were in 2020. But there are also some changes. One of them, as I've said, about, like, the military dangers that should be addressed through nuclear deterrence is the blockade of certain parts of Russian territory. But the two biggest things is, one, is that, now, nuclear deterrence covers Belarus fully as a part of a union state, which was very much expected, especially after deployment of Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons to Belarus. And it's definitely something that was, I personally believe that, Minsk was into driver's seat, in that regard, because they really wanted to have this nuclear umbrella over them. So, this is one thing.
Another important thing is that some people, quite smartly, call it reversed Article 5, so, basically, an attack by any NATO state on Russia will be considered a whole of NATO attack on Russia. And another important thing is that, which is also not really new, but I think, for the first time, it is qualified in this way, is that so-called negative security guarantees that nuclear weapon state will not threaten or use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear state are not applicable on the cases where non-nuclear weapon state is carrying out aggressive actions against Russia with support from a nuclear weapon state or being allied with a nuclear weapon state. So, I'm not sure that anyone, actually, had any doubts that it is the case, but now we have it on paper.
But there are also some quite strange, from my perspective, things like putting major military exercises near Russian borders in a list of those military dangers to be addressed through nuclear deterrence. Then, we've also added to the list of specific conditions for nuclear use the detection of massive strike by means of airspace attack, like uncrewed aerial vehicles, tactical aviation, cruise missiles on Russian territory. And I've thought that it will be basically a broadening of another provision about detection of ballistic missile launch against territory of Russia rationalized. But it turned out to be two separate points. And while the old one with ballistic missile launches was, in this point, both Russian territory and territory of Russian allies is covered. But the new one, with all other means of airspace attack, they cover only Russian territory, which is a bit strange to me.
[00:14:45] Peter Slezkine: So, what is the distinction? There's different territory is covered when it comes to ballistic or non-ballistic missile attacks.
[00:14:56] Dmitry Stefanovich: Yes. And this is quite strange to me. Let's wait and see, maybe there will be some more clarifications, public statements. Another interesting thing is that the most direct cause for nuclear use, which is, I think, shared by all nuclear weapon states, is about using nuclear weapons in response to attack with nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction on the territory of Russia or Russian allies. But now, it also covers Russian forces and military bases abroad or overseas, which is, again, not something totally unexpected, but quite interesting. I think it majorly relates to bases in Syria, if they will remain Russian, or maybe some new bases that will be established elsewhere. Again, it's interesting that they've added this language.
But, you know, what is the most peculiar thing about this document is that, now, we have, like, second public version of it. And probably, I wouldn't guess how many… not public versions were there before. But as time flies, we have more and more details about Russian nuclear deterrence, at least, formal part about Russian declaratory policy in the field of nuclear deterrence.
And I think that It's simply unique, if we look at nuclear weapon states, to have such a detailed document with such detailed conditions and the missions for nuclear deterrence, because, like, in the U.S. it's much simpler and broader and much more vague than what we have in Russia. And, like, you live happily with that. In France, it's also not that detailed, but in Russia, we somehow decided to have this list. And while, to some extent, it might enhance nuclear deterrence, like, there will be a clear understanding, what is Russia afraid of and what you shouldn't do if you don't want to cross the nuclear threshold, but to some malign actors, it might be like a blueprint of what you can try to do and see what happens next.
[00:17:02] Peter Slezkine: So, you're saying that it allows Russian adversaries, it gives them a clear indication of just how many problems they can cause for Russia before they enter risky territory.
[00:17:14] Dmitry Stefanovich: Yeah, this is a challenge. And I would also say that some of the stuff that is written in the document, I think it can be tested without immediately triggering nuclear response. And this will be a challenge in the future. But here, I would like to make a link again with non-nuclear deterrence and, like, general military capabilities, is that one thing that is very important to understand, and I hope many people understand it in Russia and in other countries, that, as I've said, you cannot solve all your problems, all your military problems, with nuclear capabilities. You need to have a general purpose military.
There are quite a number of interesting metaphors that have been introduced recently by some of the observers and experts. For example, nuclear deterrence is a kind of immunity for the state as a body, which means that, yes, you can get sick, but with nuclear deterrence, you will probably stay alive. Another thing is that, if you look, for example, at sports, you can have better results if you use some prohibitive substances, but it doesn't mean that you don't need to train, that you don't need, like, to practice and so on.
So, the idea is that nuclear deterrence is very important. Nuclear capabilities will help you to achieve better results or to survive, but they are not the ultimate source of security. You need to develop other sorts of capabilities, including strictly non-military capabilities. And this is quite a challenge.
[00:18:53] Peter Slezkine: Well, and Russia clearly is deploying the rest of its military arsenal quite forcefully at the moment. And the nuclear instrument remains in the background, and it's difficult to tell how effective this immune system or artificial enhancement has been. You were talking about the difference in nuclear doctrines between Russia now and other nuclear powers, France, the U.S, etc. how much more detailed the Russian one has become. Isn't that just a product of the Ukraine war, that, for the U.S., nuclear weapons obviously exist in the background, but deterrence has never been tested quite as it has been now in the case of Russia? That Russia is fighting a war on its border, it is wielding the nuclear weapon, there have been all sorts of implicit thresholds, and now, after three years, this doctrine puts on paper the experience that the Kremlin has had over the course of this war, that, in some sense, it's a doctrine that is supposed to look forward and set expectations for the future, but, in many cases, just reflects the experiences from the last few years.
[00:20:04] Dmitry Stefanovich: To some extent, yes, it's definitely a reflection on the realities that we face throughout the special military operation. But the 2020 version was already quite detailed, which is uncommon. And so, the reality is that there are a lot of things going on in the nuclear domain. And credit where credit is due, for example, but the Nuclear Posture Review by the previous Trump administration in 2018, it was a horrible document, but it reminded a lot of people that, well, nuclear weapons are there and they will not go away.
[00:20:43] Peter Slezkine: Why was it a horrible document?
[00:20:45] Dmitry Stefanovich: Well, first, it was rolled out horribly. For example, I think there are still publications comparing, like, the mistakes that were fixed throughout the first few days after it was rolled out. It has a lot of very strange misconceptions about, for example, Russian nuclear doctrine and the Chinese nuclear doctrine and stuff like that. And then it also provides for quite a broad set of circumstances for the American nuclear use. And there were parts that were clearly written by different people under different circumstances. Then some parts were cut off. I think it's in the community that's generally perceived as a document that could have been written in a much more concise manner.
But first, it brought back the public attention, the attention of the international community, the attention of everyone to the fact that there are nuclear weapons, they remain there, there are modernization programs, and there are people who are thinking how to use those.
And the minor thing is this whole idea about fictional Russian doctrine of escalate to de-escalate that were to be addressed by the U.S. through deployment of low-yield warheads for trident submarine launched ballistic missiles, which is a different topic. But nevertheless, I'm absolutely sure that it was one of the reasons why Russia come up with a public version of the basic principles or the fundamentals of state policy of nuclear deterrence, just to sort things out. Like, that's how we see it.
Interesting thing, if you're speaking about all this idea of escalation for de-escalation, there is one paragraph in the Russian document that was in 2020 and that remains in 2024, is that nuclear deterrence might help Russia to end the conflict, not on Russian terms, but on, like, acceptable terms. And some people were running in circles with this paragraph, like, “See, it means escalate to de-escalate.” But my personal reading, that it should be, as with many other documents, you can't take, like, a single paragraph and use it as a justification for all your concepts, because there are another paragraph that was in the previous version and remains now, is that nuclear deterrence works continuously like at peacetime, during conflict, and so on, all the way to nuclear use.
So, after nuclear use, we enter some uncharted waters. We have no idea what happens next. So, again, I might be doing some wishful thinking here, but it seems that, at least on paper, our government does not believe that you can restore nuclear deterrence through nuclear use. And this is different from the way American officials and American scholars think about U.S. nuclear deterrence. For example, there were relatively recent comments by senior strategic command officers who said that, basically, you need to retain some sort of nuclear arsenal after nuclear exchange and you need to achieve victory in a nuclear war just to… so everyone will see you as a leader of the free world afterwards, which is, probably, he has to say it this way, but it's quite a nerving attitude.
The worst thing is that all these ideas that people, over the ocean, play with, here, they're perceived not as ideas but as some sort of maligned plan to achieve the strategic defeat, as we call it here, and is a challenge if you want to find a way out of the current crisis.
[00:24:35] Peter Slezkine: But what do you mean? I mean, in Moscow, presumably, nobody believes that the U.S. would use nuclear weapons in this conflict. I mean, it's so far from American shores. It would be very difficult to imagine a scenario where the U.S. would want a nuclear exchange with this as the reason for starting such a process.
[00:24:54] Dmitry Stefanovich: No, I'm saying that, if people in Moscow see that there are people in Washington thinking about prevailing, even in nuclear conflict, then, clearly, in non-nuclear conflict, you also see, like, some sort of ultimate victory.
The good thing is that, this very same official, he, I think it was CSIS event, he was very clear that they understand the challenge of achieving some sort of victory but also not crossing the nuclear threshold. So, like, that they need to find an exact amount of pressure on the adversary. And he didn't say that it was about Russia and Ukraine, but it seemed that it is the case. The right level of pressure, but not to cross the nuclear threshold. And yeah, it's a challenge. And it is a challenge for us as well. But the problem is that, if decision-makers here believe that the U.S. is using Ukraine as a people with spears against Russia, then probably, eventually, we'll come up with a situation that we need to hit, not the arrow, but the archer.
[00:26:04] Peter Slezkine: So, what is the point of nuclear doctrines and detailed statements in this context? You said that the Trump document was terribly written, full of objective mistakes, but nonetheless important because it reminded everyone of the extraordinarily important reality of nuclear weapons. The Russian document is extremely detailed and outlines all sorts of specifics, but nonetheless, it seems the truly significant fact is that there are nuclear weapons that may or may not be used in situations that are hard for us to imagine. So, is there beyond, kind of, the political exercise or the interest among experts, any real significance to the publication of such documents in terms of deterrence?
[00:26:54] Dmitry Stefanovich: Well, in terms of deterrence, but not only. First, in terms of deterrence, again, as we've just discussed, it basically gives some sort of insight into thinking about deterrence by your adversary. And then you may test these assumptions, which may end badly; but also, you may understand, like, what to do and what not to do.
But even more importantly, it provides, like, a ground, a foundation for discussion of these issues. And luckily, we have empirical evidence that there was a discussion after publication of Russian document, there were discussion of nuclear doctrines on the level of P5 or nuclear 5. They've met and they've specifically discussed nuclear doctrines. Clearly, it was more of a Russian side explaining the Russian doctrine to others and answering their questions and so on. So, this is one thing.
And then again, while it might be quite sad reality, especially for disarmament community, for example, that, like, the Nuclear Five is discussing how to enhance deterrence among themselves, not how to disarm, but looking at the state of the world today, it is still quite a useful development.
But what is also important, at least in the Russian case, but I think in the U.S. case as well, such documents are used for defense planning, for budgetary process, for all sorts of things that basically make the bureaucracy work and things like that. So, this is not only, like, a signaling document. It is also a strategic planning document. And in Russia, we actually have, like, a law on strategic planning with such a type of document specifically listed as a basis for strategic planning in the field of defense.
In other countries, it might be different. For example, we know that, in France, one of the major sources of understanding of the French nuclear policy is the regular speeches by the president, not some sort of accounting document. In UK, they also have different approaches. In China, like, they have no first use, and everything they do is to enhance the practices that were originally established under Mao and Zhou Enlai and things like that, which might be not entirely true, but that's the way that they do.
[00:29:26] Peter Slezkine: We'll get to China in a moment, but let's move from official statements to unofficial, briefly. You had mentioned earlier various American experts making statements that worried the Russians. There have been Russians who have made statements that have worried the Americans. Sergei Karaganov, in the summer of 2023, suggested in an article that Russia could seriously escalate toward the nuclear threshold and even consider using a nuke in Europe, and the rest of the world would forgive it, and so on. So, what was the reaction among the expert community in Moscow to that article?
[00:30:03] Dmitry Stefanovich: In summer of 2023, yes, Sergey Karaganov definitely made quite impressive wave, both in Russia and abroad. And there were quite significant discussion on our side. And me and some of my colleagues also published some article in response.
Well, the important thing that this discussion did not start with Karaganov, but he probably made the most loud contribution to this debate. And others like Trenin, like Timofeev, or Lukyanov, they've also contributed to this debate, which is, to some extent, a good thing in terms of person know several Western experts who are surprised there is such a vibrant expert discussion on such a significant topic in Russia these days.
[00:31:00] Peter Slezkine: Well, so, how would you describe the state of the debate now, a year or two on, and your contribution to it?
[00:31:08] Dmitry Stefanovich: I think that the results of the debate are, on paper, we have revised the foundations of state policies. So, it can be said, like, a more or less final outcome. But then, we also have other comments, other statements, for example, the ratification of comprehensive test ban treaty and comments by a number of senior Russian officials that we might come back to nuclear testing.
And while the highest official line is that we will not come back to live nuclear testing, the trend is not really positive. Then, we have use of new dual capable weapons, like, I guess, intermediate range ballistic missile, which also definitely have a nuclear variant. And again, it is also some sort of escalatory step. But at the same time, we see that all these moves can be considered not that impressive for the other side. Like, we have this lifting of, at least, some of the limits of use of long-range Western made munitions against, like, internationally recognized Russian territory.
But if you ask me personally, I say that, again, this shows that nuclear deterrence isn't perfect, but it works, because if we look at the level of, or intensity of debates in Washington and elsewhere, at least, judging by the, including by recent publications, in the media, it looks like, yes, people understand that there is a nuclear threat, that they can cross a nuclear threshold and can come up with a serious nuclear escalation. So, yes, this debate, it does work. It doesn't work perfectly. All these actions, they involve very real people with their, to some extent, quite rigid thinking about how the world functions, how the state functions, how the adversary state functions.
And here, I would like to say that it seems that we have a huge issue of lack of mutual understanding and empathy. There are so many misperceptions about each other and about each other's societies, each other's governments, that exist.
[00:33:35] Peter Slezkine: Well, can you name a few of the most significant?
[00:33:39] Dmitry Stefanovich: I think one is that, probably, some people in Russia consider that, if we come up with, like, nuclear saber, the West will back off immediately, and that this whole conflict is much more important for Russia than for the West. And personally, I think that, as an expert, as a part of a strategic community, I was not vocal enough in explaining how this is very important for our adversaries, that Russian military action will be met with quite significant response and increased support for Ukraine.
Another from the West, is that, definitely, people believe that these sanctions from hell will somehow undermine Russian leadership and lead to societal unrest and the destruction of Russian economy. Actually, this is what I've said in spring 2022 numerous times to some of my American counterparts, that almost everything that was done on this field of sanctions, it led to the entirely opposite result. It led to railing around the flag. So, it was because it was explicitly aimed not at the decision-makers but at the whole of the Russian society, whole of the Russian state. The point is that the perception of dynamics within Russian society and Russian economy, it was totally wrong from the West.
Why has it happened? Well, I think that COVID can be part of the blame, because, for several years, there was significant drop in person to person. You cannot sort out everything through Zoom, no matter how hard you try. And it definitely was not the only cause, because there was degradation in the level of communications on the official level, on the expert level, for several years, even before COVID. Clearly, there was a lack of understanding, lack of empathy, lack of trying to understand each other. There were, like, some people who tried harder than others, who tried to talk to everyone and to understand everything, but a rather small group. And they hope that this trend will be reversed because the consequences of such lack of understanding, they are enormous and they are quite bad for everyone.
[00:36:09] Peter Slezkine: In Russia, my sense is there are quite a few people who follow the war with great passion, who are terribly frustrated by Putin's red lines being announced and then crossed, or Medvedev, or whoever else is making terrible statements about the horrible repercussions that the West will face if it does X, Y, and Z. And then, inevitably, it does all of these things months, years later.
So, on the Russian side, there's a frustration that deterrence isn't working well enough, that a red line is drawn in the sand and then crossed by the other side. Whereas, in the U.S., there are quite a few people who are frustrated that Russian deterrence is working too well.
[00:36:48] Dmitry Stefanovich: Specifically, about red lines, I think this is where our guys could have done a better work, propaganda-wise, just explaining, like, what happened when this red line was crossed. And actually, the president himself, I think more than once, had to explain that the Ukrainians blew up, tried to blow up the Crimean bridge, so they've lost several power plants. And this action, reaction stuff, it's quite hard to draw lines. But coming back to the idea about frustration, when we see that the Russian Ministry of Defense says that they've carried out strikes against these targets in response to Ukrainian use of U.S. missiles, like everyone asks questions, why did you wait? So, basically, you are in a hot phase of conflict for several years. You have these targets. Why do you strike them in response, not before something happens?
[00:37:45] Peter Slezkine: Well, so going forward, what sort of politics of deterrence or public statements would you propose? Should red lines be drawn at all? Is that a useful exercise? If you don't really wish to escalate beyond a certain level, should it be a very strict annunciation of action reaction that, if one side does X, I will do Y, and there will be a tit for tat, so that everybody knows the rules? Should it be some kind of larger ambiguity so that nobody knows what the reaction might be and can imagine the worst?
[00:38:21] Dmitry Stefanovich: Well, I think that there is always a balance of transparency and ambiguity in this field, and then decide for themselves which is better. I think there should be one very clear, like, basis, foundation for this announcement of consequences. And, like, red lines as a concept is very bad. But still, one foundation should be that you should not allow something that you will not be able to do. And I think the reality is that it is not always the case that you actually know what your capability is, at least from what we see from past, almost, three years.
Second is that, probably, you should not announce consequences explicitly, but you should announce them retroactively. But again, not in the manner it is being done right now. But I think the good idea would be just, like, when you already delivered the response, you should probably take an extra effort to explain that what led to such consequences.
Actually, to some extent, what is being continuously done by Russian officials, by Putin, by Lavrov, by others, well, with explaining how we end up in such an intense conflict in the middle of Europe, when they come back to, like, 2014 or even earlier, it is, to some extent, it is useful just to explain the thinking of the Russian side, just like we think that it happened because A, B, C, D. Yeah, I also understand people who get tired about this. And, like, when some… there's some people even give our president a nickname historian, because they got tired about this, like, long histories that everyone has heard several times already.
But actually, this is the biggest thing that I would like to advise everyone. You should read what leaders of nuclear weapon states write and say and listen to it and just take it as something very important, not only Russian president, but what Biden said, what Trump will be saying, what Macron is saying, what Xi Jinping is saying.
[00:40:41] Peter Slezkine: Well, let's finish, then, with Xi Jinping and the China factor. So, we should take the statements of nuclear leaders seriously, especially the ones who are the most major players in this field — so, the U.S. and the USSR, and then Russia were clearly in a level by themselves. And now, China, slowly but surely, is becoming, perhaps, a third member of this club. And there is a sense in the U.S. that, perhaps, the U.S. might need to match Russia and China together. I don't know if that is even possible, but there's certainly discussion. And then there's also discussion about the extent to which China might act as a brake on Russian nuclear policy. There have been articles recently about how the Biden team asked the Chinese to tell the Russians not to use nuclear weapons. So, evaluate the Chinese factor and how this two-part system has become a three-part system, and whether China will serve as an accelerant on American nuclear policy in a break on Russian nuclear policy.
[00:41:50] Dmitry Stefanovich: Well, yeah, we could talk for another hour or so on each of these questions. But nevertheless, first, actually, China already played this role in the ‘70s and the ‘80s being a part of a three-body problem, but not for Washington, but for Moscow. The good thing for Russia and for China is that we achieved some sort of arms control in the ‘80s and in the ‘90s. And now, we have quite a stable relationship, which is not a given for decades to come. So, things might change.
Now, coming back to current realities, when I've said that Russian nuclear doctrine updates also related to the realities of the broader nuclear world, I also thought about this possible increase in the U.S. nuclear arsenal and so on, because, clearly, this is something that Russia will need to react to somehow. Again, I'm in the camp of those who think that we should not try to play catch up if the U.S. will decide to increase nuclear arsenal because we clearly have other priorities in our military industry, in our military buildup. But some sort of reaction will need to happen, at least, on the… in terms of concepts or declarations.
For the U.S., it seems that it will be quite a challenge to ignore the Chinese buildup. So, there will be a need to do something, at least, like, to show that they care. But the challenge that lies before the world and before our three countries is that the U.S. might decide not to focus on nuclear arsenal, but to somehow try to increase the capabilities of non-nuclear strategic weapons. And this was hinted by the current administration. For example, as far as I remember, Jake Sullivan was very clear that they might agree not to increase nuclear arsenal if Russia and China also agree to some arrangements on nuclear arsenals. But they will preserve and achieve advantage in all other domains, like in advanced invention weapons, in space, in cyber, in artificial intelligence.
And this is where the problem is, because from the Russian perspective, we need to find a way to address all strategic capabilities. So, there is this Russian idea of the security equation that was actually introduced as a basis for discussions with the previous Trump administration. And it will, at least the way I see it, it remains on the table. So, the idea is to find a way to address both strategic nuclear and strategic non-nuclear offensive and defensive capabilities, and not through some single document, but through a system of some sort of arrangements.
And if, from the U.S., we see the readiness to agree on something strictly nuclear and strategic or nuclear non-strategic, which has been a very important factor for the U.S. thinking for quite a while, then it's not something that Russia will be happy to discuss without discussing non-nuclear strategic capabilities that we've partly addressed earlier, despite the fact that they are probably not as impressive as some people thought.
For China, again, from what I've heard from Chinese colleagues, they're not changing their traditional approach. They're enhancing it. And they are concerned with U.S. conventional superiority in some domains, with U.S. allies, with U.S. missile defense. And that's why they need to have more launchers. They need more naval capabilities. Russian experts often joke that they simply cannot believe that China will float out modern strategic submarines and they will go on patrols without missiles, without nuclear warheads, because it makes no sense. Like, why do you actually waste all the resources?
On the other hand, the Chinese have so many resources that, probably, they can just carry out some testing; but still, it looks a bit strange. China, definitely, is becoming more proactive in their nuclear deterrence postures. They are becoming more public with their capabilities, at least about their dual capable missiles. They've recently carried out a long-range ICBM test to the Pacific Ocean. It looks like they'll understand the value of nuclear signaling. And by building up those huge silo fields, they also invite the Americans to offer them something.
And we're entering quite uncharted waters in this regard because, clearly, there will be a much more close numbers of strategic nuclear weapons deployed in all three countries, because after a series of Russian-American bilateral nuclear cuts, the arsenals are still enormous, but their divide between nuclear superpowers and other nuclear powers is not that big. For example, actually, the number of Russian deployed strategic launchers, as defined in the New START, is quite close to a combined number of French and British nuclear arsenals. With China, it becomes even more complicated. And I understand why Americans are concerned, even if the Chinese will not go all the way to numerical parity, but it will increase by two fold or three fold, their current arsenal.
What can be done about that? Definitely, I do not see any room for a trilateral hard arms control agreement but some sort of risk reduction measures, or politically binding statements, or parallel moves can be achieved. But the problem is that we live in a world where we have ongoing proxy conflicts or very possible proxy conflicts between the major players. And in this situation, the stuff that is already ruining our relationship should be addressed first, and then we go to the strategic level.
That's why the Russian attitude is that we need to sort out the Ukrainian crisis first and then discuss strategic stability. In Chinese side, we also see a similar attitude with Taiwan, like, first stop sending weapons to Taiwan, then we will discuss arms control.
There are no easy answers. I still hope that, eventually, we will come up with something better than a trilateral arms race, but, so far, there seems to be a lack of immediate good prospects.
[00:48:55] Peter Slezkine: Thanks for listening to the Trialogue Podcast. Make sure to subscribe to the show, so you don’t miss out on any episodes.
The Trialogue Podcast is hosted by the Stimson Center and produced by University FM.