Mike Kuiken and Josh Hodges, two commissioners on the congressionally appointed US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, join us to discuss the recommendations of the Commission’s 2025 annual report and the state of US-China relations more broadly. *The Trialogue Podcast is hosted by the Stimson Center and produced by University FM.
Mike Kuiken and Josh Hodges, two commissioners on the congressionally appointed US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, join us to discuss the recommendations of the Commission’s 2025 annual report and the state of US-China relations more broadly.
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*The Trialogue Podcast is hosted by the Stimson Center and produced by University FM.
(Transcripts may contain a few typographical errors due to audio quality during the podcast recording.)
[00:00:00] Peter Slezkine: I'm Peter Slezkine, Director of the U.S.-Russia-China Trialogue project at the Stimson Center. Since the middle of the 20th century, relations among the United States, Russia, and China have had an enormous impact on each country separately and on the world as a whole. The purpose of the Trialogue is to better understand this extraordinarily complex and consequential relationship by directly engaging with experts from all three countries.
In this show, guests from across the political spectrum and from every corner of the globe share their views in their own voice. While the Stimson Center seeks to provide access to a wide variety of perspectives, it does not endorse any particular position. We leave it to the listeners to judge the validity and value of the views expressed by the guests.
My guests today are Mike Kuiken and Josh Hodges, two members of the Congressionally appointed U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. We discussed the nature of the China challenge and the recommendations made in the commission's annual report, which was just published on November 18th. I hope you enjoy the episode.
Mike and Josh, thanks so much for joining the podcast.
[00:01:16] Mike Kuiken: Thanks for having us.
[00:01:17] Joshua Hodges: Good to be with you, Peter.
[00:01:18] Peter Slezkine: Let's start by trying to figure out why we are here today, what the occasion is. So, you are both commissioners in something called the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission that was appointed by Congress. Can you tell us a little bit about it? When was it appointed? What is its purpose? What's its audience?
[00:01:37] Mike Kuiken: Commission was created about 25 years ago, Peter. In fact, I think, next year is actually the 25th anniversary of the commission, and it was right around the time of China's accession to the WTO and the debate in Congress about permanent normal trade relations with China. And I did, like, a little bit of ledge history on this when I joined the commission.
The story is fascinating in that, congressional leaders in Congress, at the time, decided they didn't trust two entities. One was China, and the other was the executive branch. And the task was basically keep an eye on both, and, sort of, how is the relationship building after PNTR and after WTO accession, and then just keep an eye on it on an ongoing basis. We do an annual report every year and then have a series of recommendations that accompany that report as well. So, that's the history of the commission, and that's the primary product that we have come out every year. There's also six hearings, usually, that we do on a variety of topics and engagements with the executive branch and a variety of other officials that come through Washington.
[00:02:31] Peter Slezkine: How often has the composition of the commission changed?
[00:02:35] Mike Kuiken: So, the way the commission exists is that the four congressional leaders each get three appointees. Each appointee is there for a two-year term. Some people stick around for just two years and then rotate off, and there are some folks that stay on for a number of years and stick around. And I think, right now, it's a… and Josh, check me on this. I think it's mostly a mix of folks that have been around for a while and some new folks that have been coming in.
[00:02:55] Joshua Hodges: Yeah, that's right.
[00:02:56] Peter Slezkine: So, how long have each of you been doing this? And if you could just provide your personal background with China, how long you've been working on China, and how has your relationship to China changed over time?
[00:03:10] Joshua Hodges: I was appointed in April of this year. And before this, I was in Speaker Johnson's office, Mike Johnson, who's in charge of the House. I was his national security advisor for the past year and a half. He brought me in right when he was elected Speaker of the House. Before that, I was with the National Security Council under the first Trump administration, focusing on the Western Hemisphere.
And one of the things that I did when I was in that office was put a spotlight on China, kind of, exposed the hidden hand of all their activity in the Western Hemisphere, from Canada down to South America and in the Caribbean. And since then, it's just been increasing focus. Obviously, I did some work when I was on the Hill before that, over in the Senate, related to China, as well as when I was over at the National Nuclear Security Administration. That really, kind of, opened my eyes to how fast China was closing the gap to catch up to the United States on a series of critical capabilities.
[00:04:03] Mike Kuiken: I spent 23 years on Capitol Hill, three years in a personal office for a senator named Carl Levin. And then I moved over to his Armed Services Committee staff in 2004. Spent 12 and a half years there, and then seven and a half years with Majority Leader Schumer. His first day on the job as the Democratic leader in 2017 was my first day on the job as his national security advisor. And China's been something that's been a thread that has, sort of, continued to get pulled through my career, whether it was on the Armed Services Committee or in Leader Schumer's office.
[00:04:33] Joshua Hodges: I didn't know we both had that in common, being there the first day. That's quite the wake-up call.
[00:04:39] Peter Slezkine: This commission has existed for almost 25 years, you said. The United States' relationship to China has changed dramatically during that period. For the past number of years, China has been described as a pressing problem, a pacing threat, I think, was one term of art. So, this report that is coming out on the 18th, right, certainly describes China as a problem for the United States across a variety of dimensions. So, could each of you explain what sort of problem China poses to the United States in broad terms, and then, perhaps, identify the most pressing challenge as far as you're concerned? So, Josh, perhaps, you could start.
[00:05:23] Joshua Hodges: Yeah. So, look, one of the reasons… this, kind of, gets back to your original question. One of the reasons I wanted to join the commission when I left the Speaker's office was… I really do think the commission's done a good job over the years of highlighting things that are going on now and things that are going wrong that need to be addressed. And I think the work it's done over the past couple of years has been really essential to driving the conversation and for serving as, sort of, a good bipartisan discussion on everything China's doing.
And I think the report this year continues that trend. It shows that the Communist Party of China is not just seeking to dominate in one critical area, that they are focusing on core technologies that they view as essential for their future in order to have a chokehold on the United States and the international, sort of, world order. And that ranges from AI to computing power to biotechnology and to military equipment.
And so, it's something that the Commission has focused on in the past. It's something that I think a lot of folks in D.C. and across the United States are starting to wake up to. And we repeatedly heard from witnesses throughout the year that have provided evidence that they're looking to replicate their supply chain chokehold in other emerging tech areas. And so, one of my big, sort of, messages to people all year long has been, pay more attention to China and what they're doing, because for a long time it, kind of, felt like folks were talking the talk but not actually making the rubber meet the road when it came to action.
My hope is that, with some of the events that have unfolded this year, people will really wake up and realize this is something we've got to take seriously. And that ranges from individual people to American businesses and policymakers.
[00:07:02] Peter Slezkine: But what does that mean specifically? Because it sounds a bit strange in D.C. to be calling on people to pay more attention to China. It seems like there is no conversation that ever omits China. And you've said that there's a lot of talk but maybe not a lot of action. So, given how much talk there is, how would you direct action? What is the particular threat that China poses? And where should we start in dealing with it?
[00:07:30] Joshua Hodges: So, I think the threat part is broader than the “what we can do about it” question. I think China right now poses a threat to us here domestically at home. I think they pose a threat to us internationally, and I think that they pose a threat to us from a U.S. standing perspective. What I mean by that is they are right now taking steps in order to cripple us in two to three years from having any manufacturing being able to be done here in the United States. And that's why I'm happy to see the renewed emphasis on being able to have a production line here in the United States, agnostic of what the technology is.
On the threat piece, I really do think a lot of folks, even though it is a regular, sort of, thing to talk about in D.C. and internationally, to a growing extent. I was in Europe last year with some members of Congress, and I was, kind of, taken aback at one point whenever I had recommended to one of them, “Hey, you should really talk about the importance of having Europe follow suit on American actions.” And they, kind of, all stopped and looked like, ″Why would we talk about China while we're in Europe?"
And that, to me, was a little bit of a wake-up that, like, we really need to have people who are better educated on how this all ties together. Well, part of the reason I was interested to come talk to you today is, I think, your, sort of, position where you're looking at Russia and China and how those overlap is vitally important. And, I think, too many people right now are looking at the China problem from a business perspective. They view this as business competition, not economic statecraft, not competition that potentially could lead to some type of conflict. And I don't think that's the way China's viewing it. I think they're viewing it in much more real terms and national security terms. But I think it's something the United States really needs to wake up to.
[00:09:07] Peter Slezkine: But, so, it is a challenge across the board, interlocking geographically, thematically. Mike, how would you answer this question? Is there a particular domain that concerns you most? And also, maybe if you could date it. Like, is there a period in these last 25 years when you decided that China was suddenly a problem?
[00:09:27] Mike Kuiken: Let me answer your original question first, Peter, and then I'll come around to that one. So, the thing that drives me the most, having existed in Washington for however many years, is when we constantly try to brand something. So, whether it's adversary, competitor, enemy, frenemy, pacing threat, persistent focus, say-do gap, all these, sort of, Washington hot takes drive me insane. So, like, I don't want to put a word on it.
The way I think about it is that China has done an incredible job of saying that they're going to do something and then doing it in the, sort of, technological and strategic competition space. And I think that folks in Washington, too often, see these things that come out of Beijing as aspirational documents, not actually, sort of, marching orders and plans. And so, that's my, sort of, reaction to your original question.
On the question you asked me of, when was my lightbulb moment, my lightbulb moment was really 2017 when I took a trip, actually, out here to California, in the Silicon Valley area. And I, sort of, heard two stories. One, all of the incredible work that the innovation ecosystem is doing out here and throughout the United States. And then, two, just how much of it was also happening in China, almost at a pace that was equal to what we were seeing in Silicon Valley.
In a lot of places, there's just more money, so it was moving faster in Silicon Valley. And so, the Chinese have done a lot to overcome the money issue. But the other thing that I learned about out here was just how active the Chinese services were in terms of building relationships, taking intellectual property, and building themselves into the ecosystem so that they could benefit from all the innovation that was happening out here.
So, 2017, at least for me, was really a lightbulb moment. And there were a lot of things that happened in 2017. Obviously, President Trump was newly elected at the time. One of the first two things I worked on in his office’s sanctions with respect to Huawei. And then the other thing was, sort of, CFIUS reform, because that was another area where we had learned an incredible amount about how our ecosystem had been getting leveraged against us in the competition space.
[00:11:20] Joshua Hodges: Yeah. And Peter, I would say, kind of, around that same timeframe, in 2018, I was at NNSA, and I remember sitting in a briefing, and I guess this was maybe early 2019, with everything China had done the year before making significant strides in its mil tech, specifically related to hypersonic missiles, and then what they were looking to do, leveraging AI into their naval capabilities and aerospace modernization.
And then fast-forward about a year and a half, and I was over at USAID. And this, kind of, ties into what Mike was just saying that jogged my memory, is I was in a briefing focusing on the Western Hemisphere, and hearing from folks down in South America at what China was doing at the subnational level to infiltrate and get CCP operatives in order to change outcomes in five years’ time. They weren't looking to change legislation that year. They weren't aiming at the federal level. They were really looking to do things at a subnational level in order so that in five years they would have people in place to do things, and it would look like it was an organic movement by the people in that country.
And so, again, both of those things struck me as, from the technology/military capability side, they are rapidly advancing. And then from the human, sort of, whatever you want to deem it, they are working this with a view to the future, not from a “what are we accomplishing this year?” but “what are we going to accomplish in five years’ time that's going to benefit us and put the United States on its heels?”
[00:12:40] Peter Slezkine: So, I'm trying to clarify in what sense China is a problem. And part of this is, sort of, the ideological versus realist analytical framework. So, the report I've read in advanced copy uses quite morally charged language throughout, it is “China doing bad thing X, Y, and Z.” But another way to read what is happening, or to understand what you two have just described, is that China is increasing its power across any number of domains.
So, is the problem principally one of relative power, or is there truly a claim that this is, in some sense, a nefarious actor that is doing morally bad things that we disapprove of in absolute terms? Mike, you can start. That chuckle, I think, is not sufficient on its own to answer the question.
[00:13:37] Mike Kuiken: I mean, listen, it is a great question, and you're trying to put your finger on us, which I always love because it's something I usually try to do to people. The way I think about it, Peter, is they're certainly trying to acquire power. And they have been very clear-eyed and plainspoken that this is their intent, right?
So, let's just answer your question straight up. I think the United States rightly views this as a country that is trying to displace the United States and the democratic world after 80-plus years of democratic primacy in this space. And we should see that as a threat.
Now, going back to the first question of, like, what word do we put on that, I refuse to buy into any of these Washington think tank terms. No offense for both of the think tanks. I recognize that, Peter.
[00:14:17] Peter Slezkine: Although, you did just use a term, one version of many, because there’s “free world,” “liberal order,” you called it “the democratic world.”
[00:14:24] Mike Kuiken: Oh, my god, can I use the washroom, Peter?
[00:14:26] Peter Slezkine: Well, it’s hard to escape them. That’s not the point. The point is that China is challenging the democratic world, or whatever synonym we would like to use, and that that is a problem fundamentally for the United States. But it seems that, for the last six months, we Americans have also decided that the liberal order doesn't quite suit our needs, isn't exactly fit for purpose, and perhaps should be entirely discarded or dismantled. What's the problem in that regard?
[00:14:58] Joshua Hodges: All right, I'll jump in here, Mike. So, I guess two parts. First, your original question on, sort of, the increase in its power, and is that relatively bad, given that all things considered. Again, this isn't a question of, sort of, they are increasing their business competition or they're increasing their military capabilities. This is a matter of values.
And oftentimes, we, in the policy world, forget they're actively building their market and their capabilities on the backs of slave labor. And they are doing it with the intent of having global domination. Their five-year plans, or I guess their 14th five-year plan, spells out that they want to leverage the international trade and investment climate in order to position China to be able to be the dominant player.
If the United States had language that was anywhere near the language they had in that plan, there would be an international uproar against the United States and UN resolutions condemning us for that type of language. And yet, China does it almost on a monthly basis, and no one really raises eyebrows about it. And so, appreciate your question on the second part of your…
[00:16:04] Peter Slezkine: Wait, I need to push back on that slightly, because if we go beyond the bounds of the West, the democratic world, whatever you want to call it, there is a widely shared belief that the United States has long made such claims about its role in the world, that it is the sole purveyor of power, that it is the rightful possessor of primacy, and that it is the ultimate determinant of global order. And, of course, it is described in slightly different terms in the Chinese, but the Chinese also often use fairly benign formulations when describing global initiative X, Y, and Z.
[00:16:43] Joshua Hodges: A couple of the phrases you use really jump out at me, “global order” and “balance.” Those are the two that the U.S. typically focuses on. Those are not the ones that the CCP focuses on. They want chokeholds. They want domination. They want global reliance on the Chinese market. Those are definitely different than…
[00:17:01] Peter Slezkine: Wasn't there a book that just came out, published by a former Obama official, literally called Choke Points? And the idea is that the United States needs to identify these choke points ahead of time, ensure mastery over them in order to prevent bad actors such as Russia, China, Iran, and so forth from being able to escape, essentially, our control, that we would like to have leverage over these international actors through this…
[00:17:26] Joshua Hodges: You are talking about a former official, not a CCP state document. And I also think the point… I don't know, I haven't read the book, but I've seen a summary of it. I think it's talking about identifying those areas to ensure that we don't have an overreliance on China in those vectors.
[00:17:41] Peter Slezkine: How about the axis of autocracy? There is a chapter that bears that name. What is this? We've been talking about China. China poses a threat because it is increasingly powerful. It is trying to unseat the United States. It is challenging the democratic world. So, is there something that is, sort of, the antagonist to the democratic world called the axis of autocracy? What is its logic? Who is it made up of?
[00:18:06] Mike Kuiken: We did have a hearing that was the title, Peter. And usually, the purposes of the hearings are mostly to, sort of, shine a light on an issue, not necessarily to, sort of, drive any particular storyline. And for this particular hearing, the idea was to basically show and tell the story about the relationship between China and some of the, sort of, key countries that share their views. The countries that we focused on, I believe, for the hearing were North Korea, Iran, and Russia. And so, that was the, sort of, story behind that hearing.
And, I think, the biggest thread for me that came out was just the deepening of the relationships between all four countries, and how they have almost interlocking relationships now, and how those are really changing and morphing, especially, sort of, post–Russian invasion of Ukraine. And that was the takeaway that I had and, sort of, the theme of the hearing.
[00:18:54] Joshua Hodges: I hadn't been appointed to the commission yet when they held that hearing, but this is an issue that I worked on very closely last year when I was in the Speaker's office. And the reason is because, increasingly, as time went on, we saw more and more interconnectedness between the axis you talked about and the war in Ukraine. And we saw, sort of, the Chinese providing economic support, technology support to the Russians.
A lot of this has now been made public. And it's, again, as more time goes by, more and more people are aware of exactly what China has been doing to support Russia's war against Ukraine, which is ultimately, depending on, kind of, what side of that you fall, threatening peace and larger, widespread stability in Europe.
There's also evidence to support… It's been a while since I looked at it, but there's evidence to support that there were ties as well to Iran and to some of the Middle East activity that happened in early 2023. And so, it's absolutely something that is concerning. It's something that I think more and more evidence continues to be made public about it.
[00:20:00] Peter Slezkine: But can you share some details with us? What is it that China is doing to support Russia that is particularly concerning, other than increasing, obviously, its trade with Russia, which seems a natural consequence of Russia losing many of its Western trading partners?
[00:20:18] Joshua Hodges: So, you are saying that it's natural for countries to increase their trade with a country that's gone to war with another country?
[00:20:24] Peter Slezkine: I'm saying that, in the global economy, if a massive country suddenly is denied access to its primary markets, it will seek to sell its goods elsewhere. So, you can make a moral judgment about this. But the fact that, as Russia's trade with Europe declined, its trade with China and India increased does not seem to be, sort of, on its face a surprising fact.
[00:20:48] Joshua Hodges: Well, I don't think it's surprising. You're right about that. The other thing we've seen them do is supplying dual-use military products, different types of circuitry that are used for drone components that are increasingly necessary for Russia's war against Ukraine. We've seen… I think there have been public reports about potential intelligence sharing. So, again, I think there's more than enough publicly available information that demonstrates China has done more than just, sort of, economic support by buying goods from Russia.
[00:21:18] Peter Slezkine: I don't dispute that at all. And we don't need to make this an argument. We're going to move on to another subject soon, but just in terms of dual-use technology, circuits, and so forth, I just came from lunch with a Ukrainian, and my understanding is that drones are the most important military technology on both sides at the moment, and that the components for the drones that each side assembles are all Chinese.
So, that technology is going to both sides of this conflict, that initially, both Ukrainians and the Russians were just buying ready-made, commercial Chinese drones. Now, they assemble their own drones out of Chinese parts, so that there is a strange symmetry in that respect, and that the most important military technology is actually going to both sides.
[00:22:00] Joshua Hodges: It's strange, indeed.
[00:22:01] Mike Kuiken: Yeah. There's also the shadow fleet issue, Peter, which is the same ships that historically have enabled Iranian oil trade are now enabling Russian oil trade. And the Chinese financial institutions are, sort of, actively facilitating this. There's obviously the facilitation of drones that we've already, sort of, talked about. And then, obviously, China's purchase of Iranian oil is something that we're seeing incredible spikes in, and those were all issues that, sort of, got highlighted during the course of that hearing.
[00:22:28] Peter Slezkine: And if we're going to talk about shadow fleet and purchases of oil, India obviously is not part of this axis, is often called the world's largest democracy, but nonetheless, for clear economic reasons and in pursuit of national interest, they are also purchasing Russian oil, enabling the shadow fleet.
So, is this a categorically different sort of relationship? Does it seem like, perhaps, India may decrease its purchases in real terms? I mean, we've heard headlines to that effect, but it seems like they've been pretty good at using a number of intervening layers in order to get the oil, whether directly or some other way.
[00:23:06] Mike Kuiken: Yeah, I'm not sure of all the dynamics with respect to India. That's obviously a, sort of, current event, or an issue that's being currently debated between the White House and India. So, I don't know exactly where things stand. At the hearing, obviously, it did come up, but not as a data point that we focused a great deal of time on.
[00:23:20] Peter Slezkine: I was wondering if there's, sort of, a qualitative difference in this respect between what China's doing, what India's doing.
[00:23:25] Mike Kuiken: I mean, is there a qualitative difference? You know, I generally wouldn't take all of the terms that we talked about earlier, adversary, competitor, enemy, frenemy, pacing threat, or anything like that, and apply them to India. So, I would certainly say that there is a qualitative difference. I'm not sure you would necessarily agree, but I would certainly say there is.
[00:23:42] Joshua Hodges: I would also add to that, again, I think it's not, sort of, just a one-off. I think, if you look at it in totality of everything that the Chinese are doing, then that's, kind of, where the… I don't want to call it a dividing line. If the Indians would ask me, I'd recommend that they stop engaging on, sort of, the energy sales. But I think it's everything, kind of, combined together.
[00:24:01] Peter Slezkine: So, to take the other two members of this axis, the report talks about how neither Russia nor China supported Iran much at all, or terribly actively, during the 12-day standoff with Israel. And then the Chinese and Russian relationship with North Korea seems to, in some sense, be competitive.
I understand that, in the report, there is an admission that this is an axis or coalition that exists to advance the interests of each party for its own selfish reasons. But so then, again, what is the point of looking at them all together? Like, one piece of evidence that China has a special relationship with these three countries is that it's its top trading partner, but it is the top trading partner for much of the world. It is very active in Latin America, as you, Josh, mentioned. So, again, I'm just curious about why these four countries fit together in some special unit.
[00:24:59] Mike Kuiken: Peter, you unfortunately have two commissioners, neither of which were the co-chair of this hearing. My colleagues, Aaron Friedberg and Jon Stivers, actually co-chaired this hearing. But as I understood their, sort of, objective behind this hearing, it was basically like, how do we tell the story about China’s deepening of its relations with Russia, North Korea, Iran, and the interdependencies that they're increasingly having as a result of the war in Ukraine?
I think the hearing did a good job on that. I think you obviously have gone through some of the things that we talk about in the report. Obviously, North Korea sending service members to Russia is obviously a dramatic change. The strategic hedge that China makes with respect to North Korea for a potential Taiwan contingency in the future is, like, a real thing, and it's something that I know, I think, we highlighted in the report. The oil trade that goes around between these nations at discounted prices, I'm sure, is a story that we told. The efforts of the Chinese and the Russians to build parallel financial systems that are designed, or at least designed with the intent of undermining the U.S. dollar and the global economy is a story that we effectively told. The drone ecosystem, which you, sort of, talked about, how there's a little bit of both-sides-ness going on here, is a story that we were able to tell. Not the both-sides part of it, but the incredible reliance of the Russians on Chinese parts for their defense industrial base was a story that we were able to tell.
I think the commission did a good job of highlighting these issues. People might disagree on the, sort of, the value of, you know, calling it the axis of autocracy or telling the story the way we did, but I think that was the objective of the hearing, and I think the folks that testified before us did a good job.
[00:26:33] Peter Slezkine: All right. Well, it seemed to me that this was one of the important frameworks within which the challenge was perceived. It's in the introduction. It's the first substantive chapter after the initial chapters that describe the year that has just passed. It resonated quite clearly with the Biden-era global division between democracy and autocracy, which provides, again, a conceptual framework for perceiving the bilateral relationship between the U.S. and China.
So, I was curious to what extent that is how you guys see the problem. And has there been movement away from this overarching framework associated with the previous administration? Because it seems that the current one not only doesn't espouse that particular worldview, but in many respects, actively rejects it.
[00:27:29] Joshua Hodges: I think it would be a misnomer to suggest that it was a Biden-led effort to identify the, sort of, China-led axis related to Russia, Iran, and North Korea. These are known adversaries of the United States for a long time, definitely going back 10, 15 years. I can think of half a dozen different documents that have identified them as such.
And so, I think what happened in 2024 was you saw… and I'm thinking now of a speech Speaker Johnson gave where he actually said, you know, he characterized it as, sort of, a China-led axis working to undermine the United States and peace internationally. And so, that’s why I think it goes beyond trade. And in your earlier question, you, kind of, put this in the context of trade, and I think that fails to really encompass everything China is doing. Yes, they are large trading partners, they're large trading partners to a lot of nations. That's, I think, fine. What we also see is, as China works with these countries, they're providing them with technology. They're providing them with resources. Sometimes they're providing them with intelligence. Sometimes they're providing them with ammunition. Sometimes they're providing them with critical minerals and chemical precursors for explosives to carry out acts that have a negative impact on the international stage, as well as to the countries adjacent to where they are.
And so, I think this isn't just a Biden administration, sort of, continuation of any Biden administration, sort of, position. This is a bipartisan... In fact, I think 235 Republicans voted for the supplemental last year that actually called this out. And then I think a majority of Republican senators did in the Senate as well.
And so, I think it would be a misnomer to paint this as a Biden administration policy. I think this was a bipartisan policy and bipartisan recognition that China is acting nefariously internationally, and there are a group of countries working with it to further destabilize the international order and peace.
[00:29:29] Peter Slezkine: Right, and I didn't mean to say that that division of the world was not bipartisan. But I do think that, in terms of administration, there has been a clear departure from the dominant frame that used to exist, that was put into the national security strategy, which was democracy versus autocracy, with China and Russia being the central elements in the autocratic axis, and the new approach where national interest, pragmatic relations, are, at least in theory, possible with all other states, including Russia and China, and North Korea.
Perhaps, this hasn't worked out, but the administration has certainly made attempts in the name of advancing American national interest and has also seemed to stress linkages less, so the idea that the war in Ukraine bears directly on a contingency in Taiwan seems to be less of an emphasis now than it was before, but we don't need to pursue this line of inquiry too far [crosstalk 00:30:11].
[00:30:29] Mike Kuiken: Yeah, the only thing I would… as, sort of, a reminder, both to you and the listeners, is the objective of the commission is our client is Congress, and our job is to, sort of, look at China and to tell the story about, sort of, where we see the key areas of competition. So, we have the fortune of not having to get into the politics of one administration versus the other, and rather just look at the China piece of the story, thing one. And then thing two, I would just say, if you read through the report [crosstalk 00:30:55].
[00:30:56] Peter Slezkine: I like how you've gotten to Dr. Seuss. It was getting contentious before, but Dr. Seuss and Thing One, Thing Two always add a little bit of levity.
[00:31:02] Mike Kuiken: Yeah. And then the other thing I would just pile on is that the commission has a long history of producing a consensus-based report. And so, all 12 commissioners sign onto it on a consensus basis. And it's always, sort of, like a negotiation that happens within the commission to get to a place of consensus because no one wants a lowest-common-denominator product, and no one wants us to, sort of, get on the extremist train.
So, that's, sort of, the reaction I had as I was just listening to you and that commentary that we're fortunate enough not to have to, sort of, get into that, like, whose version of the global order is winning at any given moment. The job is, tell us what China is doing, tell us how you evaluate that problem, and give us ideas on how we can, sort of, march forward from a U.S. policy perspective to, sort of, enter into that, either with a dialogue or conversation or debate or threat metrics conversation on the various issues.
[00:31:52] Peter Slezkine: Well, unless Josh has a thing to add to this particular subject, perhaps we could move on to the marching orders. Like, what then do you 12 commissioners propose that the United States should do in order to confront these many challenges that China poses?
[00:32:08] Mike Kuiken: One of the areas that I've been spending a lot of time on since I left government, Peter, is biotech. And I was actually just in Paris last week at an international conference called iGEM, and Josh was actually with me there. And it's an area where, I think, the commission, for two years now, and the National Security Emerging Biotech Commission as well, have said this is an area of incredible competition. And so, we have a recommendation on that included in the report.
And we also have a recommendation with respect to quantum. This is an area where the commission spent a little bit of time last year and had a recommendation with respect to vertical integration and with, sort of, our countries that are aligned with us. And this year went a little further after really taking a close look at this issue. So, quantum is another area. And obviously, quantum and biotech, in my view, and you might not agree with this, Peter, are areas where there's some sort of incredible first-mover advantage.
So, if you think about the opportunity of quantum, whether it's, sort of, the convergence of quantum and AI or quantum and scientific research in AI, there's real opportunity there. And then in biotech, the group of countries that unlock biotechnologies, that general-purpose technology will have an enduring advantage. And so, you know, the United States largely did it with respect to physics and the, sort of, the Manhattan Project. And this is an area where the commission highlighted another area of competition.
[00:33:24] Joshua Hodges: To add to that, I think one of the messages of the report, in my opinion, is the United States needs to prioritize innovation and show that the United States can still lead because the Chinese have, for a number of years, had this message out there that China is winning, the United States is falling behind. And what we've done with this report is we're showing they're seeking to do that, and we're showing the critical areas they're seeking to do that in — AI, computing, Mike mentioned biotechnology, a few others. Because they really are seeking to prioritize that and actually make it a reality.
We are still absolutely, the United States is still absolutely the leading innovator of the world. And yes, the Chinese have some great technology, and there's some great places for people who visit China to visit. Absolutely. But we've heard from numerous witnesses throughout the year, and as we've toured the country and heard from experts, both in the IC, as well as from the business community, that the Chinese are looking to replicate their supply chain chokeholds in other new emerging technology markets.
I met a few weeks ago with a leading, sort of, U.S. specialty chemicals company… or actually a few different companies, who shared the, sort of, how China is rapidly rising. The number of Chinese imported chemicals is rapidly rising. And it's making American companies' abilities to compete even harder, because it's not just about, ″Oh, China's competing now. Oh, American companies don't want it." It's the Chinese come in with subsidies. They come in with a different bandwidth. And so, they're able to out-compete, not because they have a better product, but because they have lower costs.
That is running some American companies into the ground, trying to keep up with that. It's not better for the consumer. And in five or 10 years, probably shorter than that, one of them said it's probably within the next two years, if it continues to go this direction, the United States is going to lose its ability to have major manufacturing goods produced here in the United States. Chemicals for everyday products, from pharmaceuticals to agriculture to clean water. Even one company said we're going to lose the ability to make tires here in the United States if things don't change.
So, it really does run the gamut and shows the scale China's doing this at. And so, that's why I think it's absolutely fair for us to be focusing on in the report, because we've got to show the world that the United States, A, can continue to compete and lead. We can continue to innovate. To Mike's point, we've got to prioritize those investments. We've got to prioritize that the U.S. government is actually making it possible for universities and institutions to do that work and to keep people engaged.
[00:35:46] Peter Slezkine: And so, other than investments internally, how important are tariffs, the building of some larger coalition that would all act in accordance economically in order to confront China's subsidizing of its market at scale?
[00:36:05] Joshua Hodges: So, I think what you saw initially with the Trump administration was they came in, before they got in, they recognized the system right now is not structured for the United States to win. It's structured for the United States to allow other countries to catch up. And they wanted to take some steps to very rapidly turn that on its head. And we should have a system that, again, we are working for a wide-scale benefit, for everyone's benefit, but where the United States is in the lead.
And that's something I think that, as an American, I support. I think the United States has done a lot of good for the world. Yeah, so I think that coming in, that was, sort of, the initial effort. I think you're starting to see the ground start to settle a little bit now, after that major tilling. But I think there are good things in store.
[00:36:47] Mike Kuiken: And Peter, to just talk about the third recommendation I wanted to make sure we touched on, which is consolidating various entities in the executive branch. So, the thing that I, sort of, heard Josh saying without saying it explicitly is, like, the United States government, at all times, should use all of the available tools that it has to it to, sort of, persuade, cajole, deter countries that we view as a pacing threat or an adversary or a competitor or frenemy or whatever, again, whatever terminology you want to stick on it.
So, you know, President Trump, whether you agree with him or not, has decided the tariffs are especially effective. But there are a lot of other tools that we have, and you see some of them came up with President Xi last week, export controls, obviously, sanctions that we've leveraged against Russia and China in some cases.
And so, the one thing that doesn't exist right now in the executive branch is a place where all of these tools are consolidated. And so, one of the other… I think it was the number one or number two recommendations of the commission this year, was that we recommend Congress do essentially a review of the various entities that have equities in this space and consider consolidating them into, sort of, an economic statecraft–like institution. And so, that was one of the big recommendations we had this year. And it's something that we did to a, sort of, limited degree in the post-9/11 era when we consolidated and empowered the sanctions community from the Office of Foreign Assets Control, and made sure that the Treasury Department was part of the intelligence community.
And the idea there was basically to make sure that you had the ability of the sanctions folks to reach into the intelligence community and get actionable information. And so, I think we're really now at a point where we need to think about almost hitting the refresh key in this economic statecraft ecosystem and think about export controls, tariffs, sanctions, and some of these other tools of economic statecraft to consolidate into a single entity. Mostly because, unfortunately, these things are in different departments and agencies, and too often it becomes just, sort of, like an interagency morass that is more interested in process than decisions. And so, that's the motivation behind that particular recommendation.
[00:38:46] Peter Slezkine: And so, this is about providing effective instruments for the United States to create leverage, for example, in anticipation of some trade deal. So, China creates export controls on rare earths, we would have a weapon to respond with. Or this is more about punitive sanctions that would be levied against, like, Russia, and then applied to China to weaken Russia, or is it all, sort of, part of the same picture?
[00:39:17] Joshua Hodges: I think that's the negative side of the coin. That's the stick. If you look at the carrot, the carrot is, this is also about the interagency working together in a much better, sort of, clip to create a U.S. ecosystem that can thrive, where innovation actually has a place to go. And so, it's working with international companies to get U.S. products out of the United States into emerging markets. It's to get leading companies that aren't American to buy American equipment to take it overseas.
I mentioned earlier the Chinese ability to come in with subsidies whenever there's a competition with local companies in some emerging markets. One of the other things that the Chinese are very good at is being fast. I talked to the CEO of a company who operates overseas. He said, “You know, I spent a year talking to the DFC, wasn't really sure we were making any progress. It was, kind of, the same conversation I'd had on day two of us meeting. And within a couple of months of talking to the Chinese, we had what we needed.”
And so that, I think, is an example of the U.S. interagency not moving fast enough, not being nimble enough. Again, this is the carrot side. Working with companies in a positive way, whether that's cutting regulation, whether that's working with foreign governments because there's foreign regulations that are impeding the companies from going in or operating there, whether it's concerns with a lot of businesses. One of their main concerns is, can we actually operate on a balanced playing field in these foreign markets? State Department, Department of Commerce can help those businesses mitigate and manage some of that concern and some of those risks in order to go in and compete.
That's good for American business. It's good for American products. It's not just about money, it's about having everyone working towards the same goal, which is promoting American business. That's what these organizations were established for, right?
Then, to your point, like, yes, if there is a country who is… if there's a shadow fleet operating, or then yeah, that's when you can look at sanctions. If there's a… I don't think any exist, but, sort of, a Chinese company that's not a flagged Chinese company operating in a third… I'm joking. There's thousands of them internationally that operate in third-party countries that are truly a Chinese-owned company but just don't say that they are. Like, those are things that the U.S. government should know about, that American businesses should know about, that the international community and those local governments should know about, right? And so, I think it's getting easier with the internet to identify that type of stuff, but it's still something the U.S. government has struggled with.
[00:41:45] Peter Slezkine: Can you be a bit more specific about the carrots? Because I didn't quite understand in concrete terms what this governmental entity would be able to do to create better conditions for American business abroad. So, if you could just, sort of, draw a picture for us in a particular, kind of, business.
[00:42:02] Joshua Hodges: Yeah, of course. So, right now, there are multiple different entities. So, there's the Development Finance Corporation, there's the U.S. Export-Import Bank, then there's the Department of Commerce. And they all have similar roles but very different roles. And so, one thing I've found… and again, I worked with the National Security Council, I worked with these entities on a regular basis, they don't play well with each other. In part, that's because people are trying to control their pot of money and their turf. Some of it is also just because of the way they were stood up. Some of them were stood up… for example, the DFC is limited in financing opportunities in countries that are high-income. And so, that is a specific limitation they have. But they're very slow to turn something over to the EXIM Bank or the Department of Commerce to find an alternative.
And so, trying to speed that up would be one, sort of, direct rifle shot, easy-to-understand, kind of, tool. Another one would be, if there's financing… if the Chinese are offering financing for a company, but it all can't come from DFC or EXIM Bank, is there a, sort of, joint venture that could be undertaken to make it more competitive? The financing more competitive?
And so, that's one. The other is just the due diligence process. And a lot of times, there's years of due diligence that have to be done in order for the U.S. government to engage with a company overseas. That timeframe should be brought down. That can be brought down by actually having enough people staffing these positions to actually do the work. Department of Treasury is a great example, since earlier you brought up sanctions. Oftentimes, there aren't enough sanctions staff to do the legwork. And so, one of the things we've advocated for is, is there… given, sort of, the new tools with AI, can AI be used to help the staff that do exist, the billets that do exist, to do more work? Or is there an opportunity to actually increase some of those billet numbers?
So, again, those are questions for the administration to take, but those are the types of reforms that I think are necessary in order to modernize the USG.
[00:43:58] Peter Slezkine: Well, making American business more competitive abroad, I think, is absolutely a positive goal. And, again, one that probably we would be motivated to achieve whether China was there or not. But China's presence, I suppose, is a good incentive. What other recommendations does the report make? Just for the final five, 10 minutes, make sure that we get all of that.
[00:44:20] Joshua Hodges: So, another one we haven't talked about, I think we briefly touched on it, is space. And so, space is absolutely an area where the Chinese are making major strides and seeking to close, sort of, the U.S. competitive advantage. This has global implications, just given the nature of space, but it's also got direct national security implications for the United States, whether it's telecom, whether it's just protecting the air over our heads. But this is an area where we've made a recommendation for the USG to actually… we've got Space Command, but to actually look at China as a near-peer competitor and to put resources necessary to stay ahead of them.
[00:44:55] Mike Kuiken: The only other one I'd throw in there, Peter, is scam centers. Obviously, not the theme of your podcast, but an area where the commission has put a lot of work into it. And it's an area where we've really been trying to raise awareness. We had a chance to visit a couple of countries in Southeast Asia this year, and all of us were just totally taken aback by the scale of these scam centers in Southeast Asia and how, it's a murky, sort of, story to tell about what the Chinese relationship is exactly with these scam centers, but there's definitely… there's definitely something going on there. Thing one.
And then the other piece of it would be this is thing two, since you like Dr. Seuss, is that it's incredible how these scam centers are using advanced technology, whether it's artificial intelligence, whether it's voice modulation tools, whether it's, sort of, things that make all of us look like incredibly attractive women, various tools like that to, sort of, go after their victims. The Economist did a good piece on this. And then a piece on this as well, we've done a report on this, and it's an area where, again, looking at the threat, looking at how our government's currently organized, and looking at how this is almost fitting in the, sort of, gray zone of international crime, it was another area that we called some attention to this year in our top 10.
[00:46:03] Peter Slezkine: Well, luckily, I have not been the subject of a scam attempt from Myanmar. But you never know. It’s nice not to have that sort of thing over my head, if you guys eliminate it. So, the question is, what can be done about these giant scam farms in Southeast Asia?
[00:46:20] Mike Kuiken: I mean, the simple answer, Peter, is I don't think I totally have a good answer for you. So, I'm going to disappoint my host a little bit. But one thing that is incredibly clear is that the victims of these scams are often unaware of where they're coming from. And so, where do they report the crime that's been committed against them?
Two, how do we let them know that there's an ecosystem of people that actually want to help them potentially get their money back? So, it's raising awareness. I think sometimes people hear public service announcements and roll their eyes, but sometimes they are incredibly useful to, sort of, make sure people that are victims know where to go.
And then this is also, like, a bit of not a failure of our system, but, sort of, a gap in our system where the crime is happening at a super local level, right? A farmer in Iowa, or a person in Oklahoma, or a person in Michigan. And so, like, ″Who do I call? Do I call 911? Do I call 311? Do I call my local police department? Do I call the FBI? Like, does the FBI give a damn if I got my money taken?"
So, it's like one of these things where we're not necessarily organized in a way that makes it easy for people to know where to go. So, the recommendation that we had was, you got to think about how we organize U.S. law enforcement to think about this in a new and thoughtful way. And then, honestly, how do we work with foreign partners that are also eager to, sort of, slow this down or end this, kind of, crime? So, I think we tried to take a swing at some ideas in this space, and I think it's an issue that we're going to continue looking at in the coming years.
[00:47:42] Peter Slezkine: Well, you mentioned foreign partners. So, to finish, can you guys give a breakdown of what kind of international partnerships are necessary to produce the results that you desire? Is it, sort of, a consolidated West? Is it existing military alliances in one place or another? Or is it dependent entirely on the problem? And so, when it comes to space, we have certain partners, when it comes to scam centers, we have others?
[00:48:09] Joshua Hodges: I do think it's a unified effort. And I think, to be honest, I think it's all of the above. We take it where we can get it. And one example of this is, one of the recommendations of the commission last year, or maybe it was the year before, was on addressing U.S. financing of Chinese companies and, sort of, what's termed outbound investment. And I remember talking to the Europeans because I was looking at this through, kind of, a skeptical lens and thinking, like, is this really going to make a dent? Or are things just going to get shifted, and then this they're going to go to, sort of, European investment? Like, how can this actually be done?
And the answer I finally, kind of, landed on was, ″Okay, this can have a meaningful impact to help the United States to slow down the military growth in China. And, again, this is investments to non-military means, but given the dual-use nature of a lot of technology, there were, sort of, benefits to the military." And what I landed on was, ″Okay, if the United States and Europe act on this, it can have a significant impact on Chinese military capabilities over the course of the next several years. But we have to do something, not together, but we both have to act. And it has to be measurable and meaningful."
And when I talked to the EU about this, I was told, "We'll do something when Congress passes a law," because at the time, the Biden administration had an executive order. And they said, "No, we need an actual law that can't just be changed every four years." And so, that's an example of clear, like, if Europe and the United States acted together, we would have a meaningful impact. In other areas, I think it varies, right? In some cases related to space, yes, we could have definite benefit with just a few different countries acting. But in others, we're going to need everyone to, kind of, act together.
[00:49:47] Peter Slezkine: But you said that when you went to Europe recently, you did not find great receptivity to this message. Is there a sense of how to describe it as a common challenge in order to get the Europeans on board? Because they're obviously in dire straits economically, many of the bigger countries in Europe and they're facing pressures from all sides and asking them to drop China [crosstalk 00:50:08].
[00:50:08] Joshua Hodges: The meeting that I was referencing was in 2024. I was just there a couple weeks ago, and the message was they had done, not a 180, but definitely they had taken several steps forward. Everyone from, sort of, NATO, to the EU, to individual nations are now… they recognize what China is doing related to the war in Ukraine, as well as the other aspects that they're doing a little bit below the surface, undersea cables, and just different things.
And so, Europe has woken up to this. Again, not quite fully. I still think a few countries need to wake up, and I'm apprehensive to see, kind of, what happens out of the upcoming French president’s visit to China. But I think that they've definitely made improvements.
[00:50:50] Peter Slezkine: But what have the most effective arguments been, in your experience? So, you mentioned China's support for Russia in Ukraine. Is that the issue that gets the European attention the most?
[00:51:02] Mike Kuiken: I'd actually zoom out on this question, Peter, a little bit. Your question, sort of, looks backwards. Let's look forwards for a moment.
Anytime you're building or maintaining a coalition, it's work. It doesn't come for free. It's not easy to do. And a lot of it is, sort of, situation-dependent. So, the way I always think about it is, Josh said, ″You know, you got to, sort of, pick an all-of-the-above approach." And I think that's what you have to pick at all times.
And whether it's Europe or India or some other Western partner or American partner someplace, you just have to be prepared to, sort of, meet them where they are, see what their needs are, and have that conversation. I think that's a more forward way of thinking about it. I think, right now, the Europeans are certainly interested in talking about Ukraine. That may not be the case in six or nine months, and we're going to have to, sort of, meet them where they are then.
I hope it's still the case that, if Putin has not left Ukraine, that it's still front of mind for them. And so, that's how I think about it. And when I was in the Senate, it was always about coalition-building too. How do you get to 60 votes, right? And sometimes you can get members there just by asking, and sometimes you can get members there by having, sort of, a hard conversation. And so, it's no different with our European partners. And that's how I, sort of, think about it.
[00:52:05] Joshua Hodges: One thing I'll add there. I agree with all of that. What can't be the conversation is, "If you take these steps, we will give you X." It's got to be, like, you're doing this because you recognize the long-term value for doing the right thing and for having a fair and balanced international system.
[00:52:20] Peter Slezkine: So, we're not going to give them a big pot of gold. We're going to give them your report, and that will be terribly convincing. They will all get on board.
[00:52:27] Mike Kuiken: Why not give a pot of gold to everybody?
[00:52:30] Peter Slezkine: Well, the Irish are allies, and they've got leprechauns, so we can ask them to pull their weight.
[00:52:34] Mike Kuiken: Love some leprechauns and lucky charms.
[00:52:37] Peter Slezkine: Wonderful. Well, Josh and Mike, thanks so much for joining me.
[00:52:40] Joshua Hodges: Thank you.
[00:52:40] Mike Kuiken: Thanks for having us, Peter.
[00:52:45] Peter Slezkine: Thanks for listening to the Trialogue Podcast. Make sure to subscribe to the show so you don’t miss out on any episode. The Trialogue Podcast is hosted by the Stimson Center and produced by University FM.