Fyodor Lukyanov, Editor-in-Chief of Russia in Global Affairs, returns to the Trialogue at the start of an already-eventful year to take stock of Russian strategy amid dramatic U.S. intervention in Venezuela, crisis in Iran, and negotiations over the future of Ukraine. *The Trialogue Podcast is hosted by the Stimson Center and produced by University FM.
Fyodor Lukyanov, Editor-in-Chief of Russia in Global Affairs, returns to the Trialogue at the start of an already-eventful year to take stock of Russian strategy amid dramatic U.S. intervention in Venezuela, crisis in Iran, and negotiations over the future of Ukraine.
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*The Trialogue Podcast is hosted by the Stimson Center and produced by University FM.
(Transcripts may contain a few typographical errors due to audio quality during the podcast recording.)
[00:00:05] Peter Slezkine: I'm Peter Slezkine, Director of the U.S.-Russia-China Trialogue Project at the Stimson Center. Since the middle of the 20th century, relations among the United States, Russia, and China have had an enormous impact on each country separately and on the world as a whole. The purpose of the Trialogue is to better understand this extraordinarily complex and consequential relationship by directly engaging with experts from all three countries.
In this show, guests from across the political spectrum and from every corner of the globe share their views in their own voice. While the Stimson Center seeks to provide access to a wide variety of perspectives, it does not endorse any particular position. We leave it to the listeners to judge the validity and value of the views expressed by the guests.
My guest today is Fyodor Lukyanov, Editor-in-Chief of Russia in Global Affairs, host of the weekly TV program International Review, Chairman of the Presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, and a research professor at the Higher School of Economics.
Fyodor is among the most influential and astute Russian commentators on Foreign Affairs. This is his second appearance on the podcast. I hope you enjoy the episode.
Fyodor, welcome back to the podcast.
[00:01:19] Fyodor Lukyanov: Thank you very much. I'm very glad to be here again.
[00:01:23] Peter Slezkine: Much has happened in the relatively new year. There has been a rather dramatic implementation of the Trump corollary, so-called, to the Monroe Doctrine. What do you make of that move in Moscow?
[00:01:39] Fyodor Lukyanov: I think that's quite an interesting reaction. On the one hand, I can say that people are impressed — it does not mean positively, but impressed by what has happened. The military intervention of the United States in another country, the regime change is actually nothing new. We saw it before many times, even in the relatively recent past, but not to talk about what all of us read in books about Latin America in 20th century, 19th century, and so on.
And people, of course, expected something like this to happen, that Americans will overthrow a regime place occupation forces in Venezuela, and so on. And it was quite unusual, to put it very mildly, that it didn't happen. And I think that the main reaction, if I try to summarize it, is that it's not so much about American very much brutal way to conduct its interest. It's actually not very much new again. But the format, which each time is different from expectations in the period of Donald Trump, brings people to the conclusion that the main thing is not how to react to this particular move or another move.
The question is that international environment has changed profoundly. The United States in this environment is absolutely different than recently. And it has to do with the United States, of course, because the United States is a very active transformative power.
But actually, is not only about that, it's about the total reshuffle of the international system, for which Russia, frankly, was not entirely prepared. And what we have now, it's a deep, if not confusion, but a deep consideration what to do next, what implications it can have.
[00:03:51] Peter Slezkine: But is there now a feeling in Russia beneficial circles, or more perhaps among commentators, that this American move means that it's totally fine to just openly claim a sphere of influence?
[00:04:05] Fyodor Lukyanov: Absolutely. But not exactly this. It's clear manifestation of this sphere of influence approach on the American side. It does not necessarily mean that the United States and Trump, in particular, mean that others have the same right. So, this sphere of influence is something which Americans have and Americans will defend that sphere of influence.
But it's not isolationism. We are back to our Western Hemisphere and do what you want. Not at all. And we see that activities, including these days, clear firm stand on Iran, shows that we cannot expect this carte blanche from the U.S. administration to other countries to do whatever they want in their neighborhoods.
[00:04:52] Peter Slezkine: But I suppose the question is whether Russia believes it gains more legitimacy or more freedom of maneuver from just adapting to this new world of might makes right, or sticking at least formally to the old frameworks of the UN Charter in seeking to make Trump's United States stand out as the rule breaker.
[00:05:17] Fyodor Lukyanov: Whatever happens, whether we like it or not, but the behavior of the United States sets a tone for the whole international atmosphere. Still now, maybe it'll change in the future, but now it is a fact of life.
So, in this situation, rhetorically, of course, all countries trying to position themselves vis-à-vis the United States most likely will refer to the international law, to the UN Charter, and so on.
In fact, I don't believe that anybody thinks that it can work in any way. So, reluctantly, conclusions will be made that now we need, at least, to consider what options we have in areas where our interests lie, to behave in a more or less similar way. I think those considerations are going on in Moscow, in Beijing, maybe even in Europe, to some extent. The question is that might make the right approach puts the biggest emphasis on the notion of might.
And here, of course, we arrive to the very brutal version of the balance of powers approach. And here, again, whether we like it or not, but still now the United States, have accumulated the forced power, which is still hardly comparable to anybody else. At the same time, I think it's important to note, and some commentators in Russia said, that Donald Trump, who looks extremely brave, and he tries to appear disregarding anything because he's totally sure that America is stronger than anybody else, but at the same time, he confronts countries and situations where he's sure that the response cannot be given, at least the consequences for the United States will not be negative. In case he's not sure or the result is different, as for example, in this tariff conflict with China, then he's very much calculated. He understands that this particular aspect of might is not necessarily overwhelming, then, okay, let's try something else.
And I think that it's not yet a conclusion made in Moscow or in many other capitals. But all international players will seriously look at their own capacities, capabilities to understand where they have instruments, assets, which might stop the United States. And of course, what happened quite immediately after the Maduro case, the use of Oreshnik by the Russian Federation against Ukraine, that's just a gesture again, but that's a gesture which has a name to remind the United States about Russian ultimate advantage.
[00:08:25] Peter Slezkine: Although that was justified as a response to the apparent drone attack on Putin's residence, right? A response had long been promised, and this was framed as a retaliation for that attack. But you're saying that this is broadly a signal that Russia shouldn't be messed with beyond a certain point, and the Venezuela case is wrapped up into that.
[00:08:50] Fyodor Lukyanov: I think so. Maybe not necessarily with the Venezuela case, but the case which followed Venezuela intervention with this oil tanker, which has been seized by Americans. This story behind this tanker is extremely murky, so no one can understand what happened. And even the official statement by Dmitry Medvedev did include an indication that it was not that clean as we would love to see, but still it was under Russian jurisdiction. It was taken, and then it was responded in a way.
[00:09:24] Peter Slezkine: But neither side seems to be interested in picking a fight over this tanker. Both have pretended that it didn't really belong to Russia, even Medvedev, as you said, who is typically an absolutely extraordinary fire-breathing monster, at least online, was strangely conciliatory in this case.
So, to return briefly to Venezuela specifically, does Moscow feel like it has lost an important asset? Is there anything potentially to the whispers that Russia might have actually turned a blind eye, and that this is part of some broader exchange of Venezuela for Ukraine? Is there a chance that Russia can remain, since the regime seems to remain in place, that it will keep certain of its assets in Venezuela? What is Venezuela to Russia?
[00:10:17] Fyodor Lukyanov: First of all, I think that there is a possibility that Russia will keep something in Venezuela, not playing the previous role, but something. And here, I can recall the case of Syria, because when Assad was deposed late 2024, absolutely everybody in Moscow, outside Russia, were sure that the Russian bases would be kicked out. And of course, Russian presence there would be eliminated completely. It didn't happen. It didn't happen because of the much more reasonable leaders of Syria, reasonable compared to what people expected.
And it didn't happen probably because some outside players, in particular Turkey, and Israel, by the way, decided that the presence of Russian bases there would be, in one or another way, useful. Of course, Israel is a different case. But at the same time, again, the old regime basically is in place.
I think that the much bigger question is not for Russia, but for China, because the biggest partner of Venezuela, of Maduro, Chávez before, was actually China. And politically, in slogans, Chávez and then Maduro claimed a lot of very positive things about Moscow. But in material terms and practical terms, China was very deeply involved and invested a lot into Chavista regime. So, now, the question is whether they will be able to communicate with Trump and the United States to keep some assets or to withdraw some assets, and so on. As far as the political side is concerned, you know, of course, there are people here saying that that's another humiliation, we had to defend our ally, and so on. But even those who are very much anti-American understand that Israel is very, very far away.
So, the real ability of Russia to do something to support this regime, especially given the fact that the regime was not in the best shape since quite a while, those capacities remain very limited. So, you know what struck me even before this case last year, we come back to this more general conceptual view.
What is happening, and Trump is a herald of this, is the reevaluation of what matters in international relations. Because during the period of liberal globalization, a view emerged and prevailed that, basically, territory is not that important. You might have an ally 10,000 kilometers away from you, and that is fine because in today's world of rapid communications, you are there online all the time.
For example, I remember many, many years ago, in 2000s, then time president of Kyrgyzstan, Askar Akaev, gave a lecture in Moscow, and he said that, "You know, our country, Kyrgyzstan, has three great neighbors. Those are Russia, China, and the United States. Why United States, would you ask? Because the United States is the biggest neighbor of any country in the world." And so, that was the approach…
[00:13:44] Peter Slezkine: I spent 2011 on a U.S. State Department Fulbright in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, expressing my neighborly affection for that far away country.
[00:13:54] Fyodor Lukyanov: Yeah, yeah. Anyway, what we see now is actually a comeback to the classical geopolitical approach — that territory matters, neighborhood matters. So, first of all, you should bring your surroundings in order. And then you might do something else, but it's less important. And I think that it's more or less accepted in Russia now, for a reason which has not so much to do with Trump or Venezuela or other new trends, but because the process of rethinking of the post-Soviet period is happening.
This year, '26, we will mark 35 years since the collapse of the Soviet Union. That's a very long historical period, even in any time, any epoch, but especially now when time has been condensed, and so on. And I think that the main priority now on the official level, on the expert level, is on this issue: how to rearrange Russia as part of this bigger neighborhood, Eurasian neighborhood.
And the conclusion is very, very simple and very obvious, that resources are limited. And you cannot spend on everything. I think even the United States thinks in those terms, but especially Russia. Coming back to your question, Venezuela, that's a bad thing. From the Russian point of view, Maduro was a friend. He visited Russia many times. Russia tried to make him part of BRICS, or partners of BRICS 2024, during the Kazan Summit.
And by the way, at that time the country which prevented that was Brazil, because they have a very bad relationship. And the Russian leadership was very sad about this, and Maduro was extremely negative. But now, I think it was a good development because if Venezuela would be part of BRICS, or partners of BRICS, that would be an even less convenient situation for us.
[00:16:02] Peter Slezkine: So, Russia essentially understands and accepts the United States' desire to dominate its own region, is not terribly upset about the outcome in Venezuela, may maintain some assets there if it can come to an arrangement with the new version of the old regime and the United States. But what if it turns out, as you said, that the United States is claiming an exclusive sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere, but also right to intervene elsewhere, namely in Iran? Then who knows what will have happened there by the time this podcast is released? Is it fair to assume that Russia would react much more acutely to American intervention in Iran?
[00:16:49] Fyodor Lukyanov: That's another completely different story, because first of all, I don't believe that Americans will intervene. So, to imagine the American intervention in Iran, boots on the ground, it's very difficult, and it's against what Trump is trying to demonstrate all the time.
At this point, it looks like the expectations in Israel and the United States, and in all countries negative to the Iranian regime, is that mass protests in the situation of deep socioeconomic crisis will undermine regimes from within. And there are some signs that there is a significant domestic internal clash between groups and factions of the Iranian leadership or establishment.
Of course, it might not be enough because Iran demonstrated several times quite a high degree of resilience to such kind of instigated riots. In case, it will be an attempt to inflame by coming directly, for example, by Israelis, no, it will be a different reaction on the Russian side. It'll be a different reaction on the Chinese side because, first of all, even Israel is there very far away, that's the American sphere, we will not accept it officially, but everybody understands it.
Iran is here. Iran is an important pillar of the whole Eurasian construction, Eurasian constellation. And that will be seen by many, including, I guess, even some Arab regimes in the Persian Gulf, as a very dangerous destabilization.
[00:18:30] Peter Slezkine: You mean if Israel or the U.S. were to intervene directly, militarily?
[00:18:35] Fyodor Lukyanov: Yes, intervene directly and will try to seriously destroy the existing state in Iran. I think that whatever Russia and China would think in this situation, and China, for example, Chinese approach is very well known, that's always a willingness to be calm and to be distant, not to intervene. But in this case, they will be forced. Both Russia and China, and maybe some other countries in the region, will be forced to react in one or another way. Of course, it's not so much Russia can do in case the Iranian regime will certainly collapse from within.
[00:19:02] Peter Slezkine: Are there any lessons learned from the Syrian case, that if a regime looks rotten enough, it is not worth sustaining? Or is it so important because it is a BRICS member? It is nearby that Russia has an interest in keeping this regime in place, even if it is seriously weakened.
[00:19:39] Fyodor Lukyanov: Yeah, I think so. It's difficult to compare with Syria because Syrian regime, at the end of Assad's period, was basically non-existing. So, it was totally discredited, and no one wanted to even think about attempts to defend it. And as we know, Assad asked both Iranians and Russians to come to rescue, but both said no.
It's not the case in Iran. Iran, with all domestic troubles and irregularities in management, which we all of us know very well, those who visited Iran, but this is a serious state, serious power with traditions.
Also, I think that we should not underestimate the resistance to outside interference there. Yes, of course, the interference is in place, and we know all those rumors, or maybe even not rumors, confirmed facts, about infiltration by Mossad in all security systems. But still, it's a very proud, proud nation. And I guess that they might react in this way, in the way of certain consolidation, in case it'll be the obvious demonstration of outside support to the radical opposition.
But of course, no one knows what will happen. And I don't believe that Russia or China or any of Iran’s neighbors would try to militarily resist if Americans or Israelis intervene. But at the same time, stakes are very high because if Iran will change their orientation, so to say, it's not just about political or ideological competition. It's about the most important things — about logistics, about transport routes in the region. For China, for Russia, that's the most important crossroad.
And of course, that will be seen as a very, very important change, negative change. So, again, I don't know, but what I can imagine is that if this situation will continue for a while, and of course, both Russia and China will do everything to try to support the current regime by means they have — by money, by supply of arms, by whatever they might need in this situation. If it will not work, then, of course, that will be a very dangerous situation, and that will seriously change the whole equation in the region, influencing the South Caucasus, Central Asia, Middle East, for sure.
[00:22:22] Peter Slezkine: What is the worst-case scenario for Russia? A regime change, which in the most absurd scenario results in Reza Shah's grandson arriving in Tehran and a pro-American regime. Again, the likelihood of this is very low, but let's pretend. Or a state collapse where Iran fractures, and then you end up with chaos.
[00:22:45] Fyodor Lukyanov: Objectively, I think that the state collapse would be absolutely disastrous because state collapse might generate a development which no one can predict. And in case of state collapse, that will be the end of any possible projects, North–South Corridor or the Chinese or Indian projects from East Asia and South Asia to Europe, and so on.
So, we saw before what happened when countries in the region collapsed or de facto collapsed, like Iraq, for example. That's nothing positive. The really pro-American regime there, it depends, again, looking at the Venezuelan example, which was very unusual. Okay, is it a pro-American regime now there? Maybe not, but very much constrained by Americans. I guess that, to install the really pro-American or American puppets there, this crown prince, you know, I have not enough fantasy to imagine that. Maybe I'm wrong. The pro-American Iran is very difficult to imagine, frankly.
[00:23:56] Peter Slezkine: So, we are just about a year into Trump's second term, and there have been many apparent twists and turns, but also a fairly consistent, I suppose, new trajectory, in some respects. So, what do you make of the United States after one year of Trump Two?
[00:24:20] Fyodor Lukyanov: It's not up to me to judge the United States, and of course, I cannot…
[00:24:26] Peter Slezkine: It doesn't have to be your personal opinion exclusively. There is a lot of discussion about Trump in Moscow. Clearly, he, specifically in the United States, is a subject of great fascination. So, how has that conversation progressed over the year? Have you arrived anywhere, or is it still confusion combined with fascination?
[00:24:41] Fyodor Lukyanov: It's less confusion because Trump is actually very consistent. Whatever people in Europe, especially, say or Trump's opponents in the United States call him unpredictable, it's not unpredictability, it's something else. It's strategic consistency and tactical creativity. That’s what we see. But in fact the conclusion which has been made by all, regardless of what people think about Trump, like him or not, is that the liberal world order is over completely.
Understandably, the only country which could destroy that world order was the United States — not China, not Russia, not Iran. The country which created this world order decided to get rid of it. That's what happened.
I think there is a debate here whether it's sustainable. I mean, when Trump is over, and we can imagine that the next period will be more troublesome for Trump with the midterm election and many other obstacles, whether it would be possible that the previous approach, rules-based something, might become, I think, step by step, most of the majority of commentators and analysts believe that it's irreversible. The tone might change, the format might change, but it's absolutely a new era which started. And it was not because of Trump. Trump was just a symptom, very bold symptom, but still a symptom of those changes which started well before.
Then, as I mentioned at the beginning, there is a deep reflection and a certain degree of confusion, what to do with all this, because Russia was very much against the rules-based order. Now, we have order without any rules, or disorder without any rules. And again, the capacity of the United States to do what Americans believe is right and corresponds to their interest is still very, very huge. The positive thing which many people see, not as a hope but as a possibility for the future, is the fragmentation of the so-called collective West, the political West, because of course, the whole construction of the political West, as we all of us who are not 85 years old but younger, all of us grew up and got used to the collective West, the West as an entity.
But now, it seems to be deconstructed. And we are actually back to normal, because the political consolidated West was a historically tight phenomenon. The period where this phenomenon was produced is over. And now, we see that European attempts to see Trump as an aberration will most likely fail. And then again, what for Russia? Because we see now that this decomposition of the West, Europe, and America going astray means that Americans do whatever they want without taking so much into consideration, I mean, about Russia, about Russian interest. It's rather indifferent.
While Europe, without the United States, is actually much more hostile towards Russia than it used to be before. And all the most radical energy and ideas on how to concur, how to deter Russia, how to create a new security system in Europe which would see Russia as an ultimate enemy, so that comes from Europe. It doesn't come from the United States anymore. And of course…
[00:28:44] Peter Slezkine: My sense is that's precisely because they hope that the U.S. has not left. So, Europe that was truly on its own might moderate its hostility to Russia. But because they are concerned about the United States withdrawing, but that outcome has yet to occur, they invoke the Russian threat, which many of them obviously believe in sincerely, as a reason why the United States must stay.
[00:29:15] Fyodor Lukyanov: Maybe.
[00:29:16] Peter Slezkine: Or do you think in Russia that basically if the U.S. withdraws from Europe, Europe will remain a collective unified adversary of Russia?
[00:29:26] Fyodor Lukyanov: I think, again, if we try to summarize this, the mood here, it's rather the latter, that people believe that without the United States, Europe will be maybe not united because united Europe, without this patronage of the United States, is pretty difficult to imagine. And we see a lot of domestic splits inside the European Union. But to some extent, the Russian issue and the Ukrainian issue are the only ones which can keep the European Union today, at least, and maybe in the foreseeable future, together.
And that's why they are so unwilling to change their position, to adapt their view on the Russia-Ukraine war to the changing situation. Because if we imagine that this issue would be away, I think the conflicts from within will immediately come up. I mean, both domestically in each country, in the big countries, and also in the European Union as such.
The general problem, which many analysts here believe is the most acute for Europeans, is that the model of European integration, as it emerged in the 20th century and very successfully existed until the beginning of the 21st century, that was a great model, I must say. This was one of the most successful political experiments in European history. But it was very much connected to the international environment which has gone. And there is no way to continue with the same model of integration in this new environment. But no one has the slightest idea how to change it, what to change inside the architecture of European integration to respond to those international changes.
And that's why what Europeans are trying to do, they're trying to double or triple efforts to do the same as before, hoping that time will change, Trump will disappear, and so Europe will be great again. I'm afraid it's not the case anymore. Trump might disappear. Trump may even fail. But this situation with the disharmony between the architecture of the European Union and international environment will remain.
And then it's a desperate situation. And if so, European politicians are aware of it or feel that at least, maybe not intellectually, but they feel it. Then, they have no choice but to try to keep it going as it is. And for Russia-European relations, it's pretty dangerous, actually.
[00:32:28] Peter Slezkine: Well, and the one way for the Europeans to keep it going as it is would be to continue to support Ukraine and prevent its defeat, which would perhaps carry existential consequences for the European project, not in the sense of Russian tanks in Berlin or Paris, but because, as you say, this is a political construct that was created in a particular environment. And if Russia demonstrates that the rules have changed, that would seriously impact the varied foundations of the European experiment.
Given that, what do we do about Ukraine? Is there any possibility for a deal? Because as we've seen, Witkoff visits Moscow, Trump talks to Putin. Then the Europeans come in. They change the plan. Putin rejects it. And we have repeated this cycle now many, many times. So, if there is this fundamental gulf between Russia and Europe, leaving out, obviously, Ukraine, which is essential to this, is there any way to overcome it?
[00:33:35] Fyodor Lukyanov: Frankly, I don't know. We will mark a year of very intense diplomatic efforts by the Trump administration pretty soon, I think, early February. On the one hand, spirit of anchorage, or any other spirit of attempts to come to terms with this conflict is alive. Despite all zigzags, we see certain commitment on both sides. And more than that, during this year, we saw several times that the spiral turned new rounds, I think four times — same trajectory, from hopes to disappointments, back to hopes, back to disappointments. Each time…
[00:34:21] Peter Slezkine: Although the good thing about a spiral is that it does eventually come to a point.
[00:34:25] Fyodor Lukyanov: It might come to a point because each time, each new turn means a little bit more clarity about how to solve it. But having said that, we see that, still now, sides are still committed to fighting, I mean, militarily. Russia, for sure. Ukraine as well. In Moscow, since quite a while, there are people who expect Ukraine to be exhausted and then to give up, but we don't see it yet. It's a very hard advance for the Russian army.
Europe, for reasons which we just discussed, is firmly and irreversibly committed to support Ukraine, even by, at least, promising things which they will never be able to deliver, like, for example, quick membership in the European Union. And Americans, I think, coming back to the beginning of our conversation about capacity of the United States, what the White House diplomacy demonstrated is actually, on the one hand, it is the only actor which can do something, which can change situations. At the same time, capacity is limited, is not endless.
And the very fact that Trump administration having almost absolute leverage on Ukraine, that's the country which is totally dependent on the West, and they cannot continue without Western support, without American intelligence, without many, many other things. So, this leverage of Americans is huge. Despite that, Trump cannot impose those terms on Zelenskyy. Zelenskyy is Zelenskyy. Too sophisticated, rather, no. But anyway, there are limits to what Americans can do.
And that brings me to particular conditions for peace settlement. Unfortunately, we're still basically where we started. And it sounds extremely nice when Trump or Europeans, or Zelenskyy, say that 90% of all those points in the plan are already agreed. Yeah, but the rest, the 10%, the territories and the security guarantees. And here we are, far, far away.
I think that the mood on the Russian side didn't change much. So, as we see, the conditions put by Putin initially, and at least in this more or less concrete form, at least for two years ago, they never changed. And in this regard, attempts by Trump, by Europeans, by anybody else to influence Russia in a way that Russia will change approach, will compromise, those attempts don't work.
[00:37:19] Peter Slezkine: Could you just, again, for the audience, reformulate Russian objectives? I know Putin has been very consistent in expressing them, but they're also rather general in their formulation and hard to imagine in concrete application.
[00:37:35] Fyodor Lukyanov: You know, it's not that general anymore. It was very general at the beginning, that general that not so many people understood what was meant. But in fact, now, almost four years after, we understand very well. This is the de facto transformation of the Ukrainian state to the system which remains independent and sovereign, but has formal limitations to be sure that Ukraine can never be used as a military platform against Russia.
Basically, it is what has been called, after the Second World War, the Finlandization vis-à-vis another country. And, you know, the stupidity of us all, of us of the mankind, is that when the whole crisis erupted, 2014, wise people like Henry Kissinger, and if I'm not mistaken, even Zbigniew Brzezinski, said that Finlandization would be actually the right way to solve it. That would guarantee Ukraine a lot of benefits and satisfy Russia. And I think they were right. But at that time, it was perceived as something absolutely impossible. That's discrimination of sovereignty of Ukraine, and so on.
Now, it would be great if we could achieve… And many people accept that in the West, even in Europe. But unfortunately, much, much happens to that.
Coming back to conditions, yes, this is the very clearly formulated limitations on Ukrainian military capacity and presence of NATO on the Ukrainian territory. And that was, actually, initially, that was it. That was about this when the whole operation started in '22. And the whole Istanbul process was about that.
So, at that point, '22, territorial issue was not there, or it was, by far, not the most important. And I must say that Putin was very consistent. When the whole Istanbul process failed in March, April 2022, he said basically, okay, then each next attempt to solve this issue and the range of issues on the table will bring us to the same agenda, but in the worst situation for Ukraine. And that consistently happens.
Of course, now, since Russia took a significant part of Ukrainian territory, since that, now, you cannot ignore this. So, now, the territorial issue came to the forefront. For some people, that's maybe the most important thing.
I still don't believe that Putin considers territory as the key element. But unlike 2022, we cannot compromise on the territorial configuration that easily, that it could be done at that time. And unfortunately…
[00:40:44] Peter Slezkine: Is Russian control of the entirety of Donetsk non-negotiable, or at least Ukrainian withdrawal from it? Because I understand that territory might not be the prime concern, but that particular issue keeps resurfacing as a key Russian demand.
[00:41:01] Fyodor Lukyanov: It looks like now it's non-negotiable. Whether it was negotiable before, I don't know, but now it is, because after all those statements, all statements made from the Ukrainian side, all responses from the Russian side, now this is one of the key elements. And of course, what happened in September '22, with the change of Russian constitution that made the whole situation pretty irreversible in terms of the Donbas territory.
I'm afraid that, at this point, it's not the most important thing either because, beyond the Donbas, Russia has made significant advances in other regions of Ukraine as well. And the more advances, the less probability that those territories will be given back, and so on. So, that's, unfortunately, like a vicious circle. The longer you reject negotiations, as Putin said many times, the worse conditions you get.
[00:42:04] Peter Slezkine: Well, one could argue that Russia also suffers the longer this goes on and bears costs in the immediate term and in the long term, the future Russia strength. So, perhaps both sides have… I mean, inarguably, both sides have suffered since Istanbul.
[00:42:21] Fyodor Lukyanov: No doubt about that. Just one thing. Yes, of course. And I think the understanding of long-term costs of this prolonged conflict is there in Russia, but in this situation, that's a matter of principle anymore. And the Russian side, there is a deep conviction, at least for now, that Russia has a bigger capacity and bigger resources to continue. And it will continue as long as these resources in place.
[00:42:46] Peter Slezkine: How seriously should we take the political demands tied to Russian language rights, status of the Orthodox Church, denazification, so-called? Is that as important as the objectives you've already listed, or is that clearly a second-order interest?
[00:43:06] Fyodor Lukyanov: No, I don't think as a second order, because this is exactly about the nature of Ukrainian statehood, because in the current form, especially during the war, Ukraine transformed into a radically anti-Russian entity, radically. It's not just a country with some conflicting interests. It's the statehood based on anti-Russian foundation. I think that, unfortunately, this is not of secondary importance. That's really one of the core demands.
[00:43:45] Peter Slezkine: But Russia still believes that, if Ukraine makes certain commitments on paper regarding Russian language, Orthodox Church, et cetera, that, even after this brutal war, Ukraine might change its attitude towards Russia? Because you say since 2014 the state is radically anti-Russian, but also after the war, presumably the population will be largely unsympathetic to Russia, to put it mildly. Or is there a sense that, over time, if Russian language is permitted, things will gradually change?
[00:44:20] Fyodor Lukyanov: That's the question. I don't know how… You know, historically, we can remember different situations in this area. So, after what happened during the Civil War 100 years ago, exactly in the Ukrainian territory, it was very difficult to imagine that people living there would, at any point in the future, be able to coexist. But it happened. It happened even before in the 17th century, in the 18th century. We had examples.
I don't mean that we should or can expect the repetition of what was centuries ago, but history teaches us that changes might be pretty significant, especially given the fact that what we discussed at the beginning of our podcast, that everything is changing completely around us. And of course, I said it many times, maybe even we discussed it last time when I was a guest of your program. The whole battle in Ukraine is actually not about the future. It's about the past. Those problems were never seriously discussed, considered, and settled after the Cold War. Consequences of collapse, the way how the Soviet Union collapsed, and how the whole European arrangement was made after 1991.
And this is the last battle of the Cold War, actually. It's not the battle for the future of Ukraine, of Russia, of Europe. In a way, it is now because it's a very big conflict. But initially, those so-called deep, how Putin says, the deep roots of the conflict, they go back to that period.
What I mentioned before, that Russia is trying, with very big troubles, mental troubles, to leave the period when we considered the whole area through the lenses of the former Soviet Union. It does not mean that the future relationship between Russians and Ukrainians, Russia and Ukraine, will be profoundly different. But to say that, now, we are bound to be enemies forever, like India and Pakistan, probably it's too much.
[00:46:48] Peter Slezkine: What kind of regime does Russia envision in Ukraine? Can Zelenskyy remain the leader? Is a Venezuela scenario acceptable where Zelenskyy somehow leaves but somebody from this regime takes over, whether it's Zaluzhnyi or Budanov or somebody else? Or is Russia seeking a real reboot of the entire regime?
[00:47:18] Fyodor Lukyanov: Certainly, not Zelenskyy. Zelenskyy is a symbol of something which Russia certainly will not tolerate anymore. Another regime may be. Of course, the ideal picture is that a completely new group of people will come. But Russia has no constituency in Ukraine. Russia has no political environment which could be suitable and pro-Russian or loyal to Russia. I don't believe that kind of political forces do exist in Ukraine now.
But probably, the more pragmatic people who would understand that Ukraine will be probably totally destroyed if the military conflict will continue, I can imagine that, under certain circumstances, Russia would accept it. But of course, the conditions are quite multiple. Now, again, back to the previous issue, combination of the geopolitical constellation plus territories and the European factor, because we speak about Ukraine, but Ukraine is a function, as we said, a function of the European situation. And of course, for Europeans, if they, at some point, finally arrive at the understanding that they need to discuss with Russia, now, some politicians, they're like Melania. They start saying that. I don't think it's serious, but still.
[00:48:52] Peter Slezkine: Or even Macron wants to sit at the end of the long table across from Putin once more.
[00:49:00] Fyodor Lukyanov: Okay, Macron. So, but anyway, as it looks now, it's the totally unbearable task to formulate something which would more or less suit all. At this point, we don't know what will happen in case Russia will finally, through big losses, through big efforts, but finally demonstrate that the Ukrainian statehood is endangered by the continuation of this war. Maybe it might be changed. But again, coming back to the beginning of this Ukrainian part of the conversation, I hope that 2026 will be the last year of this military confrontation, but I'm not sure.
[00:49:44] Peter Slezkine: Well, so from what you say, it's clear that Russia believes that time is on its side and is willing to continue to press its advantage until that advantage becomes clear to all, assuming that that is possible. Is there any concern that the U.S. deal might expire, that Trump's offer of normalization of business ties, of total diplomatic reset, that offer will be taken off the table for domestic political reasons in the coming six months?
[00:50:20] Fyodor Lukyanov: Yeah. Trump has his own agenda. And we understand that he will be consumed by the internal struggle pretty soon, midterm election, and so on. Some people here think that we have two or three months more of Trump's attention to this matter. Will it be a blow to Russian expectations? Maybe not. Putin is clearly interested to keep Trump on board, clearly. Whatever happens, he's trying to be extremely polite and constructive vis-à-vis Trump.
But you can find views here that, if Trump will walk away, as he promised a couple of times, and not increase support of Ukraine, maybe not cut what is in place, but not increasing, then maybe it's okay with Russia, that Russia still has resource and potential to continue with its agenda in case United States will be occupied by their own issues.
[00:51:29] Peter Slezkine: But so a victory, a hypothetical victory in Ukraine that is not accompanied by a real improvement in the U.S.-Russia relations is preferable to a compromise in Ukraine and a real normalization of the U.S.-Russia relations that may also have the effect of definitively splitting the collective West that you mentioned before, because it's hard to imagine maintaining any coherence if the U.S. and Russia start building positive relations over the heads of the Europeans.
[00:52:05] Fyodor Lukyanov: First of all, I think everybody understands here, and I think it's true, that any other projects or areas of cooperation between Russia and the United States might be discussed and explored only after the Ukrainian issue is settled. So, those ideas, initial ideas which we heard in February, March '25, let us start with easier issues like reinstate diplomatic services, which is really easy, and then we can step by step approach the most complicated ones. It doesn't work. For me, it was always from the beginning. First, Ukraine, then everything else.
[00:52:49] Peter Slezkine: Well, so the question is whether you want a lot in Ukraine and a little bit of everything else, or a little bit in Ukraine and a lot of everything else. And the Americans believe that they, or the administration, are often a lot after Ukraine is settled, and that the Russians are being very obstinate, trying to settle some small problem when they could do great things with the U.S. after that is solved. In Russia, it seems like the attitude is the reverse.
[00:53:15] Fyodor Lukyanov: Russia had a pretty bad experience with different American and European administrations after the Cold War, when very bright futures were described, and nothing happened when Russia did what Western counterparts wanted the Russian government to do. So, that's why I'm afraid it's a bit personal. And Putin put too many hopes on his real relationships with previous leaders, be it George W. Bush or Chirac or Schröder, and anybody else. It's a bit problematic in this regard.
The problem is that Ukraine is seen here as something that important for everything, for Russian existential future, for the future of Russian civilization, that this issue cannot be put in the framework of relative advantages. So, let's compromise here, but get something else there. I'm afraid it's not possible. It's not possible both politically and even, which is worse, more complicated psychologically.
So, rightly or wrongly, we can discuss it, but it's a fact of life. And another issue, which unfortunately has some explanations and history, the whole history of Russian diplomacy after wars, except world wars like Napoleonic Wars, Second World War, shows that, the moment Russia stops military operations, since that moment at any diplomatic negotiations, Russia can only give something, never gain, only give some of what military previously got. And unfortunately, this is how it always worked in Russian history.
And that's why the idea initially supported by Trump, first ceasefire, then negotiation, that was there from an arrival. So, it was absolutely impossible. So, to make a long story short, the importance of the Ukrainian issue, again, you might agree or disagree, you might say that this is some kind of obsession, we can discuss it, but the importance of Ukrainian issue for perception of a Russian role in the world and Russian future, existential future, is that big that it is hardly measurable in the context of deals, what Trump likes.
[00:55:55] Peter Slezkine: Well, to finish, let's try to imagine a world after some deal is done. So, in 10 years, the Ukraine War has ended, one way or another, the liberal order is dead and buried. What sort of world would Russia like to exist within, ideally and realistically?
[00:56:17] Fyodor Lukyanov: You know, that's a rare moment in history when no one has a clear picture of the world, not only here. I think if we ask Chinese, of course, they have. And they will very eloquently describe it. But it'll have nothing to do with the real chances. I think a Russian trajectory after the collapse of the Soviet Union until now, and most likely it'll continue in the future, is the self-determination as a big Eurasian power with clear understanding of its limitations of its capacities. Those capacities are very huge, but they are limited. And Russia will not be back to the highest level of the international system as a superpower. No potential, no resources, and no need, actually, no wish.
If we talk about an ideal picture, actually, Russia, given its size, its potential, its geographic location, Russia is the country which would mostly benefit from a very strong and stable peace in the world. Because if there is peace and everybody thinks about cooperation, about benefits, and so on, you cannot bypass Russia. Russia is an indispensable power, to use the term of Madeleine Albright about the United States, indispensable, because whatever you do, you have to cooperate with Russia, and Russia has to cooperate with the rest of the world.
But this is an ideal picture of a world where people are purely rational. It's not the case. And that's why I don't believe that we can expect that anytime soon. But that is something which we should aspire. Realistically, I think that Russia, again, after the end of this war, however it ends, Russia will obtain a big experience, both in military terms, but also in understanding how to avoid the necessity of using military force.
Because again, maybe I am too naive, but I think that, despite all rhetoric we hear on Russian television, for example, there is a growing understanding also among the ruling group that this is not the way how we have to address the challenges Russia will face. Let's assume that that was inevitable, that was a product of the previous development. And as Putin said in February '22, we had no choice but to start. Okay. But it should be an exception.
And in the contemporary world, there are a lot of other means on how to address vital interests. And by the way, President Trump demonstrates some of those means. Of course, no one can replicate the United States, but the very approach to avoid direct collisions, but by some interesting, creative ways to achieve things, combining PR, rhetoric, deals, hidden diplomacy, open diplomacy, and a demonstration of force, that's something which I hope Russia will also learn a little bit from the United States.
[01:00:06] Peter Slezkine: Making military operations special again.
[01:00:09] Fyodor Lukyanov: Exactly.
[01:00:12] Peter Slezkine: Okay. Well, so the U.S. is the indispensable power, and Russia is literally the unavoidable power geographically. So, let's end on that. Thanks so much for coming back.
[01:00:23] Fyodor Lukyanov: Thank you.
[01:00:27] Peter Slezkine: Thanks for listening to the Trialogue Podcast. Make sure to subscribe to the show so you don't miss out on any episode. The Trialogue Podcast is hosted by the Stimson Center and produced by University FM.