This week, our guest is Fyodor Lukyanov, Editor-in-Chief of Russia in Global Affairs, Professor at the Higher School of Economics, and Research Director of the Valdai Discussion Club. What is it like to sit on stage with Putin? When did relations with the West go wrong? And what in the world is the “world majority”?
This week, our guest is Fyodor Lukyanov, Editor-in-Chief of Russia in Global Affairs, Professor at the Higher School of Economics, and Research Director of the Valdai Discussion Club. What is it like to sit on stage with Putin? When did relations with the West go wrong? And what in the world is the “world majority”?
(Transcripts may contain a few typographical errors due to audio quality during the podcast recording.)
[00:00:00] Peter Slezkine: I'm Peter Slezkine, Director of the U.S.-Russia-China Trialogue Project at the Stimson Center. Since the middle of the 20th century, relations among the United States, Russia, and China have had an enormous impact on each country separately and on the world as a whole. The purpose of the trialogue is to better understand this extraordinarily complex and consequential relationship by directly engaging with experts from all three countries.
My guest today is Fyodor Lukyanov, Editor-in-Chief of Russia in Global Affairs, professor at the Higher School of Economics, and research director of the Valdai Discussion Club. Fyodor, welcome to the podcast.
[00:00:42] Fyodor Lukyanov: Thank you very much. Hi.
[00:00:43] Peter Slezkine: Although I suppose you should be welcoming me, considering that we're in Moscow and I'm sitting in your studio.
[00:00:48] Fyodor Lukyanov: We can do it in both ways.
[00:00:51] Peter Slezkine: Very good. Well, a reciprocal welcome.
[00:00:53] Fyodor Lukyanov: Yeah.
[00:00:53] Peter Slezkine: So, every year, the Valdai Discussion Club has a big conference for international experts in Sochi. And as part of that conference, Putin comes out on stage and answers questions. In the last few years, you have served as the moderator for this session.
[00:01:12] Fyodor Lukyanov: Exactly.
[00:01:13] Peter Slezkine: So, can you tell us a little bit about how this works? From afar, Putin looks mysterious and menacing. What is he like up close?
[00:01:22] Fyodor Lukyanov: I did this kind of job for seven or eight years already. So, for me, it is not that mysterious anymore as it used to be before when this format started. Each time, it's very interesting because President Putin likes this kind of conversation. He loves to talk to international audience. And this is, I would say, unique format. I don't know any other international leader who would be able to respond to questions from the audience, most of them not prepared in advance.
[00:02:01] Peter Slezkine: I think now we have actually found somebody. Trump is another who loves this sort of repartee.
[00:02:06] Fyodor Lukyanov: The last meeting with Putin was four hours. And I don't believe that Trump would stand for that long time. So, in case of Putin, you might be impressed. And I used to be impressed by his ability to respond to anything. Of course, there is a preparation for this event and people from presidential administration and from the staff, they, as any entourage of a leader, they give him the outline to be prepared for this conversation. And this is normal thing, this routine. But each time, I have a feeling that he does need it.
[00:02:43] Peter Slezkine: But the outline is a series of questions that people in the audience will ask.
[00:02:48] Fyodor Lukyanov: The general format, first, there was a speech. Valdai became a place where Putin delivers a programmatic speech on international affairs. Then, it might be some conversation between moderator and him. And we select a couple of most interesting questions from those which are sent from the audience. But normally, the prepared scheme works for 10, 15, 20 minutes. And then it is absolutely free discussion. And President Putin loves to monopolize the stage. And so, the moderator will be sidelined and he start to pick up questions from people himself. So, at the end of the day, it's very much spontaneous.
[00:03:34] Peter Slezkine: So, he gives a speech, then the two of you have a short exchange, then you field questions, and then, typically, he takes over and begins improvising.
[00:03:43] Fyodor Lukyanov: At the end, I try to take it back because I see that the time is running. And sometimes, it's a feeling that he would love to continue forever. But of course, we need to stop at some point.
[00:03:57] Peter Slezkine: There’s one time I think where you publicly told him that you were in command. How did he react to that?
[00:04:03] Fyodor Lukyanov: He accepted.
[00:04:07] Peter Slezkine: You said, “I'm in command here,” right?
[00:04:09] Fyodor Lukyanov: Yeah, “I'm in command here, not you.” And he said, “Okay.” And that was spontaneous. That was, of course, as you can imagine, it was not prepared. But because I saw that the situation is becoming chaotic, so, I had to do something.
[00:04:24] Peter Slezkine: Are there some kind of questions that you think he prefers relative to others? Are there some questions that really pique his interest?
[00:04:30] Fyodor Lukyanov: You know, first of all, he likes controversial questions. He has absolutely no problem to respond to anything. He likes to talk about, especially now, likes to talk about big philosophical things or historical things. History is something which is of biggest interest for him. And I think, not only me, but for example, Tucker Carlson can confirm that history plays a very big role for Putin.
He masters a lot of numbers. For example, when he's being asked about energy, some kind of cooperation between Russia and Europe, Russia and China, he knows all figures, how many cubic meters of natural gas should be delivered or can be delivered, and so on. So, in this regard, he is very well-equipped to have such kind of conversations.
[00:05:28] Peter Slezkine: And when he sees you backstage before you go out, does he say, “Hello, Fyodor Aleksandrovich?” Does he know your name? Does he make a joke? Or do you just, sort of, stare at each other and then walk out together?
[00:05:42] Fyodor Lukyanov: No, he knows my name. He knows me. We cooperate in this way for quite a long time. Sometimes, he makes jokes — sometimes very smart ones, sometimes not. It depends on his mood. Putin is a very human person. I experienced different situations. Once he was in a very bad mood, for some reasons, personal reasons I don't know, and that was pretty challenging for me. Some other times, he is very nice and open and really love to talk, love to embrace public. And then, yeah, it's an interesting experience, both of them, negative and positive.
[00:06:24] Peter Slezkine: Okay. Well, let's go back from Putin all the way to Gorbachev.
[00:06:30] Fyodor Lukyanov: I met him as well, yeah.
[00:06:31] Peter Slezkine: Did you, really?
[00:06:32] Fyodor Lukyanov: Yeah.
[00:06:33] Peter Slezkine: But already after his starring moment.
[00:06:35] Fyodor Lukyanov: Of course. I was too young when he was president.
[00:06:37] Peter Slezkine: How old were you when he came on the scene?
[00:06:40] Fyodor Lukyanov: 18.
[00:06:40] Peter Slezkine: 18, so, you came of age just as the Soviet Union was about to expire?
[00:06:46] Fyodor Lukyanov: University student, it was, of course, a big fun to follow, even when signs of forthcoming collapse started to emerge. But we were, at that time, much more radical. And yes, Gorbachev enjoyed a huge popularity until, probably, ‘89. Then, started to decline, but not because of disappointment in transformation, but because people like me and many other in Moscow, and among intelligentsia, they believe that he was too slow, too undecided, too cautious. And then another idol emerged, Boris Yeltsin. And I was among those who went to public gatherings to support Yeltsin and so on. Now, I remember this a little bit nostalgic about how rosy we were at that time.
[00:07:49] Peter Slezkine: But so, you did not regret the collapse of the Soviet Union when you were young and it was happening?
[00:07:54] Fyodor Lukyanov: I did not regret it at that time. And at the moment, when Soviet Union collapsed in December ‘91, the agony of the system, which did last for at least half a year, was so obvious that, for many people, it was like a relief, at last. And I must say that, in fact, it was impossible to believe that was the end. Because to imagine, I'm sorry for being politically incorrect, but to imagine that Kyrgyzstan is another country, is a country, is a state, I'm sorry. But at that time, yeah, I think many people believed that, okay, now, as the Russian Federation, our country will be able to do what Gorbachev and Soviets failed to do. I just finished studies in ‘91 and I started to work as a journalist. And that was a brilliant time for journalists, of course, that was…
[00:08:51] Peter Slezkine: And you had studied Scandinavian languages.
[00:08:53] Fyodor Lukyanov: I studied German and Scandinavian languages. I worked, initially, as an editor and then reporter for Scandinavian service of Radio Moscow. At that time, we still try to broadcast to the whole world. And then I worked for many newspapers in 1990s until 2002 when I was invited to launch the Journal Russia in Global Affairs. And of course, 1990s, for journalists, especially in Moscow, it was a golden age. It was extremely interesting. It was, I wouldn't say free, but it was very pluralistic because all media were distributed among different groups of oligarchs or some influencers. And that was broad and diversified picture.
[00:09:41] Peter Slezkine: But so, within this diversified picture, what were the ideological currents and sociological groupings? Was everyone, more or less, a liberal of some kind or another, feeling that, through these pangs, we will finally end up as part of a globalized world and become one with the West?
[00:09:58] Fyodor Lukyanov: Yes, in circles where I was operating, that was, more or less, different scales of liberal approach. Yes, with the basic assumption that, of course, Russia should become part of something like a broader wider West, wider Europe. And again, I emphasize that I belong to the privileged part of the society because, when I think about even journalists who worked in other cities in Russian countryside, that was completely different experience. That was experience of very hard survival, of collapse of everything, of collapse of, not just living standard, but just the ability to survive. And now, of course, looking back, I understand how difficult it was. But at that time, being a part of this privileged elite, of course, we had a slightly distorted view.
[00:10:52] Peter Slezkine: But what was the picture of Russia that you had at that time?
[00:10:57] Fyodor Lukyanov: You know, at that time, the conceptual debate was almost absent. And that was, by the way, it's in a very important part of what happened to Russia since collapse of the Soviet Union. Because I would argue that, in the late stage of the Soviet history, during Gorbachev's glasnost and perestroika, it was an attempt, pretty rich, from the intellectual point of view, to launch a debate about Russia, about Russianness, about what should be the aim for our development, how Russia should look like in the new world, and so on. And that was not only connected to the official line, which at that time was openness, West-oriented policy, and so on. Debate was pretty interesting and pretty rich.
[00:11:51] Peter Slezkine: Which side of the debate did you find most appealing?
[00:11:54] Fyodor Lukyanov: Of course, I was on the liberal side or, at that time, it was called democratic side of the debate. The notion of liberalism came later. At that time, there were conservatives versus Democrats. So, we belong to the so-called Democrats.
[00:12:08] Peter Slezkine: But the conservatives were those who just wanted to maintain the state at all costs, or who still believed in resurrecting Leninism of some sort?
[00:12:14] Fyodor Lukyanov: Some were those who believed in resurrecting Leninism, but Gorbachev was actually among those who wanted to resurrect Leninism in his understanding.
But it was another part of conservatives, those who used to be dissidents in the Soviet time. And they rather can be described as Russian nationalists or Russian traditionalists. They were against Leninism and Bolshevism, but they were in favor of something genuinely Russian and, mostly, anti-Western, at least, suspiciousness to the West. And that was, of course, continuation of a very long Russian tradition from the 19th century.
Anyway, what I want to emphasize, there was a debate which was interesting and which was very important. And this debate has never been completed because Soviet Union collapsed and 1990s wasn't time for debates. It was time for survival, and it was time for, I would dare to say, intellectual monopoly of pro-Westerners. There were, of course, those who continued this anti-Western tradition. They did exist, but they had not so many options to explain and to be public.
Why I remember this now? I think that was a very unfortunate end of the Soviet Union, not just of the Soviet Union, but the fact that this debate never produced any intellectual conclusion that brings to the situation we have now.
[00:13:49] Peter Slezkine: Yeah. So, now, this debate that was started in the ‘80s is being continued, some of you in the same figures or inspirations.
[00:13:54] Fyodor Lukyanov: Exactly. It should be resumed, I would say, but in a broader context and a broader form. Unfortunately, now, we have another extreme that, at that time, liberals suppressed everybody. Now, it's rather the opposite. But I think that, at the end of the day, we will have this debate, hopefully, on the more sound and the more reasonable basis than at that time.
[00:14:18] Peter Slezkine: Well, let's explore the nature of that debate in a moment but first figure out when this post-communist trajectory went wrong. So, there was an assumption throughout the ‘90s that Russia would converge with the West or become part of a greater West. What was the point of no return?
[00:14:37] Fyodor Lukyanov: I can give two different answers to that. One answer is very simple. It was no point of no return because it was not in a moment when this trajectory could bring us to this integration into wider West. Because, looking back, it seems that it was a very much self-perception and perception of the West. Wise people on both sides, here in Russia and in Europe and in the United States, those who were not fascinated by the mood of the end of history in the late ‘80s, early ‘90s, they said very clearly at that point that this idea will never fly.
But unfortunately, those people at that time seem to be, like, very conservative and people without imagination. But looking back, we, unfortunately, have to say that those skeptics were probably much more realistic about what was possible, what was not possible. And the whole trajectory was bound to fail from the beginning. That's one answer.
Another answer is that this trajectory has been conducted in a very steady way, not only in 1990s when Boris Yeltsin was president of Russian Federation, but also during the first and maybe even second term of President Putin, because President Putin, in his initial incarnation as the leader of Russian Federation, was probably one of the most pro-Western politicians and leaders in Russian history. Because he really believed and he really worked hard to make Russia part of this Western-centric system, on particular terms, of course.
He never bought this idea about Russia which should transform itself into a big Poland and then become part of the West. No way. But he believed that, even in its genuine form, Russia could become part of the West if the West would understand that it should not try to impose on Russia, so to say Copenhagen criteria and so on.
And I think that, coming back to your question, that was probably mid-2000s when President Putin concluded that this way would not bring us anywhere. We can say symbolically that the so-called Munich speech of Putin was a manifestation of that. But even this Munich speech, even this conference 2007 was not a break yet. He finally tried to convince that, “Guys, you do wrong things. Watch, look what follows and how Russia reacts.” And that was ignored, actually. I remember very well the reaction, the Munich conference, when very respectable Western gentlemen like Carl Bildt or John McCain or others, they just laughed and said, “Okay, we feel your pain. Russia is in decline. So, of course, Russia is trying to imitate greatness, but okay.”
And that was most likely wrong, because what followed next year in Georgia and then many other events demonstrated that this move by Putin was not just an act of desperation. It was something else. And of course, it's very difficult for a Russian person not to feel schadenfreude. This year, when we look at the Munich conference and Vice President Vance talking to Europeans and their reaction to that, they are totally destroyed.
So, in this regard, again, to your question, I think that was probably the final moment when Putin tried to bring this perspective back. Listen to us, accept some of our concerns, and then we can try again.
[00:18:51] Peter Slezkine: So, that's when the realization came on this side. But you said that, basically, convergence was impossible from the start, and the boring conservative realists may have always been right. Is the reason purely geopolitical that Russia is too large to be incorporated in the West? Or is it cultural, historical, and more about different forms of civilization?
[00:19:14] Fyodor Lukyanov: I think, yes, of course, culturally, historically, Russia is very much specific. But the main thing for me is geopolitical. And that was noted by many Western intellectuals as well. And by the way, when Gorbachev came with his all European home idea, which was utopian by default, but still Gorbachev never, and his entourage, he never spoke about Soviet Union to be integrated into something else into European community or whatever, NATO. He spoke, and that was his idea, about convergency, about equal rapprochement and creation of something new together, not to be integrated into the West and the subordinate terms.
[00:20:06] Peter Slezkine: Well, we know that he was a Leninist and a dialectician. So, for him, it might've made sense. Although, I think that is probably equally utopian, this dialogue.
[00:20:14] Fyodor Lukyanov: It was absolutely utopian, but I mean that, for him, it was the utopian idea, but an idea that Soviet Union will remain sovereign, actually. And after that, when Soviet Union collapsed, Russia was treated as a country, which basically should be considered as other candidate states to the EU, without perspective of membership. But basically, you should change yourself.
[00:20:42] Peter Slezkine: Like Turkey, perpetually.
[00:20:44] Fyodor Lukyanov: Maybe like Turkey. Yeah, maybe like Turkey.
[00:20:45] Peter Slezkine: To form an empire that is always going to remain on the periphery of the Western bloc.
[00:20:49] Fyodor Lukyanov: More or less, and be tied by norms and rules formulated in Europe because those norms and rules are excellent and brilliant and good for them.
[00:20:58] Peter Slezkine: Well, you guys broke from the norms and rules pretty abruptly in February 2022. How did your professional life change? You have contributors from all over the world, conferences, visits abroad. So, in what way did that change after the start of the war in Ukraine?
[00:21:19] Fyodor Lukyanov: As far as conferences and trips abroad are concerned, so, my life changed earlier, because when pandemic erupted and all of us had to be at home for quite a while, after this period, I suddenly realized that I hate to travel. So, I stopped traveling almost entirely, even when it became possible again. Then, this Ukrainian conflict came. And, of course, we lost a significant part of our contributors to the journal. I expected that the journal would be expelled from Scopus. It didn't happen. I must say that, in this regard, our colleagues in the West demonstrated academic freedom.
[00:22:08] Peter Slezkine: But the Publication Foreign Affairs did sever relations, or at least pretended that they never existed.
[00:22:15] Fyodor Lukyanov: Yes, Publication Foreign Affairs, which we had cooperation for exactly 20 years before this war, they suddenly said that it was no cooperation, actually, because it was something wrong with the initial document. Okay, that's life. But, to some extent, it was useful for me as an editor and for the journal because we had to look for new contributors in Russia, outside Russia. We have still some cooperation with some Western colleagues. We have much more of a Chinese, Indian, African, Asian scholars. So, that's new stage, as far as the freedom of speech is concerned. Of course, any war brings restraints and brings limitations. So, it would be strange to deny. But I dare to say that we managed to keep ourselves inside the acceptable space of free speech. So, that's… I hope that it might be even broader space in the foreseeable future.
[00:23:32] Peter Slezkine: Well, so, let's finally turn to the state of the debate within that framework of the permissible. So, from outside, we hear now a certain number of buzzwords coming from Russia: multipolar order, civilization state, and world majority, which I understand is a term you coined. Can you give us a quick glossary of these three terms and what they mean in conceptions of Russia's place in the world, going forward?
[00:24:02] Fyodor Lukyanov: Let me disappoint you. I will not give you the glossary of those new notions, because I believe that we are now in a very transitional state of affairs, not just Russia, but the whole world. And the many notions we use, the language we use is becoming totally outdated, and some of new terms as well. So, the world majority, for example, I think that this is a correct description, but we see how quickly this world majority changes as well.
[00:24:41] Peter Slezkine: Well, what was it supposed to mean at its inception?
[00:24:43] Fyodor Lukyanov: It was supposed to mean the world which is not part of the Western coalition because the world majority is, by far, not an organization or structure unified by anything. The only characteristic which can be applied to all members of this grouping is that they rejected to join anti-Russian sanctions, 2022. And this is not because of Russia, but this is because they don't want to be told how to behave in particular situation by anybody, be it United States, Europe, or Russia.
And for me, that was emergence of this community, which is totally diversified, divided, not homogeneous, but the emergence of a community which doesn't want to be guided by anybody. That's probably the main geopolitical outcome of the whole episode with the Ukrainian war.
[00:25:49] Peter Slezkine: But it is a concept that depends entirely on its opposition to the U.S.-led West. The world majority emphasizes the fact that the greater portion of the global population is no longer going to take the Washington diktat.
[00:26:05] Fyodor Lukyanov: Yes, but I would extend it. They would not take the Washington dictate, but they would not take the dictate of anybody else as well. And this is the key issue. The Washington is now, and now especially, with such a brave person as President Trump, is the strongest player, but it will not be forever. Sooner or later, some other players will probably try to dictate, be it China, be it probably Russia or somebody else. But I guess that those countries, they will not follow their dictates either, as they reject to follow the American path. So, maybe I'm wrong. And of course, the development shows that it's extremely liquid and flexible, but all attempts to frame the international affairs in previous terms, including multipolarity, by the way.
[00:26:59] Peter Slezkine: I was going to ask how this notion can be reconciled with multipolarity, because if you don't take anybody's diktat, then there can be no polls.
[00:27:06] Fyodor Lukyanov: Exactly. That's why I personally believe that multipolarity is not a correct description anymore. Because “pol” means that other countries, minor countries gravitate towards you. And the main idea today for anybody, any country, bigger ones, smaller one, is not to be subordinated not to be gravitated by force.
[00:27:29] Peter Slezkine: Well, with the dramatic exception of the Germans and others in attendance at the Munich Security Conference.
[00:27:35] Fyodor Lukyanov: This is not a world majority, and that's exactly the West, the collective West, the political West, different description. That's the exception. And this is quite a… it's a world minority, to put it differently. And this is unique. But what, from my point of view, is important to understand, even if the West will remain as it is, more or less unified, around the United States, but it's not an example for the rest of the world, is rather very specific civilization, which will exist in those terms, but it will not be a model for anybody else.
[00:28:13] Peter Slezkine: Yeah. Well, it certainly is no longer promoting a universalist model. But it is, to the extent that Vice President Vance emphasizes the importance of Western civilization, creating a larger geopolitical block that is bound by some kind of cultural, historical, shared characteristics. And in that respect, it seems like what China and Russia and India are proposing is similar. So, each will have a different history, a different set of associations, but each one is representing itself as a separate civilization that then allows it to have weight within the international system. So, China makes sense as a civilization. The West, there's also a long tradition that needs to be revived that has almost entirely disappeared, but now there is an attempt. India as well. Russia has called itself a civilization. But when Putin talks about this concept, he emphasizes two characteristics—size and internal diversity. That does not seem to amount to a civilization. So, what is missing? I mean, is Russia a civilization? Is it merely an attempt to put Russia on the same plane as India and China?
[00:29:34] Fyodor Lukyanov: It's a very difficult question. Personally, I don't believe that Russia fits the criteria of civilization in the same way as China or India does. Because for Chinese or for Indians, there is absolutely no question to prove for themselves that they are different than Europeans, Americans, and others. They are self-sufficient.
It's not the case with Russia because Russian historical development was based on mixture of many cultural floods. But of course, the main framework, since several centuries, was a European one, with inputs from other cultures, but still. And that's the most controversial debate in Russian intellectual circles since, maybe, ‘80s and certainly since beginning of the 90th century. Are we Europeans? Are we non-Europeans? Who are we? And so on. And by the way, we went… in those 30 years after collapse of the Soviet Union, we went through the whole cycle again, but very quickly. The same debates, which we had in the ‘90s and 20th century, then, it was repeated. So far, we arrived to the same result as ever.
[00:31:06] Peter Slezkine: So, Russian civilization is just schizophrenic by its very nature?
[00:31:12] Fyodor Lukyanov: No, I don't think it's schizophrenic. It's complicated. I support the idea of civilization just now, and since it was put in the official doctrine in the Russian concept of foreign policy, for one simple reason, not because I'm a big fan of a civilizational approach, but I think that civilization in this extremely unclear world means that, actually, we might be very flexible.
We don't need to tie ourselves to something very clear, particular model, particular set up of values. We can change. Civilization can mean anything, actually. And for the current stage of international development and for years, if not decades, to come, it might be the most comfortable format. And this frame will inevitably change because we will see enormous changes around us in the whole world.
So, in this regard, just instrumentally and technically, I think that civilization approach is very good just now. In terms of self-identification, who we are, I'm afraid that this debate will continue far beyond my life.
[00:32:31] Peter Slezkine: But the biggest question, I mean, they're very intellectual debates on this subject, but in some respects, the most acute political question is the same as the one that is concerning the Europeans. And that is Islamic immigration. So, that is not just a matter of, sort of, flexible identity, but it’s a question that, I suppose, needs to be addressed now, because Central Asia has a young and growing population. Islam is a much more powerful ideology than any Russian Christian competitor. So, in the next five, 10 years, I mean, do you see a model being created now to deal with this in practical terms or in ideological terms or in history textbooks in school?
[00:33:16] Fyodor Lukyanov: It's very difficult because, even without immigration, even without inflow of people with different culture and different religious roots, we have embedded controversy in our history that people in Kazan, in Tatarstan, of course, they tend to see Russian history slightly different.
It should be addressed. And I think that now and in years, decades to come, that might become one of the most vital challenges for our, not just intellectual, but even, yeah, you're right, the practical development of our society.
As far as migration is concerned, that's another huge challenge. The problem is that Russia, given demographic trends we have, Russia cannot survive as a dynamic, economically dynamic country without significant inflow of other people, of migrants. The Russian system, I mean, not just mentality, but the technical administrative system, is very badly prepared for that, because it's inefficient, it's corrupted, hugely.
And now, we have an attempt to address those challenges rhetorically, politically, and partially in administrative terms. Sometimes, what I hear from Russian officials or from Russian intellectuals, it's absolutely crazy because they try to disconnect from the reality totally. But I see just one positive aspect of that, that, at least, a Russian public opinion started to care about this, to prepare for inevitable wave of migrants, maybe 10 years from now, 20 years from now.
And you asked about those who come from Muslim countries or Central Asia. But I guess that, at the end of the day, we will need to accept many other people as well, not just from neighboring countries, the former Soviet republics, because, yes, they have… some of those countries have growing population, but not so many. In other countries, they have same demographic problems as us.
So, I guess that Russia will need to formulate a completely new model, both psychologically and technically, how to deal with the inevitable migration. We are not there yet, unfortunately, but at least, the problem starts to be realized by both authorities and population.
[00:36:02] Peter Slezkine: Thanks for listening to the Trialogue Podcast. Make sure to subscribe to the show, so you don’t miss out on any episodes.
The Trialogue Podcast is hosted by the Stimson Center and produced by University FM.