Dmitry Suslov, Deputy Director of the Center for Comprehensive European and International Studies at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow, joins us to discuss the Trump-Putin summit in Alaska and Russia’s expectations for a settlement in Ukraine. *The Trialogue Podcast is hosted by the Stimson Center and produced by University FM.
Dmitry Suslov, Deputy Director of the Center for Comprehensive European and International Studies at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow, joins us to discuss the Trump-Putin summit in Alaska and Russia’s expectations for a settlement in Ukraine.
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*The Trialogue Podcast is hosted by the Stimson Center and produced by University FM.
(Transcripts may contain a few typographical errors due to audio quality during the podcast recording.)
[00:00:00] Peter Slezkine: I'm Peter Slezkine, Director of the U.S.-Russia-China Trialogue project at the Stimson Center. Since the middle of the 20th century, relations among the United States, Russia, and China have had an enormous impact on each country separately and on the world as a whole. The purpose of the Trialogue is to better understand this extraordinarily complex and consequential relationship by directly engaging with experts from all three countries.
In this show, guests from across the political spectrum and from every corner of the globe share their views in their own voice. While the Stimson Center seeks to provide access to a wide variety of perspectives, it does not endorse any particular position. We leave it to the listeners to judge the validity and value of the views expressed by the guests. I hope you enjoy the podcast.
Last Friday, August 15th, Trump hosted Putin for a major summit in Alaska. This past Monday, Zelensky and a number of European leaders met with Trump in Washington. This week, we are releasing two special episodes to examine the outcome of these talks and to consider what might follow. Today, we'll be talking to Dmitry Suslov to get the Russian perspective. Tomorrow, Jana Kobzová will provide the European and Ukrainian point of view.
Today's guest, Dmitry Suslov, is Deputy Director of the Center for Comprehensive European and International Studies at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow. He's a member of the Russian Council on Foreign Affairs and of the Council on Foreign and Security Policy. Dmitry is also a host on The Great Game, Russia's most watched television talk show on international affairs.
Dmitry, welcome to the podcast.
[00:01:40] Dmitry Suslov: Hello, Peter.
[00:01:42] Peter Slezkine: So, perhaps, we could start by discussing the recently concluded Alaska Summit where Putin and Trump met in person. Can you tell us from the Russian perspective how it all came together?
[00:01:54] Dmitry Suslov: Well, first, I think that it was really a historic summit because it was the first personal encounter between the Russian president and American president since 2021 when Vladimir Putin met Joe Biden in Geneva. And it was the first visit of the Russian president to the United States, actually, since 2010, which was a drastically different time. It was the apex of the U.S. so-called U.S.-Russian Reset when Dmitry Medvedev actually was the Russian president and went to the U.S. to California and then to Barack Obama in Washington, D.C.
[00:02:29] Peter Slezkine: So, that was when he was, sort of, the tech savvy young liberal president and he went to California to meet with the Silicon Valley entrepreneurs, as part of this greater globalization of which Russia would be a part.
[00:02:39] Dmitry Suslov: Yes. But then the relations collapsed. After that, then, there was a period of confrontation. There was a period of hybrid war. And actually, the Alaska Summit is considered to be a watershed, in this sense, in U.S.-Russian relations intended to end this period of hybrid war, to normalize relations, to provide further impetus to the normalization of U.S.-Russian relations. Without question, we won't become friends, right? Russian and the United States will continue to be adversaries, competitors, you know, in different camps, so to say. Russia will not abandon BRICS. Russia will continue to position itself as a part of the non-Western world.
But our relations need to be managed. The period over the last four years was abnormal when we had not just confrontation but hybrid war and no contacts at the official levels, at least. It was very dangerous and abnormal. So, now, we are reestablishing normalcy in our relations. And I think the summit in Alaska was a very strong impetus towards further normalization.
[00:03:50] Peter Slezkine: Why do you think normal relations between the U.S. and Russia must be adversarial? I think there are some in the Trump administration who do not necessarily see a reason for a fundamental conflict with Russia going forward if we can get over the obviously extraordinary obstacle of Ukraine.
[00:04:07] Dmitry Suslov: Look, I think that, without question, U.S.-Russian relations can be less confrontational. And I think that's a shared desire by both the Russian government and the Trump administration, to reduce the intensity and depth of confrontation, which could be done if we resolve the war in Ukraine, the conflict in Ukraine, if we establish some rules of the game over the European security order. And actually, Russia understands that Trump administration would like to reduce its military presence in Europe, would like to decrease American involvement into the European affairs, American, I would say, micromanagement of the European affairs in the security realm, and to channel American resources to the Pacific.
That would be very healthy, of course, for the U.S.-Russian relations. And if it is done, if it is managed successfully, then, without question, the intensity of our confrontation would definitely decrease. However, having said that, we still disagree, I would say, fundamentally, over the bigger picture in the international order. And we are in different camps, as I said. The United States, even under the Trump administration, is very much committed to American primacy and American dominance. Russia is very much against that. Russia is in favor of a multipolar world in which the United States would be equal to other great powers in many dimensions, including the financial one, for instance. Whereas, the Trump administration is committed to the dominance of the U.S. dollar, is committed to the dominance of the United States in artificial intelligence, dominance of the United States in military affairs, and so on and so forth, right? And when you hear the word “dominance,” you know, bell starts ringing in Moscow because Russia is against that.
Moreover, China is the major strategic adversary of the United States and will continue to be so. Yes, of course, today, the Trump administration is willing to establish some deal with China, especially, in the economic realm, but strategically, the United States is very much committed to containment of China. And again, we are in different camps here because Russia will not sacrifice its relations with China. A so-called reverse Kissinger when Russia could be moved to the side of the United States against China as the major rival to the United States is just impossible. So, Russia will be at the side of China, as the United States continues to pressure China and continues to increase the military presence in the Pacific. Russia is a member of BRICS. Whereas, the intention of the Trump administration is to weaken and dismantle the structure, the commitment of the United States to projects such as the Golden Dome, which Donald Trump cherishes, the increase of the defense budget of the United States to more than 1 trillion U.S. dollars, these are all the features which Russia still considers very negatively, right?
However, having said that, of course, some tactical achievements with the Trump administration are possible and desirable. There is a very clear understanding in Moscow that we do not benefit from such a crazy confrontation, such a comprehensive confrontation which we had with the Biden administration. On the contrary, both countries could benefit if we manage this confrontation, if we reduce the intensity of this confrontation, and if we establish, at least, selective cooperation in the areas where it is really desirable for both countries, such as the Arctic. So, some economic things and so on and so forth.
But of course, to move there, we need to address and resolve the Ukrainian conflict. So, coming back to your original question on the outcomes of Alaska, I think that one of the most crucial outcomes and positive achievements from the Russian perspective is that the Trump administration abandoned the idea of ceasefire in Ukraine as a precondition for further negotiations over political settlement and accepted the Russian approach according to which we need to focus on the final and comprehensive settlement of the Ukrainian conflict, whereas the ceasefire would be the final result of this settlement, not the beginning of this settlement. And this is a very, very significant shift.
[00:09:06] Peter Slezkine: So, Trump's shift on that score that he has moved from what the Ukrainians and Europeans were proposing, which is an immediate ceasefire without any conditions to what the Russians have long been advancing, which is that fighting continues while the comprehensive details of a larger peace agreement are finalized. So, you say that there are a whole host of important issues about which Russia and the U.S. will continue to disagree, but the state of the relationship from the past few years has been unnatural and dangerous, and that Putin's visit to Alaska is, perhaps, a breakthrough that might usher us into a new stage of the relationship which can be more effectively managed.
So, before we get to the outcomes of the Alaska Summit and Zelensky’s subsequent visit to Washington, can you tell me how the summit came together? So, Trump imposed a deadline, which he then shortened. He threatened so-called secondary tariffs against India and others for purchasing Russian energy. He then applied that tariff to India, but with a 20-something-day delay. And then Witkoff made a trip to Moscow, and a few days later Putin was in Alaska. So, which of these factors was most important in producing the summit? Who proposed the summit? And how was Alaska chosen as the site of the summit?
[00:10:34] Dmitry Suslov: Yeah, great questions. I think that the strategic reason or strategic, I would say, necessity for Alaska, was actually the failure of the Trump administration’s attempt to pressure Russia through blackmailing India, China, Brazil, and other Russian major trade partners within BRICS, because indeed, you are absolutely right — the Trump administration wanted to impose the unconditional ceasefire by applying strong tariffs against the major Russian trade partners in order to compel them to stop importing or reduce importing Russian oil, thus, making Russia bankrupt, and imposing this unconditional ceasefire.
But the further developments showed that that was an utter failure. The results were quite opposite. And instead of coercing Russia, Trump found himself, I think, in a very difficult situation because neither India nor China nor Brazil abandoned Russia. On the contrary, each of these great non-Western powers considered Trump's pressure as a violation of their sovereignty. And they consider themselves as very proud, great powers, right? So, they considered Trump as trying to tell them with whom to trade, with whom not to trade. And that's unacceptable. You know, each of them considered that as humiliation, as something…
[00:12:02] Peter Slezkine: And these each happened to be the founding members of BRICS.
[00:12:06] Dmitry Suslov: Right. Absolutely. And each are the founding members of BRICS. So, the result of that pressure campaign was the deepest and sharpest crisis in U.S.-Indian relations over, at least, a quarter century because today the U.S.-Indian relations are worse than they have ever been since 1990s, which is very bad for the United States, you know, because India is an extremely important player in the Pacific, you know, and the United States considers India as a desirable strategic partner, especially against China.
[00:12:43] Peter Slezkine: Right. Well, I mean, the term was changed, as you just hinted. It became Indo-Pacific to emphasize India's role.
[00:12:49] Dmitry Suslov: Right. So, there is this deepest crisis in U.S.-Indian relations. At the same time, India proclaimed intensification of economic relations with Russia instead of abandonment of Russia. Moreover, there is the intensification of Indian-China rapprochement because Donald Trump actually pushed China and India together, not just India and Russia, but also China and India.
[00:13:17] Peter Slezkine: With the two foreign ministers just meeting yesterday or the day before.
[00:13:20] Dmitry Suslov: Absolutely. And with Prime Minister Narendra Modi declaring that he will visit China for the first time in seven years and he will go to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit in the very late of August. So, he will visit Xi Jinping. These are very negative developments. And actually, I think that the United States needed a way out of this situation.
[00:13:40] Peter Slezkine: I’m not sure that they're negative developments. Our president likes peace. If India and China can settle one of the most difficult international relationships in the global arena, then perhaps that would be a great achievement.
[00:13:52] Dmitry Suslov: Oh, I think that, yes, indeed, Donald Trump could take credit for it. Absolutely, for the rapprochement. That's fair, I'm not kidding. I mean, Donald Trump is behind the current China-India rapprochement, actually.
[00:14:06] Peter Slezkine: So, after that, perhaps, unexpected and ironic success, do you think Trump dispatched Witkoff to Moscow for, I don't know what, the fourth or fifth time a day or two before his deadline, because the threat that he had made he realized he couldn't carry out.
[00:14:24] Dmitry Suslov: Absolutely. So, at the same time, I think there were some signals from Moscow that we could help with this situation. And indeed, it looks that, during Witkoff’s visit to Moscow, Russia indicated to the United States that Russian position on the resolution of the Ukrainian conflict is not as maximalist as it was before, that some concessions from the Russian side are possible, despite the fact that Russia is the winning side right now, despite the fact that the balance of attrition at the front line clearly favors Russian.
[00:15:03] Peter Slezkine: Who was the one who made the first move? So, you were saying that, when Witkoff arrived, it was Putin who indicated that the Russian position could be somewhat modified. It wasn't Witkoff coming with a different offer from America.
[00:15:18] Dmitry Suslov: We don't know, of course, the details. And thank God, I'm not involved in, you know, top secret discussions behind the closed doors in the Kremlin. But from multiple sources, including the Western sources, we read and we see that, indeed, the Russian terms became a little bit different or could become a little bit different when it comes to the territorial settlement of the conflict than they were before.
[00:15:44] Peter Slezkine: In the sense that they would not insist on the entirety of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson.
[00:15:50] Dmitry Suslov: Absolutely, absolutely, right, that Russia could agree on at least a partial freezing of the current line of contact not in Donbas, but in the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson region. That was a certain shift from the position, if it happened, right, from the position that Russia held a year before and up until now.
And I think, so, the two factors came together, right? Strategically, the Trump administration needed a way out from the situation in relations with India, China, and others. Tactically, Russia largely offered this concession, which is actually a concession, on the terms of the settlement of the conflict. And moreover, this concession, I think it was unexpected to the American side because the Trump administration seems to believe, and I share this belief, that the winning side, which is Russia, is not supposed to make concessions, right? If Russia believes that it can overwhelm the situation militarily, why should Russia make concessions? But nevertheless, Russia largely made this concession, which proves actually that Russia is serious about dealing with Donald Trump, is serious about not antagonizing Donald Trump, because yes, Russia could afford just continuation of this war for a good long while. But the other side of the coin would be deterioration of relations with the Trump administration. And this is not definitely in Russian interest. So, the third factor which I want to propose is that Russia really values relations with the Trump administration and Russia does not want these relations to deteriorate.
[00:17:31] Peter Slezkine: So, that then explains the focus on territory. After Witkoff’s visit, there was a series of articles talking about this, sort of, change, I guess, in Russia's approach, that Putin no longer was insisting on all of the four regions that Russia has constitutionally annexed, but only the two in the Donbas, one of which it had already controls, essentially, in its entirety. So, then, how do we get to the Alaska meeting? Who proposes a presidential summit? And how is that site chosen?
[00:18:06] Dmitry Suslov: I think that the Trump administration was satisfied with the results of Witkoff’s visits to Moscow and they want to clarify the situation, they wanted, probably, to confirm with Putin to try to move forward.
Secondly, Trump administration itself was not interested in antagonizing Russia, in imposing sanctions against Russia, let alone implementing new tariffs against India and other major Russian partners. And this required the personal meeting of the two presidents. Thus, they went to Alaska.
Now, why Alaska? I don't know who proposed the place, but I think it was a very smart selection because Alaska, actually, is the neighboring region to Russia. So, it shows very clearly that Russia and the United States are not too far from each other, that we have common interests. And one of our common interests is actually our common neighborhood in the Arctic, which is the Arctic.
Secondly, Alaska proved that European prism or Euro-Atlantic prism is not the only focus of U.S.-Russian relations analysis, right? Because the overwhelming majority of troubles in U.S.-Russian relations are the result of Euro-Atlantic prism, right? The overwhelming majority of our confrontations have historically been in Europe, over Europe, right? Whereas, if we select a different prism, then we are not necessarily actually adversaries, right? And that was the meaning of Alaska, a place which is very, very far from Europe, but very, very close, less than four miles, from Russia. So, it was very symbolic to have this summit in Alaska.
[00:19:55] Peter Slezkine: So, Witkoff came back from Moscow believing that the Russian position had softened somewhat as it concerned two of the four territories that Russia claims in Ukraine. It then seems as if the Americans left Alaska, believing that Putin had softened his position somewhat in regard to security guarantees to Ukraine. So, the shift on territories, you seem to confirm and has been much publicized, the shift potentially on security guarantees seems less certain. And there have been many different interpretations about what was actually agreed, if anything, on this subject. So, what can you say about the Russian positions on security guarantees? Have they, in fact, changed? Or is this just a restatement of the Istanbul agreement from 2022 or the proposal in that agreement, that the Americans misunderstood and the Europeans have taken in a different direction?
[00:20:59] Dmitry Suslov: Look, first, let me say that the very decision to focus on final settlement allowed to structure the further negotiations, because now, we understand what we have to talk about. We have to talk about, let's say, three baskets. Basket number one, territorial settlement. Basket number two, security issues, right? Not just security guarantees vis-a-vis Ukraine, but also I would say security guarantees vis-a-vis Russia, from the Russian perspective. And the third basket is the humanitarian situation in Ukraine, what Russia calls “denazification,” which is basically the change of the Ukrainian domestic legislature, when it comes to the rights of the Russian speakers, the Russian Orthodox Church, and so on and so forth.
So, three baskets. And it seems that each of them, of course, is very difficult. And right now, the understanding, at least in the Russian expert community, is this. That, in order to move forward, the Trump administration seems to pressure Ukraine on territorial concessions. And at the same time, the Trump administration tries to pressure Russia on the concessions in the security area, right, in the field of security guarantees.
[00:22:17] Peter Slezkine: Leading the so-called third basket aside entirely for the moment.
[00:22:21] Dmitry Suslov: So far. So far. I mean, for Russia, of course, it's impossible to achieve the settlement without the third basket. It will definitely come. But now, we have these two very acutely disputed issues, right? Ukraine unwilling to make concessions on the territories but Trump administration pressuring Ukraine, and Russia seemingly also unwilling to make concessions on the security basket. And I do not think that the Russian position on security basket changed or could change. So, the impression of Russia willing to make concessions here is a false concession. Why? Because, look, Russia is always talking about the root causes of the conflict, right? That the final settlement should address and resolve the root causes. The root causes are not about territories. The root causes are precisely about security. The issue of Ukrainian integration into NATO and the issue of Ukrainian relations with NATO. Today, also, the issue of the power of Ukrainian armed forces. And for Russia, it is, of course, a must. It is, of course, extremely important to ensure that Ukraine, A, remains neutral, that Ukraine, B, is prohibited from staging Western troops on its territory, and C, that there are limits to certain practical security relations between Ukraine and the Western countries, such as the provision of long range strike weapons, joint military training, joint military exercises, and so on and so forth.
Without these issues, of course, it's impossible for Russia to resolve the war, because again, from the very beginning, territories were not the most important issue. For Russia, it was always security. Having said that, Russia has never, ever excluded the very proposition of security guarantees vis-a-vis Ukraine. If you remember, the draft of the Istanbul Agreement between Russia and Ukraine dating back to April 2022 did include security guarantees to Ukraine.
[00:24:46] Peter Slezkine: With Russia as one of the guarantors, though, right, which creates an interesting dynamic.
[00:24:50] Dmitry Suslov: That was a [crosstalk 00:24:50].
[00:24:51] Peter Slezkine: Well, that creates an interesting dynamic, if one party to the conflict is a guarantor in case of its future resumption.
[00:24:57] Dmitry Suslov: Right. Yeah, there was a certain disagreement.
[00:24:59] Peter Slezkine: It's not outrageous for Ukrainians and Westerners to believe that this is a strange solution to the problem.
[00:25:06] Dmitry Suslov: Look, of course, we can discuss who exactly should be the guarantor, right? By the way, Russia does not insist, as far as I know, on itself being one of the guarantors of Ukrainian security.
[00:25:20] Peter Slezkine: And Putin mentioned China as a possibility.
[00:25:23] Dmitry Suslov: Absolutely. So, the United States on the one hand, China on the other hand, India on the third hand, European countries on the fourth hand.
[00:25:32] Peter Slezkine: It's funny that you said India on the third hand because it's only Indian gods that have that many hands.
[00:25:37] Dmitry Suslov: Yeah, right
[00:25:39] Peter Slezkine: We mortals definitely don't.
[00:25:41] Dmitry Suslov: So, there could be countries who guarantee Ukrainian security. I mean, Russia is not against it.
[00:25:46] Peter Slezkine: Do you have any indication that China or India would be willing to take on such a role, assuming that the rest of the peace process proves productive?
[00:25:54] Dmitry Suslov: Well, I think that, if the rest of the process proves productive, I don't see the reason why they would not. You know, China proposed itself as the friend of peace, so to say, right? It established, together with Brazil… so, by the way, Brazil could be another guarantor. Under the auspices of the United Nations, China and Brazil established this group of Friends for Peace. So, why not? I mean, again, Russia is not against the very idea of providing guarantees to Ukraine. What Russia is against is Ukraine remaining a Western bulwark at the Russian borders, Ukraine remaining the Western proxy and very strongly militarized Western proxy. And on this, Russia is not willing, and I think it's very unlikely to make any concessions. However, I think, right now, we are witnessing the typical Trumpian art of the deal, right? Which is that when the Trump administration starts negotiations about anything, right? It starts from just crazily, you know, unacceptable propositions for the other side. This is why, at least we think in Moscow, Donald Trump started to talk about the support of the deployment of the so-called European coalition of the willing and, moreover, assisting this European coalition of the willing with some American air power or whatever.
[00:27:26] Peter Slezkine: So, Trump's talk of Western troops on Ukrainian territory is the equivalent of 150% or whatever they are tariffs on China. That's the opening gambit, but the final stage is supposed to be much lower.
[00:27:39] Dmitry Suslov: Yeah, absolutely. We consider that as the opening gamble in the very beginning of negotiations. I think Trump and the whole Trump team understands very clearly that this is just completely unacceptable for Moscow. This is why they proposed this in the beginning of the negotiations, in order to move somewhere, when Russia would be compelled to sacrifice, also, something, right?
And I think what the Trump administration wants Russia to sacrifice is this idea of demilitarization, because the Trump administration believes that Ukraine, after war, must be militarily strong without limits on its armed forces, without limits on the concrete relations between Ukraine and the West. The Russian opening position is diametrically opposite demilitarization and no strong links between the West and Ukraine. So, in order to accomplish the militarized Ukraine, non-NATO, but militarized, the Trump administration seems to start from this gamble from a large support of the European armed forces on the Ukrainian territory. This is how we understand that.
But this will be very difficult negotiations, because as I said, security is viewed in Moscow as the root causes and the major purposes, actually, of the whole war, of the whole endeavor — not necessarily territories, but security. So, it would be very, very difficult for Russia to agree on a relatively militarized Ukraine. However, I think, if we do have a political will, this is not impossible, right? We could discuss concrete limitations, you know, on the provision of concrete weapons, concrete exceptions for what is allowed, what is not allowed in terms of the military relations between Ukraine and the West. And each side could present it in how it likes, right? Russia would continue to talk about the demilitarized Ukraine. The West and Ukraine would continue to talk about militarized Ukraine. But anyway, we are in the very beginning of very, very, very difficult negotiations. It's already clear now with this issue of security guarantees, that these negotiations will be very uneasy.
[00:29:53] Peter Slezkine: So, the details will take a long time to negotiate. And hopefully, that process does begin and isn't immediately thrown off by various parties insisting on the maximum. But let's attempt to paint the final picture in broad strokes. So, for Russia, an absolute non-negotiable issue is the presence of Western troops on Ukrainian territory and, obviously, NATO membership for Ukraine. So, assuming that Ukraine does not get NATO or a facsimile of NATO and that there are no French or British troops in Odessa, then there can be talk of security guarantees with major guarantors that would include the U.S., maybe another Western country or group of countries, and major non-Western countries such as India and China. Presumably, they would have to come to a consensus that aggression had been committed by one side or the other in order to act, or would Russia be satisfied with the U.S. unilaterally determining that the terms of the deal had been broken.
[00:31:05] Dmitry Suslov: Well, originally, of course, and as a maximalist position, Russia would insist on consensus. But realistically speaking, of course, it's very unlikely that it could be supported by all the parties involved. So, in case of another aggression, of course, the guarantors would have to take certain action as they decide properly. However, again, I think that the United States, as one of the potential guarantors, would not be willing to start to launch World War III with Russia if Ukraine is provided an equivalent of Article V. Although, I would remind that Article V is not automatic, right?
[00:31:45] Peter Slezkine: Well, it is automatic, but it does not demand that any party go to war.
[00:31:50] Dmitry Suslov: Yes, absolutely. So, that could be quite acceptable. But in order to minimize this negative scenario, of course, the core Russian interests must be addressed. And as you rightly said, the core Russian interests are non-membership in NATO, certain limits on relations between Ukraine and NATO, and non-deployment of the Western troops on Ukrainian soil, absolutely. So, if we agree on that, then we could move forward with the formula of security guarantees.
[00:32:20] Peter Slezkine: So, in terms of membership relations with NATO, so no NATO troops in Ukraine, no joint training outside of Ukraine. But there has been considerable defense industrial cooperation between select European countries and Ukraine. And that has continued and is growing. Private American defense companies are also very invested in this area. That seems like something that they would be loathed to give up and that Russia would have a very difficult time demanding, enforcing, or even tracking. So, does Russia believe that the ship has basically sailed on that, that there are going to be some kind of joint ventures on drones and so on between Ukraine and Western defense companies?
[00:33:03] Dmitry Suslov: Look, that's, first, a very difficult issue. And you're absolutely right, that this is one of the irritants and one of the obstacles to peace, from the Russian perspective, because Russia would definitely insist on, at least, limitation of such industrial relations, deep industrial relations between Ukraine and Western countries.
Something could be done, something not. You know, realistically, I do not think that it is possible to limit in any way the Ukrainian capacity to produce drones. And by the way, in the relations between Ukrainian companies and Western companies, Ukraine is more advanced. Ukraine is the leader which shares its technologies and techniques with the Western companies. That cannot be limited.
What could and should be limited, I think, is the escalatory potential. The industrial cooperation, which is aimed at long range missiles, especially the missiles which could reach Moscow, you know, like the medium and intermediate range missiles. So, the provision of missiles, like Storm Shadow attack and SCALPS and Taurus must be prohibited. And the Western participation in the Ukrainian production of equivalence must also be prohibited from the Russian perspective in the peace agreement, because you can't provoke a full-fledged war, let alone a world war, by drone attack. I mean, missiles, especially high precision, long range missiles, is another thing. And from the security perspective, Russia is quite concerned about that.
What is also troublesome for Russia is, of course, the depth, I would say, of military strategic and intelligence cooperation between Ukraine and the Western countries, you know, because again, I mean, Russia would like Ukraine to be neutral and not a potential asset of the West in a hypothetical conflict against Russia, right? I mean, Russia is very much concerned that Ukraine could continue to be a proxy of the West, a military proxy of the West, against Russia. This is something that Russia would want, of course, to resolve.
[00:35:30] Peter Slezkine: So, I understand about missiles. And there are all kinds of precedents for monitoring and tracking such matters. Intelligence sharing in intelligence capacity seems much more difficult. As The New York Times reported, the relations between the CIA and the Ukrainian intelligence services began, basically, as Maidan was still going on in 2013, 2014, various stations were placed right on the Russian Ukrainian border. Obviously, intelligence sharing is a major part of the war effort now. How on earth could Russia know whether that is happening or not?
[00:36:06] Dmitry Suslov: Well, we always knew that it was happening. But realistically, it's impossible to control, right? I mean, or you could control it, only through something which seems to be unachievable right now, which is regime-changing Kyiv.
[00:36:22] Peter Slezkine: Would Russia be willing to “demilitarize” itself, to some degree, to reciprocate in some fashion, perhaps, not reciprocate relative to Ukraine, but relative to NATO, so, some limits on troop deployment, missile placement, along with the NATO Russia border?
[00:36:44] Dmitry Suslov: Well, I think that some reciprocal measures between Russia and NATO could be done in the next stage, which is the security negotiations and some security settlement between Russia and NATO. And that's a very, very important topic for the future, because even when the war in Ukraine ends, Russia and NATO will remain, A, adversaries, B, with militarization and the growth of military deployments going on, on both sides of the border. And this situation must be controlled and managed again, right? Because we are not interested in an unlimited arms race. We are not interested in the risks of inadvertent escalation between Russia and NATO. We are not interested in a nuclear war between Russia and NATO. We are not interested in a new missile crisis equivalent to the 1983 Euro missile crisis between Russia and NATO. So, these all issues must be discussed.
And in the context of these discussions, of course, some new, I would say, elements of arms control in Europe should be settled, right? Covering not just nuclear, but conventional arms as well, right? Because the most likely weapons which could be used in the Russian-NATO war are conventional weapons first.
So, this must be done after the settlement of the Ukrainian conflict. And in this settlement, you know, NATO-Russian settlement, some limitations on NATO side, some limitations on Russian side are possible. But when it comes to the Russian-Ukrainian settlement, I don't think that Russia would agree to any hint of reciprocity, because again, the very paradigm of Russian approach is that we are winning, Ukraine is losing, right? And this is measured not in the size of territories taken, but in the scale of attrition. And the balance of attrition clearly favors Russia. So, no reciprocity here.
[00:38:54] Peter Slezkine: Well, the argument is that attrition is unpleasant for all who experience it, and that, if you are not determined to win the war decisively and at high cost at some uncertain future date, then a deal requires a compromise. And you might have more leverage at the moment and might concede less than your counterpart. But nonetheless, to arrive at a compromise, you can not only make demands but have to seed something. And you already mentioned that Putin has relaxed, at least, the Maximalist claims on all four regions and has softened, perhaps, his position in other areas. So, I don't know if you're making a distinction between his softening vis-a-vis Trump, which is possible, but not vis-a-vis Zelensky, which brings us to the possibility of a Putin-Zelensky meeting.
Do you think that will happen? It sounded originally like there might be a trilateral meeting between Putin, Trump, and Zelensky. Now, it seems like a bilateral meeting is being discussed. At the same time, Lavrov and others are saying that, perhaps, there will just be a gradual increase in the level of representation on both sides. So, there might be a ministerial level meeting first. So, will this happen on what timeline, and where?
[00:40:11] Dmitry Suslov: Well, first, I think that you are absolutely right in saying, or at least in hinting, that the flexibility of Russian position on the Ukrainian settlement is a result of U.S.-Russian dialogue, not Russian-Ukrainian dialogue. Russia has shifted or largely shifted its position not because of the Russian attrition. Yes, of course, there is Russian attrition, but the general understanding is that Ukrainian attrition is much greater and against the balance of attrition matters. And it is in our favor. So, Russia made this a large shift of its position or shift from the Maximalist position, not because of attrition, but in order to continue positive dialogue with the Trump administration, not to lose the chance of normalization of U.S.-Russian relations, and, indeed, to accomplish basic Russian goals through diplomacy, which is, of course, preferable then through military means. That's why Russia made this shift.
As for the Putin-Zelensky summit, which Donald Trump is talking about, I think that Russia would not hurry, you know, because Vladimir Putin is known for his unwillingness to get engaged in unprepared meetings. The Russian position is that any Russian-Ukrainian, you know, meeting, at the higher level, must be prepared.
[00:41:45] Peter Slezkine: And by prepared in this instance, you mean that there need to be deliverables that have already been agreed upon and can be announced.
[00:41:52] Dmitry Suslov: Absolutely. The presidents must confirm with an already predecided arrangement. And this is why I think Russia will demand on further intensification of Russian-Ukrainian dialogue, perhaps, at a higher level. And Russia is not against the increase of the level of Russian representation and of Ukrainian representation during these bilateral meetings. You mentioned the level of ministers. Why not? I do not exclude, actually, the meetings between foreign ministers of Russia and Ukraine, defense ministers of Russia and Ukraine, moving towards some [crosstalk 00:42:09].
[00:42:33] Peter Slezkine: Well, Umerov was there last time in Istanbul. So, the Ukrainians have already sent their defense minister, right?
[00:42:38] Dmitry Suslov: Yes, but the current head of the Ukrainian delegation… Mr. Umerov is no longer their defense minister.
[00:42:45] Peter Slezkine: But he was when he did go to Istanbul. So, Ukraine has sent its defense minister.
[00:42:49] Dmitry Suslov: Right.
[00:42:50] Peter Slezkine: So, if there would be a meeting of defense ministers, that would be the Russian side raising its level, not Ukraine.
[00:42:55] Dmitry Suslov: Raising the level of representation, absolutely. I mean, Russia hasn't done it yet because the Russian original position was that the negotiations in Istanbul that we are having now are continuation of the negotiations which took place three and a half years ago in Istanbul, first in Belarus and Minsk, and then Istanbul in April 2022. So, Russia basically sent almost the same delegation, right, in order to symbolize the continuity. But now, if we need to intensify these negotiations, addressing different tracks, which were mentioned territory security, rights of the Russians, then the level of negotiations could be upgraded. And by the way, these negotiations could also be distinguished or, kind of, divided among these three baskets.
[00:43:45] Peter Slezkine: So, you would bet on high level meetings, perhaps, several parallel meetings working on different issues between Russia and Ukraine, and a Zelensky-Putin meeting might come out of it, but it is certainly not something to take for granted before we see what these working groups and ministerial meetings produce.
[00:44:03] Dmitry Suslov: I would say I would be strongly, strongly surprised if Vladimir Putin and Vladimir Zelensky meet before all that process accomplishes something.
[00:44:12] Peter Slezkine: So, two final questions. One, is Russia's position relative to Ukrainian accession to the EU, is this perfectly acceptable, acceptable with certain caveats, or not acceptable?
[00:44:28] Dmitry Suslov: The right answer would be that there is no unified position on that in Moscow. There are different groups of thoughts, and there are different towers of Kremlin, as we say, each having a different position, the position of the Russian foreign ministry being much more hard line than actually the position of Vladimir Putin. So, the hardliners say that, with the European Union actually having become the most anti-Russian actor in the world, with the European Union conducting its militarization, which is what they are doing, becoming a military alliance, not just economic and political alliance [crosstalk 00:45:13].
[00:45:13] Peter Slezkine: And you take that seriously because they are talking of becoming a military power but there is nothing in the European Commissioner in the EU that would demonstrate that capacity at the moment or in the near future.
[00:45:25] Dmitry Suslov: In the near future, yeah. But strategically, it could happen, you know. The site and vendor proclaimed by previous Chancellor Schwarz takes time. Obviously, it is slower than originally expected. But nevertheless, they're moving there. So, the staunchly anti-Russian approach, coupled with militarization of the EU, makes Russia think that, in the current conditions, and especially in the future conditions, Ukrainian accession into the European Union would not differ much in terms of its security implications for Russia than the Ukrainian accession to NATO. And these people, who are in this group, they say no, Ukraine must not join the European Union. Whereas, traditionalists, to which Vladimir Putin seemingly belongs, they say that European Union is different from NATO, that European Union is still not necessarily the military alliance in the first place. As you rightly said just now, there are major troubles and big troubles in terms of European re-militarization. So, maybe Russia should not be as strictly against Ukraine accession in the UN. By the way, in the Istanbul Agreement of 2022 draft agreements, Russia did not demand. On the contrary, Russia agreed with the possibility of the Ukrainian accession into the European Union.
And also, there is a third group of thought, which says that Russia should not object to the Ukrainian accession into the EU because it will never happen, because joining the European Union is much more difficult even than joining NATO. And the major opposition to this accession will be from the countries which support Ukraine most, starting with Poland, right?
[00:47:20] Peter Slezkine: Because of agricultural issues, among others.
[00:47:22] Dmitry Suslov: Absolutely. And by the way, France, too. However, if Ukraine, for instance, joins the military, the political and military aspects of the European Union without joining the common market, which hypothetically could also be possible, that would be quite troublesome for Russia. Anyway, there is a very, very intensive discourse on this issue going on in Moscow, and there is no unified position on that.
[00:47:48] Peter Slezkine: Okay. So, final question on the third basket of Russia's demands or objectives, as you described them earlier, the ones that have to do with humanitarian issues, otherwise known, according to the euphemism, denazification. So, rights for Russian language speakers, the Orthodox Church, perhaps, some prohibition on the official glorification of certain historical figures with demonstrated ties to Nazi formations.
[00:48:15] Dmitry Suslov: Yes.
[00:48:16] Peter Slezkine: So, that has been much discussed, sometimes derided in the West, but consistently repeated by the Russian side. But it's clear that it is not at the forefront now because it is not something that can be easily agreed upon by, say, Trump and Putin. This is a domestic Ukrainian political matter. Russia can apply military pressure, hoping to affect this situation, but has no direct levers to pull.
So, what is the Russian theory for achieving the third basket aims at some point in the future? Does Putin hope that Trump will understand the importance of these aims and then pressure Zelensky or some future Ukrainian presidents? Or, is there a bet on, I don't know, putting within a peace settlement deal for Ukraine, a demand that there will be presidential elections that have to be accompanied by reforms X, Y, and Z and that that would actually be inscribed in a deal? So, what are the levers that Russia could use to enact these changes?
[00:49:16] Dmitry Suslov: Well, I think that Russia would certainly want to see those changes in the peace agreement or in the context of the peace agreement, not waiting for the new Ukrainian presidential elections because they are unlikely to change the situation in Ukraine.
Well, you are absolutely right that these are domestic issues, but these are domestic issues very, very important for Russia. From the perspective of classical international law, this is, of course, Russian interference into the Ukrainian domestic affairs. But yes, I mean, this is of utter, utter importance for Russia. But also, I would say that this is a part of the human rights issue, which Ukraine clearly violates in each language policy, in each religious policy, and so on. So, Russia would want the Russian language to be officially allowed. I mean, not necessarily the state language, maybe official language at the regional level where the majority of the people are Russian speakers, like Odessa, Kharkiv, you know, and other places and so on.
Of course, rehabilitation of the Russian Orthodox Church, not necessarily state-ization but, at least, you know, the end of persecution of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, of the Russian Patriarchate. The prohibition of clear neo-Nazi organizations, which glorify the allies of Adolf Hitler, and so on and so forth, I mean, Russia would want this to be a part of peace settlement. And Russia won't agree on a ceasefire or on the end of war unless these issues are addressed.
So, it is either for Donald Trump to pressure Zelensky and, obviously, Russia tells to the American counterparts and provides the facts to the American counterparts about language religious violations in Ukraine and other atrocities that are being done, or simply, I mean, as I said above, Russia won't agree to stop war, which Russia believes it is winning before this issue is resolved.
[00:51:25] Peter Slezkine: So, how can that issue be resolved is, again, the question, because you can have it agreed in the deal, but so you are saying that we cannot expect a cessation of hostilities until Ukraine has revised its domestic legislation.
[00:51:41] Dmitry Suslov: At least until Ukraine takes a legal obligation to do that, because these obligations must be part of the peace treaty, that Ukraine must do this, this, and that, right? In this third basket change, its language legislature changes, its religious legislature adopts laws, which prohibits certain organizations and so on and so forth. This must be part of the peace agreement. And the military hostilities will not end until Ukraine, at least, signs this peace agreement.
[00:52:11] Peter Slezkine: All right. Well, it seems like we may have had one big breakthrough but there's a lot of work left to do. Thanks so much, Dmitry, for agreeing to this interview.
[00:52:22] Dmitry Suslov: Thank you very much, Peter. It was my pleasure.
[00:52:27] Peter Slezkine: Thanks for listening to the Trialogue Podcast. Make sure to subscribe to the show so you don’t miss out on any episodes. The Trialogue Podcast is hosted by the Stimson Center and produced by University FM.