Alexander Dynkin and Feodor Voitolovsky, President and Director of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations at the Russian Academy of Sciences, join us to discuss their return to Washington, the war in Ukraine, and Sino-Russian relations, among other subjects. *The Trialogue Podcast is hosted by the Stimson Center and produced by University FM.
Alexander Dynkin and Feodor Voitolovsky, President and Director of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations at the Russian Academy of Sciences, join us to discuss their return to Washington, the war in Ukraine, and Sino-Russian relations, among other subjects.
*The Trialogue Podcast is hosted by the Stimson Center and produced by University FM.
(Transcripts may contain a few typographical errors due to audio quality during the podcast recording.)
[00:00:00] Peter Slezkine: I'm Peter Slezkine, Director of the U.S.-Russia-China Trialogue Project at the Stimson Center. Since the middle of the 20th century, relations among the United States, Russia, and China have had an enormous impact on each country separately and on the world as a whole. The purpose of the trialogue is to better understand this extraordinarily complex and consequential relationship by directly engaging with experts from all three countries.
So, today, I have not one but two guests, both in the flesh, both in Washington, D.C. I am joined by Alexander Dynkin and Feodor Voitolovsky, respectively, president and director of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations at the Russian Academy of Sciences in Moscow.
So, welcome to Washington and welcome to the podcast.
[00:00:55] Feodor Voitolovsky: Thank you very much, Peter. And we are very grateful to Stimson for bringing us here.
[00:00:59] Peter Slezkine: Do you think that you are the first two foreign policy experts from Russia to have come to the U.S. capitol since the start of the war?
[00:01:07] Alexander Dynkin: It looks like that because we have been before in 2019, and today sounds like a century ago.
[00:01:14] Feodor Voitolovsky: Yeah. Then pandemics happened, then the conflict in Ukraine has activated in a new phase, because we see there's a continuum since 2013, special military operation has started. So, after that, I do not think that too many persons from the expert community from Russia have visited Washington, D.C.
[00:01:38] Peter Slezkine: Yeah, I think, really, you two must be the first to have come in a number of years. So, I know you came for an event at Tufts. They invited you, and there was no particular trouble on either side.
[00:01:50] Alexander Dynkin: Well, no. It was unbelievably easy issuing our visits in the American embassy, just like that during one week.
[00:02:00] Feodor Voitolovsky: Yeah, we just came to the embassy. They have asked one, two questions. “So, what is the purpose of the visit?” They looked at the invitations and they suggested waiting for one week. And then one week later, we got our visas.
So, we came here to talk to American professionals in the field of foreign policy, world economy, to discuss a broad range of issues because we have a lot of things to be discussed in, not only in Russian American relations, but also in global agenda.
[00:03:28] Peter Slezkine: Well, wonderful. And we at Stimson are going to put you to work. We're interviewing you now for the podcast, have a private meeting later, and a public presentation tomorrow. So, I hope that you're not too jet-lagged.
So, I was in Moscow myself about a month ago and met with you, Feodor. And this was a few days after Witkoff had arrived and, maybe, a day after Vice President Vance had given his speech in Munich. And I asked you what you thought of the new Trump administration, and you seemed generally skeptical of the possibility of any great breakthrough in U.S.-Russia relations, saying that Russians had seen resets before under Obama that didn't come to much and that the conflict in Ukraine and, more broadly, in Europe was complicated and would not be easily resolved.
And I told you that there had been a real revolution in Washington, a new paradigm, and that what may have been true under Obama would not hold for Trump, that there was a real transformation here. So, on one hand, in the intervening month, we have seen the argument in the Oval Office, a cessation of American military support for Ukraine, and then a resumption of that support, many meetings in Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, it seems like the pace of the negotiations may have stalled a bit.
So, have you changed your mind? Are you still skeptical that any U.S.-Russia normalization is in the offing? Or do you think that there is really a possibility for a sudden transformation in relations?
[00:04:57] Feodor Voitolovsky: I do not want to spoil the environment with a huge ball of skepticism, but I believe that both sides are very cautious right now because there are too many problems in relations, not only Ukrainian conflict, but many other, including the risk of eclipse of strategic stability and the arms control regimes, because in 2026, we will have no agreement at all on these issues.
[00:05:26] Peter Slezkine: Because the New START will expire.
[00:05:27] Feodor Voitolovsky: The New START will expire because of many other things, because of very negative political, psychological, and security effects going from the Ukrainian conflict as a knot with a lot of ropes interconnected with this knot.
[00:05:45] Alexander Dynkin: Well, I try to believe in being optimistic, because, you know, in history, we know that there are decades that are just like a week where nothing happens. And there are weeks which look like decades because a lot of events happened. And my take is that, today, in Washington, D.C. we are enjoying the same process. It's unclear what would be the outcome, but I guess a major breakthrough of Mr. Trump is trying to search for an exit strategy from the Ukrainian crisis before we have heard about the strategic defeat and about real support Ukrainians long, I don't know how long. But he completely changed the paradigm.
And this is, of course, I would like to say that this is very much new and I have some positive hopes. Of course, the problem for Mr. Trump is his patience. He's well-known as a non-patient person. And the issue is so complicated, so deep, that this is my first concern — how patient he could be.
Second concern is, in the current administration, I find out the lack of Russian experts. Maybe, it's for good. I don't know. We know some Russian experts who did not work for good.
And the third concern is the strongest lobbying from Europe, especially from our former Baltic brothers. In one of my articles, I used such a term that before we have heard about Finlandization of Europe. They have some positive connotations. But today, for me, it's clear that we are facing the Estonization of Europe. And the old Europe doesn't know how to behave in such an environment. These are my three concerns regarding this process we are talking about.
[00:07:42] Feodor Voitolovsky: Donald Trump is trying to set a new agenda. This is for good, for sure. And the Russian government, our officials, are so tired of Biden's agenda and the deficit of any progress in any field.
[00:07:57] Peter Slezkine: What about Biden's agenda were they most tired of?
[00:08:00] Feodor Voitolovsky: Rules-based order, concepts of community of liberal democracies living under one…
[00:08:09] Alexander Dynkin: Against autocrats.
[00:08:09] Feodor Voitolovsky: Yes.
[00:08:09] Peter Slezkine: So, the democracy-autocracy divide as the central framework of foreign policy was not something that pleased the Russians, for obvious reasons.
[00:08:16] Feodor Voitolovsky: Absolutely. The very ideological view of international politics. I think that, with Biden, we had some progress in the beginning. We had two very significant steps of Biden's administration, which shouldn't be underestimated. First of all, the P5 Declaration on the necessity to prevent nuclear war, that it shouldn't be started, and there will be no winners. It was a very significant step.
[00:08:45] Peter Slezkine: When was that declaration made?
[00:08:46] Feodor Voitolovsky: It was January ‘22, just one month before the special military operation, I believe.
[00:08:54] Peter Slezkine: And so, just a few months later, there were videos — simulated videos — of bombs going off over England on Russian State TV.
[00:09:04] Feodor Voitolovsky: It depends.
[00:09:06] Peter Slezkine: I remember watching it.
[00:09:08] Feodor Voitolovsky: But anyway, the United States and Russia have signed it. Second thing, which is very significant, that Biden's administration has prolonged current stock trading. Previous Trump's administration didn't want to invest any effort. He called it a bad treaty, Obama's treaty, whatever. I believe that Trump's administration right now will find a way to have its own agenda on arms control and strategic stability because it's necessary for both countries to have dialogue on these issues.
[00:09:39] Peter Slezkine: Well, not even both. He has even floated the idea of a three-party talk about arms control with the Chinese. The extent to which the Chinese would want to engage in a trilateral negotiation is another matter.
[00:09:51] Alexander Dynkin: The key approach to involving China, that the United States has to suggest something which would attract them. It's a complicated and creative task. But without that, they would reject, because as you know, they are planning up to the end 2035 to reach the same level as we have, both countries.
[00:10:14] Peter Slezkine: That the Chinese would not be interested in arms control until they've reached parity, more or less, with the two main players.
[00:10:20] Alexander Dynkin: If they did not find anything attractive.
[00:10:24] Peter Slezkine: So, Trump would have to offer them something substantial for them to stop before they each go.
[00:10:28] Alexander Dynkin: Maybe medium-range missiles in Asia. I don't know.
[00:10:33] Peter Slezkine: Withdrawing them, yeah.
[00:10:33] Feodor Voitolovsky: Yeah, intermediate-range missiles could be the key because China… but I do not think that the Chinese will be really interested in reducing the numbers of their intermediate-range missiles. But anyway, some talks on it could be valuable. But as offered in several Chinese publications, I can put it like this, they have mentioned the figure of 1,000 strategic warheads as a level from which they could be engaged in arms control talks.
[00:11:09] Alexander Dynkin: And it's scheduled for 2030.
[00:11:10] Feodor Voitolovsky: Yes. And there were several publications. They openly mentioned this figure. I have heard it from Chinese experts. And they are openly telling us that, until they will not reach this level, it is not in Chinese interest to get engaged in any arms control negotiations. But of course, starting with bilateral decisions in this field between Russia and the United States, we can build a background for engaging China on further steps. But I think that bilateral dialogue on this issue is critical.
[00:11:45] Peter Slezkine: And you think that is possible, a resumption of strategic arms control negotiation on a bilateral basis? Or, do we first need to satisfactorily settle the Ukrainian conflict, I imagine?
[00:11:56] Feodor Voitolovsky: Look, yes, of course, the Ukrainian conflict is the key to many issues. But even during the Ukrainian conflict, we can start to have talks on strategic stability. For a long period of time, Russia's officials have been telling Americans that the Ukrainian conflict is the main obstacle for dialoguing further in other different fields, including strategic stability.
Right now, I believe that things, slightly, have changed. But concerning arms control, we can not only have treaties. Sometimes, other instruments could work. For example, Russia has unilaterally, and it was the initiative of our president, declared that it will not deploy intermediate range ground-based missiles in the European part of Russia until the United States do the same in Europe. So, if the United States will deploy intermediate range ground-based missiles in Europe, Russia will break this moratorium it has unilaterally declared. And the moratorium is still working on our side.
So, it’s a small example of other instruments of arms control and confidence building measures we can create for dialogue and for building trust between our nations. Of course, Trump, during his first term, that's why I'm a little bit skeptical, was not a big supporter of international treaties and any limitations for American military power. He withdrew from the INF Treaty. Trump's administration also left the Open Skies Treaty. But maybe, he will be ready to invest his political capital into further steps and to sell it on the domestic political market as a huge result.
[00:13:52] Peter Slezkine: One, it's one thing to withdraw from your predecessors’ treaties. It's another to make your own. And so, I don't think that he's against these sorts of deals, per se. We know he likes deals. He just likes the deals that he makes himself.
[00:14:05] Alexander Dynkin: Peter, look, the landscape is totally different because we are now in a polycentric nuclear world. It's nine nuclear states over there. Secondly, there is a change in technology, completely. When we launched New START negotiation, there were no cyber, no space, no precision-guided missiles, and no supersonics. So, today, to reach this comprehensive agreement, the task for, let's say, one year or a heavy job of let's say 50 from different sites, it's so complicated. But as Feodor says, canceling something, making some parallel steps, exchanging some information, that could help. So, I do not believe that, until 2026, we would have a new comprehensive treaty. But some parallel steps, I do believe it's possible.
[00:15:00] Peter Slezkine: So, yeah, let's hope that we can, step by step, rebuild or build a new system of arms control. But now, let's get back to Alexander's list of concerns regarding the current conflict in Ukraine.
So, the first one you mentioned was Trump's apparent impatience. And it seems like there is an asymmetry here between Washington and Moscow. Trump, just the other day, said that he thought Putin was dragging his feet. And there does seem to be, on Trump's end, a desire to wrap up the conflict as quickly as possible. Putin, on the other hand, seems to believe that he holds the initiative on the battlefield and that he would like to maintain that leverage until he is given something substantial. So, it's in his interest to play out these negotiations as long as possible.
So, is this a fundamental tension? Or, is there some sweet spot between solving this tomorrow and waiting until the Russian military has advanced however many more kilometers six months from now?
[00:16:09] Alexander Dynkin: Well, look, the biggest difference if we compare, let's say, this to the Vietnam War, this war happens near the city of Smolensk. This is the biggest challenge for Putin. And we also have our deep government as you have. And this government is deeply anti-American, just like your deep government.
[00:16:30] Peter Slezkine: Is anti-Russian?
[00:16:32] Alexander Dynkin: Yeah. So, Putin is in a complicated situation. He has to calm this deep government and to make some steps toward the solution of the crisis. And I'm not quite sure that in the U.S. administration, those conflicting situations are very well understood.
[00:16:53] Feodor Voitolovsky: Another thing which is significant, I believe that nobody in the Russian government is interested to have this conflict as a permanent factor of foreign policy and domestic, political, economic life or social life. But our government and President Putin himself gave a promise to protect Donbas. And it is critical to finish the job in Donbas. And it doesn't mean that Russian troops will go further. Russian troops could have an opportunity to take over Kyiv and Kharkiv. They didn't. They didn't because of the risks of many victims, on the civilian side, on the military side, including, of course, our troops.
[00:17:41] Peter Slezkine: But when would they have taken Kyiv and Kharkiv? They obviously could have done that in 2014, ‘15, but presumably not in February 2022.
[00:17:48] Feodor Voitolovsky: Absolutely, absolutely, both times.
[00:17:51] Peter Slezkine: But you're saying, 10 years ago, they could have taken these two cities.
[00:17:53] Feodor Voitolovsky: In 2022, in our situation, it was very risky. The United States has created its embassy from Kyiv because they understood that, if the Russian government would do such a decision, they would take over Kyiv, but they didn't. And it means that Russia is doing everything to have leverage, to raise stakes. But the principal thing is to protect Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson districts.
[00:18:27] Peter Slezkine: Well, the last two were added almost as an improvisation at a time when the military situation wasn't looking great, because Donbas, of course, was referenced very clearly in Putin's speeches before the launch of the special military operation, and they've been the focus of the conflict since 2014, ‘15. Zaporizhzhia and Kherson were not a big focus for the last 10 years or for the first months of the war. So, how important are they now, relative to Donbas?
[00:18:59] Feodor Voitolovsky: They’re important. And we have seen, when Russian troops left Kherson, that a lot of people who had pro-Russian sentiments have been punished by Ukrainian special services, and everybody are understanding that it's impossible for reputation of Russia for these people who are living there and who have trusted Russia and who have decided to leave in Russian Federation to lead them. And now, these regions are included into the Constitution of the Russian Federation. So, they are under the protection of the Russian Federation. And now, it's not a military improvisation. It's much more. It's a domestic political issue which shouldn't be underestimated.
[00:19:43] Alexander Dynkin: Well, to simplify a little bit of a complicated story, let me give you such an example. Could you imagine the street or the square in the City of Haifa or Tel Aviv named after Heinrich Himmler? Do you understand what I mean? Why do you believe that people in Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk would enjoy a street named after Stepan Bandera? It's impossible for them. That's a historical memory going through generations.
[00:20:11] Peter Slezkine: Sevastopol now is under Moscow control, so there are no streets named after Stepan Bandera. He served in the SS, but he was, at the same time, a Ukrainian patriot. So, by the current key of government, he is represented as a national hero opposed to Russian Soviet imperialism. But in Moscow, he, of course, is still remembered as a member of the enemy Nazi camp.
[00:20:39] Alexander Dynkin: As well as in Warsaw.
[00:20:41] Peter Slezkine: As well as in Warsaw because Poles and Ukrainians are having to bury difficult moments from their mutual history.
[00:20:48] Feodor Voitolovsky: Yes. And then Stepan Bandera, he was responsible for killing thousands of Jews and thousands of Polish and Russian people.
[00:20:57] Peter Slezkine: If we take the street names as an important matter, can this be addressed politically, or must it be addressed militarily? So, let's assume that Russia is not poised to take the entirety of the four regions that it has constitutionally incorporated into the country and that it is certainly not, anytime soon, going to go all the way to the Polish border and have the freedom to re-erect statues, rename streets in according with its own historical memory. So, how important are these objectives? And can they be reached through negotiation?
[00:21:38] Feodor Voitolovsky: Look, in 2014, the Ukrainian government, Poroshenko’s government, Zelenskyy’s government, they have issued dozens of laws oppressing Russian-speaking people, Russian culture, and the attitude towards Soviet and Russian history. And I think that this policy has been taken seriously in Moscow and has become one of the significant reasons for decisions about special military operations. But together, with an absolutely irresponsible attitude in France and Germany towards Minsk agreements, because it was a chance to and has been perceived in Moscow in those times, to reach some form of peace and political process between Russia and Ukraine, some political process inside Ukraine and to reach stability. But as Angela Merkel and François Hollande have openly said, it was a fraud to have some time for Ukraine to get prepared for a more serious war with Russia than conflict in Donbas.
[00:22:51] Peter Slezkine: So, the Minsk agreements did not manage to give Russia what it wanted. The special military operation also, so far, has failed to meet the maximum objectives. So, what is the path forward, to keep fighting? Or, is there a way in negotiations with the U.S. side first and others later to achieve the primary objectives now through discussion?
[00:23:18] Alexander Dynkin: Of course, it's a rather simple question. Negotiation is much better than fighting. It goes without saying. But look, if we look back, I guess the biggest Russian mistake regarding Ukraine was that we supplied Ukraine with very cheap hydrocarbons, starting from ‘92 till the ‘24. And we supplied according to market prices in Poland. And Poles, they have no choice than to launch the institutional and structural reforms. In Ukraine, there were no such stimuli. For example, we had our painful land reform in 2001. They have this reform in 2021, 20 years later. And we, by our own hands, have grown this oligarchic autocracy in Ukraine, because they steal our cheap gas, sell it abroad, and have money. And we did not pay attention to the civil society, the Ukrainian civil society, to having, let's say, a common meeting of students, professors, and so on and so forth.
[00:24:33] Feodor Voitolovsky: And we lost a generation of people.
[00:24:36] Alexander Dynkin: Absolutely.
[00:24:36] Peter Slezkine: So, the idea was very simple, that the Kremlin could buy Kyiv's loyalty by subsidizing the country with cheap gas, but that didn't work well because it distracted Russia from dealing with the whole of society and noticing how it was changing.
[00:24:51] Alexander Dynkin: That was the biggest mistake.
[00:24:53] Feodor Voitolovsky: Yes, I absolutely agree. I think that we missed a chance to engage, not the group of oligarchs in Ukraine and bureaucrats around them, but to engage the whole society, grassroots, private enterprise, civil society, education system, science, to engage all these parts of Ukraine who have been suffering from very obstructive economic policy of many governments — Yushchenko government, Yanukovych government, Poroshenko’s government — these governments were not supporting interests of broader groups of Ukrainian population. And Russia was only working directly with the government which was in power and didn't work with the society. It's a huge mistake.
[00:25:46] Peter Slezkine: Russia, you say, had an opportunity to work with Ukrainian society to increase its bonds with the whole of Ukraine and not just with the oligarchs and presidents who ruled it and benefited from the cheap guests supplied from Russia. Is it possible for Russia to adopt a, sort of, whole of society strategy going forward? Or, has the war transformed the situation fundamentally?
[00:26:16] Alexander Dynkin: Never say never. But the tragedy of the current situation, that this war, in a certain part, is a civil war. And you understand between who. It's Russians against Russians, in a way. And that, of course, produces some long-lasting negative effects. But look today at Vietnam, it’s concluded its strategic partnership with the United States, 46 years after the tanks of the North stormed the presidential palace. So, it happens in history.
[00:26:51] Peter Slezkine: And pho is one of the most fashionable foods among hipsters in cities all over the United States.
[00:26:57] Alexander Dynkin: Exactly. But at the same time, if we look at relations between Croatia and Serbia, they're still very suspicious and hostile, mainly from the Croatian side, not from the Serbian side.
[00:27:09] Peter Slezkine: Well, in some sense, it's probably harder to reconcile when you're close together, of course.
[00:27:13] Feodor Voitolovsky: But we have the French and German example who have been fighting for more than two centuries. And now, they are very close partners interconnected deeply economically, with trust on a very high level.
[00:27:28] Peter Slezkine: But it helps that they're both under the same American umbrella.
[00:27:32] Feodor Voitolovsky: Look, before 2014, and even before 2022, we, Russia, and before that, Soviet Union, had relations with the Federal Republic of Germany. Even after the Second World War, even after the tragedy of millions of people of Soviet and Russian, Belarusian, Ukrainian people, and from other republics of Soviet Union who have been killed, even after that, we have restored absolutely positive relations between the Soviet Union and Russia and Germany, an economic sphere and social sphere and cultural sphere. And I'm sure both Russians and Germans will come back to this fundamental relationship after some period of time.
And I'm very optimistic about restoration of normal economic ties with Ukraine, but maybe after two or three decades, after a generation change. And, of course, now, the blood chain is very significant because a lot of people on both sides, they lost their relatives, they lost their children, they lost their friends, and they feel a boiling hatred towards another side, especially in Donbas, because people in Donbas, they say, “We have got our freedom with our own efforts. And Russia came and Russian troops came to protect us. But we have our own story of independence from Ukraine. It was our decision.”
So, for them, it's the most sensitive issue. For a lot of people who have been fighting in this war, it's also a very sensitive issue, of course, on both sides. And for their relatives, friends, children, and others. But, anyway, there is a logic of long-term ties among families, among groups of people, the economy will drive both countries closer to each other after decades. But before that, we need a normal diplomatic and political process with guarantees for both sides, for Ukraine, but also for Russia. And then, it should include humanitarian issues, to support normalization of relations.
[00:29:57] Peter Slezkine: What do you mean by humanitarian issues?
[00:29:59] Feodor Voitolovsky: A lot of access to the infrastructure and to resources. For example, Donbas, and especially, Donetsk, for 10 years, has been suffering from the deficit of water. And the same thing was in Crimea before the special military operation. A lot of people have been suffering from the deficit of water because the Ukrainian part has closed channels, several Donetsk channels and other channels, which have been supplying the city of Donetsk and Crimea with water. It's one issue.
Second issue, exchange of prisoners of war, exchange of people who would like to and who would prefer to live on another side of this conflict line and border. For example, there are a lot of people who may decide from the Ukrainian side to live in Russia. And there will be some people who will prefer to live in Ukraine, for sure, on the Russian side. And if we would land this exchange, social context between families. The mining is a very significant issue because there are thousands of mines on both sides. And mining is a critical issue for normalization of agriculture, for usage of normal routes and roads, because it poses danger, not for military people, after the war, but for civilians.
[00:31:25] Alexander Dynkin: Peter, if I may, I would like to raise a little bit of our conversation to the historical experience. Every time, the demise of an empire brought internal conflicts between former parts of the empire. Look at the partition of India conflict. Look at Yugoslavia. Look at the Turkish empire. The borders inside the Russian empires, which used to be the Soviet Union, were designed by Bolsheviks according to short-term political necessities.
Look at Karabakh. This is the story. Because Karabakh was populated by Armenians, mainly. There were many Azeris, but it was Armenians, mainly. And they took Baku, not yet Yerevan, They just gave Karabakh to Azeris. Nobody in the West talked about the sharp conflicts which existed in Central Asia — the fight for the water, the fight for the land. Nobody paid attention to that. And only right now, when Mr. Mirziyoyev in Tashkent started diminishing these tensions. He launched the demarcation of the borders.
And this is the new attitude. Look, we have problems in the European part of the former Soviet Union. They have huge problems in the Caucasian part, but not in the Central East at this scale, thanks to, let's say, skillful approach to the problem and understanding that all these borders were made by Bolsheviks absolutely voluntarily.
[00:33:05] Feodor Voitolovsky: Yes, absolutely agree with you, Alexander, because, for example, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have been balancing for decades on the brink of war. And they had a lot of incidents on the border until, with the diplomatic support of the Russian Federation and Uzbekistan and others, they started this process of limitation of border, resolving very complicated issues because territories inhabited by two nations are very mixed in that region.
[00:33:37] Peter Slezkine: Well, borders are very complicated everywhere and are always artificial, by definition. There's no such thing as a natural border drawn by God. And most people have memories of a time when their borders were in a better place as far as they were concerned. The Poles and the Germans, the Hungarians, the Romanians, all of the Balkans, all of South Asia and so on and so forth, Africa, we don't even have to start with that conversation. So, of course, revisiting where borders lie is opening quite a can of worms.
[00:34:12] Alexander Dynkin: Absolutely. But this is reality. And sometimes, a border changes according to war outcome. But that was just a political decision. You need this part, you gave this part, and that's it, you're done. So, it's a bit of a different story. I'm not suggesting going back in these historical tunnels, but to have in mind that it's helped sometimes.
[00:34:35] Feodor Voitolovsky: And in European history, blood and war, unfortunately, was the principal instrument of the limitation of borders. And what is going on, unfortunately, in Ukraine right now is this new delimitation of borders.
[00:34:51] Peter Slezkine: So, let's say that, after a painful process of negotiations, at some point in a number of months, the two sides, three sides, four sides, however many there are, settle on some new dividing line, to what extent can the U.S. and Russia discuss bilateral relations in parallel with this process in negotiation over the dividing line in Ukraine, specifically? So, we started with a discussion of strategic stability and you suggested that that is a track that can be pursued in parallel with the Ukraine negotiations. In Washington, in the Trump administration, there is a clear focus on geopolitics, which has led to the attempt to normalize relations with Russia. And I think this attempt would've been made regardless of Trump's desire to make peace in Ukraine. And a big issue here is Washington's worry about China. So, how far can the U.S. pull Russia away from China? Is Russia itself a bit uncomfortable in its current state and very happy to have an opening to the West if it is provided? Address the China question because it's obviously central to every conversation that takes place in D.C.
[00:36:16] Alexander Dynkin: Okay, absolutely. The short answer would be that we have to develop relations with the United States up to the level at which Beijing has relations with Washington, D.C.
[00:36:28] Peter Slezkine: Although the China-American relationship is based on an economic entanglement that Russia could never recreate.
[00:36:36] Alexander Dynkin: Exactly, but we have strategic relations. Different leverage. So, current relations between Moscow and Beijing, I should say, are structural because we have a long mutual border. And both countries are interested in keeping it safe like today we have it. This is the first one. We have a matching or parallel outlook for different international problems — Taiwan, Ukraine, whatever, terrorism — a lot of parallel views. When Mr. Bolton came to Moscow in his capacity as the state secretary during the first term of Mr. Trump, I had a meeting with him and he asked, “What is your relations with China?” I said, “Look, never against each other, but not always together.”
Today, I would say that it has grown up, those relations. And nobody speaks about Russian dependence on the European Union. When the trade turnover was 51% with the European Union, nobody cared. Today, our trade turnover with China is 34%. So, in opposite, we are going to a more balanced relationship. And China has a growing market, on the contrary, to the European Union market.
So, I guess that, for the whole century, the development would be close. And we need China. We need Chinese investments. Unfortunately, they're not very big. Not all mutual programs go smoothly. We, for the case, are talking about a new wide border, long range jet. No way. There is some disagreement. We've been discussing, for a long time, this new gas pipeline, and so on and so forth. So, it's normal relations. And I completely disagree that Moscow is dependent on Beijing. This is a very Western narrative, very wrong narrative.
[00:38:38] Feodor Voitolovsky: And one more thing. When hundreds of European and American companies have decided to leave the Russian market, they have been changed with Chinese companies who decided to come and to take these opportunities. So, it's absolutely a market economy based approach on the Chinese side and on the Russian side. If Europeans and Americans are leaving the market, Chinese are coming with their investments, with their contracts, with their value chains.
And what should Russia do? To ignore it? To disagree? They came when everybody left, and together with Indians. And we shouldn't underestimate the depth of ties, economic, political, security, military, technical ties between Russia and India. It's not well-known in this city, but we have a strategic partnership comparable to Russia and China relations with India. Of course, the figures of trade turnover are lower, but they skyrocketed after 2022. And Indian companies feel very comfortable in the Russian market. A lot of Russian companies are working in India. We have a high level of trust between our governments and our leaders. And nobody's talking about the risk of Russia-India.
[00:40:04] Alexander Dynkin: Dependence.
[00:40:04] Feodor Voitolovsky: Dependence, yes. Everybody is talking about Russia-China dependence. And Russia is trying to diversify its foreign policy in the Asia Pacific, also, working closely with Vietnam, cooperating with other countries, ASEAN countries. Before 2022, we had fantastic progress in our relations with Japan and South Korea. With South Korea, we still have deep ties. And South Korean companies are thinking how they can manage to work on the Russian market, even taking into account financial sanctions of the United States. And a lot of Korean companies are still working in Russia. And a lot of them want to come and to bring back their investments.
[00:40:51] Alexander Dynkin: So, my take is that this is a completely wrong narrative, that Moscow has become overdependent on China.
[00:40:57] Peter Slezkine: So, you both argued against the narrative that Russia is or has become a vassal of China. But ironically, that argument probably hurts your position in negotiations with the Trump administration, because if the Trump administration feared that you were, in fact, becoming inextricably linked to China, then they would have great motivation to seek to improve relations with Russia in order to change that situation. Because there is nothing they fear more than they consolidated in adversarial Eurasia. But if Russia is already no more reliant on China now than it was in Europe previously, if its economic relations are balanced between China and India and other parts of the world, Korea and, perhaps, Japan, then maybe the U.S. doesn't need to do anything.
[00:41:53] Feodor Voitolovsky: Look, it shouldn't be so primitive because I believe…
[00:41:58] Peter Slezkine: Politics are primitive, I'm afraid.
[00:41:59] Feodor Voitolovsky: I do not think so, because I believe that Trump's administration and officials, especially in the security block of Trump's administration, understand that Russia and China can do a lot of things together in the military sphere. And they understand that pushing Russia towards China with the Ukrainian conflict, with this policy of humiliation and expelling Russia from relations with the West, if they would continue such policy provided by Biden's administration, before that, by Obama's administration, it will bring Russia and China so closely to each other that they could build a military block, that they could cooperate in the military technological sphere. And I think that approach would be very rational if both Russia and China would be under pressure from the West.
[00:42:55] Peter Slezkine: But you're saying that this Russia-Chinese military and strategic cooperation, which has been gaining strength over recent years, could be put on pause or at least slowed if Russia-American relations improved.
[00:43:08] Alexander Dynkin: A bit different. My take is that Kurt Campbell, he's one of the greatest Asian experts in the United States. And something like 12 years ago, he stated that double containment would be a nightmare for U.S. security. Today, you enjoy this double containment. If you diminish the tensions with Russia, it would be a little bit easy. But it does not mean that Russia could be against China. It never would happen during this century.
[00:43:39] Peter Slezkine: So, you're saying that Russia doesn't have to do anything, that the onus is on the United States, that if the U.S. improves its relations with Russia, then it necessarily improves its global security position because it has one fewer adversary to worry about.
[00:43:56] Alexander Dynkin: Right. This is a correct interpretation. But at the same time, the current relation between Beijing and Washington is much better than between Moscow and Washington.
[00:44:05] Peter Slezkine: That seems true on the face of it, given that the United States and Russia are fighting directly in Ukraine, as we found out in print in a New York Times article yesterday, where it was clear that American generals are providing targets for Ukrainians to strike. So, in that sense, the U.S. and Russia have been engaged in a pretty much direct war for a number of years. On the other hand, if you ask anybody in Washington, D.C. or in the Pentagon who they are focused on, who they're drawing up the military plans for, they will spend an hour telling you about China before they remember that there's an ongoing conflict in Ukraine.
[00:44:45] Alexander Dynkin: This article uses cynic definition and the language is different. It's not the target, it's the points of interest.
[00:44:52] Peter Slezkine: Well, euphemisms are the natural language of international politics, I'm afraid.
[00:44:59] Alexander Dynkin: Maybe. But this article glorified the brotherhood in arms between Ukrainians and Americans. I do understand Ukrainian generals, but I do not completely understand American generals.
[00:45:13] Feodor Voitolovsky: And in terms of empathy, I think that, on the Russian side, it would be perceived as a proof of what our officials have been saying about the Ukrainian conflict as a proxy war and as a hybrid war against the Russian Federation managed by NATO coalition and the United States. And it's a very sensitive issue.
Concerning China, I believe that both Russia and China would never be interested in confronting each other. But relations between the United States and China have this significant economic background. And they have connections on a deeper level, which Russian-American relations do not have yet. But between the United States and Russia, there are plenty of opportunities. And the Russian market is one of the most under-invested markets in the world. And a lot of American companies are understanding this.
And I can give you a very small example. In Russia, domestic patent registration filed during the last three years, most foreign companies registering brands, technologies, trademarks were American, during the war, because a lot of American investors are understanding that the Russian market is very interesting — 150 million people, a little bit less, with high level of consumption and with a very strong deficit of foreign direct investments. And they're thinking further about the next investment cycle. I believe that people around Donald Trump, and maybe he himself, are also understanding these issues. That's why they have started to have dialogue with Moscow.
[00:47:10] Peter Slezkine: Well, we sent a businessman to Moscow to talk to your president. So, perhaps, these opportunities are, in fact, enticing. But what is most enticing for us now is the prospect of dinner with a bunch of other interesting Washingtonians. So, I think we should wrap it up and head off to the restaurant.
[00:47:27] Feodor Voitolovsky: Thank you very much.
[00:47:29] Alexander Dynkin: Thank you, Peter.
[00:47:29] Feodor Voitolovsky: Thank you for this opportunity to speak to the audience of Stimson Institute.
[00:47:33] Peter Slezkine: Thank you very much.
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The Trialogue Podcast is hosted by the Stimson Center and produced by University FM.