This week, our guest is Philani Mthembu, Executive Director at the Institute for Global Dialogue in Pretoria. We discuss the South African perspective on the war in Ukraine, China, and BRICS.
This week, our guest is Philani Mthembu, Executive Director at the Institute for Global Dialogue in Pretoria. We discuss the South African perspective on the war in Ukraine, China, and BRICS.
*The Trialogue Podcast is hosted by the Stimson Center and produced by University FM.
(Transcripts may contain a few typographical errors due to audio quality during the podcast recording.)
[00:00:00] Peter Slezkine: I'm Peter Slezkine, Director of the U.S.-Russia-China Trialogue Project at the Stimson Center. Since the middle of the 20th century, relations among the United States, Russia, and China have had an enormous impact on each country separately and on the world as a whole. The purpose of the trialogue is to better understand this extraordinarily complex and consequential relationship by directly engaging with experts from all three countries.
Hi, all! I recorded this conversation with Philani Mthembu a couple of weeks ago before relations between the United States and South Africa took a sudden turn for the worse. So, unfortunately, we weren't able to discuss Elon Musk's interventions on the subject of South African policy or Secretary Rubio's intention to avoid the G20 Summit in Johannesburg.
Instead, Philani and I mostly focused on Pretoria's perception of the war in Ukraine, China's role in Africa, and the future of BRICS. I hope you enjoy the episode.
Today, my guest is Dr. Philani Mthembu, Executive Director at the Institute for Global Dialogue, which is associated with the University of South Africa and based in Pretoria. Philani, welcome to the podcast.
[00:01:11] Philani Mthembu: Thank you very much, Peter.
[00:01:14] Peter Slezkine: So, how many languages do you speak, and which ones are they?
[00:01:18] Philani Mthembu: Well, I'm speaking English right now. My mother tongue is Zulu. I do speak German. And of course, I think, if you speak Zulu, you can essentially get by with Xhosa, with Swati, with Ndebele.
[00:01:40] Peter Slezkine: What about Chinese? You spent some time in China. How much of that did you master?
[00:01:44] Philani Mthembu: China, I could only order a taxi. I could order some food. I could order a drink. Just the basics.
[00:01:53] Peter Slezkine: Well, food, drink, and transportation, those are the absolute essentials. Can you tell us a little bit about the institute that you direct? What is its purpose and what is your role?
[00:02:04] Philani Mthembu: So, I am heading the Institute for Global Dialogue, which is a foreign policy think tank associated with the University of South Africa. We are pretty much as old as South Africa's democracy. So, the idea of founding the institute was an idea from former president Nelson Mandela and former president Thabo Mbeki.
The idea at the time was that South Africa was going through a transition, the world was going through a transition, and they wanted to create an outlet that would be able to assist the government through policy research.
So, we do a lot of work, of course, with the executive, but also with parliament, with the various arms of the state. But of course, also with political parties, with non-state actors, with trade unions, pretty much, all stakeholders who are involved in shaping South Africa's foreign policy, but also, South Africa's interlocutors, whether it's in BRICS, whether it's in the G20.
And you'll normally find us in what we call multiple tracks of diplomacy, sort of, bridging the formal government track with non-state actors.
[00:03:24] Peter Slezkine: So, the institute was an idea of Thabo Mbeki and Nelson Mandela, both major figures in the ANC. The ANC recently lost its controlling position in government for the first time since the end of apartheid. How has that changed the work of your institute and South African foreign policy, more broadly?
[00:03:42] Philani Mthembu: Fundamentally, it doesn't change the work of our institute. At the time, the idea was whether it should be a government think tank or whether it should be a non-government think tank. And what won the argument was that we should be a non-government think tank, especially in terms of our work with parliament. We work with all political parties, but of course, it's important that we work with the dominant political party in South African politics, which is the African National Congress.
And the fact that its majority has been reduced for the first time below 50%, it does come with some qualitative changes, because of course,the government of the day, which is called the government of national unity involving about 10 political parties, has to find consensus on certain areas. However, it is quite important to also emphasize that, despite the ANC having fallen below 50%, in the realm of foreign policy, the ideas from the ANC, the ideas from the liberation movement and from the anti-apartheid movement continue to dominate South African thinking when it comes to positioning the country within Africa, within the global south, but also within the international community.
[00:05:07] Peter Slezkine: So, in the realm of foreign policy, there's still much continuity with the long era of ANC dominance. To what extent does that extend to South African relations with the United States and Russia? During the apartheid period, the Soviet Union was seen as a supporter of the liberation movement, the U.S. as an obstacle, to put it politely. Is this something that is still strongly felt? And is it felt by the younger generation or only by people who are really active in the moment?
[00:05:42] Philani Mthembu: I think what's important when you go back to the liberation movements in South Africa, is that the ANC always positioned itself as non-aligned. So, it received support from the Soviet Union, yes, but it was not the only support that it received. It received support also from the Nordic countries, also, some key stakeholders in Western Europe and also in the United States. It had a sophisticated way of engaging in international relations, in a sense that, even though it was regarded as a terrorist organization by the likes of the United States government, but also by key governments in Western Europe, it actually had quite a strong presence in those countries.
And so, when its efforts were being rebuffed at the official level, it was smart enough to build people-to-people relations through culture and through other means. And it established what may be called external missions, which were essentially like embassies of the ANC.
And so, the point here is that, even during that time, the president, the longest serving president of the ANC, O.R. Tambo, he always said to those countries and those people that assisted the ANC, he said, “Even though you are assisting us, it does not mean that we must now align with you on everything. We will maintain our independence. We have our own vision for the country, for the continent, and for the world.”
In the West, the ANC, at times, was seen as being socialist or being communist, but it always rebuffed that. It always said, “No, we are not a communist organization or a communist political party. We are a broad church that encompasses a whole range of thinking, from capitalists to socialists to social democrats. You find it all within the ANC.” And so, the ANC was always sophisticated enough to continue to engage at multiple levels of diplomacy, and including in countries where the governments branded it a terrorist organization.
And I think it has tried to do that in government, to try and keep a position of non-alignment. South Africa has very strong economic relations, for instance, with the United States. It disagrees with the United States on certain areas, especially around the reform of multilateral institutions, where the United States is seen as a status quo power, preventing the democratization of the international system. But that does not prevent South Africa from actually having very fruitful relations with the United States. Likewise, you know, with the like… you think about Russia, yes, it has economic ties with South Africa, but they are not comparable in any way with the type of economic relations that South Africa has with the United States.
And what is interesting is that, at a political party level, for instance, in Russia, the ANC has party-to-party ties with United Russia, but it has stronger ties with the Communist Party of Russia. And so, whenever an ANC delegation goes to Russia, they will meet with both the Communist Party of Russia and with United Russia. And that's the ANC trying to, sort of, balance its relations. At times, it gets the balance right, but also, at times, it gets that balance of non-alignment wrong.
[00:09:45] Peter Slezkine: Well, so, it's an important point that the ANC was clearly not a creature of the communist bloc. But still, in pure institutional material people-to-people terms, there was a greater connection at the time to the Soviet Union. Many of the top figures in the ANC and in the, sort of, communist branch of the liberation movement, especially, spent time in Moscow. So, to what extent does Russia remain an important part of South Africa's vision of the world as a result of this leftover sentiment? Or is that decreasing now, as the ANC ages out?
[00:10:22] Philani Mthembu: No, history remains important, and I would say not only for the older generation, I would also say for the younger generation, and I would even expand that to say not only amongst those who are active within, let's say, political parties or organized, sort of, civil society actors, but the broad South African population. I think history continues to resonate with them. So, memories of the support that was received from the Soviet Union, especially military support for the military wing of the ANC, and many comrades of the ANC were trained there. Many also studied there. But this was the Soviet Union. So, it was not necessarily that all of them were in Moscow. You had also quite a strong presence of South Africans in Odessa, for instance.
I think the point is not necessarily about a Moscow-centric understanding of the Soviet Union. I think, especially those who are quite active politically, they do understand that, yes, Russia, essentially, was at the heart of the Soviet Union. But they do understand that the Soviet Union involved a much bigger territory within Eastern Europe, especially.
[00:11:52] Peter Slezkine: Yeah. Well, the relationship of these various countries to the Soviet Union is a complicated one. Now, many in Eastern Europe would not like to claim that legacy. So, it's interesting that the South Africans remember it that way.
[00:12:03] Philani Mthembu: Well, I would even argue that, at times, that works against them when it comes to their relationship with South Africa, sort of, distancing. I mean, I understand, people understand why some of those countries would want to distance themselves, but purely in the formation of relations between independent states. I think, strategically, when you are forming relations with a country like South Africa, it is important to also draw on your history, whether you see that history as positive or negative. South Africa, also, has a negative history in the form of the apartheid system. But I can tell you that most foreign policy scholars, actually, when they speak about South Africa in the world, they also mentioned the likes of Jan Smuts who was a top diplomat, was there when the League of Nations, when the UN was being formed. And so, South Africa was there, also, as a founding member.
So, when we understand South Africa in the world, even though we have a negative relationship with the apartheid regime, we still acknowledge and understand that it was still the statehood of South Africa involved in international affairs. And so, it is quite complicated. But I do think history still does play a role. People remember that Russia was at the heart of the Soviet Union. And when the Soviet Union collapsed, it didn't have much to offer South Africa and Africa in the form of economic relations, but it maintained its political relations, so that it could continue, I think, to basically capitalize on the history that it shared with counterparts in Africa.
[00:14:04] Peter Slezkine: So, just to clarify, because I think it's an important point. You say that a country like Ukraine, for example, a post-Soviet country, that rejects its Soviet past is making, in some sense, a mistake in regards to its relations with South Africa and, perhaps, other countries in the Global South. So, how exactly is this a mistake?
[00:14:25] Philani Mthembu: If you think about the cohort of South Africans that were in the Soviet Union, I mean, I don't have the exact figures, but a very significant portion of those who went to study in the Soviet Union were based in Ukraine. I mean, if I was advising a foreign minister of Ukraine, I would actually say, the reality is that many of the counterparts that a Ukrainian foreign minister is meeting in South Africa have actually spent time in Ukraine, studying in Ukraine, doing some form of military training. And so, that is one of the areas that they reflect upon. So, I understand why Ukraine looks negatively towards its Soviet history, but that does not necessarily mean that history cannot be harnessed and instrumentalized to achieve modern Ukraine's strategic objectives.
[00:15:31] Peter Slezkine: Interesting. It makes sense that South Africans who have a fond memory of their studies in Odessa in the ‘70s and ‘80s would not immediately take kindly to the rejection of the history of which they were a part. Now that we've started talking about Ukraine, let's move directly to the ongoing war. What is the South African attitude toward the war in Ukraine? And what role might South Africa play in its ultimate resolution?
[00:16:01] Philani Mthembu: What was interesting for me is that there was quite a bit of surprise with the position that South Africa took, within some of South Africa's key partners in Western Europe, especially, but also in the United States. They had, I think, expected South Africa to take a very strong position that condemns Russia and completely supports Ukraine. But if we just go back and we understand what was happening from 2014 with Crimea, it's quite clear that, even then, South Africa was trying to position itself in a non-aligned manner.
Why is that? How do political decision-makers in South Africa actually view what is happening in Ukraine? Do they view it as something that began in February, 2024? No, they don't. They view this war as a result of an inability to resolve the European security architecture after the collapse of the Soviet Union. They see it as a miscalculation in terms of NATO's continued expansion eastward. And they see it as a result of a deteriorating relationship between the United States and Russia and between the European Union and Russia. But they also see it as a failure of the Minsk Agreement, a failure to implement the Minsk Agreement.
And so, when diplomats were trying to apply pressure to South African diplomats to vote in favor of various UN resolutions, South African diplomats resisted that, not because they supported the war. In fact, even though their communication at times has been very poor and, at times, contradictory, it's quite clear that South Africa has always supported a negotiated settlement. They see this as a political problem that requires a political solution. I can tell you that, just a few months, a few weeks, even, before this war really escalated and you had Russian tanks moving from the borders of Russia into Ukraine and reaching this phase of the war, discussions were being had within South Africa between the think tank community and government. What was interesting is that a lot of those conversations were also reflecting on Russian history, sort of, taking into account that many of the wars between Europe and Russia have taken place along or, at least, through those flat plains. And that, for many years, there was a sense of vulnerability amongst Russian elites, however big their country was, they always sought to essentially create almost, like, buffer zones, whether formal or informal. That had not dissipated. That was still there, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
So, the inability to resolve that security architecture is viewed as the source of this conflict. So, even while South Africa condemns the use of force to resolve political problems, even though South Africa has affirmed the principle of territorial integrity, it has tried to stay clear of outright condemning one side and supporting the other side. It has tried to position itself as potentially a bridge between those who are at war and those who are trying to resolve the war. And hence, you find initiatives like your African peace initiative, where about 10 African heads of state went to Ukraine and went to Russia to speak to the counterparts in those countries about the negative impact of that war that it is having in Africa, whether it's in energy, access to grain and the disruptions there.
And remember that South Africa and Africa were emerging from a pandemic, hoping that the period after the pandemic would be a period where the world focuses on development and economic growth. And so, this war was definitely bad for South Africa and bad for Africa. However, South Africa did not want to position itself on one side or the other side. It wanted to position itself as non-aligned. It wanted to position itself as being part of those countries that were seeking to resolve this conflict through dialogue.
And last point, why would South Africa position itself in a non-aligned way? Non-alignment would not make any sense if South Africa viewed the war purely as one between Ukraine and Russia. You adopt non-alignment when you interpret a conflict that is taking place amongst the great powers and you don't want to position yourself on one camp or the other.
And that tells you a lot about how South African decision-makers actually view this conflict. They don't view it as one purely between Russia and Ukraine, they view it as a larger geopolitical conflict between the U.S. and Russia, and, of course, involving Europe, involving Ukraine. And so, that position tells you a lot about how South Africa interprets the causes of the war and how it interprets the actual war that is happening.
[00:22:23] Peter Slezkine: Well, it seems now that the great powers might be ready to talk, or at least Trump, newly elected in the United States, has expressed eagerness to settle the conflict and to reach out to Putin. Do you think that is the necessary start and that that is, in itself, sufficient, that the U.S. and Russia will get together, Ukraine and Europe will play a role, and the major stakeholders in the conflict will find some resolution? Or is there a place in the settlement, a useful one or a necessary one, for South Africa and other countries that have maintained a non-aligned position throughout?
[00:23:02] Philani Mthembu: So, as we speak, I mean, South Africa continues to play an active role in facilitating dialogue between Ukraine and Russia. So, one of the areas, for instance, where South Africa has been very active in is in addressing Ukrainian concerns around children that were taken from Ukraine, taken to Russia during the war. This is an issue that Ukraine has raised. It's also an issue that the African delegation raised in its discussions with Russia and Ukraine.
And so, behind the scenes, South Africa has actually been quite active in trying to find a way if there's a need to reunite those children with relatives in Ukraine. So, it's continued to do that. It's also continued to participate in the initiatives by Ukraine that have sought to outline, sort of, Ukraine's peace plan. South Africa has been involved in those meetings, and it's played an active role. But what South Africa has also been doing, it has been actively speaking to the Ukrainians, saying there cannot be any peace without engaging Russia. You have to engage Russia. South Africa itself has experience in this. You do not make peace with your friends. You make peace with your enemies. South Africa has experience in doing that. Our whole story after 1994 and before 1994 is about enemies speaking with one another and finding a way to actually build a country, irrespective of all the tensions that would unfold.
[00:24:48] Peter Slezkine: What is the reaction in Ukraine when the South Africans present this position?
[00:24:53] Philani Mthembu: Yeah. Most recently, towards the end of last year, the new Ukrainian foreign minister was in South Africa, had meetings with his counterparts. I was also fortunate to be one of the people who was able to have an exchange with him.
And during that time, Ukraine actually said it is now open to having dialogue at lower levels within the framework of Ukraine explaining its own peace plan. And so, the expectation was that this would begin to take place, whether in the open or not in the open. But what was communicated from the Ukrainian side was that, yes, they do understand that there does need to be some form of engagement with Russia. And so, that is something that is quite important. But what's also important is that South Africa does not necessarily see itself as being a central actor in resolving this conflict, but it does see itself as playing a role as trying to contribute to an alternative, because the concern from South Africa is that all of the discussions in the last few years has only been about military, more war, trying to resolve this conflict either through a strategic defeat of Russia or through a military defeat of Ukraine.
Now, South Africa is saying that cannot happen, there will be no winners if they think that a military solution is the way to go. And so, Soviet has been emphasizing this point both to the Russian side and to the Ukrainian side. In fact, even at a political party level, you have had delegations of the ANC going to Moscow to speak with the United Russia Party and with the Communist Party of Russia. Essentially, the discussion has been around saying, what for you would constitute an atmosphere that is conducive to dialogue? And so these discussions have continued to unfold.
Now, so, that, I think, is realistic. It knows that it's not going to be the main actor in the resolution of this war. But I think it is, to a certain extent, encouraged. When the current administration of the United States speaks about stopping the war, I think South African actors are cautiously optimistic about that because they do think that the United States does have to play an important role in fostering a dialogue.
[00:27:55] Peter Slezkine: Well, let's hope that some solution can soon be found and that South Africa will manage to play a constructive role in that process. Let's turn quickly to China. So, China has a massive economic presence in Africa, and there are also quite a few Africans in China, many of them as students, fewer now after COVID than before, but still a notable cohort of which you were a member at one point as we discussed at the outset. So, can you tell us a little bit about the Chinese presence in Africa and African presence in China?
[00:28:28] Philani Mthembu: China plays an increasingly important role. I mean, you mentioned right now that the people-to-people dimension and, increasingly, yes, you've got South… you have South African, but also African students in China, learning the language, learning the culture, but also understanding that China is playing a key role in shaping the international order.
And so, that relationship is important. How South Africa sees it is it sees it as part of efforts to grow and strengthen South-South cooperation. If we go back to the year 2000, the Economist magazine published a front cover where it said “hopeless continent,” speaking about Africa. That, pretty much, was the sentiment at the time of key European and Western actors when it came to Africa. They largely saw the continent as one where, yes, you could continue to extract minerals, natural resources, but they largely saw it as a charity case. They largely saw it through the lens of official development assistance.
China came with a different approach. Remember that China itself was, not too long ago, one of the poorest countries in the world. It understood when it looked at Africa, it understood that there lies potential there, not just as a charity case, but for business, for cultural ties. It understood the strategic importance of Africa in the United Nations. In fact, China can never forget that it was Africa that played a key role in ensuring that mainland China took up its seat in the UN Security Council, rather than it being represented by Taiwan. So, China can never forget that. It can never forget that, without the support of Africa, it could not have taken its seat within the UN Security Council.
And so, what China has done, it understood that there is a strategic opportunity on the continent. So, when it looked at Africa's infrastructure, it saw many gaps and it provided concessional funding without overt political conditionalities. Sometimes, people say China provides loans without conditionalities. There is no loan without a conditionality. Ultimately, you have to pay that loan back. But China does not put political conditions to those loans that it extends to African countries.
And so, China has built quite a lot of infrastructure within Africa, hard infrastructure, ports, rail, road infrastructure, but it's also now began building soft infrastructure. It’s also started investing in cultural activities, investing in education exchanges. It's invested now in media exchanges on the continent.
I think what has been important is that South Africa does not see China as a status quo power. It sees China as a country that is also attempting to reform the international architecture, just like South Africa. And so, they work together in formations like the BRICS where they are seeking, especially, the reform of the international financial architecture. Of course, China, like many countries, is now South Africa's leading trade partner.
But what is also important is that China is playing catch-up in the form of it being a source of foreign direct investment for South Africa. So, increasingly, Chinese companies are looking to invest and set up a presence in South Africa and not just to be a trading partner. This is not to say that everything is rosy in terms of the relationship between South Africa and China. For instance, South Africa wants to see more Chinese investment in manufacturing. It wants to see more jobs created by Chinese firms in South Africa. South Africa also wants to export more beneficiated goods to China, rather than only or mostly exporting raw materials to China. So, these are things that, you know, obviously, are being worked at a bilateral level, where South Africa seeks to also address its concerns with China.
Maybe one last point about the relationship. You know, at times, I think people mistakenly, sort of, look at South Africa as, sort of, in China's camp. I don't think South Africa is in… is necessarily in China's camp. South Africa views itself as an independent actor. One of the things that illustrates that is that South Africa gained its democracy, or at least the first democratic elections were in 1994. It's only in 1999, 2000 where South Africa officially adopted the One China Policy. Now, one would have assumed that, almost immediately, when the ANC came to power, they would have just automatically adopted the One China Policy. However, Taiwan had diplomatic relations with apartheid South Africa. It had strong economic ties with apartheid South Africa. And during the transition, the Taiwanese, also, in trying to reposition themselves in South Africa, donated to the political process leading up to the elections and negotiations.
And so, what is interesting is that President Mandela tried to convince the Chinese counterparts that South Africa would keep diplomatic relations with both Taiwan and with China. And so, there was this back-and-forth. Of course, the Chinese were saying, “This is not going to happen, you know. We want you to adopt the One China Policy. You can't keep diplomatic relations with both Taiwan and with mainland China.” And so, it took several years for South Africa to come to the conclusion that, yes, indeed, we cannot have diplomatic relations with both. We have to adopt the One China Policy. However, despite that, Taiwan continues to have a liaison office in Pretoria, which is likely going to move to Johannesburg, South Africa.
[00:35:54] Peter Slezkine: Is its move to Johannesburg a symbolic act to make it seem less official? So, that pleases the Chinese, that the Taiwanese will move from Pretoria to Johannesburg. So, they still have a semi-official mission, but at least it's not in the capital.
[00:36:08] Philani Mthembu: Absolutely. It definitely, I think, would please the Chinese. There is resistance from the Taiwanese liaison office. There's certainly resistance at the moment. But I think this is an eventuality that will happen. But it just goes to show that, even with such an important strategic partner as China, I mean, it took about three, four years for the South African government, democratic government of the ANC to actually adopt the One China Policy.
[00:36:41] Peter Slezkine: What about African students’ experience in China? So, the economic relationship is very strong. The parallels, potentially, in the development trajectory are evident. But the cultures and language are very different and distant. So, when you were in China and you have to download all these apps and read characters in order to do anything at all, did you manage? Do Africans have a support network among themselves? How do they manage to penetrate Chinese society and survive in these foreign universities?
[00:37:17] Philani Mthembu: What was interesting for me is that there are elements of the Chinese society and culture where I found similarity with African culture. I mean, I was in a big city — so, Shanghai and also in Beijing. But what struck me is, in interacting with many of the Chinese, it was like interacting with Africans from the rural areas. There were quite a number of things that I found familiarity with, actually, at a cultural level. Sort of, the idea of the individual versus the collective, you know, sort of, a greater emphasis on the collective versus an emphasis on the individual. That is something that resonates in African culture. But at the same time, it was quite clear that, because of our history, you would find still that many Africans will find it more familiar to be in a European country or to be in the United States, for instance. You know, I'm always struck when people talk about, at times, that South African politicians are anti-West. I mean, these guys actually love the West. They may disagree with political positions of Western countries, at times.
[00:38:38] Peter Slezkine: In the sense that they orient themselves toward the West, in terms of popular culture, discourse, language, and many of the other important aspects of life.
[00:38:50] Philani Mthembu: Exactly, exactly. But I mean, I had a good experience in China. And I was there at an interesting time. What was interesting for me is that it was, like, of course, China had opened up not so long ago. I mean, it was just a matter of a few decades where Chinese society was opening up to the world. And that was very clear to me that you going into a society where the vast majority of people are not necessarily exposed to day-to-day interactions with Africans, with Europeans, with Americans, and all of that, so this was clear to me. Hence, the analogy around the rural orientation of many people, sort of, entering a city.
[00:39:32] Peter Slezkine: That they just felt provincial in a general sense. That they were less cosmopolitan, less aware of the world than in Germany where foreigners are ever present.
[00:39:44] Philani Mthembu: Exactly.
[00:39:45] Peter Slezkine: I bring up Germany because you studied there as well, right?
[00:39:48] Philani Mthembu: Exactly. So, I was actually doing a joint Ph.D. program between Germany and China. So, it was interesting in that sense. So, you could see that the vast majority of people, there's still a sort of awkwardness at times in terms of just interacting with internationals and all that.
But I was there at a time where I felt it was quite welcoming. So, of course, you are in a bit of a bubble, right, as an international student, at times. But for instance, when going out, it was quite clear that bars were, sort of, competing to have the most foreigners. It's like, okay, if that place has more foreigners, more locals will come.
I also found myself doing really interesting things, like, on a Friday night where I would not be out, but I would be in the middle of a field at Renmin University speaking with Chinese counterparts in English. And I found that very interesting because they would dedicate almost every Friday to learning English. And I found that interesting, like, you know, it's a Friday night and instead of going out, you prefer to improve your language skills.
[00:41:00] Peter Slezkine: And you sacrificed a few of your Friday nights to assist them in this process.
[00:41:03] Philani Mthembu: Yeah. I mean, it was, you know, you learn. It's mutual learning. So, they were hosting me. I felt the least I could do is spend some time doing what they are doing on those days. And, of course, it's a great way to meet people. So, it was a great experience, a great learning experience for me. And, of course, I know that the country is obviously going through changes, especially since the pandemic. So, the experience of international students may not be the same as when I was there. But, you know, quite clear that it's still a political imperative for China to open up and to open its institutions to international students. In fact, recently, a few years ago, you had more African students for the first time studying in China than those who are studying in Anglo foreign Western capitals. And that demonstrates that, over time, China has been deliberate at trying to enhance the people-to-people exchanges.
[00:42:07] Peter Slezkine: Let's move from the personal level back to the geopolitical plane. Tell us a bit about BRICS and how South Africa views this organization.
[00:42:16] Philani Mthembu: BRICS is definitely seen as an important formation for South Africa. For many years, particularly during the apartheid period, South Africa's dominant political and economic relations have been with the West, with the likes of the UK, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, of course, the United States of America. South Africa thinks that it is important to consolidate those relations, but it also thinks that it is important to grow its political and economic relations with new actors that are shaping the global order, like China, India, Brazil, you know, the various BRICS countries.
So, South Africa sees that relationship as part of its own efforts of diversifying its political and economic relations. At times, it gets accused of rejecting the West and going East. This is not the case. The relationship with the West remains important, but if you're looking at the world, where is the world going to be in the next 50 years, you have to build those relations today of the leading actors that will be shaping the world in the next 50 years. And those actors are not just going to be Western actors.
South Africa and South African decision-makers think that the world is moving in a multipolar direction, where no single authority or no single state or coalition of countries can dominate the world. This is how South Africa thinks the world is going. It does not necessarily think the United States will suddenly become an irrelevant actor. But there will be an emergence of other influential actors. And what South Africa has tried to do in the last 30 years is to diversify its economic and political relations towards those actors. So, it's tried to attract more investment, more trade, with China. It's tried to increase its exports into China in agriculture and in other areas. It's tried to build strong relations with Brazil, to work with the Brazilians in reforming the global governance architecture. It's worked closely with the likes of India, both under the Congress party and under the BJP. It sees India as strategic in terms of its South-South cooperation, in terms of its efforts to reform the international financial system, especially the World Bank and the IMF, but also in terms of reforming the UN.
So, South Africa sees a lot of similarities in the countries that form the BRICS. It sees countries that are coming from the periphery of global politics, countries that have worked on their own national development plans, countries that are playing an influential role in their own regions, but also, countries that are increasingly shaping key discussions at the international level. And South Africa wants to be part of that. It wants to be part of that whilst, at the same time, consolidating its relations with its traditional partners in the West.
And so, at times, people think that a country as small as South Africa would not necessarily have much influence within BRICS. But if you look at the many evolutions of BRICS, remember that South Africa was the first country in an expanded BRICS. It was not part of the original BRICS countries, but it lobbied very strongly to join the BRICS formation. And once it joined BRICS, South Africa proposed quite a lot of measures. It proposed, for instance, regional outreach meetings. So, in 2013, when South Africa hosted BRICS, it was intentional about inviting African countries and regional economic communities. And what happened? After that 2013 summit, all subsequent presidencies have also had some form of regional outreach. South Africa has also sought to shape BRICS by opening it up to think tanks, to civil society, to the business community. And it's supported such initiatives which have subsequently also been adopted by other BRICS countries. So, South Africa does see BRICS as important. And especially, with an expanding BRICS, it certainly sees it as gaining additional weight when it comes to shaping geopolitical discussions.
But what's very important is that South Africa does not see BRICS as being a formation that is anti-West. Now, I know, at times, Western decision-makers scoff at that and they think that, no, this is just rhetoric. But in reality, South Africa does not see BRICS as an anti-Western formation. And so, if you had efforts within BRICS to come out with, for instance, a communique that is strongly anti-West, I'm quite certain that South Africa would actually reject the wording. And because of the way in which decisions are taken within BRICS, by consensus, South Africa, no matter how small, it is able to influence, it is able to effectively have a veto within the grouping.
[00:48:21] Peter Slezkine: Well, as far as Washington is concerned, any grouping that contains Iran, China, and Russia is anti-Western by definition, so I'm afraid communiques don't matter in this regard. So, you mentioned that expanding BRICS gives it greater weight in the world. At the same time, it might sap some coherence from this formation. So, can you, from the inside, give us some sense of the logic of expansion? UAE, Ethiopia, now Indonesia, Saudi Arabia is maybe in, maybe out, Iran and so forth. There's been a large round of expansion, and the expansion continues. So, what is the logical expansion? You said that these countries seem similar in some respects, but they are also very different in terms of regions, size, economic structure, and so on.
[00:49:13] Philani Mthembu: Yeah. The world is a complex place. You have over 190 countries. These countries have different histories, political systems, economic structures, and all that. But what BRICS is basically demonstrating is that it is not necessarily about having countries that look the same, act the same, that should be cooperating. That, if you want to solve global problems, you're going to have to find a way for countries that are very different to find ways of cooperating. And that's what BRICS has basically been doing. It's not to say that BRICS countries don't have differences within them. South Africa's position on Morocco is different to China's position, to Russia's position on Morocco and Western Sahara. South Africa might want a seat at the UN Security Council, but when push comes to shove, will Russia and China really support that expansion and giving African countries veto powers over there? These are questions, obviously, that remain open.
Cohesion is something that is definitely going to be challenged through expansion. That is a definite. It's given. It was seen as important to expand so that you capitalize on the interest and the momentum towards BRICS. You had a lot of requests wanting to join the formation, wanting to attend meetings of BRICS. So, if you just keep it closed, you create disappointment amongst those countries that are interested in participating in BRICS meetings. However, you can see that the next rounds of full expansion will be much more careful because, essentially, you don't want to expand too quickly that you completely erode your cohesion and decision-making abilities. But at the same time, how do you manage expectations of those countries who want full membership but can't get full membership because you need consensus to invite them? Well, you create another category of BRICS dialogue partners. So, you say to them, yes, you can continue to participate in BRICS meetings, but you are not yet full members of the grouping. And that is an attempt to manage those expectations. So, you could find that more countries will be joining as dialogue partners. And then, every now and then, you get countries coming in as full members. So, that's how they are trying to…
[00:51:55] Peter Slezkine: And the dialogue partners are not dismayed by this second class status? As we've seen with Ukraine and Georgia, sometimes, partial membership is worse than none at all.
[00:52:05] Philani Mthembu: I don't use the term second class in this sense, but you could see it as a route to full membership, right? So, I think this is… politically, this is how it is being sold. But, of course, we all know that you need full consensus to invite new members. And I think it helps to explain to those countries that you just need one country to oppose you, and you can't get in. However, what we can potentially do is agree on you becoming a dialogue partner. So, it's about managing their expectations. Who's to say what will happen in years to come, whether they'll get frustrated becoming dialogue partners? But I think, as long as the original members manage it properly, both through the BRICS, but also through the new development bank, because the new development bank is also expanding, getting new members. So, you're creating an ecosystem of countries that are engaging BRICS at different levels. And over time, I think that will help to mitigate, you know, that frustration.
[00:53:15] Peter Slezkine: Okay, so, final question. You mentioned several times that the purpose of BRICS, at least one of the main ones, is the reform of the international financial structures. How successful has that been in practical terms?
[00:53:27] Philani Mthembu: Well, I don't think it's had the success that it would have wanted in terms of the reform of the World Bank and the IMF. But we have had reconfigurations of the voting powers. Countries like China have increased their weight within the IMF and the World Bank. But at the same time, I think there is still dissatisfaction with the pace of reform within the IMF and the World Bank.
And what BRICS countries have essentially resolved to do is to pursue a route of reforming from within and from outside. So, they continue to persist within the World Bank and the IMF. They continue to push for reforms. Whilst, at the same time, understanding that the reforms will not happen as quickly as they would want them to happen. And so, what do they do? They form new institutions outside of the World Bank and the IMF. They form structures like the New Development Bank. The New Development Bank, by 2026, has an objective of dispersing close to 60% of its loans in local currencies. So, essentially, what you are doing, you are applying pressure from inside institutions of global governance and you are applying pressure by forming new institutions outside. And I think that's the strategy that they are currently pursuing.
[00:55:02] Peter Slezkine: Well, great. It's a Friday afternoon in South Africa, so I should let you go. Thank you so much for being on the show. I hope to have you on again before too long.
[00:55:11] Philani Mthembu: Thank you for having me. I've enjoyed the conversation.
[00:55:17] Peter Slezkine: Thanks for listening to the Trialogue Podcast. Make sure to subscribe to the show, so you don’t miss out on any episodes.
The Trialogue Podcast is hosted by the Stimson Center and produced by University FM.