Glenn Diesen, professor at the University of South-Eastern Norway and host of the Greater Eurasia Podcast, joins us to discuss the current state of affairs in Europe, including the West’s approach to the war in Ukraine, the future of integration on the continent, and the militarization of Scandinavia. *The Trialogue Podcast is hosted by the Stimson Center and produced by University FM.
Glenn Diesen, professor at the University of South-Eastern Norway and host of the Greater Eurasia Podcast, joins us to discuss the current state of affairs in Europe, including the West’s approach to the war in Ukraine, the future of integration on the continent, and the militarization of Scandinavia.
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*The Trialogue Podcast is hosted by the Stimson Center and produced by University FM.
(Transcripts may contain a few typographical errors due to audio quality during the podcast recording.)
[00:00:00] Peter Slezkine: I'm Peter Slezkine, Director of the U.S.-Russia-China Trialogue project at the Stimson Center. Since the middle of the 20th century, relations among the United States, Russia, and China have had an enormous impact on each country separately and on the world as a whole. The purpose of the Trialogue is to better understand this extraordinarily complex and consequential relationship by directly engaging with experts from all three countries.
In this show, guests from across the political spectrum and from every corner of the globe share their views in their own voice. While the Stimson Center seeks to provide access to a wide variety of perspectives, it does not endorse any particular position. We leave it to the listeners to judge the validity and value of the views expressed by the guests.
My guest today is Glenn Diesen, professor of the University of Southeastern Norway and host of the Greater Eurasia Podcast. Glenn is an expert on Russia and a rare European realist.
In the conversation that follows, we discussed the Western approach to the war in Ukraine, the future of European integration, and Scandinavia’s militarization, among other subjects. I hope you enjoy the episode.
Glenn, welcome to the podcast.
[00:01:20] Glenn Diesen: Well, thank you so much for inviting me on.
[00:01:23] Peter Slezkine: Well, I was on yours first. So, reciprocity is, I think, the foundation of harmonious international relations, but we'll get into theory perhaps a bit later. So, first, just so we get a sense of who you are, other than an accomplished academic and a prodigious podcaster, could you tell us a bit about where you grew up, what your parents did for a living, or do still, where you have studied and worked?
[00:01:48] Glenn Diesen: Well, my parents, before they got retired, were a nurse and a taxi driver. So, not an academic background.
[00:01:56] Peter Slezkine: And both Norwegian.
[00:01:58] Glenn Diesen: Well, no, my mother's side is Dutch. So, most of my Norwegian family got split up and spread during the war, World War II. Because of the resistance fighting against the Germans, they ended up being spread across the continent. But in Netherlands, my mother's family is very Catholic. So, she has 10 brothers and sisters. They all have five, six kids, so we colonize that whole country.
[00:02:23] Peter Slezkine: So, these are ethnic Norwegians who fled to the Netherlands during the war?
[00:02:28] Glenn Diesen: No.
[00:02:29] Peter Slezkine: Or these are Dutch?
[00:02:29] Glenn Diesen: My mother’s side are actually Dutch, yeah, because Catholicism spread very much across the whole country. While the Norwegian family, most of them were resistant fighters against the Germans in World War II. So, they were either killed or had to flee to England. So, yeah, they're all almost gone.
I grew up in Norway, until I finished my army service. And thereafter, I moved to Australia. And for 20 years — well, 14 years — I was in Australia and another six I was in Russia and Ireland and a little bit in the Netherlands. And I moved back again five years ago.
[00:03:08] Peter Slezkine: And you went to Australia to study international relations in Russia, or that came a bit later?
[00:03:14] Glenn Diesen: Well, initially, I did a business degree, and then I went to Russia for language, actually, for commercial interest. So, I lived there. I moved there in 2006, and then when I was there, I took a massive interest in politics instead because… well, it was fascinating to me when you read, for example, what happened in the 1990s and thereafter, it is the same story, but it's like two different worlds. The story they tell in Europe, the narrative, and the one they tell in Russia, it's as if there would be, again, two different worlds. So, I took an interest in this.
[00:03:48] Peter Slezkine: Well, so what are the competing narratives?
[00:03:51] Glenn Diesen: Well, in the 1990s, democracy began to spread in Russia. The West held out an open hand to the Russians, and everything was just going dandy. And then, at some point, Putin comes along and he wrecks the party. And that's when everything goes wrong.
When I lived there, I lived in an obshaga, the student accommodation. And I thought it was fascinating. 2006, you know, you had the girls putting posters of him on the wall like he's a rockstar. And you notice that everyone, kind of, appreciates him for saving the country. And they saw the 1990s, you know, very differently. They had bet everything on being accommodated into the West. And then the West decided to create a Europe without the Russians. And again, a firm stab in the back. He saw the oligarchic class — well, the criminal class — develop taking control over businesses, communication, increasingly government. And then Putin comes along and restored national control. Again, in his first term, he reduced poverty by 50%. And even his opponents, or people who criticized him, like Gorbachev, still recognized that he probably saved the Russian Federation. So, leaving that part out of the narrative, it's, kind of, interesting.
[00:05:03] Peter Slezkine: So, your discovery of a different reality in Russia is what prompted your interest in the countries, precisely. The contrast between the Western narrative that you were familiar with and what you found on the ground.
[00:05:11] Glenn Diesen: Yeah, very much so. So, I went back to university. I did an international relations degree focusing primarily on Russia. So, my Ph.D. was focused on the European security architecture. After this, I began looking at the consequences of the coup of 2014, as the Russians began to then change gradually political economy.
[00:05:34] Peter Slezkine: And by coup in 2014, you're referencing what happened in Kyiv?
[00:05:39] Glenn Diesen: Yes. So, it's worth remembering that, in Russia, since Gorbachev, the ambitions of creating this common European home, they bet a lot on this. And in 1990, when they had this charter of Paris for New Europe with the Europeans, they had essentially what they thought were an agreement for a pan-European security architecture. They had OSCE established in 1994 built on the same principles, indivisible security Europe without dividing lines, sovereign equality, you know, all these common principles.
And when NATO began to expand, this was seen as, all of this being thrown out in favor of hegemonic peace. So, this is, well, what changed a lot. But the Russians, they still continue to strive towards finding a common solution. So, in 2008, you had President Medvedev suggesting pan-European security architecture. In 2010, you had Putin suggesting EU-Russia union that also went nowhere. But nonetheless, they still hope that there will be a gradual integration of Russia into the political West.
And in 2014, that effectively was buried with the coup in Kyiv because Ukraine had all the potential for being a bridge in terms of only 20% actually wanted to join NATO, most actually preferred a security partnership with the Russians, before 2014, that is, but after the coup. And the way the Russians responded fiercely by taking back Crimea, the greater Europe dream was dead. Even people who still wanted to believe in it nonetheless had to recognize what the sanctions did. So, for this reason, I argued that this is when it began to shift from greater Europe to greater Eurasia.
[00:07:16] Peter Slezkine: You mean from the Russian perspective, that they gave up on the dream of greater Europe and shifted to a different concept that was oriented more to the East.
[00:07:25] Glenn Diesen: Yes. So, I wrote a book then in 2015. It's called Russia's Geoeconomic Strategy for Greater Eurasia, and effectively wrote a political economic theory, copying to some extent the political realism of balance of power. I refer to it as a balance of dependence. And based on this, I made the argument that the most logical thing for Russia would be to seek economic connectivity in the East in order to diversify everything from its technological partnerships, industry, transportation corridors, banks, currencies, payment systems, insurances — essentially, all economic activity. And I asked Sergei Karaganov to write a forward for me, who has been an advisor from Brezhnev to Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and Putin.
[00:08:12] Peter Slezkine: And has lately become scandalous in the West for threatening to throw nuclear bombs.
[00:08:18] Glenn Diesen: Yes. He’s also been the main one pushing for Russia to change its nuclear doctrine eventually. Every year, Putin says, “No, no, we're not there yet.” And then last year they did change it. So, anyways, he wrote the foreword.
[00:08:32] Peter Slezkine: But for a domestic audience, he's also been very prolific in promoting a new national idea in a pivot to the East.
[00:08:38] Glenn Diesen: Yes. So, his department at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow, they mainly focused on Russia's pivot to the East, so, this greater Eurasia where they will look to the East, because, you know, since Peter the Great 300 years ago, the main assumption was that, if Russia wants to modernize, they have to become more Europeanized.
Now, I argue that one of the consequences of 2014 was not only moving away from Gorbachev's common European home, but indeed the past 300 years since Peter the Great, because this happened at the same time as we essentially canceled greater Europe on the Russians in 2014. This was the same time that the Chinese were beginning the Belt and Road Initiative. In 2013, they pursued this ambition for technological partnership with China 2025. 2015, they began pursuing their own financial autonomy or financial instruments with, for example, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, trying to internationalize their own currency.
All of this happened at the same time. So, the Russians then began to look more to the East for partnerships. In this sense, it was the worst possible time in history to really reject this common Europe with Russia. So, now they're looking East.
Anyways, I wrote this book. And after I asked Professor Karaganov to write the foreword, he later offered me a job in Moscow. And I worked there at the department where they focus on greater Eurasia. And after that, pretty much most of my books have been on the greater Eurasia initiative, looking at different aspects, everything from the technological partnerships to the new identity, the new Russian conservatism being built, linked up to Eurasianism. So, there's a lot happening in Russia at the moment.
[00:10:23] Peter Slezkine: And so, when did you return to Norway to take up a professorship there?
[00:10:28] Glenn Diesen: 2020. Well, yeah, when COVID began, we thought, “Yeah, let's get out of the big cities,” because we were living in Moscow. And it was more of a family decision than anything. We have three small kids, so I thought it would be better to live in a tiny little student town in Norway than living in the middle of Moscow.
[00:10:46] Peter Slezkine: But after the war in Russia started in 2022, your ties to Russia, your research agenda must have made you stand out in Norway. How has your position changed since the start of the war?
[00:11:03] Glenn Diesen: Well, from my perspective, it's close to impossible to be an academic here because, you know, after the Russians invaded Ukraine, we had our previous foreign minister, also she was the defense minister, go out in the media and say, “This is not the time to understand, it's the time to condemn because, you know, we can't walk in chew gum at the same time.”
[00:11:20] Peter Slezkine: And you are a realist, if you had to choose what you were to call or associate?
[00:11:24] Glenn Diesen: Yeah, I would consider myself a neoclassical realist. So, I see. Yeah, very hardcore realist. However, the neoclassical realist, we tend to see decision makers as the intervening variable between the international distribution of power and foreign policy.
[00:11:40] Peter Slezkine: So, the position of this official was anathema to your analytical approach.
[00:11:45] Glenn Diesen: Yeah. So, the analytical approach you take has become a problem not just in Norway, but all of Europe. That is, the Europeans became very constructivist. Some of it's tied up to the European Union. The idea is that you can socially create your own reality.
And through this perspective, major political realism becomes almost immoral because, if you view the world simply as an international distribution of power, creating systemic incentives for the ideal foreign policy, this is seen as legitimizing power politics. And that's immoral.
And it's very difficult to say anything of common sense. I mean, let's say you want to discuss World War II, I would say that the Germans invading Norway, it was a good decision for them because it was low cost. We didn't really have an army, and it was huge benefit. They got a huge coastline. The English were also planning to invade us. They could have had a massive hostile northern flank. They got all the resources. It was a good cost benefit. It was almost foolish not to invade.
If you make this point in Norway, then you're seen as legitimizing the Nazi invasion of your own country. And it's like saying Iran, it would be ideal for them now to develop nuclear weapons as a deterrent to prevent future attacks or determination to destroy them. If I would advise the Iranian government, I would probably advocate for nuclear weapons. It doesn't mean I want it. I think it would be horrible. Nuclear proliferation, you know, spreading, it's a terrible idea. But it's the same as with Russia. You know, you have to see that they do genuinely see NATO expansion into Ukraine to be an existential threat. And they will act upon this. In Europe, now they see this as legitimizing the Russian policies. You're taking their side.
So, if you want to be pro-Ukrainian, you just have to close your eyes and say, “No, no, no. The NATO expansion is not a threat at all.” The irony there is that they think this normative position is a moral one, so they confuse the two. Of course, if you know that the Russians will invade and destroy Ukraine if you try to expand NATO, it's hardly a moral thing to advocate for this. It would be as if, you know, I would make a moral case for why Mexico should host a Chinese military basis because I believe in their sovereignty and freedom to do what they want. They will be burned to the ground. I don't think a realist analysis will be immoral, but this is, kind of, where we are in Europe at the moment.
[00:14:03] Peter Slezkine: You mean if you're judged by results as opposed to principles, then the picture becomes more complicated.
[00:14:08] Glenn Diesen: Yeah, how you would like the world to be as opposed to recognizing the way it is. I think, if you ignore the way it actually is, you end up doing very foolish things. And we keep doing foolish things over and over again.
[00:14:22] Peter Slezkine: Well, let's backtrack a bit in order to get to the foolish stage of the affairs more slowly. First of all, is it even fair to refer to something called Scandinavia and then what is it as, sort of, a unit over the last 50, 70 years?
[00:14:38] Glenn Diesen: What is Scandinavia? Well, typically, it refers to Norway, Sweden, and Denmark. But again, like all concepts, no one dominates on it. But if you look at Norway, for example, we used to be part of Denmark, until, of course, the Napoleonic Wars. They were defeated. Denmark, as a result, lost Norway because they were allied with Napoleon. Instead of getting independence, we were handed over to Sweden and we were part of Sweden until 1905. So, we all have the same kind of history. Our language — spoken, written — is more or less the same. We have the same Viking history as well. Norway has been passed around from Denmark to Sweden. So, we have got similar political systems, similar social systems. So, there's much in common.
Some would also put, perhaps, Iceland into this category. But they were just Norwegians in the past who fled, pretty much, or left. Some would put Finland in that category, but then the language becomes fundamentally different. So, these days, you have even some people in the Baltic states trying to redefine the Baltic states as Scandinavian because they are desperate to not be considered post-Soviet. So, they're very revolutionary in this sense in terms of their national identity. But of course, then it becomes a bit ridiculous.
[00:15:59] Peter Slezkine: So, Norway was part of NATO from the start, as were Iceland and Denmark. Sweden was not, was neutral, sort of, leaning West. Finland, which is not Scandinavia, but nonetheless, a northern neighbor was neutral leaning East. Finland and Sweden just joined NATO recently.
What has changed, as far as you're concerned, now that this is all part of one security block and the neutrality of your two Northern neighbors has been forsaken?
[00:16:30] Glenn Diesen: Well, one has to ask why Scandinavia has been relatively peaceful throughout the Cold War. And as you said, Finland and Sweden were neutral countries. Norway was, kind of, a NATO light because, yes, they were part of NATO, but they put a lot of self-imposed restrictions, studies they did not accept in foreign basis on Norwegian soil.
The Norwegians also, sort of, limit the military activities by the British and Americans in the high north, so it wouldn't be too provocative. Again, not as a favor to the Soviets, but just the recognition of what is in our interest. That is, if you have the security competition and we wanted the NATO membership to the extent it provided defense, but not have the activities which would provoke a security challenge to the Soviets, which would make them respond in a way that undermined our security.
But the whole idea of what creates security, it's, kind of, changed. Now, we don't anymore think in terms of mitigating the security competition. Instead, it's all very conceptual around the idea of hegemonic peace and the liberal hegemon. So, we now pursue peace by essentially bombing bad guys. This is, well, to oversimplify.
With the Swedes, I mean, their history with the Russians have been always interesting because Sweden used to be the dominant power in the North. And if the Russians wanted to use the Baltic Sea, this would be under the stewardship of the Swedes.
But then you had the Great Northern War from 1700 to 1721, where the Russians defeated the Swedes. This was the end of Sweden as a great power. And it was when Russia was born as a great power as an empire and as a European power. And this was under Peter the Great, and it was followed with all these cultural revolutions.
Now, since then, Russia has had its European status, because it gained access to what it was missing, to a large extent, ever since the collapse of Kyivan Rus, which was a reliable maritime transportation corridor.
What we now see is, by Sweden trying rejoining NATO, and we're now talking about making the Baltic Sea a NATO lake, and we can put more pressure on the Russians in Kaliningrad. The former NATO Secretary General Dane, he made the point that we could put a blockade on St. Petersburg if necessary now because we had Finland and Sweden and NATO. So, it's almost as if there's an effort then or some ambition to go back, redo the Great Northern War by challenging the role of Russia in the Baltic Sea.
And you can have a similar problem with Finland. I mean, they fought the Winter War before World War II. But again, if you go through the documents and archives, it's very clear why the Soviets attack, because they feared that the Germans would use Finland as a bridgehead to attack the Soviet Union. And indeed, the Fins did ally themself with Nazi Germany during World War II.
But the solution then after the Second World War was simply that Finland should be neutral. And once they were neutral, they weren't a threat to the Soviets. The Soviets were happy. That provided a stable border. And they had peace and prosperity since then. And the Fins and the Swedes never really wanted to join NATO. The majority was against it. But when the Russians invaded Ukraine in 2014, I would say it was a legitimate reason for concern. They didn't really know what is happening. And all the media is styled up to 100 on the war propaganda. So, people, thinking that Putin is Hitler, the objective of the Russians was to restore the Soviet Union.
So, the poll goes above 50% in terms of who would like to join NATO. So, at that point, there's no need for a referendum or anything. They finally got the majority. So, they join NATO as soon as they can. And now, of course, when the Swedish defense minister or the prime minister of Finland speaks out about their history with Russia, they say, “Well, our history has been freedom. We have to fight for it.”
But this is a very strange interpretation of history. They both had a very different history. That is, they chose neutrality, and in return they got security. But now, of course, everything has to be rewritten.
[00:20:41] Peter Slezkine: I imagine this isn't really discussed publicly, but do you have a sense that the irony of the timing has become palpable to the former neutrals, that with Trump's arrival, the block that they had just joined suddenly seemed to be falling apart.
[00:21:00] Glenn Diesen: Definitely, no. I mean, if joining NATO would be good for their security, then why not? But then you also have to take into account the security dilemma to what extent, how the Russians would actually respond. So, often, the mindset here is either you're pro-Russian or anti-Russian. So, if you want to join NATO, then you're definitely anti-Russian. So, then you're good. If you say, “No, we shouldn't,” then you're suspected of being pro-Russian. But this is, kind of, the simplistic mentality, which is promoted.
But, I would say that, not only does it trigger a security competition, as the Fins are discovering they have a very demilitarized border. Now, the Russians are building up the St. Petersburg military district, which hasn't existed since the Cold War. And so, I would say, based on this alone, it would be a bad decision, just recognizing the response coming from the other side. But as you suggest, the timing, I mean, this couldn't possibly be a worse time because what we now see is that the unipolar moment, it's over. And it's worth unpacking what that means, because during the Cold War, the Europeans were a bit cautious. You don't want to provoke the Soviets too much. In the unipolar moment, no one cared about what Russia thought. We will be so dominant that it doesn't really matter. If the Russians feel threatened, there's nothing they can do. They will have to adjust to these realities. But in the multipolar system, when there's many centers of power, the concept of security changes. Now, suddenly, great powers will have to pursue the principle of indivisible security. You can't have security anymore through just being so dominant. Others will have to fall in line.
And you see this from the American side. They do recognize now that the ideal for the… in the best service of American security, you do have to take into account the security concerns of opponents. So, we have to readjust back to this system.
[00:22:47] Peter Slezkine: And you understand Trump in this respect as a reaction to real constraints, not a political anomaly or, sort of, a domestic upheaval.
[00:22:56] Glenn Diesen: No, I think it made perfect sense. And I know Kissinger talked to him as well before he passed away. But in a multipolar system, the U.S. has relatively few resources. It also has to make more priorities. And in all fairness, Europe is not that important anymore. And it keeps making itself more and more irrelevant.
So, if I was advising Trump, I would say the same. I’d say, yeah, you should focus on America. And possibly, secondary would be Asia. But Europe doesn't come even as a close third. So, if the U.S. has few resources, and we'll use them in other places. That means, the whole backing for the Europeans to do whatever they want, to poke the Russians in the eye and not have any consequences. This is going away.
But here's also the wider problem for the Europeans. That is, there's no political imagination to think about how to readjust to multipolar system. Now, if you ask me, the main thing most countries around the world do under multipolar, is you diversify your economic partnerships to avoid excessive dependence on anyone. Now, I think we should prioritize the American relationship simply because of some civilizational affinity.
[00:24:03] Peter Slezkine: And by “we,” are you referring to the Europeans or to the Norwegian.
[00:24:06] Glenn Diesen: Oh, sorry, Europeans. Yeah. Yes, I'm speaking for all of you now. But, instead, the fear is that America is going to leave us. So, we want to elevate our own stock value for the Americans. So, essentially, do anything that the U.S. wants. So, if the U.S. says cut your ties with Russia, of course, sever all your ties with Iran, which we achieved with these snapback sanctions. Done. Stop buying Chinese technologies. Okay. Done. And then we end up with excessive dependence on the U.S., which is not ideal because this is a very asymmetrical partnership.
That is, we will be much more dependent on the U.S. than the U.S. is on us. Now, again, I think the U.S. should be a preferential partner, but not the only partner. And so, now we're putting all our eggs in the American basket, and the Americans don't even want to be here. I mean, we had J.D. Vance telling the Europeans, "You have to stop behaving like vassals. We need allies, not vassals." When your masters in Washington have to tell you that you're too spineless and subordinate, then things are getting pretty bad. So, yeah.
[00:25:07] Peter Slezkine: What did you make of Vance's message? What do you think this new administration actually wants to see in Europe? Just more money for weapons, more balanced trade deals, or a total reversal of economic flows? Or a stronger NATO, where the burden has been shifted, but the system hasn't been fundamentally altered?
[00:25:29] Glenn Diesen: Well, I think they want the Europeans to carry greater weight, look after their own security. That's, kind of, why they're pushing for this more military spending, because, well, Europe's not prepared to stand on its own. We've been living in the basement of Uncle Sam for the past 80 years, so it's not easy to move out. And they do need to develop their own security, their own military.
And of course, if they buy some more American weapons and American energy, then, of course, that's a big plus for the U.S. So, I think there's a desire to make sure that Europeans nonetheless still have an economic and political loyalty to the United States. And again, this is in America's interest, I think in Europe's interest, it's not identical. That is, they should also, yeah, diversify, not sever themselves from other centers of power.
But I think also from the U.S. perspective, it's not just the economic issue. I think it's also… whatever one might think of Trump and Vance. I think… well, I like Vance, but they're quite authentic in this rejection of this liberal globalist idea. So, I do think that they see this as eroding all national identities. I think they also see the concern that over the past few decades, the liberal nation-state has ceased to exist because liberalism more or less divorced itself from the nation-state.
And we always had a balance. That is, the nation-state encompasses one common history, language, faith, tradition, so all of this. And over time, we, kind of, liberalism was balanced off it. You carve out some area of autonomy for the individual, but over time began to embrace everything. That is, liberalism began to push for multiculturalism, you know, whatever languages, multi-faith, you can choose anything, even your own biology these days.
So, after a while, the nation-state and liberalism, they go separate ways. And I think this is quite detrimental. So, I do think that Trump very genuinely wants to support some of the same populist movements that reject this increasingly authoritarian, yeah, globalist club.
[00:27:38] Peter Slezkine: But you've been speaking for Europe as a whole, but the argument you just made seems to suggest that a renationalized Europe cannot cohere. Do you see Europe remaining a single entity, but operating according to a different logic? Diversifying geopolitically, maintaining national difference internally, and adjusting its relationship with the U.S. from one of pure subordination to some greater level of autonomy?
[00:28:11] Glenn Diesen: The problem for the Europeans is how do you have almost 30 countries? I don't think they've ever been one entity anyway. But if you have almost 30 countries, and they should be split by competing interests or identities, how do you form a common policy? And the main objective then seems to be, well, we have to transcend this. So, we say we find unity in values, which means that everything is ideologically framed. Everything is a moral policy versus an immoral one. And this is, kind of, how we form…
[00:28:37] Peter Slezkine: So, you think that that, in some sense, is a… I don't know if I would say rational, but a predictable reaction to the constraints of a structure that is, in some sense, fundamentally incoherent?
[00:28:50] Glenn Diesen: Yeah, but it's also a massive curse. That is, we don't act based on the national interests anymore. I made a point that this began already in the ’90s when the European Union began to expand. For some countries, like Germany, it would be good. For countries like France, it would be too much power shifting in favor of the Germans there because it was an eastward expansion.
But we began to engage in what's referred to sometimes in the literature as a rhetorical entrapment. Would you say, “Well, the European Union is about democracy.” Everyone agrees. Okay. Who would oppose helping Eastern Europe with democracy and effectively shame other countries into consensus? But this is…
[00:29:29] Peter Slezkine: But do you think that this, in some sense, was cover for German economic expansion? You said that eastward expansion benefited Germany. So, is the EU, in many ways, a German project disguised as a pan-European one?
[00:29:44] Glenn Diesen: Yeah, the Germans benefited much more from the expansion to the euro because then they had a very undervalued currency across the board. It benefited the Germans much more. And this created some problems because the balance of… well, what I call at least the balance of dependence within the European Union and began to skew as more and more power concentrated in Germany.
But again, if you want to contest any of this, if you want to look at, for example, the integration of Europe, to what extent it would be ideal to expand, also what considerations we should take into account, all of this, kind of, is glossed over because we can only speak in the language of values. And so, you end up in a situation where no one is really capable anymore of defending properly their national interests.
So, over time, Europe would unavoidably to weaken itself. The 1960s, we had David Mitrany in Britain. He was writing the two possible futures of European integration, and he separated between federalism and functionalism. And he made the point, functionalism is ideal, you look for areas where it's good for integration. If it's good for pooling our sovereignty for common security, for economic competitiveness through collective bargaining or good governance, whatever it might be… if it makes sense, then we do it.
In other words, the form should be dictated by the function. But he warned that this is not what's going to prevail in Europe. They're obsessed with a federalist approach where the form dictates the function. In other words, we already decided we want the United States of Europe, so we're looking for how to centralize power even when it doesn't make sense in terms of security, economy, or good governance. So, he predicted that the European integration project would begin to resemble much more like the Soviet Union than the United States of America. And I think that's very correct. But again, I think we got…
[00:31:30] Peter Slezkine: But the tendency now seems to be toward greater integration, at least in terms of policy proposals. The Draghi report suggests greater economic and regulatory integration, from what I understand. In terms of geopolitics, everybody now talks about the need for greater security cooperation, a greater European role within it, the construction of a true European security potential.
So, I take it that you think that this is the wrong path and perhaps an impossible path. If you were invited to Brussels, or if your countryman, Jens Stoltenberg, asked you to give him suggestions in the security domain, what alternatives are available, given the fact that these forms do exist and continue to exercise constraints?
[00:32:18] Glenn Diesen: I would advocate for a multi-speed, different-layered Europe that is…
[00:32:22] Peter Slezkine: I mean, Norway already is multi-speed in some respects, right? [crosstalk 00:32:25].
[00:32:25] Glenn Diesen: Yeah, well, no, we're on the same as Switzerland, pay without say. So, we still pay money, and we still adapt to all the legislation, but we don't have a vote, pretty much. The political class is very much in favor of joining the EU, so they're, kind of, going through the back door almost. They're adopting all the decisions.
But the EU has many problems. The problems were between everything or nothing. Because, for example, when they developed the common currency, the euro, many people refer to this as the “half-built house” strategy because you can't have a monetary union that is a common currency unless you have a common fiscal union. And you can't really have a common fiscal union unless you have a common political union. So, once you then develop the monetary union, it'll create natural conflicts, which incentivize or make it necessary to develop a fiscal union, how much you can borrow and all.
And with this, it becomes necessary to develop a political union. Usually, it would go the other way, but because there's no political consensus for a political union, this is the way they will go. So, essentially, the idea is through crisis. When we go into crisis, we have to look at what is the solution. And the solution is always “more Europe.” That's what they say, which means centralizing more power.
[00:33:36] Peter Slezkine: And what is presented as a purely technocratic economic exercise ultimately becomes political. So, you get that through the back door, as you said.
[00:33:45] Glenn Diesen: Yeah, very much so. And this is what frustrates, for example, Hungary. They make always this point. They joined the European Union as an economic bloc, and now they have these bureaucrats coming down to Budapest and trying to dictate to them what to do, how many migrants they have to accept, what, kind of, policies they should have, how many LGBT parades there should be… I mean, this is not what they wanted to join. It is fundamentally changing.
And now, of course, with the war against Russia… You know, you don't let a good crisis go to waste. This is now used as an opportunity to seek more autonomy for the EU, so build an EU army, for example. But again, this is also causing some divisions. The Germans, they say, “Now we want to be the biggest star in Europe now because then we will take leadership.” And also, von der Leyen is saying, “No, no, we have to do this through the EU.” And so now even there, who used to be very…
[00:34:39] Peter Slezkine: Oh, that's an intramural disagreement. Von der Leyen, of course, being German herself.
[00:34:42] Glenn Diesen: Yeah, that is interesting given that they're both. But again, this is the globalist or national approach. But it's hard to see…
[00:34:52] Peter Slezkine: No, but as a pure realist, do you think that there is an argument for this approach? That if you are an advocate of European integration, the Ukrainian crisis can be used to produce that result, to stabilize the European project? Or do you think that it's impossible at this stage?
[00:35:19] Glenn Diesen: Well, my realist take on European integration. I see the extent to which it is durable, is I look at the issue of pooling sovereignty. That is, the member states beginning to transfer competencies towards Brussels as being, yeah, benefits versus, well, disadvantages. So, by pooling sovereignty, the disadvantage is obviously the national governments have less sovereignty, you hand it over to Brussels.
But there's also a positive aspect, which is if all these small countries stand alone, the sovereignty doesn't always matter that much if you're up against trade with a more powerful country. So, if you pool your sovereignty, you get better trade deals, you can convert some of that asymmetrical interdependence into political concessions.
So, the EU, for example, if they want to deal with Moldova, then they can essentially dictate economic terms. They can put political conditions if they want to trade with the EU. So, there's both economic and political benefits in terms of pooling your sovereignty. That's the plus. My thought is that the plus should outweigh the minuses. But these days, the EU doesn't really deliver much economic benefit at all. They don't have any political sway, really, beyond their own borders. I mean, they have to rig the election now in Moldova, this is as far as their influence go.
[00:36:32] Peter Slezkine: Although, as you were saying, that is proof of power.
[00:36:36] Glenn Diesen: Yeah, but in the past, the EU considered itself a legislative superpower. That is because it was a powerful economic bloc, and all the neighbors wanted to trade with it and even be a member part of it. That meant that the EU could just externalize its legislation. So, others had to adopt it. And this was a source of power. But these days, of course, when Georgia doesn't really want to make that many concessions to join the EU, for example, opening up a front against Russia, there's not much they can do anymore. So, that economic and soft power is diminishing.
So, what is the goal then? Well, they send in the NGOs, try to regime change them instead. So, I think this economic and soft power has gone away. So, they still have tools, but it's more crude. But with Ukraine, I think it's a massive defeat, because look at how the European economies are performing. First of all, we gave away all our weapons. Now we're buying American weapons to send to Ukraine. We cut ourselves off from Russian energy. And then, of course, the Nord Stream was destroyed. Germany was the economic powerhouse of Europe.
Now, the cheap energy is the lifeblood of industries. Now Germany is going into a deep crisis, pulling down many other European countries with them. And as their industries are no longer competitive, the United States has the Inflation Reduction Act. You have many German companies moving out across the Atlantic, setting up in the United States. Instead, others are going to China. But Europe is not a good place to do business anymore. Yeah, across the board, it's just very bad decisions being made.
So, I think the Europeans are becoming one of the main losers. Well, Ukraine, obviously the biggest loser of this war, but after this, I think it's the Europeans. They will come out of this economically weakened, much greater insecurity now after fighting this proxy war against the Russians. And their relevance in the world has also near collapsed.
[00:38:28] Peter Slezkine: So, what is the path forward? Is it possible for the EU to survive a defeat in Ukraine, given that it has staked its entire legitimacy on this effort? And also, can the EU survive a continuation of the war? It seems like it's damned if it does and damned if it doesn't.
[00:38:47] Glenn Diesen: It's hard to see it surviving. As you said, they bet everything on this war. And the politicians that keep this going… the Starmer, Macron, Merz, these are some of the most unpopular politicians we have on the continent. So, things aren't going well at all. And I do think that the whole system will crack because the EU keeps demanding more power over the nation-states to do more foolish things, and they're able to deliver fewer benefits.
So, just along the cost-benefit analysis, you see that the EU will wither away. Also, when you're an economic bloc, you have to convince other powers why there's a benefit to cooperate with you, because you're using collective bargaining power to get the best possible deal. Why would the U.S. deal with the EU instead of individual EU member states? Trump said it: “The EU is screwing us.” We shouldn't have it. And the Russians, why would they want the EU? The EU has become… they call it “geopolitical EU” now, which is a more militaristic project.
The main thing that's supposed to unite Europeans now is their hatred of Russia. And the same with China, when the Germans want to go to China to try to strike a good trade deal, the EU follows them like a bad smell. And they come along to the meetings, and when the Germans try to make deals, the EU’s threatening with sanctions and, you know, all these kinds of things. So, no one has a benefit, external actors, they don't want the EU anymore. They would like to split it. The member states don't really get that many benefits anymore. Instead, they have a bullying EU that tells them what to do.
So, no, I think it's going to disappear. It's a shame. I would rather have it reformed because you do need this collective bargaining power from the Europeans. It's a small region. By having, for example, the Schengen and the open borders between the member states, you know, a lot of benefits came from this. But now, mass migration into the continent is also becoming more problematic. So, yeah, we bet everything not just on the war on Russia, but also on this liberal party since the 1990s, and now, yeah, kind of, the bill is coming in.
[00:40:56] Peter Slezkine: What do you think ends first? The age of liberal establishment rule in the leading European nations, or the war in Ukraine?
[00:41:02] Glenn Diesen: Well, I think these political leaders can still hang on, so I think the Ukraine war will probably come to an end first. But there are alternatives building. I mean, we used to talk about the radical left and radical right, but you know, in Europe, we have now the radical center as the problem. If you go to Germany, for example, all the way on the right, you have AfD, on the left, you have Die Linke. And, you know, that's where you find the peace movements.
In Germany, AfD… some polls show that it's now the most popular party. But what do you do, because they are not this woke-ish, globalist liberal? Instead, they want to return to national interests and the basics. So, what does the government do? Well, they label them to be an extremist organization. So, now you have German intelligence services that have the right to go after its members, and the media and journalists talking openly about banning the most popular party in Germany.
And you saw the same in France. I mean, Macron is just holding on to power in a shameless way. He should have called elections long time ago, but instead he's using law against opposition, as he did with Le Pen. Britain is a mess of its own.
[00:42:11] Peter Slezkine: A crown was literally stolen from the Louver the other day, so it might be difficult for Macron to hold onto his throne.
[00:42:18] Glenn Diesen: No, it's… well, things are going bad very, very fast. But you can only push this back so many times because, by continuing to hold on, you're just making more of your supporters disillusioned, and it's just creating more and more opposition. So, once they finally lose power, it's going to unravel much, much faster, as opposed to if they would have aired out some of their mistakes and allowed for some corrections. I mean, look at what they did in Romania. They had elections, the first round was won by the wrong guy, who was critical of the war on Russia.
And as a result, they just claimed that the Russians financed him. Then they looked at evidence… well, I guess the Russians didn’t, but nonetheless, they can’t run anymore. This is what Europe is becoming. Same as I said, same as Moldova. The way that election was, kind of, horrible as well. And…
[00:43:03] Peter Slezkine: But, so, let’s say, alternative party wins in France and Britain, in Germany, do you see the European project transforming overnight, or do you think that the forms are ill-suited to any, sort of, attempt to revitalize Europe in a new guise?
[00:43:23] Glenn Diesen: I think it’s become a bit like the Soviet Union. It waited too long to reform. I think any efforts to do any proper reforms now would result in collapse. But, again, I might be mistaken on this. Many things are different, of course. I would be a bit cautious looking into my crystal ball because there are too many variables which are unclear. But, at least, if one of these begins to fall, the other ones will stand on much more shaky ground.
[00:43:52] Peter Slezkine: Well, a lot of people have made the parallel between perestroika and what’s going on in the U.S., so I suppose Europe is the last to get to that stage. You mentioned Nord Stream earlier. That’s in your neck of the woods. There was a Norway–Polish pipeline that was opened up a day after Nord Stream was blown up. I won’t make any causal connection, but I wonder what you make of that episode.
[00:44:18] Glenn Diesen: Well, I don’t sit on any evidence that I can use. But of course, Seymour Hersh obviously had this article where he claimed to have good sources suggesting that it was the U.S., in cooperation with the Norwegians, who blew up Nord Stream. Again, I don’t really have anything beyond that, so I’m not sure to what extent Norway was involved or not. And for my future employment in this country, I should probably not. [crosstalk 00:44:48].
[00:44:48] Peter Slezkine: Okay. Well, I will stop insisting on a Norwegian scoop.
[00:44:52] Glenn Diesen: But I will say, though, that people have to think about what a scandal, really, the Nord Stream was, not just in terms of what happened, but when, of course, the Nord Stream was blown up after being threatened by… well, promised more or less by Biden that this is what would happen if Russia went to war. What did NATO do? They began talking about it as if this was possibly an Article Five attack, something that would start a war with Russia. They said all evidence leads to Russia.
This was right after the Russian playbook. And I haven’t seen this playbook either, but apparently, it says, “Blow up your own energy infrastructure,” as opposed to turning off the valve or attacking their infrastructure. I mean, all this sloganeering, and it was used for two reasons. One was for NATO to militarize the Baltic Sea, which you should be being careful about, because this is where Russia has the grounds, they would become an existential threat. It also was used to escalate the war in Ukraine, also Russia considers an existential threat.
And then, of course, we find out that… it wasn’t the Russians after all, which leaves us only with two options, it was either Ukraine or the United States, or a combination. What do the Europeans do? Well, there’s no good narrative. Neither of these two countries are good options to have attacked it, so no journalists want to talk about it anymore. It disappears out of the media. You had some report, I think, in The Washington Post, where they interviewed a European diplomat who said directly, “If you don’t want to know the answers, don’t ask questions.”
And this is, kind of, the guiding principle, and they forget about it. But then you had the reports coming out of the United States suggesting that the CIA knew about the attack before it happened, and they tried to have Zelensky stop it, but it was too late. But this is interesting, because then one says that they knew it wasn’t the Russians before it happened, but once it happened, everyone said it was the Russians, and we used it to escalate the war in Ukraine.
So, we are admitting then that we lied about Nord Stream in order to then escalate the war in Ukraine. And no, not a single journalist across our entire continent thinks this is worth exploring. So, you know, who destroyed Nord Stream? No one cares to know.
[00:46:59] Peter Slezkine: Well, now it’s back in the headlines because of the dismissal of the court case in Poland, and you have Sikorski and Hungary’s Minister Szijjártó arguing with one another on X about whether this is just or not. Not to mention the, sort of, Polish–German rift that might arise over this issue.
[00:47:24] Glenn Diesen: Yeah, so that’s, kind of, extraordinary as well, that when the Germans said, you know, we would like to have extradited the person who’s suspected of participating in the destruction of Nord Stream, the response from Donald Tusk was, “Well, the only thing you should do is apologize for building the pipeline to begin with.” So, this is, kind of, an extreme comment.
So, I think that the Europeans will probably increasingly turn on each other as well. And that’s unfortunate, especially in such an ugly, ugly way as well. But this week, there are reports now attacks on the Hungarian refinery, a Slovakian one, and the Romanian one, and they’re all processing Russian oil. One of them is partly owned by a Russian company, I think. So, we have to… I’m not sure, I can’t find any of these stories in the media. Well, how do you make sense of this? The Hungarian and Romanian oil refineries, which are linked to Russia, are now attacked a few hours between them, causing massive fires. It’s hardly an accident.
So, the most recent one today was in Bratislava, in Slovakia. So, someone is now attacking Europeans, and it’s definitely not Russia, which is probably why it doesn’t appear much in the media either. I think Europeans will turn on each other fairly soon, or they’re already turning on each other.
[00:48:44] Peter Slezkine: Well, let’s move to finish to an area that used to be exceptional for its lack of conflict, namely the Arctic. Norway has a huge northern coastline and is strategically placed in this area. What do you make of the Arctic as a future site of geopolitical conflict or economic opportunity? Now that it is split essentially 50–50 between NATO and Russia?
But it is also the area where the U.S. and Russia are signaling rapprochement over the heads of the Europeans, with Putin and Trump meeting in Alaska in all kinds of conversations about ExxonMobil returning to the Arctic and the untold riches that the two countries might mine from the depths.
[00:49:33] Glenn Diesen: Well, along the Arctic coastline, the Russians… because of their vast territory, they have half of the Arctic coast. But with now Sweden and Finland joining NATO, all the other Arctic states are NATO members. This creates some challenges in terms of how to organize… for example, security in the Arctic. Now, if you suggest that NATO should do it, then it’s obviously not favorable to the Russians. But what was unique about the Arctic was it tended to be exempt from this, kind of, great power rivalry.
So, we were able to always cooperate there, even when there were some flashpoints in other places in the world. And another issue which has made it more problematic is simply that the Arctic is no longer just some frozen desert where there’s no real strategic interest. Now you see it’s becoming a very interesting transportation corridor, and also a lot of energy being available for extraction.
So, this is when you saw Pompeo pop up at the Arctic Council in 2019. He was saying, “Oh, we have to confront the Russians and the Chinese,” and, you know, that created some shock waves because the Arctic Council was never used for this, kind of, geopolitical chest-beating. And then suddenly… but now, of course, it is, after 2022.
[00:50:46] Peter Slezkine: And what is interesting is that in that moment when great power competition and Cold War rivalries returned, the Arctic was the one region in the world where the West could claim to be opposing China and Russia simultaneously. There’s no other area where China and Russia are present together.
[00:51:00] Glenn Diesen: Yes, but it’s also true that in the past, the Russians, in developing the Arctic, they often favored Western partners, to the extent that it was seen as benefiting Russia’s integration into greater Europe. But this also died in 2014. Now you see the Arctic being developed more in partnership with the Chinese. And indeed, the Russian Northern Sea Route, that is the Arctic corridor, is now conceptually being integrated into the Belt and Road Initiative.
The Chinese refer to it as the “Polar Silk Road,” which is, well, conceptually, of course, integrating it into the Silk Road Initiative. So, now it’s being split along these lines. Of course, the Russians don’t only want to rely on China in the Arctic, so they might have India, the Arab Emirates, you know, there’s a lot of… I’m not sure how much they would do, but the idea is to develop it more now with the Chinese instead, as they’re seeing more future conflict with NATO.
So, this also now spreading into the Arctic will have many consequences. Some are just energy and economic as well. Keep in mind that the Yamal fields up in the Russian Arctic, where all that gas is being developed, this was supposed to fuel European industries for decades to come. And a few weeks ago, it was announced, the Russians and Chinese signed the Power of Siberia II, which meant that now all that gas which was intended for Europe will now go to China instead.
So, not only don’t we get this gas, which is horrible for our industries, but it’s going to Asia, which will drive energy prices down. So, now the Asian industries will be even more competitive against the failing European ones. So, this is a disaster. But how was it met in Brussels? With celebration, “We’re freeing ourselves from Russian energy!” But it’s a bit like this green shift, you know, we burn down our house without building a new one first.
It doesn’t make any sense. So, you want to diversify, make sure you have other options. But we cut ourselves off from Russia without having alternatives. So, it’s a lot of self-harm. And I would put it into the, yeah, simply being stupid.
[00:53:02] Peter Slezkine: But is there any anxiety that you will now be cut off in the Arctic from the other side? The rupture with Russia committed Russia to more Chinese involvement in the Arctic, redirected Russian Yamal gas to China. But it certainly seems that insofar as there are discussions between the Russians and the Americans about future economic engagement, a lot of it has been focused on the Arctic. So, if that happens, then where does Norway, for example, fit in?
[00:53:33] Glenn Diesen: Well, it's unclear because, when we went against the Russians, it was, you know, the best of the Biden administration. You know, they were, kind of, leading this war against…
[00:53:41] Peter Slezkine: I definitely don't exempt American responsibility.
[00:53:46] Glenn Diesen: No. I'm just saying that America, kind of, took the lead, and the Europeans were following. And now the Americans took a step back, saying, ″Hey, we can work with the Russians,″ but the Europeans are still stuck there. So, my point is what Americans are doing now is very rational, as again, in a multipolar world, you don't want to hand over or push Russia and China too close together.
You don't need to split them up either. All you have to do is have good, reasonable bilateral relations with the Russians. And the Russians, it's in their interest to cooperate more with the United States because the Chinese are more powerful than Russia, at least economically, by far. So, if you only have one partner… well, they have more partners, but if they become too dependent on China, and this is defined very much by asymmetrical interdependence, then this can be unfavorable to Russia.
So, it's in Russia's interest, just out of pragmatism, to diversify their partnerships. And America’s a very important player. So, the Russians would like to establish better bilateral ties with the Americans, ideally make sure that U.S.–Russia relations aren't hostage to Europe, because Europe’s going to be a mess for a long time to come, and relations aren't going to get much better. So, they would like to see U.S.–Russia relations improving. And it’s also in the American interest. They also don’t want to see Russia pushed too far towards China, so they have a common interest there.
So, I think the Arctic is one of the areas where they obviously discuss most in terms of how to improve ties, things they can work on together. I'm not sure where the Europeans fit in. Again, I think the Americans will be fine, that there’s some pragmatism here, and they realize what's in their interest, and they're going for it. The Europeans, not so much.
[00:55:25] Peter Slezkine: Is there any opening for China in Europe? Because the Chinese think that the war in Ukraine ruined what was a good game that they had inroads in Europe, and that the economic relationship was in both parties’ interest. The Russians, of course, like to tell the Chinese that that is all wishful thinking, that Europe will always go the American way whenever geopolitical divisions arise.
So, do you think that given Europe's bleak economic outlook, there is a chance they'll turn to China, or that China will be able to propose something enticing?
[00:55:58] Glenn Diesen: It's hard to say. I don't think it's determined yet. But the Chinese are at least growing tired of the European Union, that is, Brussels, because, you know, there's only lectures coming from them. At least in the past, when the EU was powerful, it was one thing.
But now that they're getting weak and they're still going to lecture, it's, you know, they don't really have appetite for it. But they'd like to expand economic relations with many countries. They do well in Hungary, by the way, and they would like to increase cooperation with countries like Italy as well.
[00:56:23] Peter Slezkine: So, you think the future of Europe might be the, sort of, Central Asian, multi-vector model, that you will have separate countries doing deals with the U.S., Russia, China to different degrees, depending on their situation and interests?
[00:56:39] Glenn Diesen: Yeah, I think so. But just because of history, culture, civilization, I think that the…
[00:56:45] Peter Slezkine: The U.S. will be the preferred partner.
[00:56:47] Glenn Diesen: Yeah. But that's quite reasonable. Within, let's say, you have the political West, it seeks to stick together to make sure China doesn't get too powerful. Any club, it's never going to be complete, have all the same interests. So, let's, for example, look within the European Union, where you have the EU as a bloc to say, ″Oh, we got collective bargaining power." This is all good and well.
But when too much power concentrates in Germany, you know, they start to throw their weight around. They tell the Hungarians, for example, what to do, begin to push them and bully them around. Well, now you see Hungary beginning to push more. The Hungarian Central Bank has this annual thing where they call it the ERA Forum, where they look towards how Hungary can pivot some of its economy to the East, to cooperate, to take benefit of the rise of Asia.
And this is also a function… a political function that is, by diversifying, they become less dependent on the Germans in the EU. And that means that the EU has less sway over them, so it's good for their political autonomy. Now, I think this can also be applied to the political West. The power of the United States is very much overwhelming compared to the Europeans now, as Europe continues to sink.
So, it can be in the interest of the EU to diversify, get some more partners in order to balance off some of these excessive dependencies. The same logic goes with the Russians. If they get too dependent on China, you know, this is the most important partner, just as the U.S. is the most important partner for the Europeans. But they don't want to be stuck in a partnership with excessive dependence.
So, what they do is they try to diversify, trade a bit more with India and other countries in the region. China's still the most important one, but they avoid excessive dependence where their political autonomy is under threat. So, and I think this is the natural direction for the Europeans to go as well, just have the U.S. as the indispensable, most important partner, but, because of the lack of symmetry in terms of power, yeah, balance some of this off by also getting other partners. Otherwise, you'll have a master and a slave, where one tells the other what to do.
So, if you have excessive dependence on one power, you can do two things. One is strategic autonomy. The other one is diversify. The strategic autonomy is dead. We don't have a tech sector. We have zero digital ecosystems. We have not many good natural resources. So, the only way to balance off excessive dependence, I think, is now diversification. The globalists within the EU, they don't have the political imagination to see a world which isn’t dominated by the collective West, because they see hegemony as the only way to defend liberal democratic values.
And liberal democratic values represent more or less the end of history. So, this is why they will bow to Trump, you know, sit well in front of the desk and call him ″Daddy." That's what I mean. I think he genuinely believes in what he says because the globalist class in Europe, they're quite subservient by nature.
[00:59:41] Peter Slezkine: Right. Well, so, there's clearly an affinity now between these various populist political movements throughout the West. The question is whether tensions would arise if they actually came to power, because the U.S. would want to create an impermeable bloc that doesn't allow any Chinese penetration, which would obviously come at a pretty significant price to many members of this bloc who would prefer to diversify.
And I think it's a good idea to create some such Western coalition, but that it would be a big mistake to build it in Cold War terms on the basis of exclusion of China, or the invocation of some extraordinary Chinese threat. That it's better to, sort of, make it as powerful as possible, and if that means doing business at times with China, at times with Russia, at times with any other state, that is the rational approach.
But in any case, thank you so much for spending all this time with us today and for your sober and, often somber, analysis of the European state of affairs.
[01:00:48] Glenn Diesen: Thank you for having me on this. My great pleasure.
[01:00:53] Peter Slezkine: Thanks for listening to the Trialogue Podcast. Make sure to subscribe to the show so you don’t miss out on any episode. The Trialogue Podcast is hosted by the Stimson Center and produced by University FM.