Maksim Suchkov, Director of the Institute of International Studies at MGIMO University in Moscow, joins us to discuss direct Russia-Ukraine talks, US-Russia relations, and Russia’s own “revolution of common sense”. *The Trialogue Podcast is hosted by the Stimson Center and produced by University FM.
Maksim Suchkov, Director of the Institute of International Studies at MGIMO University in Moscow, joins us to discuss direct Russia-Ukraine talks, US-Russia relations, and Russia’s own “revolution of common sense”.
*The Trialogue Podcast is hosted by the Stimson Center and produced by University FM.
(Transcripts may contain a few typographical errors due to audio quality during the podcast recording.)
[00:00:00] Peter Slezkine: I'm Peter Slezkine, Director of the U.S.-Russia-China Trialogue project at the Stimson Center. Since the middle of the 20th century, relations among the United States, Russia, and China have had an enormous impact on each country separately and on the world as a whole.
The purpose of the Trialogue is to better understand this extraordinarily complex and consequential relationship by directly engaging with experts from all three countries. Today, my guest is Maksim Suchkov, Director of the Institute of International Studies at MGIMO University in Moscow. Maksim, welcome to the podcast.
[00:00:40] Maksim Suchkov: Thanks for having me. It's a pleasure.
[00:00:42] Peter Slezkine: So, MGIMO is part of the foreign ministry of the Russian Federation?
[00:00:47] Maksim Suchkov: It is part of the ministry of external affairs of the foreign ministry of the Russian Federation. Now, it's a big university, but its prime identity is associated with the preparation of foreign service professionals.
[00:01:02] Peter Slezkine: And you are also a member of the Academic Council to the Security Council of the Russian Federation. Is that right?
[00:01:08] Maksim Suchkov: Indeed.
[00:01:08] Peter Slezkine: Okay. Wonderful. So, now that we've established your insider credentials while acknowledging that you, in no way, speak for the Kremlin, let's turn to the recently resumed direct talks between Russia and Ukraine. So, I'll provide a brief timeline to get the listeners back up to speed, and then we'll go over the details in the Russian perspective.
So, on May 10th, a group of European leaders told Putin to accept an immediate ceasefire or else face substantially increased sanctions. On May 11th, Putin countered by proposing direct talks with Ukraine in Istanbul. Trump seemed to first support the European initiative, then backed Putin's.
On May 16th, those talks took place. And the two sides agreed to exchange 1,000 prisoners each, the biggest prisoner exchange since the war began. They also agreed to produce written ceasefire proposals and to meet again. On May 19th, Putin and Trump held a two-hour phone call after which Trump signaled support for continued bilateral Russia-Ukraine talks.
So, can you tell us how this all came about on the Russian side? Was the proposal of direct talks in Istanbul completely improvised after the European ultimatum? And what was expected of these talks? And what is the mood now that they have taken place and this new process seems to be underway?
[00:02:45] Maksim Suchkov: Well, I think that the Russian party was prepared for direct talks for quite some time. And you saw the members of the Russian delegation, most of which were part of the delegation that was in Istanbul in March 2022, and also pretty much a similar set of issues on the agenda tells you that the Russian side would like to pick up where it was left off back in March 2022.
[00:03:13] Peter Slezkine: And that's the last time that the two sides had negotiated directly with one another.
[00:03:17] Maksim Suchkov: Exactly. So, the notion of the immediate ceasefire was not seen as something fruitful for the eventual peace simply because, on the Russian side, there was a deep skepticism and, frankly, mistrust that the 30-day pause would be used by the Ukrainian party to beef up its military with the help of, if it's not Americans, then the Europeans, and would fortify its defense lines and would resume offensive and defensive operations, which just basically is aimed at slowing down the Russian offensive.
And it doesn't really serve the ultimate goal, which, in the Russian view, is to root out the causes of the conflict. And the causes of the conflict, of course, we can have a debate of. Where do we exactly start? You have Putin, who's constantly talking about the Euromaidan of 2014 when there was the toppling of the Yanukovych government, which is, in itself, a key difference in narratives between the Russian and the Western policy makers.
And the Russians see it as a coup. And the European sees it as a democratic choice of the Ukrainian people towards the European future. That's an important point of contradiction. And more pragmatically, it's a neutral status, kind of, non-NATO status, for Ukraine, the recognition of the rights of the Russian-speaking population and what Putin called non-militarization, meaning two different things, I guess, on the one hand, caps on the military production in Ukraine, and most importantly perhaps, in the Kremlin view, is Ukraine's military cooperation with Western countries.
And pretty much the same issues have been addressed throughout the three years of the conflict. And Russia's view was that the 30-day pause would not help serve any of these concerns. So, it was not a good starting point, and it was solely used by the European Union and Kyiv to distract the international community because, in the talks like this, there's always a third party, which is brought in by the rational community or by President Trump and his administration.
In particular, you're trying to frame the issue as your quest for peace, but in fact, you're not really serving peace because we hear European politicians, especially the Western European politicians, talking about strategic defeat of Russia even though the American administration is no longer pursuing that same goal as they used to be under Biden.
[00:05:57] Peter Slezkine: So, to summarize, the Russian side opposes an immediate ceasefire without conditions because it believes it possesses military leverage at the moment and is not willing to give it up for nothing.
[00:06:09] Maksim Suchkov: Well, yeah. And as we remember, Putin proposed the three-day ceasefire during May 9th and during the period during which Russia did not perform any offensives while Ukraine has attacked major Russian cities, including Moscow, with drones and all that. So, after that, there was this sense that there is no real need for a longer ceasefire because, you know, it's not going to change things for the better.
It's not going to make the peace any closer. So, instead, there should be these direct talks about the status of Ukraine and perhaps over the territories, but, again, most importantly, I think the Russian position has not really changed throughout three years. Putin's still talking about demilitarization in denazification even though there is this debate what exactly it means in the current circumstances, but obviously, you know, Ukraine party perhaps was not ready to take things that far.
And instead, the parties ended up with a swap of 1,000 prisoners of war on those sites, which, in itself, is a positive result. And I think the reason that the talks were assessed rather highly in Moscow was that none of the things that the Europeans advised Ukrainians to promote were really accepted by the Russian party in Istanbul this time.
[00:07:34] Peter Slezkine: What did the Europeans tell the Ukrainians to propose?
[00:07:37] Maksim Suchkov: The 30-day ceasefire.
[00:07:39] Peter Slezkine: Right.
[00:07:39] Maksim Suchkov: And then, now, they're talking about putting more caps on the Russian oil export. And that is telling the Russian party that Europe... or, I mean, by Europe, I mean pretty much the British, the French, the Germans who are now seem to call the shots on the Ukraine front, and they're not going to stop, and that they're getting prepared for a new round of conflict, hence the American position is twice as important, I guess, today.
[00:08:08] Peter Slezkine: Well, so, Russia escaped the European ultimatum of immediate ceasefire or crippling sanctions and managed to start up this direct negotiation process, which seems to have the possibility of continuation in the coming months and the support of the Trump administration, but what specifically does Russia expect to come from these talks? Because you listed the full series of Russian concerns and demands that have been consistent over the past three years, but presumably, not all of that can be achieved. So, what do you think the Russian side desires most from these negotiations?
[00:09:01] Maksim Suchkov: Well, like I said, I think, strategically and conceptually, the demands have not changed over the course of the three years, right? Roughly put, Russia has sought and will continue to seek positive security outcomes for itself in this conflict, meaning that it wants to make sure that, A, there is no neighbor on its border who has threatened its security in any major way, including through military incursions or acts of terrorism, B, that Ukraine does not have a potential to recreate its military capacity to start over a new military phase in, I don't know, 10 to 15 years, and, three, recognition of the realities on the ground in terms of territory control.
And if Ukrainians do not agree to that reality, again, as Putin warned some time ago, any new rounds of negotiations will be tougher and there will be, figuratively, but also literally speaking, less Ukraine, meaning less Ukrainian territory left. Status wise, I think the notion of Ukrainian non-NATO status and neutrality status is important. There is a more complicated part, I guess, if Ukraine does not join NATO, whether Russia is willing to swallow its more beefed-up military bilateral cooperation with the British or with the French.
That, I guess, is up for discussion. And that's why you see both the Deputy Defense Minister and pretty much the head of GRU, the military intelligence, at the negotiating table because these are more fine military issues, and they're important, of course, strategically, but that I can't comment on because I guess that's for the military folks to debate.
[00:10:54] Peter Slezkine: Well, I'll ask you to comment on it regardless. So, de facto, recognition of Russian territorial control seems to be a done deal. The Trump administration has, more or less, conceded that point. Non-NATO status for Ukraine, likewise. So, the real sticking point, it seems, is Ukraine's military potential. Its integration with Western countries and its own domestic military potential.
So, is that the crux of the negotiations is precisely what level of military potential Ukraine might have? And is there any way for the Russian side to negotiate a diminishment of Ukrainian military potential without inflicting a military defeat on Kyiv? I mean, it doesn't seem like something that they would readily accept at this point. That seems to be the non-negotiable issue on their side.
[00:12:01] Maksim Suchkov: Well, there is this debate in the policymaking community on what the best way to put the caps on the Ukrainian military is. One argument says that it makes more sense to put caps on Ukrainian interactions with the Western defense industrial complexes. And that will be a major impediment to recreating of Ukrainian's own military potential.
The other argument suggests that, actually, the external factors are easier to monitor, right? When you have a Western company, or not necessarily Western company, or a third-country company, through which some Western government works, do some military production in Ukraine, it's easier to monitor because it comes from the outside. Then it is to put caps on Ukrainian, the size of army, certain types of arms that the Ukrainian army may be allowed to have, and to ensure control over that. And that's, I guess, part of the military intelligence to monitor and to advise the government, which is the best way to pursue.
[00:13:15] Peter Slezkine: Let's just go back to that so that it's clear.
[00:13:16] Maksim Suchkov: Sure.
[00:13:17] Peter Slezkine: So, you're saying that there is a debate within Russia about whether it would make more sense to seek to limit Western support for the Ukrainian military or Ukraine's domestic production. And the arguments in favor of a deal limiting Ukraine's domestic production is that is more difficult to monitor. So, it would be better to put that on paper and have some third-party monitors take care of that because Russia would be aware, in any case, of the Western support and how much of that there is.
[00:13:56] Maksim Suchkov: Right. And another big chunk of the problem is, I guess, not so much the military production, per se. That is the intelligence sharing and the Starlinks and all that. So, when we have President Trump talk about being willing to walk out from the mediation process, the immediate question that pops up in the minds of the Russian policymaking community is what exactly does he mean by saying that?
If it suggests walking away from all kinds of support, you know, U.S. is no longer given financial aid, no more military arms and ammunition and Starlinks, et cetera, then it puts pretty much Ukraine and its European allies, kind of, one-on-one with Russia and obviously makes things easier for Russia to deal with, but that, of course, perhaps puts some pressure on the administration case in case of the laws. The Trump administration may be facing arguments that it sold out Ukraine to Putin. And that's not good.
[00:15:01] Peter Slezkine: Yeah, or faces its own Afghanistan scenario as some have suggested.
[00:15:06] Maksim Suchkov: Right. And the second scenario that makes sense to weigh in is, if President Trump says U.S. walks out from this mediation process, military-wise, it's no difference from what it was during the three years of the conflict under Biden, which is U.S. still supports Ukraine military. Even though it is not maybe willing to give their arms directly, it may be supplying arms to Europe, and they will be reselling to Ukrainians.
You know, it still has intelligence sharing and Starlinks and all that stuff. But that, to me, at least, is no different than the so-called boil-the-frog strategy that the Biden administration implemented towards Russia. And it still puts us and keeps us on the path of escalation. The drawback of that approach to the American party is, in my view, again, and like you said, I'm not speaking on behalf of the Kremlin on the Foreign Affairs Ministry, as an analyst, I think there is a drawback to that. There is a serious challenge to Trump's own agenda.
If he wanted his presidency to give United States some kind of operational freedom, vis-a-vis China, that goal could not be achieved because Russia and China, in that scenario, would perhaps work much closer to one another. If the idea was to create this, kind of, huge, new tech empire, so to speak, right, the United States would need more energy, and the energy deals with Russia would be helpful in that scenario, so that could not be achieved.
And none of the things that President Trump spoke about, including with President Putin perhaps, could be achieved. So, it's a bad scenario, too, for both Russia and the United States. The third scenario perhaps is the U. S. acts as if it has nothing to do with this conflict. It allows the Europeans to take the burden and the responsibility for supporting Ukraine.
Special Envoy Witkoff does his shuttle diplomacy with Moscow. Putin and Trump have phone calls while the United States continue to sell arms and do what Russians see as militarization of Ukraine. But on the parallel track, kind of, U.S. and Russia seek some energy deals, rare earth metal deals, other things. In a way, it is going to be walking-and-chewing-gum, that President Biden also spoke about initially before February 2022, kind of, approach to Russia, but there might be some positive elements in that. But again, for Russia, it doesn't really settle things in terms of Ukraine threat or Ukraine challenge.
[00:17:50] Peter Slezkine: So, the three scenarios are the Trump administration walks away from the Ukraine war completely, including turning off intelligence sharing and Starlink, which is obviously the preferable outcome for Russia but perhaps saddles Trump with the loss of Ukraine. The second scenario is status quo, so certainly less military support for Ukraine than under Biden, but nonetheless, most of the essential stuff remains.
And the third is a version of the second but with an attempt to normalize with Russia or reach some kind of agreements on a parallel track, so conflict in Ukraine, normalization elsewhere. I'm not sure I entirely understood the point about energy and the creation of a tech empire. I mean, the U.S., obviously, has lots of energy of its own and is selling LNG to Europe. So, Russia is, in some sense, a competitor in this field. So, what are the cooperative energy endeavors that would help realize the Trump administration's objectives?
[00:19:00] Maksim Suchkov: Well, by that, I mean, some of the ideas to explore some of the projects in the Arctic or American concerns that Russia has been exporting too much of its energy resources to China. And again, I look at it from the American side. If that is a challenge, this challenge will remain if there is this, kind of, second scenario is in place, not because Russia seeks to torpedo American interest, right, but simply because that is a really bad scenario for Moscow. And naturally, it would need some backup. And hence that's where the events will evolve.
[00:19:43] Peter Slezkine: So, you've mentioned China a few times. Obviously, the U.S. or the Trump administration would prefer for Russia to be a more autonomous actor and not become dependent on China or too tightly associated with China because a giant Eurasian block, that would then probably also include Central Asia, seems like a serious threat, but aren't there limits to how far Russia will go toward China even now that it is developing close relations with India, with Vietnam, trying to sustain good relations with South Korea and Japan to the extent possible, developing relations with North Korea, which is a card to play against China? So, Russia's already balancing against China. Maybe the U.S. doesn't have to do anything.
[00:20:33] Maksim Suchkov: Well, it is balancing, and it makes sense to do so not just because of the balance, per se, but simply because there are opportunities to work with all the players that you talked about. But I don't think any of them are a substitute given the size of the Chinese economy and the length of the Russia-China border and the growing importance of China internationally and for Russia.
There has been pretty decent bilateral chemistry between the two leaders. And the philosophy that Russia and China may not always be together but will never be against one another has been in place for quite some time. I think there is a fine difference towards the West as far as Russia and China are concerned. And I think there is a growing understanding in Moscow that there is no more collective West, that the strategic imperatives of the European Union and the United States as formulated by the Trump administration are quite different.
And there is no positive agenda in Europe, but there is a positiveis positive agenda in the United States, meaning all the Revolution of the Common Sense that Trump has been talking about and a lot of people in the administration havehas been talking about and we hear. That is a positive agenda for America. Whereas for the European Union, there is only one agenda that is to continue to fight Russia back and, you know, to defeat Russia. And that is not a positive agenda.
The discourse was, if it were not for the United States, we would make good with Europeans, you know. And the Americans are just sticking their finger in and messing things up for us. Now, it's not the case. It's quite the opposite. Now, it's the case, if it were not for the European Union, exactly because the Russia would prefer to deal with some individual European countries than with European bureaucracy, that, I guess, there is a big affinity in approaches between U.S. and Russia today on that sense.
But most importantly, to finish the China issue, I think, for the moment, China sees the European Union as a tactical ally against the Trump administration because of the tariff policy and because of the trade policy and other things. Whereas Russia sees the Trump administration as a tactical ally against the European Union. And that is a... I wouldn't call it a chasm in Russia-China approach, but it's a somewhat different position towards Europe that Russia and China have now.
[00:23:05] Peter Slezkine: So, you said that the U.S. now has a positive project and Europe does not, that Europe's entire purpose is to oppose Russia. So, what is Russia's positive purpose if it has one?
[00:23:21] Maksim Suchkov: Well, I would certainly like to hope it has one. And first, the idea that was mocked by some in the West, this idea of Russia as a civilizational state that promotes Conservative values. And again, it was mocked because of the anti-gay law, even though they're not anti-gay. And if you read into it, that's not exactly what it's about, but it's about the LGBT propaganda in schools and in other communities that where it should not be propagandized.
[00:23:57] Peter Slezkine: So, one could say that, in Russia, you have a law against LGBT propaganda, but there's also very little actual Conservative culture in terms of church attendance or family values. So, there's an attempt to oppose Western progressivism, but not much endogenous conservatism.
[00:24:20] Maksim Suchkov: Well, I've already mentioned the Revolution of the Common Sense. And, you know, the Russia has had its Own Revolution of the Common Sense for quite a while. And things like this, the trend to impose and infiltrate a lot of the, kind of, twisted liberal ideas were confronted in the Russian society regardless whether you attend church every Sunday or not.
So, in a way, it's important. And a lot of the things that the Trump administration has been fighting against that were mixed during the first two days of his administration were something that Putin stood for quite some time and was castigated by the liberal West. And in fact, I think there were some sanctions slipped on Russia for this anti-LGBT law.
And now, here's a question. Like, so, if the Trump administration is doing the same in America, why these sanctions are still in place? If I was a Russian diplomat, I perhaps would raise that issue as long as a number of other issues that the sanctions that were slipped on Russia for this interference. And I think there's been recognition within the Trump administration that that's never happened and the whole campaign was a hoax, but then the question is, so why these sanctions are still in place?
[00:25:42] Peter Slezkine: Sanctions were imposed on Russia for Russia's anti-LGBT propaganda law and for election interference. And the Trump administration has lifted neither of those sanctions despite presumably not agreeing with the premise.
[00:26:00] Maksim Suchkov: Absolutely. So, well, you know, if we're thinking of some positive agenda issues for the bilateral relations, and there is a clear recognition that the relations are in a comatose state, there are a lot of signals coming from the administration that, again, if I was in the Kremlin, I would catch and try to elaborate upon, including a numerous pronouncement by the Vice President JD Vance on the defense of the Christians in the Middle East.
And there has been a robust diplomacy in the past between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Catholic Church in 2016 and 2017 and in the midst of the crisis in Syria on the saving of religious minorities and Christians in the Middle East. I think if we're going to try to brainstorm some of the positive agenda for Russia in the United States and the Middle East, that is one issue to look at, especially now that the Vatican may be taken a central stage, including in the, kind of, mediation in the Ukraine conflict. That issue, I think, for the Christians in the Middle East, is important and has always been in the focus of the Russian policy making and President Putin himself.
[00:27:10] Peter Slezkine: But let's pull the focus back a little bit. So, you've mentioned various areas of potential agreement or cooperation between the Trump administration and the Kremlin, a certain anti-wokism, let's call it, protection of Christians in the Middle East, potentially lucrative energy cooperation in the Arctic, but none of these are necessarily long term and don't quite reach to the strategic or geopolitical level. So, you mentioned Russia's recent claim to be a civilization state. What does that look like for the world and for the relations with the United States?
[00:27:48] Maksim Suchkov: Well, I think there is this image of Russia as an ultimately anti-Western or anti-American state in the world, which I think is not true. And Russia's beef with U.S. before Trump was not because that there is a deep-seated anti-Americanism within the Russian state or society, which is not there. There is no anti-Americanism in Russian society, and the Russian elites are not anti-American, but there was this idea that there was a need for greater de-Americanization of the international system.
And the monopoly on power was putting U.S. dizzy with power and military incursions. So, now, the Trump administration, in a way, is trying to de-Americanize international system by reviewing certain elements of this, kind of, a more offensive policy. You know, Secretary Rubio spoke about his view of multipolarity. So, if there is no this, kind of, offensive, democracy promotion that was a problem with Russia for many years, then you see a much more cooperative Russia conceptually.
What President Trump did, in my view and a lot of the Russian policy community shares that view, is he decoupled the idea of dominance and leadership, right? So, America still wants to be a dominant country in a lot of areas and tech, and it wants to dominate in security and trade, but it does not want to take responsibility for a lot of things it feels it has no business with. And that makes, in Russia's view, America a more cooperative partner and makes Russia a more cooperative partner to the United States as well.
If you remember that, when Putin came to power, the first things he did in his first month in office was a drawdown of the Russian military base from Cuba and from Vietnam. And that was, back then, a clear sign that Russia was not pursuing a globalist hegemonic approach, but it sought to be a constructive partner of the what was then seen as a collective West, right?
And he was first to call President Bush after the 9/11 atrocities. But even before that, I think Russia has been on a constant pursuit of a common agenda with the West. In 1990s, it was the promise of this democratization, that the promise dashed with bombings of Yugoslavia. In 2000s, Putin really thought that Russia and United States could cooperate on the counter-terrorism agenda. You know, Russia provided its territory for American transits to Afghanistan.
And that did not work out because of the American withdrawal from these arms, ABM treaty, and with the support of the color revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia back then. When Obama came to power and they initiated reset policy with Medvedev, they believed there might be this agenda of modernization, of greater inclusion of Russia in WTO and out of international institutions.
And those hopes dashed over the differences of the Arab Spring and then Libya invasion and then Civil War in Syria and chemical attacks in Syria. But even in that crisis, as we remember, Russia and the United States initiated a joint initiative on the destruction of the chemical arsenals in Syria. Then even when Ukraine issue has been started to smolder in 2014 and Trump came to power, Putin offered a number of things that could be done together in the Middle East, but the whole thing was buried under the Russia interference campaign.
It didn't go anywhere. And then under Biden, things have just deteriorated to the level where they are today. And the Russian diplomats constantly speak about piles of debris that were left to the relationship. So, the new stage, what I'm talking about is... or the civilizational conservative thing, I think, may be a ground for bilateral cooperation, and the tons of things to explore. Like I said, like, the people just need to sit down and speak through in concrete terms.
[00:32:04] Peter Slezkine: But how far can that actually go in strategic or geopolitical terms? So, fine, both countries are, in some sense, Christian, although also multi-confessional, wokism never triumphed in Russia and is receding in the U.S., but still, this is not a universal ideology like liberalism or communism that can be shared across great distances.
Everybody is conservative in their own way, according to their own traditions, inherited from their own ancestors. So, the difference is fundamental to conservatism. So, Russian conservatism should be very different from American conservatism. So, it seems like there are clear limits to the points of contact that could breed real solidarity or cooperation in the practical plane.
[00:32:57] Maksim Suchkov: Well, there are differences, but, again, I don't think they have to be all identical to be able to work together. They are not diametrically opposed. I think they're still in the same, kind of, area even though there are definitely some cultural and religious and other differences in that, but they're not diametrically opposed as the other ideology you've mentioned.
That was never appreciated in the Russian policy making and most of the society. And that, I think, doesn't mean that the people were persecuted, right? They were still pretty tolerant before it was seen as a tool of interference of the liberal democracies in the Russian cultural context and history and the policymaking. To your question of how far it can go, I think that's up for debate. I could have answered depends on the political will of the parties, but I also understand that things like this should be naturally embraced by the population.
I don't think that the average Russian person, like, in his daily life thinks about these issues or builds his life according to these issues, right? If you compare societies, I think there is a lot more affinity that many people think in the West. But I do think that this administration has started to care.
What I hear from Secretary Rubio, from President Trump himself, from Vice President Vance on their reflections of how the United States has been running the world for the past 30 years and what was wrong with that, that is a lot of bravery, I think, for a self-reflection. If it trickles down to concrete changes, and we've seen some of these changes, that is good, whether some opponents of this policy say it serves the interest of Russia or China, well, I don't really buy that. If your idea is to go back to common sense, that's what eventually matters.
[00:34:55] Peter Slezkine: But let's say there's no fundamental conflict between the Trump administration's worldview and the Kremlin's. Nonetheless, there are decades of inertia built up from decades of conflict and an active war where the U.S. and Russia are on opposite sides. So, how do we get from A to B? The theoretical harmony seems hard to reach until this war has been settled.
[00:35:27] Maksim Suchkov: I don't believe in harmony in international relations. I believe in the balance of power. And there's definitely, I think, on the both sides, the notion that it's not just trust but verify, but don't trust and reverify. And that's totally normal in my view. Again, like, I don't think we have to reach for harmony as an ideal state of relationship. We should reach for a normal state, where there is a decent degree of competition, but essentially, there is no fundamental encroachment on security.
And the notion of security is very serious in Russia, simply because of its geography and its history. And the notion of the future, what bothers a lot of policymakers and people in Russia, I would say, is that you have a moment in the U.S. And with all the complications and restraints that I mentioned, there might not be a better moment for the normalization of U.S.-Russia relations than it is now.
Yes, there is a decent personal chemistry, it seems, between the two presidents and a lot of the things really have been hanging on a thread of their goodwill to do something positive for the two countries. And everything else, including a lot of the systemic factors you mentioned about in the trust level and all that, are against that drive, but there might not be a better moment.
But even though Russia does want to build up and develop this moment, it has learned the bitter experience of that things may change in the U.S. So, the questions that a lot of policy makers are asking here of how far and how long the Trump movement is for. And thinking that there might be a reversal of these policies, you know, if the new democratic administration comes to office and would like to reverse Trump's policies and the MAGA movement and, you know, including on the woke policies, what the implications for Russia will be given that there is still an inertia that Russia is the ultimate bad guy out there in the world politics?
What Trump administration has changed for now is it does seem to think that Russia is not a major problem in the world that's out there for America. And again, that's a good thing, but I can see how things may change. And in two or four years, there might be a reversal. And that puts a lot of limitations on Russia's own otherwise broad and open call for better relations with America to be more cautious, I would say.
[00:38:04] Peter Slezkine: So, what specifically could the Trump administration do to convince Russia that certain changes are enduring? So, Trump wants peace in Ukraine, Russia now believes it has military leverage that it would like to use in order to extract a whole set of concessions from Kyiv or perhaps even capitulation eventually, but again, the Trump administration would like peace earlier.
So, is there anything that the Trump administration could do outside of Ukraine that would entice the Kremlin to stop short of maximum objectives in Ukraine? So, the Trump administration has already closed USAID, the National Endowment for Democracy, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Voice of America. I mean, not all of those have been totally shut down, but, more or less, constrained in ways that will be very difficult to reverse for any future administration. So much of the machinery of democracy promotion that has existed for decades has disappeared.
So, that seems like something substantial that the Russians should believe in. Is there something that the Trump administration could offer in terms of European security architecture? Shutting down bases in Germany, withdrawing military personnel, these are things that would be very difficult for a future administration to reverse. Could that be part of a broader peace deal that would help bring about a cessation of hostilities sooner, that, okay, Ukraine's military potential will still be quite high, but U.S. military presence near Russia's borders will be reduced?
[00:39:51] Maksim Suchkov: Look, first of all, I don't want to sound like I'm advising or hoping that Trump administration would do certain things. I would say this.
[00:39:59] Peter Slezkine: We're discussing hypothetical scenarios for the benefit of our listeners.
[00:40:04] Maksim Suchkov: Sure. So, when the Trump administration came in and said they wanted to eliminate a lot of these elements that you've just mentioned, there was a lot of skepticism in Russia that it can actually do so given the power of the deep state or the inertia of the political inertia. And when he realized all of that, or implemented, including with U.S.A., that was a, kind of, a wow moment in Russia. Like, wow, he really did that.
And people got closer to the screen and say, "Well, that's interesting. Let's watch his next step." So, when he says, "The United States would like to recalibrate its presence in Europe for the sake of the Indo-Pacific," the immediate response to that in Russia said, "Well, that is interesting." What the marker of his intention would be, and yes, the marker of that intention would be a drawdown of American personnel in Europe or a, kind of, drawdown of a military basis, say, in Germany elsewhere, but again, certainly, that would create some tension between, I guess, U.S. and the European allies.
But for Russia, and I guess for the rest of the world, and for the Europeans, it would be a marker of that his intentions are true. And that's exactly what he's doing, he's willing to do, and he's able to do. So, to your other question, what other things can the Trump administration do to incentivize Russia, frankly, I don't think it has to incentivize Russia because Russia has been open to work with the United States. It does not really need more incentives or more carrots.
It understands there is a great potential for the relationship with the United States. What is necessary to move forward from this level of intention, right? There is intention in D.C. And President Trump and Vice President Vance talked about it, that there is great potential for cooperation and a lot of things that both nations can benefit from.
What is necessary to move forward is three things, time, political will, and a clear understanding of political benefits for itself. So, the time issue, I think, is important because, like you said, the Trump administration needs some quick results, but the problems are so hard, it simply is hard to fix them quickly.
But the Russian party is not filibustering any of those initiatives. It does want to meet. It does want to talk both to American delegates and to Ukrainians directly. It's not in Russia's interest to make things slower, like I said, precisely because it might be that the only good time for the normalization is with this administration.
[00:42:40] Peter Slezkine: Well, the problem seems to be that there are contending logics in Russia. There's an understanding that there is a short window of opportunity to normalize with the Trump administration in the United States. On the other hand, in Ukraine, Russia seems to possess military leverage that will increase payoffs down the road. So, the Ukraine War, there's a desire for that to continue longer in order to get closer to the Russian objectives while also hurrying along normalization. And these things seem difficult to do at the same time.
[00:43:14] Maksim Suchkov: Exactly. Well, I don't disagree with that. It's just because the Ukrainian issue is so important to Russia and there is no clarity of what may happen in Washington in some time, it does want to make sure it creates the most positive security outcomes for itself in Ukraine first before trying to explore the benefits with the U.S., but again, I agree with there is, kind of, a contending logic.
I'm talking political will, and there seems to be a genuine political will on the Trump administration to fix things with Russia, but I understand, if you are in the Trump administration, even if you understand the core roots of this conflict, if you seek to solve them in the present, kind of, atmosphere, including the information space and the pressure from the Europeans, it would look like you are helping Russia more than you are helping Ukraine.
And that goes, kind of, contradictory to Trump's own logic to stay neutral. But I don't see how you go around this issue. But again, maybe the Trump administration approach to let Russia and Ukraine talk directly and settle these issues directly, with a decent amount of American pressure on both sides, maybe it's workable. We need to see how further rounds of Russia-Ukraine talks will continue.
But as far as concrete benefits are concerned, I think both parties in Washington and Moscow understand where potential areas of cooperation may be and how beneficial they may be for both parties, that perhaps might be necessary a greater, kind of, detailization of these projects and trying to move things gradually because, when the Trump administration was talking about potential economic benefits, in Russia, people ask you, "Well, does it mean that certain sanctions should be lifted?" Right?
And if not, whether the secondary sanctions, which seem to be a bigger problem than the sanctions, per se, could be, kind of, dropped, which in a way is the case now because there was more leeway in the secondary sanctions from this administration as an incentive to work with Moscow, right? [crosstalk 00:45:20].
[00:45:20] Peter Slezkine: You're saying that the Trump administration has ceased to enforce secondary sanctions as vigorously as the Biden administration had been doing.
[00:45:28] Maksim Suchkov: I believe so. I guess that's what those who monitor this... because even, though, during the Trump administration, I think some Chinese and Turkish companies have already been placed on the list in general in certain elements when there was this, kind of, positive move on Russia and Ukraine talks. There was this mechanism used by the administration, which was observed and much appreciated in Moscow.
[00:45:51] Peter Slezkine: What sort of Europe does Russia want to see? Does Russia prefer a Europe that is mostly under American military control? Would it like NATO to disappear entirely and Europe, potentially, to fragment or to consolidate separately, militarily? What is the ideal Europe in the next five, 10 years for Russia?
[00:46:16] Maksim Suchkov: Well, I think, in the next five years, we're not going to see an ideal Europe or Russia in any case given the amount of antagonism and that what they believe is the strategic plans to deter Russia and they're putting money into that infrastructure. So, that's not possible even, kind of, theoretically. I think the stakes that what the people believe in Europe is that, eventually, Putin will go, and things will magically change in Russia.
In Russia, there is more, kind of, an expectation that, because the policies look disastrous, the current European elite will bankrupt their people so much that they will no longer be voted into office and the new generation of elites may take a different stance. And if you talk to people, kind of, in Russia who are focused in Europe, they'd tell you that most of the, kind of, major shots on the European policy on the European front have been called by Prime Minister Starmer, who is technically not in Europe, who is British, by President Macron, who has a terrible domestic situation and not so much respected in his own country, and Chancellor Merz, who is really on the ropes inside Germany, but they are the ones who are calling the most shots for the rest of Europe.
And that is a problem. I don't want to say that Russia would like to see a fragmented Europe. Again, I don't think Europe is in Russia's interests, frankly, for a number of reasons, including security reasons, but the EU policies or the, kind of, European bureaucracy as a, kind of, a joint mechanism for calling major decisions on Russia is a major problem and is not perceived as adequate to deal with, whatsoever.
[00:48:06] Peter Slezkine: So, you would prefer a fragmented Europe. The EU doesn't necessarily have to disappear, but bilateral relations with individual countries that held the power...
[00:48:14] Maksim Suchkov: Well, I think that is also not possible because even the countries that tend to take more pragmatic stance toward Russia, whether it's Slovakia or Hungary, they are under tremendous pressure and are eventually made into voting with the, kind of, rest of Europe.
So, that is, I think, also not so much on the... I think the major stake is on the that the new elites, who may come into power in major European countries, will eventually come to terms that is no more major conflict between the U.S. and Russia. And they will have no other choice to either spend all their fortune on trying to fight, kind of, the windmill that they created with these Russia threats and will eventually bankrupt their countries and make them vulnerable to external threats and challenges or we just continue and that's just a war of attrition in a way that, again, Russia believes that Europe cannot sustain without American support. But the question is whether the Trump administration would like to have Europe on its payroll, that it does not have a positive agenda, and whose only goal is to fight Russia.
[00:49:27] Peter Slezkine: But so, if U.S.-Russia relations change substantially, then Europe will have to adapt in ways that work for Russia. But so, how would Europe be convinced that U.S.-Russia relations have truly changed? Is it troop withdrawals, a different attitude towards NATO, or some kind of bilateral normalization, cooperation, economic deals?
[00:49:51] Maksim Suchkov: Well, you remember Burrell, who was responsible for European foreign policy, once noted that, the true fortune of Europe was based on three principles, right, cheap energy from Russia, cheap goods from China, and security umbrella from the U.S. So, you no longer have the first element, the cheap energy from Russia. I'm not sure whether the Chinese goods will be as cheap as they used to be.
A, if the American security umbrella is in question with the draw down of American troops from Europe, that would make, hopefully, leaders think twice, but I don't think it will be under this generation of leaders who have literally staked their political futures on the conflict with Russia. It would be hard for them to walk away from this idea because this seems to be the only idea that they're willing to promote and live with politically.
[00:50:47] Peter Slezkine: But a change of political leadership in Europe, which is certainly possible given the popularity of alternative parties, would then potentially bring about a Trump-style paradigm shift in European politics.
[00:51:01] Maksim Suchkov: I think so, but we also see a lot of authoritarian-style banning of parties, right, whether it's the alternative right in Germany, whether the Romanian candidate in Romania, and Marine Le Pen in France. When you look at it from the Russia angle, first, it does seem like a mocking of democracy that the Europeans have castigated Russia for the lack of it in the day and Putin, kind of, persecuting his opponents, but that's exactly what they're doing, and, B, is seen as a weakness of current elites to deal with these alternative views politically. And I think that is also something that the Vice President Vance have castigated them for in his Munich speech.
[00:51:46] Peter Slezkine: All right. Well, final question, since it's late night in Moscow, give me a prediction on the negotiation and military fronts. Do you think there will be several rounds in any concrete achievements? Will we have to wait for the summer military campaign to play out before the two sides are willing to talk Turkey, or is there some third option?
[00:52:13] Maksim Suchkov: Well, frankly, I do think that the European approach is, in a way, to try to wait Trump out and try to keep Zelensky on the ropes in this, kind of, smoldering phase of conflict with Russia to either, kind of, trigger Trump into saying, "Putin is no longer a constructive counterpart. I give up on the idea of fixing things," and, you know, it's back to square one.
And I think, in this, kind of, U.S.-Russia bilateral, even with all these, kind of, positive attitude initially between the President Trump and President Putin, there are other interests in the room, that is Ukrainian interest and then the British interest, part of the French interest. And this may be a bigger problem.
What gives me optimism, though, is what was written in the Wall Street Journal, I think, today, that Trump apparently told the European allies that he believes in the Russia's military victory or something like that. I don't remember the exact quote. So, some message that made the Europeans believe that they cannot really hope for the change of position in the American administration.
That is also very important because, if the idea is to filibuster peace talks and tell Zelensky to, kind of, continue the smoldering conflict the way it is going now, it's important that Trump tells him that, "No, I don't think that's the way things are going to." That may eventually change their position.
Some in Russia believe that the Europeans will eventually try to make it look like Ukraine have lost the war, not that Europe lost the war, and it lost the war because the American's support diminished. So, if you're Macron, so to say, right, your best plan is to say, "Well, Ukraine has been fighting bravely, but it has lost. But now, we have to, kind of, fortify Europe against the future Russian incursion and all that." I can see that as a possibility.
So, in a way, I think if you're talking about the summer, on the front, it will be, kind of, smoldering conflict. The military offense will be going with different degrees of intensity in different fronts, and parallel talks will continue, but it's important that none of these dynamics torpedoes direct U.S.-Russia talks because this is exactly what some of the parties that have staked on the war would like the relationship to suffer. And that, I think, is not in the interest of either Russia or the United States.
[00:54:52] Peter Slezkine: So, the most important thing as far as you're concerned is for U.S.-Russia normalization of some limited kind to continue however the Ukraine War proceeds.
[00:55:03] Maksim Suchkov: Yeah.
[00:55:04] Peter Slezkine: All right. Well, thank you very much for a wide-ranging conversation late at night in Russia. Perhaps we'll do this again if and after Putin and Trump meet in person.
[00:55:16] Maksim Suchkov: Thank you so much. Thanks for having me.
[00:55:20] Peter Slezkine: Thanks for listening to the Trialogue Podcast. Make sure to subscribe to the show, so you don’t miss out on any episodes.
The Trialogue Podcast is hosted by the Stimson Center and produced by University FM.