Jana Kobzova, Director of the European Security Program at the European Council on Foreign Relations and former foreign policy adviser to the president of Slovakia, joins us to discuss the European perspective on the Trump-Putin summit in Alaska, the Washington meeting between Trump, Zelensky, and top European leaders, and the future of the war in Ukraine. *The Trialogue Podcast is hosted by the Stimson Center and produced by University FM.
Jana Kobzova, Director of the European Security Program at the European Council on Foreign Relations and former foreign policy adviser to the president of Slovakia, joins us to discuss the European perspective on the Trump-Putin summit in Alaska, the Washington meeting between Trump, Zelensky, and top European leaders, and the future of the war in Ukraine.
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*The Trialogue Podcast is hosted by the Stimson Center and produced by University FM.
(Transcripts may contain a few typographical errors due to audio quality during the podcast recording.)
[00:00:00] Peter Slezkine: I'm Peter Slezkine, Director of the US-Russia-China Trialogue project at the Stimson Center. Since the middle of the 20th century, relations among the United States, Russia, and China have had an enormous impact on each country separately and on the world as a whole. The purpose of the Trialogue is to better understand this extraordinarily complex and consequential relationship by directly engaging with experts from all three countries.
In this show, guests from across the political spectrum and from every corner of the globe share their views in their own voice. While the Stimson Center seeks to provide access to a wide variety of perspectives, it does not endorse any particular position. We leave it to the listeners to judge the validity and value of the views expressed by the guests. I hope you enjoy the podcast.
My guest today is Jana Kobzová, director of the European Security Program at the European Council on Foreign Relations and former foreign policy advisor to the president of Slovakia. Jana is a frequent visitor to Ukraine and a great expert on European policy. In the episode that follows, we discuss the European perspective on the events of the last week and a possible settlement in Ukraine.
Jana, welcome to the podcast.
Jana Kobzová: Thank you for having me, Peter.
Peter Slezkine: So, before we get to the dramatic events of the past few weeks, perhaps, you could tell us a bit about your expertise on Ukraine and your familiarity with the European political scene. You are originally from Slovakia. You worked for the European Council on Foreign Relations. You have spent quite a bit of time in Kyiv, but give us, sort of, an overarching background and a basic chronology.
Jana Kobzová: Thanks, Peter. I guess my journey started in 2004 when I observed the presidential elections in Ukraine, which actually ended up being rigged and had to be repeated. I was there as a part of an independent NGO’s observer mission. But since then, I've been following the region more closely, developed an academic interest. I studied Russia and Central Asia in London, where I also worked, then moved to Brussels, where I worked more on European foreign policy towards these countries. It was an interesting period because my period in Brussels overlapped with the developments in Ukraine, the Euro Maidan Revolution in 2013, and of course, the first war in Ukraine, which started in 2014.
So, that was interesting. I had monthly regular trips to Ukraine. But being in Brussels provided me quite an insight into how the EU policy on Ukraine and Russia was made at the time. And then I joined the team of Slovakia's president, Zuzana Čaputová. So, for the past five years, until last year, I worked as her foreign policy advisor, which was, of course, an interesting time, to say the least, because the war erupted in Slovakia's direct neighborhood when Ukraine was invaded again in 2022.
Peter Slezkine: And Slovakia's policy has changed pretty radically since Fico returned.
Jana Kobzová: It has. There was a parliamentary election in Slovakia in 2023. And as a result of that, the government has changed the course and joined the ranks of Hungary when it comes to its policy towards Ukraine. I think the big difference remains two things. First, Slovakia is an EU and NATO member, but doesn't block Ukraine's EU membership aspirations, unlike Hungary. And the second one is, despite the government rhetoric, actually the arms exports from Slovakia, which are directed at Ukraine, but go there through third countries, continue and have increased, actually. So, the military support to Ukraine continues. It's done on commercial basis rather than charity. So, I guess we were the pioneers of the current U.S. approach, where, of course, the military aid and donations are stopped or on pause but the commercial sales are going forward.
Peter Slezkine: Very interesting. And so, you travel to Ukraine continuously and have been there recently.
Jana Kobzová: Indeed. Ever since I left the job at the presidential palace, I've been traveling to Ukraine, on average, about once a month. And that, kind of, provided me quite a good understanding or an opportunity to understand what's happening in Ukraine and the domestic politics, the dynamics, but also, of course, the developments related to the ongoing war.
Peter Slezkine: Well, so let's talk about those domestic dynamics before we turn to the big international summits. So, just several weeks ago, Zelensky tried to restrict some of the anti-corruption agencies. There was a protest in Ukrainian domestic society. There was an outcry in Europe. He pulled back. Can you explain to the outside audience what was happening? Why did he do this when he did? What was the reaction internally? What was the reaction on the European level? And where do we stand now?
Jana Kobzová: Yeah. What has happened, essentially, was that the parliament voted a law which would strip Ukraine's anti-corruption bureau and special prosecutors of their independence and subordinate these agencies to prosecutor general that, in Ukraine, is confirmed by parliament, but nominated by the president. So, that's the procedural part that law was adopted, protests erupted. A number of Western leaders expressed alarm at this development, because basically, what has happened in a sense was that these two institutions, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau and Special Prosecutor's Office, were two institutions that were part of an anti-corruption architecture that was put in place with Western support, not just political, but also financial and expertise-wise. After Ukraine's Revolution in 2014, it was part of the conditions the West has imposed on Ukraine in exchange for continued financial support, but also in exchange for continuing its European track and also visa-free regime. So, it was a very important condition for all of these relationships and support to continue.
Peter Slezkine: Is it true that these were mainly financed by USAID and the U.S. government and were partially orphaned after the Trump administration changed its policy and then the Europeans stepped in?
Jana Kobzová: No. The agencies were… I mean, they're state bodies, so they couldn't be financed by any foreign country. But they benefited a lot from some of the grants that were provided on, for example, equipment, especially in the beginning. In the initial phases, the people working there benefited from a number of trainings from experts from Europe or the United States. And those agencies’ existence and functioning was seen as a condition on Ukraine and part of the reforms.
That was something that has changed with Trump's administration's arrival. Basically, the pressure or the, kind of, the continued nudging by the West of Ukraine to continue these reforms, prosecute corruption, and so on was silenced a bit by the U.S. You know, the Europeans and the rest of G7 continued to push for some of the reforms. Ukraine was making quite a good progress, but that voice from the United States was missing.
And I think that, when you asked why that attack on anti-corruption institutions was happening, I think there were two reasons. The formal or official one, that those agencies were suspected of having some sort of Russian infiltration. That was what Ukraine secret service was saying, which, you know, none of us can exclude. It's a country that works with Russia, so I would assume Russia would be interested in that kind of information. However, of course, the argument is you investigate the suspicions, you don't close down, effectively, the organizations. And second political argument is maybe those who were proposing that felt that or, kind of, thought that the response from the West would be more muted, partly because the U.S. was not so vocally defending and insisting on the anti-corruption reforms as before.
Peter Slezkine: So, effectively, Zelensky was trying to bring these agencies, which were state agencies, but effectively autonomous, bring them more directly under his own power?
Jana Kobzová: This is how it was absolutely seen by both the civil society in Ukraine, but also by stakeholders from abroad. That's why they were, not just the usual statements of serious concerns coming from different European capitals and the European Commission, but also very concrete calls, including from International Monetary Fund and other important financial supporters of Ukraine, whose continued support is also dependent on the existence of these institutions. We have those agreements with these financial institutions, the Ukrainians that basically said, you know, these conditions, including the independent functioning of these institutions need to continue. So, if that is not happening, that means that Ukraine's financial support was endangered. And what we have seen, thanks to the domestic pressure you mentioned, the first substantial street protests ever since the first invasion began in 2022, and thanks to this international pressure, we have seen a course correction and, basically, a turnaround where the law was basically canceled by a different law that was adopted within a week by the same parliament.
Peter Slezkine: So, Zelensky retreated after the European and domestic protests against his attempt to subordinate these agencies under his control?
Jana Kobzová: I think we have seen a very substantial course-correction. Yes, I think the realization was that this was a misstep and it should be corrected and it needs to be corrected as soon as possible. And that's what happened.
Peter Slezkine: Is there any truth to the rumor that Zelensky went after the anti-corruption agencies because they had begun to close in on some of his closest associates, that there's a fellow named Mindich, whose apartment may or may not have been bugged, and perhaps, Zelensky’s voice is on tape saying something that he would not like to have public.
Jana Kobzová: This was in the Ukrainian media. And it was definitely something that, at least the protestors on the streets, expressed through their statements. But I think, if you are an agency that's supposed to investigate high-level corruption, you get into the cases which might be linked to people who are running the country. I mean, there are a lot of questions about different people that President Zelensky has done business with before he entered political life. Some of them are still part of his close circle. But again, you know, I don't have an insight into what… the case is really weird. This was definitely in the media. And at least, the optics of that was, you know, this is happening at the time when supposedly these agencies are investigating people who might be close to the president, which, of course, kind of, deepened the anger. You and I know the history of these issues in Ukraine. Corruption, and high-level corruption, was something that initially triggered the Maidan protest in 2013, and especially, this link between, you know, this corruption endangering Ukraine's relationship with the EU. So, it's highly sensitive for the active part of Ukrainian society. And this is something which, I think, also, was in retrospect probably underestimated by those who wanted to take control of the agencies.
Peter Slezkine: So, at the same time that Ukraine was experiencing, probably, its sharpest domestic crisis since 2022, there seemed to be a positive turn in American policy toward Ukraine. Trump had signaled frustration with Putin, had set a deadline for some big decision, had threatened secondary tariffs on India and others who were purchasing Russian gas. Lindsey Graham was on TV talking about his bill. So, was there a sense at that time in Europe and Ukraine that American policy had truly shifted and that the U.S. would really tighten screws on Russia over the long term?
Jana Kobzová: I think that there was hope, but I also think it was a very cautious hope, seeing the other steps of this administration on other issues not related to Ukraine. That's first. And of course, everybody was very conscious of the rocky relationship that Ukraine and the United States have had under Trump's previous administration, but also, as the relationship redeveloped after the Oval Office meeting in February this year.
So, long story short, there was a cautious optimism. There was a hope that there is an understanding in the U.S. that Russia, from the perspective of Ukrainians and the rest of Europe, is not willing to come to the negotiating table unless you increase that pressure. That pressure needs to come, not just from the Europeans, but also from the United States. Especially, the threat of secondary sanctions was seen as an additional lever the U.S. could use because this was not just about pressuring Russia itself, but by imposing these sanctions on some of Russia's allies or economic partners such as India, you know, it will not be just the West calling Putin and saying, you know, “Stop the war.” It would also be some of the countries that are economically helping Putin, whose stakes are being affected themselves.
So, there was a cautious hope. But I think the Europeans, over the past seven months, have also learned to take these statements with a pinch of salt.
Peter Slezkine: How effective did Europe believe these instruments might be? Obviously, sanctions against Russia were applied immediately and strengthened over time. Russia did not cease. Its war effort was weakened, but maintained sufficient resources to continue fighting, it seems, indefinitely. The U.S. and the West could always have sanctioned oil sales more aggressively, but there were objective reasons why they didn't, because you can only mess with global energy prices so much. You can only tighten screws on giant countries, like India and China, to a certain degree. So, was there truly a sense that it would be different this time, that the U.S. could actually affect India's behavior in a way that would truly shake Russia's economy to the point where Putin would accept a ceasefire that he otherwise wouldn't desire? Or this was just a matter of degree that it would further weaken Russia over the long haul and we're in a war of attrition, so, all of this is about shifting matters on the margins in looking into the long term?
Jana Kobzová: I think, actually, the hope was a bit more basic, because what we had seen before during Biden's administration, you basically had the Europeans and the U.S. aligned on the approach to Russia. And we, kind of, disagreed over details, but we were on board. Okay. So, that's first — kind of, getting the U.S. back on board and having a joint approach. The sanctions were never seen as a silver bullet, and that was not the hope this time. The hope was more strategic in thinking, if President Trump wants to do a deal to end this war, he may want to understand that that's probably not going to happen if the pressure is put just on the country that's the victim of the aggression. But basically, kind of, looking at how do you force Russia to come to the negotiating table and under what conditions Russia would feel it also needs to have some sort of concessions, right?
And sanctions would be part of that pressure. As you said, there would be areas where both the Europeans and the Americans could have done more, whether it's the oil exports or the shadow fleet. There is a big question, still, on the European side, why are the Europeans using or not using the frozen assets themselves, just the windfall profits? So, there is a number of tools when it comes to sanctions. But also, I think the bottom line on the Ukrainian and European policymakers’ side was always, Russia is not going to go into serious negotiations if it feels it can continue pushing on the battlefield. So, in addition to sanctions, the whole idea was you increase and reinforce Ukrainian ranks, you increase the military support for Ukraine. You, kind of, reinforce the Ukraine’s ability to resist or slow down Russian progress, to the level that it's so slow that there will have to be negotiations.
So, when I was talking about that hub, it was more a, kind of, broader picture. You know, I don't think anyone in Europe thinks that sanctions are the silver bullet. It must be a combination of different tools. And as you said, for now, I think Russian economy is feeling the impact of sanctions, but not to the point that they would, kind of, you know, come to the negotiations table tomorrow talking about everything they're ready to do to consider defeat.
Peter Slezkine: So, Europe briefly felt that Trump may have come back on side and adopted a, more or less, common approach that corresponded to this long-term strategy that you just described. And then a few days before the deadline, there's a bit of a whiplash and Trump sends Witkoff to Moscow, while also signing an executive order threatening tariffs, or imposing, I guess, tariffs on India, but with a 20-something-day delay. And then we get the announcement, not long after, of the presidential summit in Alaska. So, what is the reaction in Europe and Ukraine to this development? Is it just trying to put out fires, trying to get on the phone with the White House and see what's going on and then try to coordinate a message? What was your personal reaction at that time?
Jana Kobzová: Well, my personal reaction was something that I actually expected because President Trump has made it quite clear he wants to meet Putin at some point. To me, the announcement of the summit wasn't as surprising as the fact that Steve Witkoff came back from Moscow, saying that Russia would be open to, kind of, the West providing security guarantees to Ukraine, which, to me, was surprising because we all know that this is something that has been discussed for the past three and a half years. And I think that's fundamentally where the nut of the problem is, that, you know, the expectations of these security guarantees are so different that, for now, I don't see those two meeting anywhere near each other. So, that's first.
Second, I think, on the European side, I think it was a bit of a shock. On the Ukrainian side, what was very important from the beginning was that they wanted to have that meeting with President Trump before he met President Putin, which did happen in February, but they didn't go as they hoped. And there was a lot of investment in, kind of, fixing that relationship first.
Now, I think, not just because of Ukraine, but because of everything else the Trump administration is doing, the Europeans have basically learned how to fire-fight the relationship and be engaged as much as possible. And what basically started was a frenzy of diplomacy with the quickly assembled European call with the Ukrainian and American president before the summit.
And the source of concern on the Ukrainian and European side was twofold. First, they didn't know what the U.S. side was going into the summit with, right? I mean, it was quite to be expected what the Russian side was going to go into with in the summit. But what was the U.S. ask from this summit? You know, what is the U.S. going to take? So, I think this is what the Europeans and the Ukrainians were generally interested in. And B, the other point was, of course, there was a concern. Those two are probably, and they made it very clear, going to discuss, not just Ukraine, but European security. The summit is taking place, potentially, as far from Europe as possible. In Europe, we don't really have a good experience with, you know, these types of talks not involving countries concerned. So, the concern was, you know, is there going to be a deal made over our heads, not just over Ukraine, but also the rest of Europe?
And so, the attempt was to get Trump's ear on what the red lines are on the Ukrainian and European side before he meets President Putin. What are the expectations? How could this pan out? What are the potential scenarios?
Peter Slezkine: What are the red lines from the European perspective?
Jana Kobzová: I think it's twofold. The summit in Washington after Alaska made it clear as well. One is, any kind of discussion about territories and final deal need to happen with the country concerned. In other words, you know, it's Ukrainians who are supposed to have these discussions. And second, we want to have a say over how this war ends. It cannot be a decision made by the U.S. and Russia alone. Yes, United States is Europe's most important security partner, but the consequences of any kind of deal will be felt, first and foremost, of course, in Ukraine. But secondary, it matters whether the European Union borders a country that's completely unstable as a result of a very bad deal, or, in a few years, borders a country that may not control all of its internationally recognized territory, but has a good chance of succeeding as a country that's becoming more prosperous, stable, economically viable, and potentially a future EU member state.
And I think the last red line, not just for the Ukrainians, but also for the majority of Europeans, is that Ukraine needs to remain a sovereign country. In other words, no one else should have a veto over where Ukraine goes and how it gets there.
Peter Slezkine: Goes in what sense? You mean NATO or EU membership?
Jana Kobzová: In terms of its foreign policy choices, in terms of its security arrangements.
Peter Slezkine: I mean, the U.S., obviously, has a veto. Maybe Russia doesn't, but it's up to the U.S. and every other NATO member whether Ukraine joins.
Jana Kobzová: Absolutely, every NATO member has that veto, and the same goes for the European Union, but that veto shouldn't mean that Russia decides where Ukraine goes. In other words, Ukraine is free to pursue EU and NATO membership. And the members alone of those two clubs should decide whether it joins or not once the Ukrainian people have made that decision. But it shouldn't be a third party doing that.
I'm talking about what the red lines are. I'm not saying how realistic this is or not. But, you know, for a lot of countries in the European Union, and I think this is underappreciated, this is not just about Ukraine. This idea that the deal is made above our heads is something that is certainly a concern for a number of other countries, you know, who might have their own territorial disputes or have their own specific history with their neighbors and so on.
Peter Slezkine: So, when the Europeans are making the argument to the Trump administration, that this is a conflict which concerns Europe greatly, the status of Ukraine now and in the future is of utmost importance to Europe, so, the U.S. should not make any final deals without Europe, the problem is that the United States could respond by saying, “Fine. This is your fight. You guys take care of it.” I mean, the issue is that the United States is least concerned with the conflict but most indispensable in its supporting role. And there's always been a danger, I suppose, from the European perspective, that Trump would just pull out entirely and say, “If you guys want to be involved in making the deal in determining its terms, go ahead without us. But if we're going to do it, then we will play the leading role.”
Jana Kobzová: Yeah, no, and I think, in a way, Trump has changed the dynamic and he called what some would say was a bit of a block with the Europeans, where, on one hand, they say this is very important, but in another way, for the past three years prior, you know, there was not much of a big strategy of how we're going to end this. You know, the logic was, in synergy with Biden administration, is we supporting Ukraine. It's up to Ukraine to make those choices. You know, I was myself writing a year ago, it was like, Europeans don't really have a plan on how to end this. Ukraine presented its victory plan. We may not like it. We may hate it. We may think it's not realistic. But at least the Ukrainians said, you know, “This is how we think we can do it.” And the Europeans were just saying, together with Biden administration, you know, “As long as it takes, we are with you.” But that's not really a strategy, that's a description of a process. Whereas, now, we have the U.S. president who is basically saying, “I want to end this.”
And I think the learning curve for the Europeans and the Ukrainians alike was saying, “Okay, instead of telling Trump this is not an easy conflict to solve, you know, it's very difficult for Russia to come to any compromise because this might have consequences beyond, you know, inside Russia itself and so on,” you say, “Okay. Let's do this and let's do it in a way that works for everyone.”
You say U.S. is least concerned about how this war ends. I would dispute it a bit because, of course, you'd hear from a number of people saying, you know, if Ukraine falls at one point, Russia might attack another NATO Baltic country, for example. You may believe it, you may not believe it. But I think the policymaking should not be based on beliefs. The policymakers need to take into account the worst-case scenario. And the worst-case scenario, even if it's not probable, is that this might happen. So, the U.S. may withdraw but may face a dilemma of whether you're willing to defend or not a NATO member 10 or five years from now. And again, I'm not talking about probability, but it is a worst-case scenario. So, the U.S. should be concerned about at least this potential scenario. The second, of course, is that this is something that is being watched, not by the Russians, but also by the Chinese and Indians. What does this tell you about the U.S. foreign policy, in general, global standing, and so on?
But I think, on the other hand, you're right, this is primarily something the Europeans should be investing in. And I think, on that side, there is a change. That change is underreported in the United States and underestimated in Russia. Europeans are doing things which they should have done maybe five or three years ago, both in terms of defense spending, but also this double thread of not just Russia potentially winning in Ukraine, but also the question mark about U.S. security commitment to Europe. With the arrival of Trump's administration, it's forcing the Europeans to rethink their priorities. And right now, one priority everybody's talking about is defense. And yes, it will take time, but the money is there, the signal to the markets and investors and defense companies has been sent. And yes, it doesn't mean that there will be 15 Patriots in every EU country in five years from now, because that's not where the U.S. or European production capacity is at the moment. But the sense of priority, that, “Okay, Ukraine is our first line of defense, we need to reinforce it to make sure that none of the worst other possible scenarios happen,” that is there. And that wasn't there two or three years ago. That wasn't there even a year ago. This is really something that was triggered by this double change of both Ukraine being slowly militarily weakened and the question mark over Europe's security commitment from the United States or, kind of, the commitment to protect Europe from the United States.
Peter Slezkine: So, Europe is now making a strong commitment to increasing its own security and becoming less dependent on the United States, but in the short term, the U.S. is indispensable, the Europeans can't quite pull it off on their own. And Trump, meanwhile, is reestablishing personal contact with Putin in Alaska. So, how did that summit go in relation to European expectations? And how did we get from that summit on Friday to the European visit, including, obviously, Zelensky as the prime actor, visit to Washington on Monday? There’s a very quick turnaround. So, Europe is watching this summit, reacts to it somehow, and then has to get together and figure out who to send to Washington, what role each would play, and which direction to push matters. So, give us, I guess, a blow by blow and an explanation of the European logic from Friday to Monday.
Jana Kobzová: Yeah, I think, the changes, basically, they saw the wave of Alaskan summit arriving. And the Europeans and the Ukrainians, you know, instead of, like, resisting it, they decided to drive it or, kind of, shape it, at least. That's why there were numerous calls at different levels, including at the top level between the Europeans, Ukrainians, and Trump before.
I think, on Alaska, it's two things. First is, of course, optics. The red carpet for someone who in any EU country should be arrested because there is a warrant by the international criminal court. So, the, kind of, the optics of that is one thing. But the other one, I think [crosstalk 00:29:24].
Peter Slezkine: Although, isn't Meloni saying he can come to Rome if he's going to meet Zelensky and, obviously, would not be arrested, or Geneva? I mean, this isn't a hard and fast principle because now the Europeans also want a summit that they would host in a European city and would welcome Putin there under those conditions.
Jana Kobzová: Yeah, yeah, yeah. But I think the summit would only take place if there is a good chance that there would be some sort of a deal, which is not clear that that was, kind of, clear from Alaska. You're right. I mean, that's why I'm talking about optics. And by the way, Hungary has withdrawn from ICC, so it probably wouldn't arrest Putin in the first place anyway.
But I think the biggest shock didn't come just from the optics, but the biggest shock to the Europeans and the Ukrainians was that someone who spent, basically, from day one of his second term talking about stopping the killing and ceasefire in Ukraine has completely shifted, given up the demand to the Russian side because the Ukrainians have already agreed with an immediate ceasefire. And President Trump basically said, you know, “There is no need for a ceasefire because we have the contours of a next deal, and it's up to the Ukrainians to decide whether they take it or not.” So, kind of, both shifting the responsibility on the Ukrainians, without the Ukrainians knowing what was discussed in Alaska.
And second, which I think really came as a shock because that was the outcome of the call just three days before that with the Europeans and Ukrainians, you know, let's push for a ceasefire. The president comes and says, “There is no need for a ceasefire. We might have a deal.” Hence, the light-speed diplomacy afterwards were basically…
Peter Slezkine: Wait, really quickly. So, there was just extraordinary whiplash for the Europeans because, in the phone call with the Trump administration ahead of the summit, they believed that they had all agreed to push for a ceasefire immediately before discussions about a final peace settlement. Then, Trump announces in Alaska that we're not going to start with a ceasefire. We're going to progress directly to peace talks. And then the Europeans have to react to this reversal. So, how do they prepare to counteract this development ahead of their visit to Washington on Monday?
Jana Kobzová: I just wanted to say, like, the shock was partly because it was Trump who talked about ceasefire. You know, the Ukrainians and Europeans partly embraced it because Trump proposed it before. So, that's why the shock was quite big. What they did was basically, and I think they really applied the lessons learned from the February Oval Office meeting, you know, and what you had was a delegation of, not just the Ukrainian president, but also key European players, either the countries that have most to say when it comes to European security because they're themselves nuclear powers or the biggest economic powers such as Germany or biggest backers of Ukraine, but you also had, I think importantly, you had the secretary general of NATO, Mark Rutte, with whom president has close contact and good contact, but also that symbolizes the unity of NATO. The head of European Commission, she's not an elected person. She's chosen by EU national leaders. But she's critical in the talks about how much money the Europeans are going to spend on defense. The Commission holds the EU budget. So, when Trump asks, “What do you put on the table? Because you say, this is so important for you,” Ursula von der Leyen, the European Commission president, is the one who says, like, “This is our plan. This is what we're going to do.”
And then, of course, you had the leaders that Trump has very good personal rapport, such as the Italian prime minister and Finnish president. So, it was, kind of, a well-chosen group of people who are both serious actors and can have a personal rapport with the U.S. president, which clearly cares a lot about the personal rapport with the leaders he meets.
Peter Slezkine: Well, so you did a very good job of explaining why each of those leaders was present, but do you know how this was coordinated? It's very complicated. There are many countries in Europe. There's very little time ahead of this meeting. How did this team get together? How closely did they coordinate their respective roles and what they were going to say? I mean, it came together very quickly. So, how was this team put together? And how did they decide on a common strategy in the room with Trump?
Jana Kobzová: So, I think it's two things. It didn't happen all of a sudden. The reason why it could happen so quickly is because those conversations essentially continue almost on a weekly and daily basis at different levels among these countries. You have in Europe the so-called coalition of the willing, which is basically countries, some NATO members, some EU members, but also countries outside of Europe, such as Australia and New Zealand, who basically are saying, “We're committed to help Ukraine support militarily.” And that, kind of, informal grouping keeps having conversations on a very regular basis about how to push for a strategy that brings some sort of a negotiated solution that's fair and sustainable. And then, of course, especially frankly, since the Trump-Zelensky meeting in the Oval Office, there is a group of European leaders that work very closely with the Ukrainian partners on preparing for these meetings, you know, agreeing on a common strategy and so on. And of course, after the Alaska Summit, there was first a debrief by President Trump to the European leaders, but also the European leaders have had a number of phone calls and decided, “This is how we go forward.” But this was not the first time they met. I mean, there were a couple of meetings in London and elsewhere where similar countries were present.
Peter Slezkine: So, how did that visit to Washington go? What was the reaction of the expert community in Europe, as you were all watching this unfold? Was it a success, a partial success, not quite what you were hoping for? Where did it land?
Jana Kobzová: Well, I think, overall, it was seen as, basically, a damage control after the Alaska Summit, where, in Europe, certainly, the perception was it was very hard to understand what the U.S. was getting from the summit. It was very clear what Russia was getting from the summit, not just in terms of rehabilitation in international relations of President Putin, but also the potential bilateral economic deals and so on. It wasn't very clear what the U.S. was getting out of this.
And so, the visit was basically seen almost as a test if Europe is still counted, and if Ukraine is still counted. If you take that as a measure of success, I think the visit went well. Primarily, it would have two objectives. First message is Ukraine is not alone. This is not a David versus Goliath situation. You know, most Europeans see how high the stakes are, and they want to be part of this. Second, the Europeans and Ukrainians really wanted to get firsthand what was discussed in Alaska and understand what the U.S. was willing to put on the table to enforce a potential deal, because this goes back to Steve Witkoff's comments that the U.S. might be involved in these security guarantees once there is a deal.
So, I think there was a genuine interest on the European and Ukrainian side, like, “Okay, what is the U.S. putting on the table? This is what we are putting in terms of money, weapons, financial commitments, political commitments, and so on. What is the U.S. putting on the table?”
And the third one is, frankly, to switch the pressure, because after Alaska, the pressure was on Ukraine to basically agree to a deal it didn't understand and wasn't part of. And I think what has, again, on a very, very short term basis, we are talking about maybe this week, maybe next week, things will be different, the agreement by President Trump that before there is this trilateral between President Putin, Zelensky, and Trump, there should be a bilateral meeting between the Ukrainian leader and the Russian leader. Put the onus on Moscow. If you are interested in a deal, then here is your meeting, because Zelensky is ready to come and you meet. And only after that you'll have a trilateral with President Trump.
So, I think, judging by these low expectations, that there was definitely, at least, a sigh of relief that, for now, coordination and communication between the Ukrainians, Europeans, and the U.S. continues, which, of course, you know, judging by standards of maybe a year ago, that's a very low bar. But this is where we are.
Peter Slezkine: So, coming out of the Alaska Summit and then after the Washington meeting, it seemed like the emphasis was on territory on the one hand and security guarantees on the other. And to put it very simply, there was some expectation or, perhaps, discussion about, sort of, Ukrainian concessions regarding territory, perhaps, withdrawal from the rest of Donetsk in exchange for Russian concessions on security guarantees. So, how real is that? Do you think either side's position has changed substantially? Would Ukraine actually consider withdrawing from areas it still controls? And do you think that Russia has softened its position on security guarantees at all?
Jana Kobzová: Frankly, I remain skeptical, for several reasons. First, based on the subsequent statements coming from the Russian representatives or, kind of, the minister of foreign affairs and Putin himself, I don't see the Russian position on potential guarantees for Ukraine shifting an inch compared to where they were in March 2022. In other words, Russia insists that it is part of any security guarantees that would be provided to Ukraine and as all the others would have a veto on whether these are actually applied or not. And that was made very clear by Minister Lavrov, I think, yesterday. So, that's first.
And second, on the Ukrainian side, you know, there is a lot of talk. And it's not just a talk, it's a reality. And you mentioned it as well, that the Russians are advancing in Donbas, in Eastern Ukraine. But if you put it to a perspective, basically, Ukraine has, kind of, expelled Russia from parts of its southeastern territory in November 2022, right? That was the Kharkiv offensive in the North and then the Kherson offensive in the South. And since November 2022, Russia gained additional 1% of the territory. So, that's first. Russia, or the, kind of, the proposals that were rooted in the media was that Ukraine should withdraw from the remaining parts of Donbas, which, for those who don't know, it's roughly 6,600 square kilometers, which Russia still doesn't control.
Russia has been trying to conquer that militarily since 2014. And so, the question that a lot of Ukrainians are asking is, like, why would we give up something that the Russians have not been able to conquer militarily in exchange for weak promises that Russia would not attack us again, which, they've given the promises before and nothing changed?
So, there is a deep war fatigue in Ukraine, but there is also a very strong public resistance to doing that. And that withdrawal would basically be politically suicidal for any Ukrainian leader. It's not just it’s outside of its legal framework and constitution, but it's also something, which, I think, if Zelensky attempted, he would face a rebellion.
So, the two sides, in terms of, you know, where they can meet and, ultimately, this is not about territory. If it was about territory, Russia had been controlling parts of Eastern Ukraine and Crimea since 2014. And Ukraine did not recognize it legally, but it de facto recognized that it doesn't control its territory, right? Zelensky has been repeatedly saying that they understand they will not take all of those territories by force anytime soon, that the status of that might be open for a long time. Of course, that's very different than recognizing that this is part of Russia. I think the bottom line is that Russia doesn't feel that it needs to agree to a compromise. And the Ukrainians feel, despite all the problems, which are very real, both with ammunition and manpower, despite all the hardships that they're going through, that they don't need to capitalize right now, and they have the support from the Europeans not to do that. Yes, U.S. military support, in terms of donations, has stopped, but the commercial sales will continue. So, I think both sides do not have a reason to go into any painful compromises right now.
Peter Slezkine: So, the Ukrainians can argue convincingly that they are continuing to defend their territory successfully, have only given up 1% in years. And the Russians can claim that they are winning and will eventually prevail on their battlefield, so they also don't need to come to some deal. So, basically, we're stuck with each side continuing to insist that it is succeeding, according to its own criteria.
To put a finer point on it, you think that Witkoff, Trump, whoever on the American side, just misunderstood the Russians, perhaps, didn't quite understand the domestic pressures in Ukraine, and that the perception of an opening for peace was misconstrued and misplaced.
Jana Kobzová: Well, I don't know if they misunderstood, but I think they have different interests, right? And President Trump made it very clear — he wants a quick deal. I think the only way you can get a very, very quick deal is either through Ukraine's complete capitalization, which is not going to happen for the reasons I just described, or Russia suddenly changing course, which it feels no pressure or incentive to do so.
On one side, I haven't seen the U.S. propose Russia such an amazing incentive that the Russians would leave Ukraine alone, or threatened such a horrible repercussion that the Russians would withdraw, right? So, what's the incentive on their side right now? Whether it was misunderstanding or, kind of, lack of context, because those discussions have essentially been ongoing for the past 11 years now, or whether it's the deal making has overshadowed the underlying causes and problems that are still between those sides, I do not know. But I think that the U.S. administration was focused more on the ornaments than on the fundamentals of what is at stake now. And when you're preparing a summit like that, you and I know this usually takes months of work and preparation, you know, lower level discussions. And going into that summit, announcing that there might be a deal basically meant partly that the failure of that deal, is going to be tied to President Trump personally. That, to me, was a surprise because, kind of, he doesn't want to be seen as someone who fails to make a deal.
Peter Slezkine: So, now, the Europeans and the Americans are exploring certain kinds of security guarantees, which may not be acceptable to the Russians, or let's just put it bluntly, that certainly will not be acceptable to the Russians. The root causes of the war, as they claim, are Ukrainian membership in NATO. So, there's no way they will accept something that is Article V-like or a coalition of the willing present militarily on Ukrainian territory. So, do you think that the discussions the Europeans and Americans are engaged in now are basically about shifting the burden back to Putin and not about the specifics? Or, do you think that this is a first step in a negotiation that the West now presents X, Russia responds with Y, and then we keep going until we find a middle ground?
Jana Kobzová: I don’t know if you find the middle ground, but I do think that this is part of a process. It's not just a, kind of, one-off. And I think that we will actually know relatively soon. It's about, you know, what I see now is the process, basically, one side putting pressure on the other and seeing where and how they can move. You know, as we said, Alaska, the move was on the Ukrainians to agree with the deal they didn't know. Now, the onus is on Putin to agree that he may or may not meet President Zelensky.
But I think, when I'm talking about the very short timeframe, what I think is important on the, kind of, the Western communication and coordination internally is that one of the outcomes of the Washington meeting and the summit with the Ukrainians and Europeans was that, at the level of national security advisors, those countries, together with the United States, are going to start working on what those security guarantees that everybody has been talking about for a very long time, what that means in practice. And it's not just something that they would propose to the Russians. I think it's very important for the Ukrainians and the Europeans to understand, what is the U.S. buying in this? Because ultimately, as any security guarantee, if they're not backed by resources, joint planning, joint understanding of what they mean in practice, they're worthless if they're just on paper.
And that's supposed to happen in the next 10 to 12 days. So, we will see, frankly, also, the level of investment the U.S. president is willing to make, besides his, of course, time for summits. But in terms of, you know, what is US security commitment to a potential deal, if there is a deal at one point, you know, how is the U.S. going to enforce it?
But as you said, for now, what would reassure Ukraine and its European partners is a no-go for Russia. And what would satisfy Moscow remains a no-go for the Ukrainians and most of the Europeans. But frankly, look, I mean, it's not the first war and it's not the first negotiations which started with the two sides being completely apart. So, I do think that what President Trump is doing is creating on all the pressure on all the sides to start thinking about, you know, not just my maximalist goals, but thinking about, “Okay, how do I play this in a way that allows me to, A, survive and get a better deal than capitulation or complete withdrawal?”
Peter Slezkine: Well, so, for the final question, perhaps, you could describe what the European goals actually are. So, yesterday, I talked to Dmitry Suslov, and he described in detail what Russia's aims are at the moment and how they are confident they might achieve them, either on the battlefield or at the negotiating table. And a lot of it is based on the Istanbul memorandum that Russia formally put out a few months ago.
So, you were saying that, at this stage, the two sides are very far apart and that is often the case in war, and that doesn't mean we're not going to find some compromise, eventually. But can we even speak of, sort of, two sides in this symmetrical sense? So, again, Russia has an outline that it has put on paper. Is there a Western alternative to that? What is the Western position? What is the European position? How do they want this to end?
Jana Kobzová: Couple of points. First is, if it ends, it needs to be an end that's sustainable. In other words, nobody wants to repeat the past eight years between 2014 and 2022 when there were some sort of a process which led nowhere, there were endless ceasefires, and people were still dying. So, that's first. You know, whatever deal there is, A, it should be, of course, acceptable to Ukraine. But most importantly, like, it shouldn't provoke or, kind of, lead to another war in a few years from now. That's first.
Second, Ukraine should be able to defend itself. You talked about NATO being blocked for Ukraine because of the position of the United States. U.S. is not the only country in NATO that thinks Ukraine should not become a part of NATO right now. So, in absence of that membership, how can Ukraine do that? And I think it's key for two reasons. Of course, first is, if the country is able to defend itself, then it can deter another potential aggression, but also that Europeans have committed to bringing Ukraine to the European Union at one point once it meets the conditions, right, and once we have a political consensus on that among the EU members. What kind of Ukraine enters? And from European perspective, it cannot be a country that has a threat of another war, bringing that threat to the European Union with its membership. So, making sure that that's about, kind of, a selfish EU interest. We are not going to admit a country that might become a victim of another war anytime soon. Those are, kind of, the two big things that I think all of the Europeans agree on.
Peter Slezkine: The most important conditions for a conclusion to the war are a settlement that produces a long-term peace insured by Ukrainian strength, and then Ukraine joining the EU.
Jana Kobzová: Yes.
Peter Slezkine: That would be seen as a triumph, or whatever, the best possible result in this unfortunate set of circumstances.
Jana Kobzová: Yeah, no, I wouldn't call it triumph, but I would call it a good case scenario or, kind of, the best realistic scenario, with the understanding that, as things stand, Ukraine is not able to take back all its territories by force, right? That's first. And second, of course, we are not just dealing with a conventional war. We are dealing with a conventional war waged where one side is also a nuclear superpower, and the Europeans are conscious of that.
And I think the big difference is, frankly, that the Russian part has a lot of expectations when it comes to Ukraine's domestic politics, you know, the status of the Russian language, the idea of autonomy or the functioning of the church, which I think, when it comes to a potential settlement, the Europeans are basically, “No, this is Ukraine's own business.” It should not violate international treaties. It should not violate EU laws, because this is, you know, if Ukraine wants to be a member of the European Union, they should not probably do something that goes against our laws and regulations. But, you know, it's up to Ukraine to regulate these kind of things, which, of course, goes against what Russia aims to get from it. And that's why I'm saying that the least of Russian expectations is, basically, a proxy for turning Ukraine into Russia's buffer that it can control, which is not something the Europeans want to see.
Peter Slezkine: The Europeans want Ukraine, whatever territory Kyiv controls, stable and incorporated into itself through eventual EU membership. And EU membership is actually considered realistic because that is not an easy path to travel down, as we've seen in other instances and your own country, as well as Hungary and others may have something to say about this.
Jana Kobzová: Yeah. No, I think the priority, really, is the long-term peace and security and, kind of, Ukraine's ability. I'm talking about the EU accession, partly because, once the European Union gives that kind of perspective to a country, in theory, it will happen at one point. But as you said, that road is long, curvy, and it's subject to a veto by every EU member state.
It's also subject to the change of mood in the given country. You know, if you look at Turkey, which has had that perspective for over 30 years, there is, of course, fault on the EU side as well, but I don't see the Turkish government necessarily very enthusiastic about EU membership anytime soon as well. So, the key is, you know, whether Ukraine is integrated in a, kind of, EU political framework. Essentially, Ukraine has become part of European security, especially for countries in central Eastern Europe and the Baltic countries, the Europeans realize that, if there is a threat of a belligerent Russia, having Ukraine strong and able to defend itself is an asset.
Peter Slezkine: Okay. Well, it seems like we're in a fundamental impasse because the Europeans’ first order objective remains security for Ukraine, that they would play an active role in guaranteeing. And for Russia, the so-called root causes are precisely Ukrainian connection to Western security arrangements.
Jana Kobzová: It is an impasse in a way that, you know, Russia has been waging a war it's fundamentally unable to win, in a way, that, you know, like, if you look at the numbers I just mentioned, I mean, it can go on in this war of attrition for a very long time. But even if there is a military collapse in Donbas, what it might mean is that Russia comes closer to the River Dnipro, which is, kind of, almost divides Ukraine into two halves. But it doesn't mean that Russia is in Kyiv tomorrow. So, it's waging a war that's very difficult for it to win but it cannot afford to lose. And on the other hand, the perception in Ukraine and in large parts of Europe is that, if Ukraine is defeated, that will be such a horrible scenario for the rest of European security, that they cannot afford it either.
And I think, again, this is something, you know, and now you, kind of, you may think I'm an enthusiast European who finally believes that the Europeans are up to something. But I think, really, the under-reported, or the missed part of this is the European agency and Ukrainian agency in all of this. You know, if Ukrainians were doing what the West told them, I don't think they would put up a fight in the first place. That's first. The Ukrainians have told no, not just to President Putin, they told no to a number of European leaders. And that's the kind of the Ukrainian own agency. And the European agency also is something that they're slowly realizing. When it comes to military support, of course, there are assets which are indispensable, which only the U.S. can provide. But on sheer, kind of, financial front, how much money and donations have been given to Ukraine, that's coming primarily from the Europeans right now.
And frankly, the last point which is often missed is that the U.S. has provided enormous intelligence, surveillance, recognition, and support from day one of the full-scale invasion. But the first few months, which actually helped the Ukrainians expel the Russians from Kyiv or in North or from the South in the first year of the full-scale invasion, that was coming from the Europeans and mostly from the Eastern Europeans, who were, kind of, emptying their own storages with all the Soviet equipment which the Ukrainians could readily use. And that is under-reported, kind of, that agency, that it's not like, you know, the U.S. and Russia decide tomorrow, the Europeans are just going to go along, partly because the Poles, the Balts, part of Slavics or the Slavic society, if not the government, the Danes, the Nordics, the Scandinavians see that, if Ukraine loses, then they're next. And as we talked about before, whether we believe that or not, how likely that is, that needs to be taken into account by military planners. And that affects that calculus enormously.
Peter Slezkine: Do you think we will have a Putin-Zelensky meeting in the next month?
Jana Kobzová: I don't think so. I don't think so. I think, partly, because as we discussed, the two sides are really far apart. But I think the other… it's more of a question, frankly, you know, because if Putin means Zelensky, that means he recognizes him as a leader of Ukraine, which the Kremlin has been quite disparaging about very well, talking about Kyiv regime, questioning his legitimacy, as we know, due to war, there was no presidential election, and so on.
And that would mean actually recognizing President Zelensky as his partner, which he essentially hasn't done since December 2019, when those two met for the last time in Paris on the march on during the Normandy Summit. So, that's the reason why I think that I'm more doubtful that this is going to happen because I don't see Putin ready to recognize that.
Peter Slezkine: If Zelensky and Putin do not in fact meet, if the Russian and Western position is farther apart than Trump hopes, do you think the U.S. then washes its hands of this matter if it can't end it soon? And is that the European fear? Or is there a sense that now that Europe and the U.S. are working on security guarantees together, the team has reassembled and the U.S. will remain on side even if the peace process goes off track?
Jana Kobzová: No, I don't think there is a sense in Europe that the team is reassembled and everything's going to be fine. No. I think that is definitely not there. I think the attempt is to keep the team aligned for as long as possible. I would assume that is one of Russia's own objectives, to neutralize the U.S. from this process, both politically, because that would, of course, decrease pressure, at least diplomatic pressure on Russia, at the moment. And of course, the withdrawal of more support from Ukraine would weaken the country.
But I think that this is now a scenario that Europeans and Ukrainians are, maybe not talking about, but definitely preparing for. As we talked about, you know, nobody expects the Congress to donate or approve another donation to Ukraine of military aid. That's why the Ukrainians and Europeans have already agreed with President Trump that they would continue buying the weapons. The hope is that the, kind of, intelligence support would continue. But I think the Europeans are quite realistic about the level of support, kind of, material and financial support the U.S. is ready to provide to Ukraine. So, preparations are ongoing for that.
I don't think it's going to be catastrophic, assuming that the intelligence support continues, because as I said, I mean, we are in this scenario already. There's no new donation coming from the United States.
Peter Slezkine: Thank you very much for joining the show and presenting the European perspective. We'll see what the next few weeks bring. And then, perhaps, we can discuss it all again.
Jana Kobzová: Thank you for having me, Peter. And thanks for the conversation.
Peter Slezkine: Thanks for listening to the Trialogue Podcast. Make sure to subscribe to the show so you don’t miss out on any episodes. The Trialogue Podcast is hosted by the Stimson Center and produced by University FM.