Sunjoy Joshi, Chairman of India’s Observer Research Foundation, joins us to discuss Indian philosophy, subtleties of the subcontinent, and India’s relations with the US, China, and Russia. *The Trialogue Podcast is hosted by the Stimson Center and produced by University FM.
Sunjoy Joshi, Chairman of India’s Observer Research Foundation, joins us to discuss Indian philosophy, subtleties of the subcontinent, and India’s relations with the US, China, and Russia.
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*The Trialogue Podcast is hosted by the Stimson Center and produced by University FM.
(Transcripts may contain a few typographical errors due to audio quality during the podcast recording.)
[00:00:00] Peter Slezkine: I'm Peter Slezkine, Director of the U.S.-Russia-China Trialogue project at the Stimson Center. Since the middle of the 20th century, relations among the United States, Russia, and China have had an enormous impact on each country separately and on the world as a whole. The purpose of the Trialogue is to better understand this extraordinarily complex and consequential relationship by directly engaging with experts from all three countries.
In this show, guests from across the political spectrum and from every corner of the globe share their views in their own voice. While the Stimson Center seeks to provide access to a wide variety of perspectives, it does not endorse any particular position. We leave it to the listeners to judge the validity and value of the views expressed by the guests. I hope you enjoy the podcast.
My guest today is Sunjoy Joshi, Chairman of the Observer Research Foundation, India's most influential think tank. India is an ancient civilization, the world's most populous country, and an increasingly active player on the international stage. India is a key partner of both the United States and Russia, and has a complex and contentious relationship with China.
In many ways, India's traditional policy of non-alignment makes the country an interesting case study for the emerging multipolar world. Please, keep listening to hear Sunjoy's perspectives on these and other matters.
Sunjoy, welcome to the podcast!
[00:01:26] Sunjoy Joshi: Thank you, Peter. Lovely to be on this podcast with you.
[00:01:29] Peter Slezkine: Thanks so much for joining me. Can you begin by briefly describing the purpose and history of the Observer Research Foundation?
[00:01:39] Sunjoy Joshi: Well, the Observer Search Foundation has a history. It began in 1990, so it's over 35 years old today. And 1990 was a period of India's economic crisis. And it's interesting because there are acute parallels to what is happening to the economies of the world today. India in 1990 was going through a very similar situation where it was hugely in debt, there was a major foreign exchange crisis, its reserves were running extremely low. And India, from 1947 to 1990, had been a closed economy — high walls, high barriers, high tariffs, living in its own insular world. And when this crisis hit, at that point of time, India had reserves to just about pay for two weeks of imports. The Gulf War had just ended. Oil prices were extremely high and it was importing huge amounts of oil. Russia's economy had collapsed because the Soviet Union had collapsed. India had a very large trade with Russia at that point of time, almost 25% of the trades were with Russia.
So, in that situation, it was absolutely necessary. India pledged the school reserves to take $400 million worth of loans from various banks. And from there began the story of India's reforms. Now, India has a very fractured economy. They were a fractured country, politically. We had political parties which would never agree with anyone on what cause to take, you know. Even our gods bicker amongst themselves. Our politicians bicker even more.
So, in that situation, one of India's largest corporate houses, reliance industries, at that point of time, thought, “This is the time to see the think tank in India, which can somehow forge a consensus on some of the essential agendas on which there is no rolling back, that you have to go ahead. Otherwise, we are sunk as an economy. There's no future.”
So, that is how ORF was seeded, by a ground from one of India's largest corporates
[00:03:40] Peter Slezkine: But so this was India's opening up, which coincided or followed Russia's opening up economically and China's opening up economically.
[00:03:47] Sunjoy Joshi: Yeah. ORF got people together. And that's important to hear the story, because what did ORF do? ORF’s mandate, primarily, was, okay, do not get into ideological conflicts. We will need to work with ideas, not with ideologies, because it was a fractured coalition of governments.
[00:04:06] Peter Slezkine: This was, in a sense, a 1990s admission that history was over, that the Soviet Union had collapsed, that technocratic solutions to the global economy were necessary.
[00:04:17] Sunjoy Joshi: Absolutely. And those technocratic solutions had to be found in the think tank through people who needed to get down and form a consensus. And there, somehow, the consensus was forged by lots of discussions, the first, in fact, blueprint for reforms. A very rudimentary paper was created on ORF at that point of time. And that was followed through. Lots of other things also happened. I will not say that ORF took all the credit for it. A lot of things happened. A lot of good political leadership came in. And then, within four years, all of India's goals actually came back.
So, that is the birth of ORF. From that point in time, ORF has always remained a think tank, which has been open to all ideologies, to all ideas, and tries to create consensus across the broad political spectrum. That is what ORF is.
[00:05:04] Peter Slezkine: And ORF’s work is associated with all parts of the globe. Are there any national partners that you work with more than others?
[00:05:12] Sunjoy Joshi: Well, there are certain regions which are more important for us. That, again, depends on the shifting tides. But ORF has a global outreach. We work across every continent today.
[00:05:21] Peter Slezkine: You’ve spent much of your career in the Indian government before joining ORF. So, can you briefly describe your trajectory?
[00:05:29] Sunjoy Joshi: Well, I worked for about 25 years in the government of India as an officer in the Indian Administrative Service. I joined them in 1983. Before that, actually, I was happily teaching English literature at the University of Allahabad.
[00:05:40] Peter Slezkine: Let's move forward to the present day. India has always exerted a very strong gravitational force on the world. It is massive. It is ancient. But now, particularly, its economy is growing by leaps and bounds. It has recently become the most populous country on earth. And it seems to be more assertive and active on the international scene. So, what vision does India or Modi himself have for the world and for India's place within it?
[00:06:13] Sunjoy Joshi: When you talk about, what is India's worldview, what is Modi's worldview, or whatever even has been the larger worldview within the Indian foreign policy domain across many decades, you need to understand something about, where does India come from as a civilization? And a phrase which is very often used for India when we start talking of, what is India's worldview, we say it is “Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam,” which primarily is translated as the world is one family. But actually, “Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam” is a little more complex than that. “Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam” is not about the world being one family. It's about the earth being one family. Earth and all living things and all entities there in living and on living — rivers, mountains.
See, India, as I said, is a civilization where we have, well, the count goes 330 million gods, not one. And these gods are often at odds with each other. So, it is a very pluralistic vision of what the world is. It's a very pluralistic vision of what cycles of time are. And it is this vision which really colors how India approaches its place in the world.
So, when Prime Minister Modi speaks about “Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam”, you must understand what this “Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam” means. The two or three important things about this whole concept is, the first is the idea of imminence. What is divinity? Where is it inherent? It's inherent in everything in the world around us. And not only is it inherent in everything, this is a complex world. You cannot think in terms of binaries of good and evil. There can be no bias in this world. People who are outcasts, who we don't talk to. Everyone is part of it. The predator and the prey are one and the same. Opposites do come together. Opposites are needed. And the cycle of change is always the only permanent thing.
And if you start thinking in terms of the Indian epics, it's primarily about the very complex nature of morality, which is ambiguous, where there are no clear lines between what is right and what is wrong. And the call between right and wrong is taken on the battlefield of Kurukshetra, which is an Indian Epic Mahabharata. In this debate between Krishna and Arjuna, Arjuna does not want to fight because he sees his family members rage on the opposite side. He sees his teachers rage on the other side. He even sees his eldest brother, Karna, also on the other side, on the side of what is supposed to be evil. So, Krishna does not tell him that Karna is not evil. This is not a fight between good and evil. This is a call for duty. Time demands this duty. Do not hate your enemy. But decisions have to be taken, and the decisions have to be taken impassionately, impersonally, knowing within your heart what is right and what is wrong. And that is what it is. It all depends on context. It can change from time to time. These are cycles of time, which keeps changing.
So, this is the worldview which India brings when it approaches it foreign policy. And therefore, many times, when people get confused about what stance India is taking, and what does India mean by strategic autonomy, what does India mean by taking a particular stance, say, in the case of Ukraine or in the case of West Asia, or on happenings around the U.S. or on BRICS. You must understand where India is coming from.
[00:09:39] Peter Slezkine: Very interesting. So, I understand the point about pluralism, the interdependence of the various pieces of the globe, but as you say, even the gods bicker. So, is there some theory about how order might emerge from a pluralistic polyphonic, sometimes cacophonic, global society?
[00:10:03] Sunjoy Joshi: So, India believes in the theory of cycles. Again, as I said, everything contains a seed of its opposite. So, the important point is balance — balance between seeming opposites. Male and female are one and the same. They're actually united. It means, together, they create. And therefore, also, creation and destruction have ultimately come together. They move from one cycle to the other. And like an earthquake, seismic events ultimately rejuvenate the earth. The earth would be dead if there were no earthquakes in geology.
So, destruction and creation are a part of the process of life and a part of the process of the universe. So, this is primarily the Indian vision. So, when you ask about what India's position really means, and in the hurricanes and tsunamis, which are actually raging around us today, well, India's position is precisely to maintain that balance. It's like walking a tide trope in the middle of an earthquake. It's a difficult act.
[00:10:57] Peter Slezkine: India does not seek to intervene directly in these processes, which are more or less natural, but to more or less maintain its own balance.
[00:11:10] Sunjoy Joshi: It's not that decisions have to be taken. When the time comes to go into battle, then yes, actions even may need to be taken against your friends, against your family.
[00:11:20] Peter Slezkine: So, what is the ultimate driver of action? Is it the national interest? Is it the preservation of Indian civilization? What is the motivation to act or to intervene in this pluralistic set of actors in a repeating series of cycles?
[00:11:35] Sunjoy Joshi: Well, the larger motivation is actually for the greater good of all. But within a national context, yes, that India, as a country, first of all, as a coherent, cohesive society, needs to remain, needs to move forward in a difficult time.
[00:11:50] Peter Slezkine: Well, let’s then try to investigate these principles in a practical context. South Asian civilization is old and extended across the entire subcontinent and, quite a ways, north. And after the British left and the area was partitioned, we ended up with a series of states, which now have a more or less complicated relationship. So, what is India's policy toward other South Asian states, specifically?
[00:12:21] Sunjoy Joshi: Please, remember that this was all basically part of the cultural influences of the subcontinent and the influences of countries around the subcontinent, right? All the way from Persia to Central Asia, all the way up to Armenia. They were very much part of Indian civilization, Indian ethos.
[00:12:36] Peter Slezkine: All the way up to Armenia?
[00:12:38] Sunjoy Joshi: Oh, yes. Oh, yes. All the way up to, even beyond. See, when you start talking about the spice trade, India was actually the center of globalization at that point of time. And it was a globalization which lasted centuries. It was not a globalization which lasted 20, 25 years and disappeared.
[00:12:53] Peter Slezkine: What time are you talking about?
[00:12:54] Sunjoy Joshi: This is before the 15th century, before colonialism took root. And the predators came from the West. And yes, predators will come. No problem. Predators will also disappear. They will come in the future, too.
[00:13:05] Peter Slezkine: But the predators include the Moguls before the Brits.
[00:13:09] Sunjoy Joshi: The Moguls came. If you start looking at the history, India has always been a big melting pot. And that is why it survived as a pluralistic society and survived till this day. And when India talks about civilization, it is talking about civilization which is thousands of years old.
[00:13:23] Peter Slezkine: Well, you can say that the Aryans or the Indo-Europeans who arrived in the subcontinent were the first predators who laid a foundation for this entire civilization.
[00:13:31] Sunjoy Joshi: Yes, yes, they laid the foundations. And the Indo-European group of languages comes from Sanskrit. They all have Sanskrit roots. So, that is where it was born. So, what I was trying to say is that there are deep cultural links between all the countries in the region. Islam and India took on very different kinds of roots because it was colored by Indian civilization. Christianity in India has taken on very different roots because it was also colored by Indian civilization. So, the stamp of civilization has remained on all of this.
So, it is a complex relationship which India has with its neighbors. Many of these partitions created countries which did not exist before. They were artificial countries. And another country called India got created. And many of the disputes, which you today talk about, whether it is with China, whether it is with Pakistan, all relate to the time, which goes back to the partition of India, the defining of India's boundaries.
And India is not alone here. I think the process of decolonization created these conflicts in many other parts of the world — well, including in West Asia, including across the entire African continent. So, whereas, you know, many other regions are still struggling with these legacies, India, somehow, has managed to survive as a democracy, right, through many of these challenges posed by these legacies and moved on to being where it is today, you know, now they say the third largest economy, perhaps, almost in the world.
[00:14:57] Peter Slezkine: So, India, obviously, has complicated relations with Pakistan. There was a short, I suppose we could call it war, very recently. but it is also surrounded by Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, if you go further north. They were all part of the subcontinent that Britain once controlled. And we're all partitioned after the British left. Does the Indian government think of the subcontinent separately from the rest of the world? Is there a particular strategy toward these peoples who have emerged from the same civilization? Or is Pakistan its own problem, Bangladesh its own, and so on?
[00:15:33] Sunjoy Joshi: Yes and no. As I said, the cultural links go. The people-to-people links go across this region. They're very strong, and they remain strong to this day. And India has a special place, even within Pakistan. See, people-to-people links are strong. Cultural links are extremely strong. Bollywood songs are extremely popular in Pakistan. In many ways, they speak the same language. They speak in the same idioms. They understand each other instinctively perfectly. Even the marriage customs are, in many ways, similar.
So, please, understand the cultural links across, whether they talk of Nepal, whether they talk of Bangladesh, which has extremely strong cultural links with West Bengal, Sri Lanka, all over. See, those links cannot go away. And those people-to-people links remain extremely vibrant, even to this date.
There's a legacy of nationhood we created. So, Pakistan is, yes, one of our most difficult problems because of the very vexed history of partition and everything that went with the process of partition. So, India then emerged from the partition as a secular, multicultural country. Pakistan chose to become a country defined by its religion and created that kind of an entity. India moved on to becoming a democracy. Pakistan faltered as a democracy. The military in Pakistan became a very potent political force, where most things came to be controlled by the army. And in many cases, the reason for the existence of the army was this other side across the border, which always was created as a threat.
So, it is a history, you know, which goes back to what happened during the last seven years. And that has not gone away. I think the Pakistani army cannot stop thinking of India as enemy number one. Otherwise, there's no rationale for the army to be in power.
So, any attempt to make peace with Pakistan has always run into problems. And the terror threat is extremely real. We know what happened in Pathankot. We know what happened before that also. So, India, today, is in a position where it said, “Okay, we are not going to take this lying down. If this happens, it is not that we are going to be back to talking with you and, you know, fighting over a few more years. We are going to say that, yes, we have a strong hand and we are going to take action. It is not about being quiet and waiting for the cycle to sort itself out.” Culture does not operate that way. You take decisive action when the call comes for action, no matter who it is, no matter what it is.
So, this is India's new doctrine. So, when you start talking of, you know, India's strategy of non-alignment or multi-alignment, what does it mean? Bear this in mind. It is not about not acting. It's about taking decisions forcefully when the time comes.
So, yes, Pakistan is a problem and Pakistan needs to be handled, but Pakistan is ultimately peripheral to India's story. It is a nuisance, yes. It does tend to hold us back. But we don't see it really as an enemy. We see terrorism as a threat, and we will do everything to contain it. But otherwise, as far as India is concerned, our priorities are very, very different. India needs to grow. India needs to become an economically strong nation. India has a problem of poverty still existing. India has a problem of making sure that 1.45 billion people have good opportunities in a progressive and forward-looking world.
[00:18:46] Peter Slezkine: So, your argument is that for Pakistan, because of its national identity, because of its military government, India is a necessary threat, a central component of Pakistani policy. Whereas, for India, Pakistan is one problem among many a nuisance, you called it, sort of, a peripheral issue.
[00:19:09] Sunjoy Joshi: It's a nuisance. It's a peripheral issue. We will handle it. And I don't think it really bothers us that much beyond a point. But yes, it is a nuisance. It is like a monkey on our back.
[00:19:18] Peter Slezkine: What about Sri Lanka? The civil war is over. There was a great crisis a year or two ago when the presidential palace was stormed. Bangladesh has just had a change of government. So, what do you make of your other South Asian neighbors?
[00:19:32] Sunjoy Joshi: See, for all these countries, let us try to understand, whether it is Nepal, whether it's Sri Lanka, whether it's Bangladesh, or for that matter, whether it is Pakistan, there's another giant neighbor also looming, which is China. So, there is a game for influence in the region, which, you know, India calls the String of Pearls theory, that somehow, to be able to isolate India, and we will go into that question later about India's complicated relationship with China, but there will definitely be an attempt for other countries like China to start building influence there.
So, it is a matter of India also counteracting these attempts at influence. We do not say that these attempts to influence will not happen. But yes, India always comes forward as someone who, in a crisis, will lend a helping hand and has done so repeatedly with neighbors like Sri Lanka. India helped build them out of crisis when they were in the recent past. And Sri Lanka acknowledges it. We are not there to build huge ports and huge airports, which are not going to fetch any returns. We are there to fill solid, small-scale projects, which will give immediate returns, which alleviate, say, an energy crisis, which is the reason, when they were short of petrol, they were short of oil, we went in and stepped in, in those situations. So, it's a stable relationship with Sri Lanka which I think we've gone into.
[00:20:47] Peter Slezkine: And what about the new government in Bangladesh?
[00:20:49] Sunjoy Joshi: The new government of Bangladesh, initially, I think, you know, began with a certain amount of negativity with India. And India, of course, was really shocked by some of the actions with, I guess, the minority community there. That became an issue within India. And that will always become an issue in India, for obvious reasons. But hopefully, I think things will sort themselves out, because in the long term, Bangladesh, where it is located, you know, strategically, the Bay of Bengal always shares with India that strong cultural links which it has with West Bengal.
They remain there, you know. That's why I said the people-to-people connection always plays in. So, Bangladesh, at the moment, yes, has become something to think about, but I think the problem should be resolved, will be resolved. Let us see what happens when the next government comes in. Let there be elections. Let there be a fair government in Bangladesh, not a caretaker government. Then, we can take a call.
[00:21:41] Peter Slezkine: But you were talking about the people-to-people context, the great connections across the border between, say, Bengal and Bangladesh. But is that part of India's foreign policy, that you might have squabbles but this is considered one family? And if you are positioning yourself relative to China, do you describe them as alien outsiders and yourselves as close siblings and members of one family, or these are all sovereign nations, as far as formal foreign policy is concerned?
[00:22:07] Sunjoy Joshi: See, you have to respect their sovereignty. If you do not respect their sovereignty, you're not going to get along very well with them. So, in a modern and national system run by the United Nations, sovereignty is a basic fact. And their sovereignty must be recognized, whether it is for Nepal, whether it is for Bangladesh. There's no question of us trying to overwrite that sovereignty, under normal circumstances.
So, that holds true for all nations. So, both the people-to-people connections matter, but the enabling sovereignty of the nation is never at stake. Let's be very clear about it. Indian foreign policy works on that principle.
[00:22:41] Peter Slezkine: Well, let's pivot to China, which has its own long civilizational history, which has always been India's neighbor. Cultural influence has been shared. Buddhism has traveled from India to China and been terribly influential. But these are two very different civilizations, ultimately, in the two great powers in Asia now and into the future. So, China and India, obviously, have a border dispute, but there is much more going on, geopolitically and economically. So, describe India's relationship with China.
[00:23:13] Sunjoy Joshi: A complex relationship, an extremely nuanced relationship. So, you'll find lots of contradictions in India's approach to China from time to time. And whether India is a member of the Quad and whether India is engaging in various other formats, yes, China, in many ways, is a strategic rival to India, as far as competition for influence is concerned. Influence in the region, influence across, say, countries in Africa. India and China have had a history of, in the last few years… it's not a very long history, but say the last 30, 40 years, I’m not talking about the long history of 3,000 years. In 3,000 years China, India did not really have any major conflict except 1962. 1962 changed the trend. They were two extremely peaceful nations, living together with lots of exchange of ideas. Buddhism went from India to China. And yes, there was a lot of cultural interaction, a lot of respect in the people of the two countries for each other.
And in many cases, yes, that respect still carries on. It is not that China does not respect India as a people nor India does not respect China as a people. We do respect them. We do respect the immense amount of progress which they have made in the last few years — the way they've changed, the way they've eliminated poverty. There is a lot of admission in India for all those positives of China. But yes, geostrategically, because of what is happening around us, we do find ourselves in this situation rivals, even as we have an extremely vibrant trade relationship. And the trade relationship does not really see signs of stopping. There may be ups and downs, you know, once in a while; but otherwise, it's been fairly steady. And the problem with India-China's trade is that the trade is extremely one-sided. And that is India's problem. It’s the kind of problem the U.S. has with China, too.
[00:24:58] Peter Slezkine: So, when India looks at China, what is the greatest challenge? Is it the border dispute? Is it the unbalanced economic relationship, or more specifically, reliance on China for critical components in elements of high tech? Is it the larger region and geopolitical rivalry there? What is the rankings of challenges that China presents?
[00:25:25] Sunjoy Joshi: See, elements of high tech in India do not depend on China. It's rarely using Chinese technology because of strategic reasons. And in fact, India is the only country which actually went and banned certain apps, Chinese apps, because they thought that there was a price to pay for that. Very few other countries did, but India boldly went ahead and did that. That's why I said that, when India needs to take action, it does not hesitate from taking that kind of action, no matter who it is, friend or foe. That does not make China a foe, incidentally, in the Indian scheme of things, because we look at the world very, very differently. But the fact is that, when decisions have to be taken, they may even have to be taken against friends. So, that is very clear.
So, in technology, no. Trade, unbalanced trade, India has, for years, been in negotiations with China to try and balance that trade. And there are various discussions which have taken place from time to time. Because that one-way dependency for any country is not good, whether it is a technological dependency on any one country, not good at all. And India is actually seriously thinking about those issues also today, when it starts thinking of how to build its industrial complex, and how to move ahead into the future. Those are general questions, which India today is asking when it talks about making in India, so that India is not basically dependent on any major country — forget China — any major country, for some of the most critical elements in the supply chain. That is a kind of global trend which is happening everywhere also. But India is looking at it very differently because of the particular neighborhood it is in and the larger geopolitical framework with which it's operating.
But trade opportunities, yes. India-China trade, in many ways, has expanded India's markets. It's not that India's markets have been weakened. A lot of cheap goods have come into India. And where there are cheap goods, there has been a case of dumping. India has protested. And India has protested strongly. And India has imposed huge anti-dumping duties on China because it does not want to be sworn by those kinds of products. But products which are needed in India and do not fall in the category of anti-dumping, which are necessary also, in many ways, to help India create the manufacturing base, they have always been welcome. So, it's a competitorship. India never will say no to China as far as trade is concerned. So, that is the tight rope which India is trying to walk. And India needs friends, not just in China. India is friends in the U.S., too.
[00:27:48] Peter Slezkine: To what extent is India's relationship with the U.S. now a function of both countries’ fear of China? Because I mean, obviously, the U.S.-India relationship is long and complicated. The U.S. was closer to Pakistan during much of the Cold War. Now, China is close to Pakistan and the U.S. and India have grown more intimate.
[00:28:14] Sunjoy Joshi: As far as Pakistan is concerned, India feels that China and the U.S. have, kind of, the same strategy towards Pakistan. They have a lot to give up. And they've never really abandoned Pakistan, no matter what India says or what India feels about it. So, that is a complex equation which India has to work out, both with China and the U.S.
[00:28:36] Peter Slezkine: So, you don't feel like the U.S. has pivoted from Pakistan to India in its international relationship and priorities?
[00:28:42] Sunjoy Joshi: At times, yes, we do feel that. But then at times, like, soon after operation, though the feeling is that, perhaps, you know, there are U.S. interests in Pakistan that are still alive. And it is not easy for the U.S. to give up Pakistan, for certain geostrategic reasons, which are necessarily not aligned with India's geostrategic reasons. The U.S. will go on needing Pakistan for quite some time. And therefore, it is not in a position to give up on Pakistan.
[00:29:06] Peter Slezkine: So, what are those reasons? Is that China? Because, obviously, when the U.S. was fighting for decades in Afghanistan, then having a presence in Pakistan over the border could be useful. Although, that was a complicated relationship. But now that we are hopefully out of Afghanistan for good, what's the strategic necessity for our relationship with Pakistan?
[00:29:26] Sunjoy Joshi: Well, it's an extremely complicated region. You can never say you're out of the region for good and for how long. Remember what happened in Syria? So, for that reason, it's difficult to say that we are out of that region for good. Never say the last word on that.
[00:29:39] Peter Slezkine: Well, that's the problem, is that we never quite leave it. We always remain around the areas that we leave, which then tempts us to go back in or create some problem that then forces the U.S. to return.
[00:29:49] Sunjoy Joshi: These are larger games for influence being played in the region between Russia and the United States and European powers, which have gone on, not just in the last few years, but have gone on for a long time. Since colonial times, these conflicts have existed. So, there's a long, deep-seated history to these conflicts. Unfortunately, that has left West Asia in an extremely disturbed and delicate position. And yes, India is worried about it. And that is one region, whether it is Pakistan, whether it is Afghanistan, or whether it is a region further west of that.
India will be wary and will not always agree with what the interests of Europe and the U.S. are in the region. So, that is where, now, the whole idea of strategic autonomy comes from, that there are certain interests here in this region where India will have to look after itself, have to look after its alliances in the area, and build those alliances separately from the concerns of its other Quad members.
So, that is how India will continue to operate. So, when people start to understand why India talks of strategic autonomy, this is the region. Because as far as, to some extent, the Indo-Pacific is concerned, the eastern side of the Indo-Pacific, up to the Bay of Bengal, there is more or less greater consensus between India and the U.S. and certain European port partners.
Moving beyond that into their agency, there's a problem. Indo-Pacific, as far as they're concerned, should stop from Hollywood to Bollywood, not go beyond that. India disagrees with that. And that disagreement will be there as a disagreement, for which reason they are going to be differences between India and its friends. And India always insists that those disagreements should not be allowed to break our relationships.
[00:31:31] Peter Slezkine: So, the American and Indian strategic visions, obviously, don't align completely or everywhere.
[00:31:37] Sunjoy Joshi: They do not align completely in certain parts of the world. In other parts of the world, they may align.
[00:31:41] Peter Slezkine: So, regarding China, they align, more or less. You've mentioned the Quad several times. What is the value of the Quad to India? And what is its future now that Trump is in power? There's a slightly different logic in Washington.
[00:31:55] Sunjoy Joshi: While India talks about strategic rivalry with China, India persistently and, for a long time, consistently has been advocating that we do not want to see the Quad, a security alliance aimed against anyone, including China. They're very clear on that . This is not a security alliance. It cannot become a NATO kind of security alliance against China. And that, they've resisted time and time again.
So, why is there rivalry, strategic rivalry? India has no intention. And there's no question, unless it is forced into, you know, getting into a confrontation into war, even across the border. We would like our border issues to be resolved as mature adults — by conversations, by talking to each other, by building congress between the two partners. That is the ideal way. But should the time come for us to take a stand, then we will not hesitate. And that is what the new doctrine is, that we will not hesitate to take a stand and take a tough stand on it, including any option.
[00:32:52] Peter Slezkine: But that's the border dispute where you have Indian and Chinese forces on both sides. Those are the two actors that matter. The Quad, presumably, isn't of any use in the Himalayas. So, what is the Quad for? You say that it's not an alliance against China. What is the purpose of the Quad? Is it just to create more outlets in the region to balance China, in general?
[00:33:13] Sunjoy Joshi: Well, the importance of the Quad is, primarily, because as far as the Indian Ocean is concerned, as far as the naval position in the Indian Ocean is concerned, the Quad needs India and India needs the Quad.
[00:33:22] Peter Slezkine: Because India has the coastline and is in the region.
[00:33:25] Sunjoy Joshi: We have the coast line, and we also have the navy, you see? So, therefore, both sides need each other.
[00:33:29] Peter Slezkine: Well, the other participants have more of a navy.
[00:33:32] Sunjoy Joshi: Pardon?
[00:33:33] Peter Slezkine: Well, if you have both the coastline and the navy, then you don't need the…
[00:33:34] Sunjoy Joshi: Strong navy, but we can do with more assistance and other people coming in to patrol these very, very difficult waters. So, the Quad, A, as a maritime construct, is extremely important. Secondly, on issues of technological alliances, on alliances between democratic nations of the world building partnerships for technology, for trade, for building a counter to a very hegemonic construct called the BRI, which actually makes deepened routes Central Asia, into Africa, and just completely leaves out huge straits of the Indian subcontinent. There is a problem there. So, we do not want India to be isolated and actually be rendered an island by a march of a huge infrastructure project which excludes us.
So, that's why the trust to align with other partners, to build alternative connectivity projects, who has not… well, you can say they're a challenge to the BRI, but they're also complimentary. Trade ultimately flows through various routes and ultimately through all kinds of complementary directions. So, that is why we have deliberately become part of the IMEC. We are part of the I2U2 Alliance and West Asia. And those are particular ideas where we are one with the U.S. on some of these concepts. The I2U2 Alliance is important for us.
[00:34:51] Peter Slezkine: What is that?
[00:34:52] Sunjoy Joshi: The I2U2, which is India, UAE, U.S., and Saudi Arabia. These are ideas. And the IMEC, also, is part of that India-Middle East corridor.
So, these are ideas which, yes, we are important to build our presence in a very important part of Eurasia where India, otherwise, risks having been cut off. That does not mean we are going to give up projects like the North-South corridor with Iran or with Russia or with other countries in Central Asia because that's not the route. There's the entire hinterland of Afghanistan, which has to be there and that we need a presence there. So, these are areas where you will find we will have similarities and then we will have differences, too. And they will continue.
[00:35:33] Peter Slezkine: You mentioned the importance of this alliance of democracies in the Quad, but then you talked about other groupings that included the Arab Gulf States. Is the emphasis on democracy just to assuage the American partners during the Biden era? Does it make any difference who your partners are in that respect, if the pragmatic relationship is positive for you?
[00:35:55] Sunjoy Joshi: Well, that's for the U.S. to decide, if that should value democracy or has democracy changed, as far as India is concerned.
[00:36:00] Peter Slezkine: But that was a big part of the declared relationship with India. In every speech, when India is mentioned, it is always described as the world's largest democracy. And then it is put in this framework of democracy versus autocracy. Perhaps, that moment has passed. Do these divisions matter for India? You were saying before that a world based on binaries is not one that you find appealing as a people.
[00:36:21] Sunjoy Joshi: It does not, because if India does not make that to handle, to beat anyone with, that’s saying you're not a democracy. India has no qualms about it. India has friendships across. India is close to Russia. And the U.S. will say Russia is not a democracy.
[00:36:35] Peter Slezkine: Let's get to Russia in a moment, but first to finish on the U.S. relationship with India. There seems to be a drive to, in some respects, make India the new China as the warehouse of the U.S. economy, to move Apple from China to India. It seems like it hasn't been going smoothly. So, what are the prospects for that? What does India think of this trajectory?
[00:37:00] Sunjoy Joshi: See, it depends on what happens to ideas of nearshoring, because there is a certain amount of confusion in the U.S. policy on that. Is it about shifting all production back to the U.S.? Because in that case, countries like India, Vietnam, which have become centers for production, which ultimately, yes, over the years, will move up the value chain. It is not that they will remain confined to the last end of the value chain. If China moves the value chain, they will also move the value chain. And India is actually making very strong efforts through that. And India is far ahead of the curve, as far as that process is concerned, because India has a strong vibrant economy and strong companies who are putting in money in climbing up the value chain as fast as they can.
So, a lot of that is going to depend on U.S. policy from here into the future. Meanwhile, India is going to be talking also to other regions of the world. And that is where its alliances and BRICS become important. It is not part of the Southeast Asian alliance of the ASEAN countries. There are separate groupings which have come out. But it has very strong trade partnerships with most of these countries.
So, these engagements with Southeast Asia, with Japan, with West Asia, which is, actually, growing influence, particularly, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, all these other countries, India is developing very, very strong trade linkages. See, trade will expand in various directions. And that is going to happen. You will find regionalization of global trade happening over time. And the push will come towards that.
So, that is where India is in conversation with all these partners, including intense discussions with Europe on what to do, how to move ahead with trade, depending on where U.S. policies move from here, because some of us are concerned. What we think is that, maybe, the changes within the U.S. which are happening on trade, they're not passing phases. There are deeper reasons where these are going to continue. And we are going to have to live with it.
[00:38:49] Peter Slezkine: Obviously, the U.S. cannot immediately produce everything on its own soil, and there has clearly been an effort to find relatively cheap labor that would be based somewhere other than China. And either Apple comes to India from China or doesn't. So, let's just take the case of Apple.
[00:39:10] Sunjoy Joshi: Well, one of the largest exports of Apple iPhones is out of India.
[00:38:49] Peter Slezkine: So, is India interested in having Apple and other companies like that move from China to India? Are they seeking to incentivize these companies to come over? Are they putting conditions on these companies, some kind of technology transfer?
[00:39:26] Sunjoy Joshi: See, eventually, India is looking at models of core production. And that goes across a whole host of technologies, which includes, by the way, defense technologies, too. There is going to be increasing emphasis on co-production ventures, because the old model of buying from abroad does not really work anymore, especially in strategic sectors. And technology, too, is a strategic sector today.
So, yes, as far as climbing the value chain goes, India will definitely be grabbing a lot of attention there. And the Indian private sector is scouting for opportunities of acquiring R&D through acquisitions and using that in a fair manner, on a market-based manner, to get much more production co-located right here in India. So, that is the path which India is going to be pursuing.
Again, a lot depends on where we move from here. See, where do the demand centers for the next movement in manufacturing really arise when AI comes into play? What happens to the shape of manufacturing? Now, as far as many of us can see, manufacturing itself does not remain manufacturing. It actually becomes a service. It became a service economy with the fourth industrial revolution. When it becomes a service economy, then India definitely has certain strengths there, because India's largest growth, right through, you know, this period with this very high trajectory of growth, has been in the services sector. So, there are big opportunities for India, which we are looking at very, very closely. And if you'd ask me what India's model would be, that would be India's model.
[00:40:49] Peter Slezkine: Is seeking to take advantage of the upcoming AI revolution, which will privilege the service sector, which India, I wouldn't say has dominated, but has made a huge part of its economic rise in recent decades?
[00:41:03] Sunjoy Joshi: It's a very competitive sector, ultimately, which is India's most competitive sector. It is not really labor arbitrage. It is more the services arbitrage, which is played and played very effectively.
[00:41:13] Peter Slezkine: But isn't there a possibility that, at least from the American perspective, you call a helpline, you end up with somebody with a South Asian accent on the other side, and that's how you encounter this Indian service sector? And from what I understand, the idea is that all of those Indians will be replaced by AI chatbots. So, is AI not a problem in this respect?
[00:41:35] Sunjoy Joshi: That has already happened. See, that was the old model. That model no longer works. India's no longer looking at that model. India's now looking at the model where, when you start going into things like 3D manufacturing distributed and manufactured at, you know, centers of demand. And when those kinds of things start happening, there, you require a whole host of services. See, it becomes largely a services-led manufacturing sector, more and more. That is a transformation which I'm really talking about.
[00:42:01] Peter Slezkine: So, India is obviously central to U.S. foreign policy. It’s mentioned more and more in American political speeches about the state of the world, about its important alliances and partnerships. But India has also become very present inside of the United States in politics, in Silicon Valley, on both the right and the left of the political spectrum. Vivek Ramaswamy, JD Vance's wife, the head of the FBI, Kash Patel, Sundar Pichai, the head of Alphabet, Zohran Mamdani, who may become the mayor of New York City. Does this matter to Indians in India that all sorts of Indian Americans are now in top positions?
[00:42:46] Sunjoy Joshi: Peter, the Americans first, Indians last. Let's be very clear about it.
[00:42:50] Peter Slezkine: Not even a second, but last.
[00:42:51] Sunjoy Joshi: I think America should be. And is their priority number-one the country they're living in? I think we are very clear on that. So, we do not claim any patriarchal rights over them. They are independent individuals. And the U.S. is a very individual society anyway. And it's great what they've achieved. They're bright minds, great people. And I think they are America's fortune. They've been good for America. So, I think America should be celebrating their presence there. We are proud of them, yes, because they have heritage in India. So, yes, that makes us proud of them.
[00:43:21] Peter Slezkine: And is that celebrated, say, in Indian media and Indian TV when Sundar Pichai becomes the CEO of Alphabet, when Zohran Mamdani achieves spectacular political success? Is this something that is disproportionately covered on Indian TV?
[00:43:35] Sunjoy Joshi: It would be, yes.
[00:43:36] Peter Slezkine: But there's no special effort to use these links.
[00:43:40] Sunjoy Joshi: Special efforts will ultimately, you know, what is good for business will happen.
[00:43:46] Peter Slezkine: Is it easier to create business deals, business context?
[00:43:49] Sunjoy Joshi: In a certain sense, because of cultural linkages, yes, it would be easier. But ultimately, hard sense prevails on both sides, hard economic sense.
[00:43:57] Peter Slezkine: Well, speaking of hard economic sense and, perhaps, sentimental, historical ties, let's turn to India's relationship with Russia. So, it does seem that, from the Soviet period, there was an intimacy, a special relationship with Russia, an educational relationship with Russia, where many of the textbooks that people of a certain generation grew up on had been produced in the Soviet Union. There's obviously the military relationship with which much of the Indian military equipment was made in the Soviet Union and is still provided by Russia. And then since the start of the war in Ukraine, India has been one of the big purchasers of Russian oil. So, characterize the relationship with Russia for me, sort of, in a historical context and in a strategic, pragmatic economic setting, going forward.
[00:44:54] Sunjoy Joshi: See, in the historical context, yes, it's an extremely strong relationship. And Russia did a lot for India during the first few decades of its independence when it became an industrial economy. While the U.S. was keen to set up coal factories in India, Russians came in with hard infrastructure factories. They set up their steel mills. A lot of the growth story of India, nascent oil industry, has a lot to do with Russia and technology which came in from the Russians.
So, they helped build India's industrial backbone. And that is a debt which India will never forget because it's a generational debt. It’s a certain generation that recognizes the great role that Russia played. And not just in its defense program, India’s space program also owes a lot to them. So, these are ties which will not go away. Please, understand that, as far as Russia is concerned, Russia is an Asian power. It is not oceans away from us. And India's efforts for many, many years have been to build inroads into Russia, build the connectivity corridors into Russia, whether through Iran, whether through various other routes. It has always been trying. That's one point. Afghanistan has also tried. So, there have been various attempts to start those linkages, and they have not died down.
[00:46:05] Peter Slezkine: Russia's recent recognition of the Taliban government, is that partly a first step in seeking to create a logistical corridor to India? Is that one of the motivations you think for Russia's recognition of the Taliban government?
[00:46:18] Sunjoy Joshi: It may be. And for that matter, India also got over its initial hesitation with the Taliban. It is not happy with what happened, with the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. It didn't, again, agree with the U.S. position on choosing to withdraw when it did, because it felt like it left the region in a complete lurch. It changes times. So, you know, there was a lot of resentment within India for that, and for good reason.
But over the years, India has got over its initial fears, initial suspicions. And India today, yes, has channeled the communication with Taliban itself. It is talking to them. India's more open to them. As I said, India does not regard this whole idea of people being completely made barriers at any point of time. And that is where it also does not like any country, including Russia, to be made into a barrier and to be completely discarded. And no one talks to Russia. Russia is an important partner in Asia and will always remain in Asian power. And for that reason, India will maintain its relationship with Russia no matter what happens. And the relationship will be trade, to some extent. More than trade, yes. It is going to be a strategic relationship. Also, to balance China. Just as India uses the U.S. to balance China, Russia is also a very important counter-force when India will have problems, and does have problems with China. And these relationships have helped India in the past. And I don't see this going away.
[00:47:37] Peter Slezkine: Is the sentimental connection to the Soviet Union and Russia, does that remain strong in younger generations? Or is that something that is only keenly felt by those who studied with Soviet textbooks, who listened to Soviet songs?
[00:47:54] Sunjoy Joshi: It changes. Today, most Indians realize that Russia is not what it was in the times of the Soviet Union. Russia is a changed country. And Russia is a changed country in many ways. Changed for the better in many directions. There are opportunities there, too.
So, Indian companies, by the way, have been engaging with Russian companies for a long time, especially in the oil and gas sector. Indian and public sector companies have been engaging with Russian companies. And nothing to do with the Soviet legacy. It is far beyond the Soviet legacy.
So, those partnerships have continued. And many of these, India never actually agreed to sanction Russia. India has been bitterly opposed to the whole idea of sanctions. India has also been very opposed to the idea of using the interbank system as a weapon of war. Now, this is fundamentally something which destroyed trust and trade and set global economies back by many years, and actually has disastrous consequences for the entire countries of the South, as far as food was concerned, fertilizer was concerned, supplies of essential goods, medicines were concerned. It was disastrous. The impacts were far-reaching. It's a very ill-thought move. It’s just the fact that Russia was so important in the supply chain of many of these energy, food, and fertilizer products for many of these countries. So, again, as I said, differences with Europe and differences with the USA on these things have remained with India.
[00:49:16] Peter Slezkine: How active was the United States under Biden and now under Trump in pressuring India to follow the sanctions? How big a threat have secondary sanctions been? What do you think of this bill that may or may not pass Congress that would apply 500% tariffs to India if it buys Russian oil? So, how active has the United States been in trying to pressure India to economically isolate Russia? Or do they basically realize that India is such an important strategic partner, that India is an exception, it can do what it wants?
[00:49:55] Sunjoy Joshi: So far, I know they have been indulgent. And so, most of the time, as far as the oil trade was concerned, in fact, it is not that they were indulgent for the sake of India. They were probably indulgent also for the sake of their own markets, because a lot of the Russian crude, which is coming to India, was actually being refined and exported to Europe and America and kept prices down at the pump.
You cannot tamper with the global economy like this. You see, you cannot interfere with markets. And that realization hits hard. And therefore, there were good reasons why a lot of the oil and gas, which ultimately got traded, which got swapped, found its way back into European markets. And frankly, both European politicians and American politicians knew what was happening. And they did not come in with any secondary sanction, that process.
So, that is one part of it. But as far as India is concerned, India has always, whether it is with the oil trade with Iran or with the oil trade with Russia or with various other issues, India has fundamentally opposed sanctions and asked for leeway on them. And in most cases, it has got that leeway. If you remember, it got the leeway as far as the submissions were concerned.
[00:50:58] Peter Slezkine: What was concerned?
[00:50:59] Sunjoy Joshi: The substitutes of the Patriots.
[00:51:01] Peter Slezkine: Oh, the Russian anti-air system.
[00:51:03] Sunjoy Joshi: Anti-air system. So, it got that waiver. So, I think even America understands, and that's the good part, that amongst friends, these understanding should be there. If you regard each other as friends, we have to realize that we actually walk in each other's boots and see where we are situated. We have certain conditions where we will not agree with you. We will have differences for our own reasons. And it is important that friends take care of each other's security concerns. Otherwise, the friendship will not stay.
So, that is important — mature diplomacy, mature relationships across nations. And I think, to the credit of both sides, more or less, there have been some tickling points, which we have rubbed each other the wrong way. Otherwise, it has gone on fairly smoothly.
[00:51:45] Peter Slezkine: Do you think India will continue to mostly purchase military equipment from Russia? Will it balance these purchases with American equipment? Will American equipment end up predominating in a number of years and displace Russian military provisions?
[00:52:02] Sunjoy Joshi: Well, I told you right at the beginning that India will now be looking at more and more towards whoever gives it the best chances at co-production, because India wants to really make in India. And this will always be a very important clause in any negotiation which India enters into. And this has been happening for quite a few years.
[00:52:20] Peter Slezkine: So, where is their greater willingness to engage Indian co-production, Russian or American military industries?
[00:52:27] Sunjoy Joshi: As I said right from the beginning, Russians have been extremely forthcoming. The entire BrahMos program is a very successful co-production program. BrahMos missiles, which India has been exporting now to various countries, was actually a co-production program which began with Russia.
[00:52:39] Peter Slezkine: Are there any co-production programs with the U.S. yet, or no?
[00:52:42] Sunjoy Joshi: Well, some elements of co-production are there. You know, people are waking up to it, I think. But that is a trend which is going to increase and should be increasing. And after that, yes, whoever offers the best deal, India is open. We are a good market. And we have good production capabilities.
[00:52:57] Peter Slezkine: Seems like a very pragmatic and promising position. So, finally, there was just a BRICS Summit in Brazil. The next BRICS Summit will be in India. What does BRICS represent for India? What is its purpose? It's obviously a complicated grouping of very different states. India and China are both members at the BRICS Summit. In Russia last year, Xi and Modi sat together and seemed to have lowered the temperature on the conflict along the border, at least to some extent. So, what is BRICS for India? What is its purpose?
[00:53:36] Sunjoy Joshi: You've put your finger on it. BRICS is important for India because, yes, the leaders of two sides can get to talk to each other and discuss some of these very thorny issues which keep coming up at BRICS. That is one part. The other part is, in spite of all our rivalries, in spite of all our problems, we do have a very important trade relationship with each other.
But BRICS is larger than just these two countries, India and China. Interestingly, this last BRICS Summit, I think, is important precisely for the reason that both President Putin and President Xi stayed away. They did not participate. And you saw a declaration come out of BRICS at the end of it. Many people felt that BRICS will be a damp squid, nothing will happen in BRICS. But they came out with a fairly forceful declaration. They were careful. Trump might say that this is anti-America, but they're very careful to phrase it in ways which did not name any country. They did not say, “We are anti-America.” Even on the issue of the attack on Iran, which was actually a violation of the UN charter.
[00:54:30] Peter Slezkine: And Iran is now a member of BRICS.
[00:54:31] Sunjoy Joshi: Iran is now a member of BRICS. But also on the war on Gaza, on everything else, BRICS came out with a strong statement but did not name the U.S. It tried to step around the problem to say, “Yes, we don't want to call more here and call by any other name,” but they came out with spaces on all these fronts. So, multipolarity has become a reality. And multipolarity means not just Russia and China. Multipolarity means a lot of other nations are now a part of BRICS. So, BRICS becomes important because it is definitely the rise of multipolarity. And multipolarity is going to be important to shape the new international order. BRICS is one group which, all the time, discusses what to do with the multilateral development banks, what to do with the World Bank, how to change the shareholding patterns, how to get greater participation as far as economic development is concerned.
The key front features to talk about are, you know, infrastructure, funds, growth, climate change, how to tackle the problem of the future, technology issues. They all get discussed in BRICS. So, that is why BRICS is becoming important as a force, which will ultimately change a very slow-moving multilateral system, which is resistant to reform. Maybe move it out, do something, and reshape it. They don't want to supplant it, but they want to reshape it into becoming a more potent and a more equitable force.
[00:55:53] Peter Slezkine: But BRICS on its own isn't a poll. It's more of a discussion platform for those who are interested in creating a post unipolar world.
[00:56:05] Sunjoy Joshi: Yes. And it's a very potent discussion forum, because many common positions get taken here, get formed here. That is the advantage of many of these free lateral forums. You may even say that SCO, for that matter, and SCO is a more contentious forum as far as India…
[00:56:19] Peter Slezkine: Yeah, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.
[00:56:20] Sunjoy Joshi: Yeah, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. As far as India and China are concerned, but India is a member of the SCO, Pakistan is also a member of the SCO. That does create a lot of friction at times. But again, that becomes important as a forum for raising certain issues and discussing certain issues.
[00:56:33] Peter Slezkine: Well, thank you for discussing so many issues with me today. It was great to have you on.
[00:56:37] Sunjoy Joshi: Thank you, Peter. It's a pleasure talking to you.
[00:56:43] Peter Slezkine: Thanks for listening to the Trialogue Podcast. Make sure to subscribe to the show so you don’t miss out on any episodes. The Trialogue Podcast is hosted by the Stimson Center and produced by University FM.