Reinhard Krumm of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung joins us to discuss Germany’s reversal on Russia and a new American Ostpolitik.
Reinhard Krumm of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung joins us to discuss Germany’s reversal on Russia and a new American Ostpolitik.
*The Trialogue Podcast is hosted by the Stimson Center and produced by University FM.
(Transcripts may contain a few typographical errors due to audio quality during the podcast recording.)
[00:00:00] Peter Slezkine: I'm Peter Slezkine, Director of the U.S.-Russia-China Trialogue Project at the Stimson Center. Since the middle of the 20th century, relations among the United States, Russia, and China have had an enormous impact on each country separately and on the world as a whole. The purpose of the trialogue is to better understand this extraordinarily complex and consequential relationship by directly engaging with experts from all three countries.
My guest today is Dr. Reinhard Krumm, head of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung office in Washington, D.C.
Reinhard, welcome to the podcast!
[00:00:41] Reinhard Krumm: Thank you very much. Hi, Peter.
[00:00:43] Peter Slezkine: So, to start off, could you tell us a little bit about the FES? I won't try to pronounce the whole thing again. What is it? Who do you represent? What are you trying to achieve?
[00:00:54] Reinhard Krumm: The FES was founded in 1925. So, this year, we have our 100th anniversary. It was found by the first Democratic elected president Friedrich Ebert. During the time of the Nazis, the Stiftung was closed and it started over in the ‘50s. And the idea was to educate Germans, what is democracy all about? And the American support, the whole system, all of a sudden, each party was connected to a foundation. But the money comes not from any party, the money comes from the government. We are independent and no government will tell us what to do. It's an informal way of doing foreign policy. So, if the ambassador talks to anybody, it has protocol. If I talk to anybody, then it's no protocol. And the office in Washington is here to fill transatlantic relations with content, with life; also, to work on the understanding that the United States and Europe are partners. And there are specific subjects and topics we work on here. One is the topic of Ukraine and Russia.
[00:02:00] Peter Slezkine: Well, before we get to Ukraine and Russia, let's discuss the transatlantic relationship, which may have previously seemed a part of our common DNA but now seems far less self-evident. So, where were you when Vice President Vance delivered his speech at the Munich Security Conference? And what was your reaction?
[00:02:24] Reinhard Krumm: I was here in Washington, D.C. and I saw that he had a meeting with a Holocaust survivor and then went to the meeting at the Munich Security Conference. So, I expected something quite different than what he said.
[00:02:38] Peter Slezkine: But what do you mean? Let's be more concrete. You mean that he talked to a Holocaust survivor before the speech and then, during the speech, implicitly supported the IFD, which you believe represents a different moment?
[00:02:51] Reinhard Krumm: Exactly. I wanted to come to that, yes. And then he tells us we should also talk to the IFD, which, in their ranks, have Holocaust deniers, saying that the Holocaust was just a little hiccup in our history. And that is stunning to hear that from a vice president of the United States. Either he doesn't know it, or if he knows it, that's even worse. Then, he is telling us that the Holocaust is something which doesn't really matter anymore.
So, I don't quite understand. And that was shocking, I have to tell you, to hear that, especially after all these years of very strong cooperation between Germany and the United States, of being able, kind of, to have a second chance after the second World War, to become a member of the international community with the support of the United States.
[00:03:45] Peter Slezkine: So, what you reacted to, most acutely, was the seeming support for the German right-wing party, AfD, because he obviously doesn't mention them specifically, and there's a lot of other material in the speech about common values that have become not so common about free speech, about remaining elections, about the transatlantic relationship, about Western civilization. So, all that was secondary to the German audience, which reacted primarily to the seeming interference in domestic politics ahead of an election.
[00:04:17] Reinhard Krumm: That is correct; but also, as I said, the support of a party which has extremists in their ranks, and then he talked to the head of that party, too, in Munich. So, you could argue, well, is that the MAGA movement? Is that what it's all about? Which I cannot imagine. So, frankly, I didn't quite understand why he did all that, the speech. And it's the Munich Security Conference, so it's about security, international security. And there are many obstacles we have right now. So, he could have said, “We, the United States, still support NATO.” He could have stated that. He could have said, “We don't,” which would also have been a clear signal. But he started out by interfering in German interior politics.
[00:05:08] Peter Slezkine: So, again, I understand the German reaction to the historical sensitivities, but objectively speaking, the AfD is now the second most popular party in Germany. So, declaring it entirely beyond the pale and totally unapproachable is politically unrealistic. And obviously, Germans, such as yourself, in a semi-official capacity reside in Washington, D.C. and presumably speak to representatives of both major parties, the one in power and the one in opposition. So, explain to listeners why Vance meeting separately from the security conference in private with a representative of the second most popular party is a problem.
[00:05:53] Reinhard Krumm: I think I stated that because they're partly antisemitic and they're trying to undermine our system. Yes, 20% support the party. So, this is a challenge for Germany. Ignoring is impossible. It's the second most important party in Germany. But don't forget, we have a history about that 100 years ago, but that's engraved in German history. And in the minds, even today, the NSDAP came to power by democratic elections. And the conservative part of German society thought, “It's not that much of a problem. We'll make sure that they will be part of our political system.” And you know what happened. And there is, maybe, more in other countries—the fear that they might just be the end of a democratic Germany in the way we know it.
[00:06:49] Peter Slezkine: Well. So, let's put this in the broader context of Vance's speech of the Trump administration's first few months. So, there is interference in German internal politics as you see it. There's also a revision of the Atlantic security arrangement. There are tariffs that will come into effect by the time this episode has been released, unless there are sudden reversals, as have been the case in other instances. So, how does Berlin perceive this new Washington? What does it make of it? Has it found its feet yet and figured out a strategy of how to deal with this new world?
[00:07:32] Reinhard Krumm: Well, the German government is not yet formed.
[00:07:35] Peter Slezkine: Well, they're very active, despite not actually being in governments. We'll talk about the changes that have been instituted in a moment.
[00:07:41] Reinhard Krumm: That's true. And the vice chancellor already said that we have to be independent from the United States. Look, I mean, after ‘45 until 1991, the U.S. was the major power and Germany was divided. At that time, we started to become part of the West, and we are part of the West. After 1991, things changed. It was the mono-polar moment for the United States of America.
And I think there were a lot of hopes in Germany that this might work out for the best. It didn't, I would say. We all know the reasons. Being overconfident, marching into a couple of different countries, including Iraq made it difficult for Germany to completely support the idea that the U.S. is doing everything right and we just follow. And I'm very simplistic here, clearly.
So, now, when you have a president who is not really interested anymore in alliances, I think it's a fair wake-up call for Europe. I wouldn't really complain about it. The United States is a sovereign country. If they think Europe is not important anymore, then we have to do it on our own. Clearly, not against the United States. But with our self-confidence, we can do it. It will, I guess the next couple of years, will be hard because of the tariffs, because of possibly putting much more money into defense, and just hoping that the United States, under the current presidency, is not doing something which is completely going away from what the United States did the last couple of decades.
I don't think that Germany knows yet what to do about it. That is quite a shift, which I have never seen before. But then again, it's up to us how to deal with this. It's not really helpful to complain about the United States all the time, what they do. They can do whatever they want; and so can we.
[00:09:41] Peter Slezkine: So, your response seems to be to take American sovereignty as a given and the transatlantic divide as a “fait accompli,” almost.
[00:09:54] Reinhard Krumm: Not necessarily. But if you look at the first Trump administration, as we all know, the start was not as organized as right now. And it seems to be that those in the administration, all things, kind of, the same on that. I mean, you still have foreign policy advisors who think that the United States should be in all theaters in the world, something that China should have the priority, and other things like Vance, “We should really be more concentrated on the U.S.” Again, this is up to the United States. If this is a “fait accompli,” hard to say, but at least it looks like we are going that way.
[00:10:33] Peter Slezkine: Well, just really quickly, on Vance's speech, because you say that Vance is a representative of the part of the Trump coalition that is more focused on American interest. And that is obviously true in some respects, but when he was on that stage in Munich, on the one hand, he was saying that we have diverged from one another and have different conceptions now of values and democracy. On the other hand, he appealed to the concept of Western civilization a number of times and seemed to suggest that there was a possibility for a common Western future if Europe were to remember and revitalize itself according to the values that he espoused. So, is that on the table at all from a European or German perspective, some wonderful Western future, with the U.S. and Europe as its constitutive parts?
[00:11:22] Reinhard Krumm: Well, yeah, exactly, because the value system the vice president has in mind, it’s not the same Europe has at the moment. But I still believe you can have transatlantic relations, even with all the hiccups. I mean, again, look at the EU, they're very different countries with different ideas. They’re still together.
The question is how interwoven the opinions, the ideas of the Western world should be. Maybe it's loose. It's not as close together. Countries have a different understanding of how to cope with changes we see. And I have not given up on transatlantic relations, but transatlantic relations we had, so far, were based on experiences from the U.S. and Europe during the war. And that's faded away. So, we have to come up with different content. What is it that unites us? And what is it that doesn't unite us but that, maybe, we can leave aside? We concentrate where we’re united, and let's work on that, if we both think this is important, both the United States and Europe. I think Europe, in general, is still very much in favor of being close to the United States.
[00:12:36] Peter Slezkine: How important are common values relative to institutional entanglements? You say that the EU is composed of many different countries. Nonetheless, they still hang together. Greece voted explicitly to leave and then was unable to because they literally could not print enough of their own money to exist separately from the Euro bloc. So, it had nothing to do with preferences but all to do with the power to actually exist separately from the system into which they had been integrated. The UK voted to leave. That's a much bigger piece of this construction, wielding much more power outside of the Euro bloc with the pound sterling. And even so, it took them years in great pain to extricate themselves, more or less. So, one could say the same thing about the transatlantic relationship, that, no matter how hard Trump may try, or the Europeans may puff out their chests and talk about strategic autonomy, perhaps, we have become so entangled, that it would be impossible over the course of four years to really separate.
[00:13:40] Reinhard Krumm: Well, I don't know if it is only the Republicans and Trump. Maybe, even the Democrats will reconsider and say, “We do certain things with Europe, but certain things not.”
I think the transatlantic relations are not based only on security issues, even though this was a major pillar. But I think it's fair enough that the European part of NATO is increasing its defense spending. That does not pull us apart from the United States. But if we have a continuation of tariffs, and again, also, I'm sure there are some parts which you could agree on, but in general, from the beginning of Trump's second term, he's been concentrating on the EU, basically. His idea was, “We concentrate on China, a difficult country, maybe Russia.” And he partly does that. But it's Europe. I mean, you feel like, “We are partners, we thought.”
Anyway, there is no disappointment, fair enough, their interests. And, yes, Greece couldn't get out of the EU, but I think they're happy that they didn't. I think each European country understands alone it is a small country. Within the EU, it gets just bigger, mostly economic-wise. That's just a plus for all of them. And, for the smaller ones, more than maybe for the bigger ones, but see, there's still quite an interest in becoming an EU member from other states. So, there must be something.
[00:15:09] Peter Slezkine: Well, in any bloc, there's a question of balance. So, the Greeks feel that the Germans benefit more than they do. And in the broader Western bloc, Trump believes that the EU gains more from the relationship than the U.S.
[00:15:22] Reinhard Krumm: If the Trump administration feels that the EU is taking advantage, which is a weird thing because it's free trade, the U.S. can do all kinds of stuff. And they do. Now, I don't know. If tariff is the answer, there are very few people who know about tariffs saying, “This is a brilliant idea and let's do this.” All the former administrations didn't do that on that extent.
Fair enough, but as you said before, the bond between the U.S. and Europe is very strong. What we don't know is, if the Trump administration, which will end in four years, is the only approach to the European Union as it is right now, or will possibly, even Democrats, at one point, will say, “We have to reconsider because we cannot do everything.”
It will be a much nicer conversation, I have no doubt, but I don't know if this is all reversible. And also, we don't know if, in four years, the Republicans might not become, again, the winner of the elections. And then this will be another four years, possibly another eight years because it's a new president.
I think the EU is finally understanding that cooperation with the United States is fantastic, but as every other state, there are different priorities. Even though, among allies—and we thought we are allies—what the Trump administration does is not really appropriate.
[00:16:45] Peter Slezkine: You've said several times that the U.S. is a separate sovereign country that has its own interests. If those diverge from yours, so be it. That's a fact of life. Is it fair to say the same of Germany, which still has massive American military bases on its soil? Is Germany sovereign in its own right? How difficult would it be for Germany to assert itself in new circumstances?
[00:17:13] Reinhard Krumm: I think we are sovereign. I think that we want the U.S. troops there. It gives a certain assurance. But I would also argue, if the United States wants to get its troops home, that's perfectly fine, too. I don't know if we can beef up our military as soon as they leave. The Baltic countries have their history, Poland has its history of a very difficult relationship with Russia. And we are coming to that.
And so, Germany ‘45 is certainly not any other Germany we have seen before ‘45. It is a country which is grounded in the West, which has changed dramatically and which believed, because of our history, any strong military in Germany is unwelcomed. You could argue, “Well, come on, this is many years ago. You have to adapt.” And that's what we do slowly, because this is our history, this is the lessons we have learned.
But we will. I hope that the pendulum is going, not from very military in the beginning of the 20th century, to very anti-military in the second half of the 20th century. And now, again, to the other side. Because a heavily militarized Germany is, for any government in Germany, you act differently. Now, other countries ask us to be more able to defend ourselves. And we will do it, but we still don't have the attitude of doing more than deterrence. Whereas, the United States has a different approach to all that. It is the biggest country. And the Trump administration is even looking for enlarging territory. That is something, at least, in Germany, I think, will not be the case. But you never know. If you have a very strong military, Danzig starts to look appetizing. Once again, don't mention Danzig. Or Königsberg. You could take Königsberg back.
But things look differently. You know, you just cannot say, “We are where we are today,” and the Germans add a couple of divisions, and then we are still the same. No. Things will change. I'm not saying that Germany will attack, don't get me wrong. I'm just saying that things will shift, and I'm not sure if this is for the better.
[00:19:31] Peter Slezkine: The political situation is unsettled throughout the West, including the United States, all throughout Europe. There are efforts in Germany and Austria and elsewhere to create complicated coalitions. The last one in Germany was not terribly popular or effective. And meanwhile, the broader geopolitical and economic situation is not improving. And Josep Borrell, the top foreign policy officer in the EU in 2022, in the fall after the start of the major war in Ukraine, said that European prosperity had been based on two principal factors: cheap Russian energy and vast Chinese markets. And at the time, there was a prospect of losing both.
Now, you're hit on top of all that with American tariffs. And you were trying to re-arm. So, what is the answer? Do you turn to China? I know some top German businessmen were in Beijing recently. And the Chinese clearly think there's an opportunity to make nice with the Europeans, So, what do you do? Complicated relations with China, no Russian energy, trade war with the U.S.—how can you possibly survive?
[00:20:49] Reinhard Krumm: Well, first of all, the dependency on Russian gas, apparently, was not as big, because within half a year, Germany found different providers of gas. It's more expensive, but we got it. Yes, the United States has a lot of criticism of China. Germany has the same, but we are export-orientated. So, we still think that there should be trade with China, as does the United States, as a matter of fact. And I think President Trump is also very much interested in that. He will have some other measures, but in general I think he will continue.
So, that takes care of the Russian gas and China. But that's true. The United States is telling us, “We might still be friends, but you have to increase military expenditure. You have to go with us to China. Also, you have to swallow tariffs.” We'll see how we manage.
[00:21:40] Peter Slezkine: But you can turn Nord Stream back on.
[00:21:43] Reinhard Krumm: I heard that, yeah. I'm not surprised at this point if that is possible. I think no German will support that, even though I heard the United States is interested in that. I just cannot imagine that.
[00:21:54] Peter Slezkine: Why not?
[00:21:55] Reinhard Krumm: Because it is so loaded with emotions. This is like the pars pro toto evil thing Germany did.
[00:22:04] Peter Slezkine: Wait, Germany did what evil thing? It helped build this pipeline and create its own dependency.
[00:22:10] Reinhard Krumm: That's the evil thing which many countries will tell us. I don’t agree with that. I think Nord Stream 2, you could criticize the moment right after the annexation of Crimea. But on the other hand, you have to imagine Russian gas goes through Ukraine during the war, but that's fine. But Nord Stream 2…
[00:22:30] Peter Slezkine: Yeah. The Russians are paying Ukrainians to transit gas through Ukraine throughout the entirety of this war.
[00:22:36] Reinhard Krumm: Right. And Nord Stream 2 never went into operation. We didn't get a single cubic meter of gas. But that's the evil one.
[00:22:44] Peter Slezkine: That's not entirely consistent. Who blew up the pipeline?
[00:22:48] Reinhard Krumm: Apparently, Ukrainian crew.
[00:22:50] Peter Slezkine: Is this a subject of discussion in Germany?
[00:22:54] Reinhard Krumm: Oh, yes.
[00:22:55] Peter Slezkine: Apparently, it’s an interesting term. I mean, there have been various versions. Now, people in this country are saying that, perhaps, we did it.
[00:23:06] Reinhard Krumm: Well, the last information, which is so far known, is that there was a Ukrainian crew which did that.
[00:23:13] Peter Slezkine: Operating autonomously?
[00:23:15] Reinhard Krumm: Right.
[00:23:15] Peter Slezkine: With a little yacht [crosstalk 00:23:16].
[00:23:15] Reinhard Krumm: I don't know. There were some, as far as I understand… I don't know. I don't wanna speculate.
[00:23:23] Peter Slezkine: Well, you don't have to speculate yourself, but give us a sense of the conversation, because this is a massive pipeline, built with huge expense through which not a single cubic meter of gas has ever been transmitted. And all of a sudden, it's blown up in an act of industrial sabotage. And now, we settled on an interesting James Bond story. So, presumably, this is a politically sensitive issue in Germany.
[00:23:51] Reinhard Krumm: That is an understatement.
[00:23:53] Peter Slezkine: Are there articles written about it? Angry debates online? Or, is it just hushed because, if you really take the lid off of it, it could explode?
[00:24:02] Reinhard Krumm: It's very uncomfortable for Germany, apparently, because whatever happened after the 24th of February, 2022, Germany's political stand is, that was a huge mistake to have built that pipeline. There are some people who are saying that it was Germany's fault altogether that the war has started. So, understandable, the government is not really interested to go into that and possibly get those extradited from Ukraine, because I guess they're heroes. But it's still lingering. And I think, at one point, the German government had to make a decision on that because, as you rightly said, it was very expensive. It cost a lot of money. And it is one of those interesting developments where right and wrong is clear, and still, because of political reasons, one tries to cover it up.
[00:24:57] Peter Slezkine: Wait, it's not very clear to me. What are we talking about?
[00:24:59] Reinhard Krumm: We know the culprits and we know it's wrong.
[00:25:04] Peter Slezkine: We know who blew up Nord Stream?
[00:25:06] Reinhard Krumm: Yeah.
[00:25:08] Peter Slezkine: So, who is it? You just said that you didn't want to speculate
[00:25:10] Reinhard Krumm: The Ukrainians. That's the information I have.
[00:25:14] Peter Slezkine: Okay.
[00:25:15] Reinhard Krumm: And that's what I said, that I guess they're heroes in their country. And to proceed on that issue might be, even within the EU, extremely difficult. One would ask Germany, “Why do you do this? Why do you want to weaken Ukraine with this talk?” Just push it aside. At one point, we are coming back to that. And therefore, I think, to come up with the idea to start Nord Stream 2 to get cheap energy from Russia, which was seen by Germany as the deadliest sin ever, I cannot imagine that.
[00:25:48] Peter Slezkine: So, after the Russia invasion in February 2022, there was a dramatic change of narrative in Germany, that the entire history of rapprochement with Russia and dependence might be too strong a word, but reliance on Russian energy had been a terrible mistake. And once you make that decision, then it's very hard to flip once more in the other direction.
[00:26:17] Reinhard Krumm: I mean, you have to look at different times. I think the Eastern policy until ‘89, which was basically a policy to get Germany reunited.
[00:26:30] Peter Slezkine: This is Willy Brandt.
[00:26:32] Reinhard Krumm: Willy Brandt, Egon Bahr. Yeah, that's them.
[00:26:33] Peter Slezkine: Ostpolitik starting in the ‘60s.
[00:26:36] Reinhard Krumm: Right, after the first chancellor anchored us clearly and strongly in the West, the idea in the ‘60s was, “Okay, that's one thing, but we also have to do something with the East where the German army did terrible things. And we need some rapprochement towards Poland.” That was the Warsaw treaty in ‘70s, and then also towards Moscow, including the whole Soviet Union. And you could at least argue this was a major pillar which led them to the unification. There's the other narrative which says it was only Ronald Reagan, and that. I think it's a combination of factors. But I believe Eastern policy was one of those.
[00:27:19] Peter Slezkine: So, one of the factors that led to reunification was West Germany's willingness to engage with?
[00:27:26] Reinhard Krumm: With the Soviet Union, with Poland, with others, because at the very end they had, then, to decide if unification will come clear or not. And it was not much of who. Other countries, other world leaders in the West were not so excited about it, as we all know. And then comes the second stage—after 1991, what now? And because of Gorbachev, there was quite a support for rapprochement towards Russia, more than possibly in other countries.
[00:27:53] Peter Slezkine: Well, and just for context, we should tell our listeners that you yourself were working as a German journalist in the Soviet Union, former Soviet Union, throughout the ‘90s.
[00:28:03] Reinhard Krumm: Right,from ‘91 to ‘98.
[00:28:06] Peter Slezkine: So, you know this story well and witnessed it firsthand.
[00:28:08] Reinhard Krumm: Right. I saw the Soviet flag coming down over the Kremlin and then the trickle law coming up. Yes, that's true. And there were many talks during that time, you can imagine.
So, what is then the second part of Eastern policy, because unification is done? And I think if you look critically at that, you could say German business wanted to do big business in the former Soviet Union, 15 states all independent. Our former minister of foreign affairs made sure that, in every state, 15, we have a German embassy. Nobody else did that.
So, either, it's only business, or, which I would argue, is to bring Russia out of the cold, not only to unify Europe in terms of Poland, Czechoslovakia, at the time, and Hungary, and the Baltic states later, but even Russia. And I think that was the policy which Germany tried to pursue against… or very much criticized from a couple of countries, saying Russia will always be imperial and will never be able to join Europe.
And the second Eastern policy was never formulated. There was never a grand strategy. It was the hoping that trade would make sense, that energy also still makes sense because of interdependency. The Russians need the money, we need the oil. What's so bad about it?
But the longer that went, especially after the Munich speech of Mr. Putin at the Munich Security Conference, criticizing heavily the west, and then, of course, the annexation of Crimea and moving in of Russia in eastern Ukraine. The criticism became very, very, very loud, within Germany, but also from other countries, saying, “You cannot do that.” The only thing we should do now is to deter and stop talking to the Russians because it's useless. And then, the war started.
[00:30:06] Peter Slezkine: But this makes the causal argument a bit complicated because the hawks will blame the doves and the doves could, in theory, blame the hawks, in the sense that, if all had acted like Germany and the economic interdependence had really been the priority across the board, then who knows what would've happened? But you ended up with two competing strategies. You had the Eastern European countries who considered Russia an enemy, basically, eternally, and then the Germans who were going in an opposite direction. And obviously, it all ended up catastrophically.
[00:30:42] Reinhard Krumm: True. I think Sikorski, the Polish now foreign minister, at a conference in Ukraine, said that what was missing was a plan B in Germany. You could argue Poland never had a plan A.
But I agree with that. I think Germany, me included, we never thought this is not working. We thought that the 24th of February would not happen. It did happen. But I don't believe that Russia is path-dependent, meaning it always goes in one direction. So, it's hard to argue when a policy ended up with a huge war. The question is, if we all could have avoided it, if Russia is really so much focused on Ukraine, I don't know.
[00:31:23] Peter Slezkine: Germany was not simply an economic partner of Russia.It was an important diplomatic player, especially after the Maidan Revolution in 2014, Crimea, and so forth, there were the Minsk negotiations in which Germany was a principal party. So, where did that go wrong? Merkel has mentioned recently that it was all an attempt to buy time for Ukrainian rearmament. Is that fair?
[00:31:51] Reinhard Krumm: Well, first of all, I would say that, even though we did business with Russia, I think, if I'm not mistaken, the trade volume was about that of the Czech Republic. So, it was not that great after all, comparing it. The Minsk agreement, it's very easy to complain about it right now.
[00:32:08] Peter Slezkine: And it's important that all sides complain about it—the Russians, the Ukrainians, the Germans.
[00:32:12] Reinhard Krumm: Yeah. Which makes you wonder if that is really true. I think, at the time, the Ukrainians were extremely happy that the war stopped because they didn't have that many boots on the ground which were accordingly armed. When Putin at the time said, “If I want, we'll go to Kiev.” Maybe he wasn't that much off
[00:32:31] Peter Slezkine: The Ukrainians had essentially suffered a military defeat in the East where there was a mixture of local uprising and Russian assistance.
[00:32:41] Reinhard Krumm: So, the Minsk agreement tried to come up with a way to manage that conflict and possibly, then also, trade territories. It was not successful. But maybe, it couldn't have been successful. It's hard to say. It's always easy to complain about it. Yes, it was difficult to control the contact line. Yes, the Russians did not allow monitoring of OSCE personnel on their territory. That's all true, but it seems to be that all sides have not really tried hard enough again and again to get that through. I think France and Germany, at one point, saw this is extremely difficult, but they didn't put all the political capital into that.
[00:33:22] Peter Slezkine: What could Germany have done if it had actually assigned this problem a priority?
[00:33:27] Reinhard Krumm: I think, since 2014, because of the frustration with Russia, also, after 2016, Germany took over the OSCE chairmanship and they did it exactly to try to do something on the Ukrainian-Russia conflict. I know that the German diplomats were extremely annoyed at the Russians. And the Russians were saying, “You know, you didn't support us enough, so we don't support you here.” So, there was not really anything you can build up with the Russian. That was the impression. But still, I would argue, up to now, we never really try to have back channels and talk to the Russians. What do they really want? You can argue, well, they wanted Ukraine. And this is it, we can do nothing about it. And Russia should not have any security guarantees because it's a big country. They shouldn't care about it.
So, basically, we are telling the Russians what they should think. I think McFaul, the former U.S. ambassador to Moscow, is telling the Russians how great it is to have NATO on their borders. Maybe an ambassador should do this, but it's weird to tell this. If the Russians think this is not a good thing, then possibly it is not a good thing.
We didn't take it seriously. We thought they're moving away from the OSCE, the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe, from the Paris Charter from 1990. And interesting enough, in that document, you have the paragraph where it says, each country within the OSCE region can join a military economic alliance, whatever they want. But it's also written there that should not make any other country uncomfortable. That's usually blocked out, because people say, “Well, Russia cannot be uncomfortable because they're so big.”
So, we neglected that. And I think that was a mistake. Germany, at the time, still had fairly good relations. But we felt more and more uncomfortable because we were criticized by other countries, partly also from the U.S. And then, maybe, Germany did not have the political standing to go on with that. Even though I think it was 2009, I had a talk with the German ambassador in Washington and asked him, “So, when is the administration coming to you? When is Germany really interested?” And he said, renewables and Russia. And that was beyond just having a pipeline. And that's all gone.
[00:35:50] Peter Slezkine: In 2009, the Americans thought of Germans as an important avenue to Russia.
[00:35:56] Reinhard Krumm: Yes, exactly. And that's clearly gone.
[00:36:00] Peter Slezkine: So, let's then get back to the moment of the Maidan Revolution. So, it had peaks and valleys toward the end. Yanukovych, the president at the time in Ukraine, agrees to step down. This is coordinated with Europeans. The whole thing arises because of an economic agreement with Europe, that Yanukovych first accepts and then withdraws from. So, how is that seen from Germany? How close were we to a peaceful solution to this sticky problem in 2014, which would've saved us from everything that followed?
[00:36:37] Reinhard Krumm: I think Steinmeier, who was negotiating that with Sikorski, they thought they nailed it. But then Yanukovych left, and then the Ukrainian capital was not willing to accept anything with Russia.
[00:36:51] Peter Slezkine: But they thought they'd nailed it in the sense that there was actually an agreement before the rapid and violent regime change took place.
[00:37:01] Reinhard Krumm: Exactly. Yes.
[00:37:01] Peter Slezkine: So, there was going to be a managed transition.
[00:37:03] Reinhard Krumm: Yes, that was the idea. And I think, if Yanukovych hadn't left, that might have worked. Again, I was not there at the Maidan and I don't know how serious this was all on Yanukovych’s part. But because shootings have taken place, people were killed. But that was the understanding. And then he left and there was very little the European Union could do.
[00:37:23] Peter Slezkine: But you think he just made a decision to leave, that everything was in place. Why would he have left?
[00:37:28] Reinhard Krumm: Because I think he felt threatened. I think he thought that the Europeans will leave Kiev and then he's alone with those who object, not so much on the agreement, but mostly on him, not another day with him in Ukraine. That was very unfortunate.
[00:37:44] Peter Slezkine: So, we started with the discussion of Germany's special sensitivity to far right parties. In 2014 in Ukraine, there were some small numbers of serious right wing militias. What was the German attitude toward them? And how has that evolved over time?
[00:38:04] Reinhard Krumm: You have to put this all in the bigger picture.
[00:38:07] Peter Slezkine: And we can go all the way to Putin's discussion of denazification.
[00:38:11] Reinhard Krumm: Right. The German position was that this is just a hoax from the Russians since Zelensky is Jewish or half-Jewish.
[00:38:17] Peter Slezkine: No. I mean in 2014.
[00:38:19] Reinhard Krumm: Oh, 2014, I'm sorry.
[00:38:20] Peter Slezkine: In 2014.
[00:38:21] Reinhard Krumm: Still, there was the understanding, this is a hoax on the Russian side, we thought we don't really have to look into that. And this is only made up by the Russians to discredit the Ukrainian freedom movement. So, we shouldn't really go into that. And that continues.
[00:38:38] Peter Slezkine: And Stepan Bandera, whatever his political significance, objectively served in the SS.
[00:38:43] Reinhard Krumm: That was a minor point. And in general, the Ukrainian freedom movement has nothing to do with that. There were parts of it, but it's not decisive. And one shouldn't really concentrate on that.
[00:38:54] Peter Slezkine: So, in that sense, Germany was just the same in its attitude as the rest of the West. There was no special German sensitivity to the possible influence of right-wing ideologies or Nazi associations in Ukraine.
[00:39:11] Reinhard Krumm: Surprisingly not. You could have assumed there would be more analysis on that, but no, it was only seen, I'm sorry, I repeat myself, invention by the Russian Federation to discredit Ukraine.
[00:39:22] Peter Slezkine: Is there any likelihood, I mean, you already said that Germany has swung so far from one position to another that it is almost stuck in this new spot, not a term that you would use, but I will. But if now it's the United States that engages in ostpolitik over the heads of the Germans, how flexible can you be? Will you just man the ramparts and re-arm no matter what? Or will there eventually be a sense that it's not good to be left behind? If the two big giants are becoming friends without us, then who are we to jump up and down in the middle and continue a fight that has stopped?
[00:40:04] Reinhard Krumm: I think the German government, but also mostly the expert community, believe that the EU is doing the right thing—no talks with the Russians because it's useless—support Ukraine as long as it takes. And, the Trump administration is crazy. And possibly, the talks will go away anytime soon because Trump is not up to the speed of Mr. Putin.
That's very simple. I wonder how long this will hold on. I mean, look, on the one hand, the war is just terrible, almost not needed to be said, but, the atrocities and everything else, Germans, because of the history are always compared. So, how does that compare to what we've done? And Putin is seen sometimes in Germany as the second Hitler, because that's a clear comparison. And then everything is clear, what's good, what's bad,
[00:41:00] Peter Slezkine: Well, and that's the storyline on all sides. The Ukrainians, the Germans and so forth, associate Putin with Hitler. The Russians claim the Ukrainians are the Nazis. World War II is the obvious analogy for everyone involved, right? They just flip the script.
[00:41:14] Reinhard Krumm: But this is an argument which is, then any further discussion is almost impossible. And it goes as far as the sky is blue. And if Mr. Putin says that, then we have to come up with a different color of the sky. Because if we say it's blue, then we say, Mr. Putin says, and that's impossible. We shouldn't do that.
[00:41:32] Peter Slezkine: But should we get away from World War II as the only lesson of history, the single moral tale we tell ourselves?
[00:41:39] Reinhard Krumm: It's so hard because if you talk to the Russians, then it's appeasement. Again, second World War. So, whatever we do, it's either/or, there's nothing in between, and that's nothing new. And I would say what we see in Russia and what we see in general on security in Europe is new because the Russians for the first time ever in history have a companion they never had before.
Usually, it's the West for the longest time. Now, they have China. Yes, China is not the west and China is different. And many Russians wouldn't think about vacationing in China – yet. But the Russians made a decision and the Chinese too. So, there is an alternative. So, they don't have to come back to us and say, “Sorry, we made a mistake.”
And that's the assumption in German policy. We can do whatever we want. They will come back to us. No, they won't. They might at one point, but not because they're asking for help, but because they think it's in their interest. So, these changes, I don't know, they're not coming through in Germany.
So, I think, any new minister of foreign affairs, of course, will be within the EU and discuss this approach with European partners. But at one point, there has to be a change of mind that Russia's not going away and we have to talk to that country as difficult as it is. But Churchill talked to Stalin.
[00:43:01] Peter Slezkine: Well, FDR sent his most trusted assistant, Orson Welles, to talk to Hitler in the midst of World War II. So, even the Hitler comparison doesn't really hold up because you could actually engage with Hitler and FDR did.
[00:43:10] Reinhard Krumm: So, we know what the Russians want. They told us in December or January, 21, 22, but that doesn't mean that's the end of the discussion.
So, a guy who works at the OSCE, he had a talk with his Russian counterpart, said, “How do you do negotiations?” And he said, “We go into the negotiations and we tell the other side the dog has six legs,” and we keep that for the longest time. And at the very, very end we might agree, we might, that it has five legs.
So, in other words, they’re tough negotiators. So, we do the same. Why not negotiate? Is it worse to negotiate than let this war go on forever, hoping that at one point Russia will collapse? Is that a good thing?
But that's not the point. The point is the war is taking place in Ukraine and the country is going down objectively. And it's painful because it's not the fault of Ukraine in general. So, where's the alternative? So, when Sikorski said Germany never had a plan B, I think the EU has no plan B. It's only one plan.
And as long as it takes, and I think that's a mistake, the approach from President Trump to say, we have to talk about it. I think that's a good one. And, the argument, well, nothing will come out of it, that's not a good counter argument. Let's see. I mean, it cannot get worse. And that talking with the president of the Russian Federation makes him a bigger person. First of all, I doubt that second. Well, that's just how it is. You have to talk with them. And if they don't keep their word, well, I mean, you know, there are ways to negotiate that. So, we have to negotiate with them. It will be tough. Or we leave it and then this will go on forever. But this is on us then too. I can imagine at one point, Ukrainians in 20 or 30 years will come to us, say, “Why didn't you do anything? Why do you think this was the only way? Why do you think we all want this?”
I don't think Germany can forever stay in the framework of our experience of the Second World War. We should never forget what happened and our own consciousness and compass should be according to that. But we also have to adapt and we have a new situation. I would even argue as an historian, we always have to come up with time boundaries, you know, when does the century start? So, we said the 20th century was a short one. It started in 1914 or ‘18 and stopped in 1989. I would argue maybe the 20th century stopped a couple of years ago. Now is the new century because now everything is really different.
[00:45:42] Peter Slezkine: Or we've only just realized how deep the fault lines were.
[00:45:48] Reinhard Krumm: Yes.
[00:45:49] Peter Slezkine: So, what kind of constructive role could the Europeans, the Germans play going forward? Because as you say, there seems to have been a plan A that we’re with Ukrainians to the end. Who knows what that end could actually be? And now the situation has changed. There's a new sheriff in Washington, to use their formulation, and some kind of normalization with Russia is proceeding on the U.S. side, and talks have begun. And the European reaction seems mostly to be to try to put a brake on this process. So, if you're not going to just pull the brake lever but attempt to steer the car, in which way would you point it?
[00:46:30] Reinhard Krumm: I think what we should do is within the EU to come up with a plan, what exactly our military contribution to a serious deterrence in Europe will be. Not just saying we have here a couple of millions, trillion of dollars. That's not good enough. What do you want to do? Have that discussion with the Americans saying, “You want to have your military industry, you want to have ours. How do we do this?”
The second part is burden sharing. So, how do we want to then share the burden with Ukraine in general in Europe? And I think the European should talk to the Ukrainians, what we will be able—we, the European—will be able to make sure that Ukraine stays stable, secure, and prosperous. What can we really bring on the table and we will do it. But not excluding the U.S. but just have a frank conversation about how this all will work out. Because the Russians are not only interested in Ukraine. I think they want more, they want to have European security in general. I cannot see any architecture at the moment.
[00:47:29] Peter Slezkine: You mean they want to revisit the European security architecture.
[00:47:32] Reinhard Krumm: In a way I think they would, yeah, they're very much looking towards China. but no big country would like to be so connected only to one country. I think Russia is not coming back entirely to the EU, but I can imagine they want to be in between, in a good way.
On the one hand, China, excellent relations, but also not those relations that it has with the West right now. Number one, for Russia, the West is always the U.S. but even the European Union is still interesting for Russia. So, sort that out with the Americans and then try to be part of the discussion, open up channels with Russia on whatever level. If the official level is not okay, then do it one or two notches down. But do it. And tell the Ukrainians, “We are doing this not to belittle you, but to come up with a good solution.” Explain that the Ukrainians cannot go on forever. We are very much involved. We want you to stay, as I said, stable, secure, and prosperous, but in a way, including the possibility that we have to talk to the Russians. Russia is not going away.
[00:48:39] Peter Slezkine: Russia not going away is one very important, although, obvious proposition. The second question is just how menacing Russia actually is. On one hand, they haven't been capable of very much in Ukraine and are progressing very slowly and gaining very little territory. On the other hand, what really set Trump off in the argument in the Oval Office is when Zelensky told him that, if we don't stop the Russians in Ukraine, eventually you will feel it on your side of the Atlantic. And Trump said, “Don't tell us what we're gonna feel. We'll be fine without you.” And you hear many Europeans suggest similarly, that if Putin isn't stopped here, his appetite will grow with the eating. And he'll reconstitute the former Soviet Union, march all the way to Berlin and maybe even as far as Alexander the first in 1814 and make it to Paris.
How substantial is the Russian threat objectively? Because if it's now gonna be a very difficult process of re-arming, that should be matched to the menace that you may face. So, what is a actually credible evaluation of the Russian threat to Europe?
[00:49:50] Reinhard Krumm: After the attack on Ukraine, it's difficult to say they won't do that. We don't know.
[00:49:56] Peter Slezkine: Well, there's intent and capability. So, discuss both.
[00:49:59] Reinhard Krumm: Yeah, I agree. So, the intent on Ukraine was clear because of the fixation of the Russian Federation towards Ukraine. I don't see the fixation on that anywhere else, not even the Baltics. The Baltic countries were always, kind of, alien to the Russians.
The Russians want to cultivate in the old colonial way other republics countries. They never succeeded in the caucuses and they didn't even try in the Baltics. Having lived in the Baltics a couple of years, I understand if you live there, you might wonder if you are next. But if you come to capabilities, and I agree with you, the Russian army is just progressing very slowly, so, why should they take on NATO? So far, even though this is not included in many discussions, deterrence worked. So, why should this not continue? The Russians started the war in Ukraine, understanding this will be the Ukrainian all standing around with flowers. There won't be any people standing with flowers in the Baltics of Poland. None. And it's the whole, it's NATO.
[00:51:05] Peter Slezkine: Well, and there's also just a matter of manpower, it turns out that you need quite a few men to cover a large territory. In World War II and World War I, we were talking about millions and millions of people under arms. And in current conditions, under different demographic realities, these are armies of half a million men at the most.
[00:51:27] Reinhard Krumm: Exactly. And also, you now have the forward presence. It's beefed up. It's three different countries in the Baltics, or four, including Poland. Because of what happened in Ukraine, the Baltics were not satisfied with the idea of the Germans doing this cold warhead. You know, we retreat and then we come back. No. No retreat. We all stay there. And accordingly, the defense is built up. So, with all caution, I don't think that the Russians want to go further. That's not their goal. They know that their partners won't be very happy about that. China doesn't need a Russia which rolls all over Europe.
[00:52:06] Peter Slezkine: As we said, has great hopes for a stable Europe with which it does good business.
[00:52:11] Reinhard Krumm: Exactly. In this sense, Putin is not only trying on NATO, which might be extremely difficult for him. Also, his soldiers knowing how difficult it was against Ukraine, even though not a single NATO soldier was involved. Plus, he might eliminate his only real partner, China.
[00:52:31] Peter Slezkine: India is almost equally important?
[00:52:32] Reinhard Krumm: I haven't heard any good answer why he should do that. And in Germany in general, it's the old domino effect. If this falls, then comes the next. It never worked out that way. So, I'm dubious. I think as terrible as it is, Ukraine is taking the brunt of the Russians, but there is no more thirst. I mean, you always come to this quote from Putin, you know, that the collapse of the Soviet Union was the biggest catastrophe. But he has other quotes. He had this quote of saying, somebody who doesn't grieve about the end of the Soviet Union has no heart, but anybody who wants to rebuild the Soviet Union is an idiot. So, who knows what he really feels? But I cannot see with the capacity and with the intention to do anything else than that.
[00:53:17] Peter Slezkine: Well, and his fixation on Ukraine for historical, cultural, psychological reasons is clear. He’s written no academic texts based on archival sources in any other country anywhere on the planet.
[00:53:32] Reinhard Krumm: Exactly. So, this is a special case, and we knew this for quite a while. And actually, if you are the Baltics and you talk to security people one-to-one, they will tell you for the moment, there's no threats. And also, we have high tech cameras. We have them up in the air. So, you know, the minute you see a mass of military equipment and soldiers, it's a different story. And then we have to do something about it. But at the moment, I think it is safe. And I cannot see any argument for the Russians to go further.
[00:53:58] Peter Slezkine: So, if the Baltic military men do not actually believe there's a substantial Russian threat, then how do you explain Kaja Kallas' frequent assertions to the contrary?
[00:54:09] Reinhard Krumm: Because she was the prime minister of Estonia, maybe she has different intel. But again, when I talk to people in Estonia, they were not saying that. And I don't know if Kallas says this now, but it's also for political reasons. I mean, as long as you say that, the attention is there, but you also should be careful not to cry wolf too many times.
[00:54:28] Peter Slezkine: Obviously, this was a provocative question.
[00:54:31] Reinhard Krumm: I understand.
[00:54:31] Peter Slezkine: But what is interesting is that, clearly, peripheral powers, peripheral to the U.S. sphere, gained influence by invoking an external threat. And that had worked for decades and decades, all through the Cold War, basically along these same borders. Obviously, the Baltics were on the other side at that point. And then it worked once again, at least rhetorically, under Biden, who divided the world into democracies and autocracies. But Trump obviously has a very different worldview and Kaja Kallas and others have come here delivering this familiar message, that we are defending the ramparts of democracy against the evil autocrat across the border. Give us resources and respect. And she wasn't even accepted for a visit by the secretary of state. So, do you think that the realization of this new logic has landed in Europe?
[00:55:26] Reinhard Krumm: I think it has landed, but the consequences will be difficult. As you know, the percentage of military expenditure to the whole budget is fairly high in the Baltics and especially in Poland. I mean, they're aiming for 4.7%. And because of the history for the moment, the people are fine with that. But at one point, they will ask, guns or butter? I mean, how do we want to live? Do we always have to live in this suspension? Can we not do something else to ease these tensions? That will come in Germany and other European countries.
At the moment, there is the understanding certain European nation armies are not very well equipped. They don't work. I think one has to fix that. But to go beyond that and just build up a military equipment, and this cannot be the only answer to the question, how do we deal with the Russian threat at the moment? There has to be the second pillar, which is always talk. And the dialogue side is gone because it didn't work to prevent the war. And now we think only deterrence. And that's not enough. And even before the war, our understanding of dialogue was we present the Russians with our side and the Russians present their side, and this is it. We've tried everything, instead of going further. So, can we do certain things maybe as an entry point? But even that was not allowed because Russia is seen, in general and for the longest time and forever, as evil. And if you look at the country, it is a very difficult country. But that has always been the case in world history, that we have to deal with very, very difficult countries.
[00:57:00] Peter Slezkine: For example, Germany-
[00:57:01] Reinhard Krumm: Yes, absolutely.
[00:57:03] Peter Slezkine: … as we mentioned many times in this conversation.
[00:57:04] Reinhard Krumm: Yeah. But then you come back to the second world war, and the only way Germany then finally understood complete defeat. But that won't happen with Russia.
[00:57:14] Peter Slezkine: Well, and also it's not necessarily the solution to everything in Germany, as we mentioned. Because if you draw only one lesson from history and try to live according to it eternally, then you get a bit stuck. And all of your analogies are always the same. You can never adapt to any new situation. And everything is Munich or Yelta or something in between.
[00:57:36] Reinhard Krumm: Yes. The historic analysis on the appeasement is changing now. I mean, in general that again, that it has been tried. Why not? If we wouldn't have tried it…
[00:57:44] Peter Slezkine: Appeasement is just diplomacy that doesn't work. It doesn't mean that all diplomacy is bound to fail.
[00:57:50] Reinhard Krumm: Exactly. And every political move could fail. But to avoid that in saying we don't even try is the wrong answer to that. One has to try, and especially now.
[00:58:04] Peter Slezkine: Well, I'm very glad that, while others practice deterrence, you are here to contribute dialogue, both between the new world and the old, the West and the East. And then, perhaps, we'll send you one day to Mars to start a conversation with the aliens.
[00:58:21] Reinhard Krumm: Thank you very much for that proposal. Thanks, Peter.
[00:58:28] Peter Slezkine: Thanks for listening to the Trialogue Podcast. Make sure to subscribe to the show, so you don’t miss out on any episodes.
The Trialogue Podcast is hosted by the Stimson Center and produced by University FM.