This episode is a recording of a live event held online on April 8. Lanxin Xiang, Andrey Kortunov, and Emma Ashford joined me to discuss the state of theUS-Russia-China trilateral relationship. *The Trialogue Podcast is hosted by the Stimson Center and produced by University FM.
This episode is a recording of a live event held online on April 8. Lanxin Xiang, Andrey Kortunov, and Emma Ashford joined me to discuss the state of theUS-Russia-China trilateral relationship.
*The Trialogue Podcast is hosted by the Stimson Center and produced by University FM.
(Transcripts may contain a few typographical errors due to audio quality during the podcast recording.)
[00:00:00] Peter Slezkine: I'm Peter Slezkine, Director of the U.S.-Russia-China Trialogue project at the Stimson Center. Since the middle of the 20th century, relations among the United States, Russia, and China have had an enormous impact on each country separately and on the world as a whole. The purpose of the Trialogue is to better understand this extraordinarily complex and consequential relationship by directly engaging with experts from all three countries.
Thanks so much for tuning into this online event. My name is Peter Slezkine, and I'm the Director of the Russia program and the USA-Russia-China Trialogue Project at the Stimson Center. I'm joined today by my colleague, Emma Ashford, senior fellow in the Reimagining US Grand Strategy Program here at Stimson, by Andrey Kortunov, former Director General of Russian International Affairs Council, and Lanxin Xiang, Professor emeritus at the Graduate Institute at Geneva, distinguished fellow at the Stimson Center, and soon-to-be Quang Xi Chair at the Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore.
Andrey is joining us from Moscow, where it is currently 5:01 P.M. Lanxin is on his last legs in Shanghai, where it is 10:00 P.M. And even Emma, I think, had to overcome some obstacles to be with us here today. It sounds like her internet was cut by construction workers this morning, so she had to hustle into the office. So, thank you all for joining us from all over the world.
So, we hope that this will be the first in a recurring series of trilateral discussions featuring Americans, Russians, and Chinese discussing specific topics like nukes, UN Reform, the Arctic Energy, and so forth, and more general global issues, which is what we will approach today. So, Lanxin, let's start with you since there was quite a bit of turmoil in U.S.-China relations recently. So, how prepared was Beijing for Trump this election cycle? Did Chinese experts expect him to win? Did they believe that if he did win, Trump two would be significantly different from Trump one? And were they prepared for him to actually impose the tariffs that he had long promised?
[00:02:39] Lanxin Xiang: Well, I don't believe the Chinese political elite are really well prepared for Trump to win because they're all perhaps misled by, you can say, the failed liberal press, whatever you call it, or social media. There is a strong sense... At the last... the luck of the U.S. campaign election, there is a strong belief that Harris might have a chance. Now, the consensus at that time also is that Trump, even if he wins, he will, you know, be the same.
Not that much is going to change. Now, I belong to a very small group of minorities, basically, who say Trump is going to win. And also, I believe we have to take Trump seriously in the longer term. In the short term, maybe a disruption, a lot of problems. Medium and long term, Trump is better news than the continued democratic demonstration. So, I always believe that. But so, Janice has now realized that Trump's 2.0, it's going to be difficult.
I think that they already know the possibility of a trade war. They have dealt with him, the Trump 1.0, so it's not something they're totally unprepared for. What they did not or haven't prepared very well is the extent that Trump is actually, you know, more than just complaining about the existing international economic system. Trump is seriously doing the ultimate dismantling of the international system economically, perhaps even politically.
Now, on the political side, Chinese are actually not entirely unhappy. Trump is the first president, in my memory since the end of second World War, to raise the question why there is a legitimacy in peace time for a four-fledged standing military alliance, NATO or otherwise, or bilateral treaties, you know, U.S.-Japan, U.S.-Korea. Now, what is the, you know, logic why the United States have to justify they must maintain a standing military lines, which Trump says also is partly the reason to push Putin to the extent of invading Ukraine? Now, that's...
[00:05:56] Peter Slezkine: Wait, but so you're saying... So, you first said that you were one of the few people to take Trump seriously in China and to warn Beijing that he might come back. And you also suggested that he might be better than a continuation of the Biden administration and Harris. Is it because of his attitudes towards alliances? His-
[00:06:16] Lanxin Xiang: Well-
[00:06:16] Peter Slezkine: ... inclination to make deals?
[00:06:18] Lanxin Xiang: ... geopolitically speaking, three things. He does not give a damn to ideological argument, which is totally opposite to Biden's democracy versus autocracy. That is the worst definition of great power relations today, right, using that paradigm. Now, the second, he doesn't like alliances, which that's what I'm trying to explain.
Then he, you know, is somebody who basically says that we have to take great power relationships seriously. Don't cross great powers, red lines. He mentioned Taiwan. He mentioned many other issues, meaning you don't have to push the other side to the extent of a launching, maybe even miscalculate military operation. So, I think, you know, he understand geopolitics better than many presidents. That's what I think in a realistic way. Yeah.
[00:07:27] Peter Slezkine: How likely do you think a bargain, grand or small, between the U.S. and China might be... I mean, right now, we're in the midst of economic escalation that has gone beyond what Beijing expected, you just told us, but after this initial response by China, is there any possibility that a deal can be reached? Would Taiwan be part of it? Is there a way to issue some, sort of, statement on Taiwan that would be folded into a agreement on the economic front?
[00:08:00] Lanxin Xiang: I have the feeling that, eventually, there will be some, kind of, grand bargaining, not just economic issues, but also Taiwan, maybe South China Sea, and overall Asian-Pacific area, the security rearrangement, what he would call, I believe he used another word to explain, reexamining, you know, the alliance system. Yes.
I mean, I'm sure it's going to happen. Right now, of course, it's interrupted or disrupted by this full-fledged trade war, but personally, I have grave doubts that trade war going to last very long. Seems to me this is the, like, professional wrestling, which Trump loves since he is kid. He loves, you know, all these WWE, UFC stuff. This is the opening game, you know, high-handed swashbuckling, basically say everything that outrageous you know, maybe with a mask. Well, he doesn't have a mask.
Then eventually, he will come back to the reality. I personally do not believe. He, himself, and his son, Eric, also said tariff is an art of, you know, bargaining, right? It's a part of the art of bargaining. So, he actually had other agenda behind just trade issues. So, I think China and the U.S. eventually will come down to some, kind of, agreement, but he will push for tariff. He is a tariff man. There is no doubt. May be wrong. I don't believe a Smoot-Hawley 2.0 can work. It did not work the first time. I don't believe.
[00:09:52] Peter Slezkine: Well, the U.S. was a very different country in the 1920s and '30s. It was much more like China in its role in the economic landscape but... So, let's see now what Moscow makes of Trump. So, Andrey, let's stick to tariffs first since that's the most recent item in the news. Russia is largely insulated from the impact of terrorists since it's already been sanctioned.
It was also left off the kill list for reasons that are uncertain, either because it's already been sanctioned or because U.S. doesn't want to ruffle feathers during negotiations. So, is Russia happy to watch the world burn? Is it happy to see U.S.-China relations worsen because maybe China will worry less about American secondary sanctions? So, how does the economic turmoil look from Moscow?
[00:10:49] Andrey Kortunov: Well, thank you for the question, Peter. Indeed, the new Trump tariffs so far have not affected Russia. And the administration mentioned two reasons for that. The first one was that the U.S.-Russian trade is now negligible. It is about $3.5 billion only. And second is that the administration wants to have some bargaining chips for dealing with Moscow in the resolution of the Ukrainian crisis.
Well, let me say that, in my opinion, the attitude in Moscow towards the tariffs, sort of, schizophrenic because, on the one hand, it is very nice to watch the collective West falling apart just in front of our eyes. Of course, the Transatlantic Reef is something that suits immediate Russia's interests. It also confirms the vision of a multipolar world emerging in the international system.
Although, it has to introduce changes to the standard Russian narrative about the hierarchy in the West. Traditionally, in Moscow, they always assumed that the United States is always at the top and that European nations are just satellites or even vessels or puppets in the capable hands of Washington D.C. Right now, this narrative no longer holds water, so it has to be changed, but generally, definitely, politicians in the Kremlin can congratulate Donald Trump with the new tariffs and with the new problems within the transatlantic relationship.
On the other hand, if we look beyond the immediate geopolitical interests and look at the economic interests of Moscow, Moscow might become a victim of the tariffs, if indeed such tariffs are not just a bargaining chip but are going to be here for a long time. And if tariffs can trigger serious complications in the global economy, including a possible recession or a slowdown in China, definitely that would negatively affect Russia because it might decrease the demand for Russian oil and gas and other commodities that Russia provides to global markets.
So, it might have an impact on the Russian trade balance, on the Russian currency exchange rate. So, definitely, this is not what politicians in Moscow would like to see. Just to cut it shorter, I think that there is no consensus on how to address the tariffs. And politicians and the economists are trying to monitor the situation to see what the impact of these tariffs might be and how it will affect Russia.
[00:14:21] Peter Slezkine: Well, so, energy prices, I guess, are the area in which Russia is most directly exposed to these economic-
[00:14:29] Andrey Kortunov: That's correct.
[00:14:29] Peter Slezkine: ... adjustments, I guess, to use a mild term.
[00:14:33] Andrey Kortunov: That's correct. Now, they are quite low. So, Russia has to pay a price for relatively low oil prices that we see right now on the markets.
[00:14:44] Peter Slezkine: Well, let's turn to Ukraine, which is obviously the biggest issue in U.S.-Russia relations. Trump's attitude toward Ukraine is obviously very different from that of the Biden administration, and he made that clear during the campaign. So, I suppose the version of the same question I posed to Lanxin, how did Moscow understand the Trump transformation?
Did they really expect this Trump administration to deliver more than the previous one because the previous one sounded good for Russia, but then proved to be a disappointment from Moscow's perspective? So, did they expect more this time around? Were they shocked by the speed with which the U.S. began to tackle the problem? And how much does Moscow think that Trump can actually deliver over the objections of the deep state, EU allies, Ukraine? And finally, is Putin dragging his feet?
[00:15:43] Andrey Kortunov: Well, I think that it would be fair to say that, so far, Trump has definitely exceeded expectations that existed in Moscow after the November elections. And if you follow the official Russian narrative in December and in January, I would probably label this narrative as very cautious optimism because indeed they remember the first term of President Trump in the White House and some disappointments that are associated with his first term. And they expected, what I would call, very tough bargain.
And of course, Trump went beyond this first term in many ways. For instance, if you look at the U.S. vote in the United Nations general assembly on Ukraine, I think it's the first time when the United States voted together with the countries like North Korea and Nicaragua and Belarus, not to mention the Russian Federation itself.
I think it was a surprise. And definitely, this surprise was appreciated by statesmen in Moscow. And it helped to launch the U.S.-Russian dialect on a number of issues. However, I think that it would be fair to say that there are still doubts about the ability of Donald Trump to settle this conflict for at least three reasons. First of all, I think that, in Moscow, they're not sure that the administration fully comprehends the complexity of the conflict, that it is not just about a ceasefire, but it's about comprehensive political settlement, which goes beyond Ukraine, but includes a new security architecture in Europe.
Second, there are concerns right now that many European nations are not ready to accept the Trump leadership on Ukraine. And we might see a very different approach coming from capitals like, London, Paris, or Berlin. And that might also create obstacles on the way of implementing the Trump ceasefire plan. And finally, and Putin mentioned it many times, that he was not confident in the ability of Ukraine to subscribe to the Trump plan and to honor a ceasefire, which can be agreed within next couple of weeks.
In Moscow, they argued that even the limited ceasefire or rather de-escalation that they agreed and that was supposed to exclude energy infrastructure on both sides from targeting was not completely honored by the Ukrainian side. At least this is the official narrative that we have right now. So, there are certain doubts. And on top of that, I think that there are different priorities in Moscow. They would like to focus on the bilateral relationship.
I'm not sure that Trump is so committed to the bilateral relationship, which might be separated from the ceasefire in Ukraine. I think that Trump thinks in terms of deals. So, everything depends on the ceasefire in Ukraine. And I'm not sure that we will be in a position to reach significant progress in any other dimensions of the bilateral relationship unless and until we are going to see some, kind of, very visible, very specific progress in terms of settling the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. So, there is a...
[00:19:53] Peter Slezkine: But is that Russia's preference or... Is that Russia's preference or is that their understanding of Trump's position, that ceasefire in Ukraine must come before the normalization of the bilateral relationship?
[00:20:01] Andrey Kortunov: I think that this is how the Trump position is defined, and they would like to diversify the portfolio. They would like to include diplomatic dialect, maybe some joint projects, something on top of the Ukrainian settlement. But of course, there is an understanding that we all remain hostages to the Ukrainian settlement.
And unless there is significant progress, not necessarily by the time of Easter, that might be too short a deadline, but if there is no significant progress, let's say, by the summer break, Trump might lose interest to this whole problem, and he might shift his attention to something very different, for example, to Gaza, or to China, or to North Korea, or to some other, some other problem where he might expect faster returns on his political investment.
[00:21:01] Peter Slezkine: But maybe that's a good thing from Moscow's perspective. If you say that the gulf in understanding of the Ukrainian conflict is quite wide and the capability of Trump to convince Europe and Kyiv to go along is constrained, then perhaps the best-case scenario for Moscow is for Trump to lose patience and take his attention elsewhere and leave Russia to-
[00:21:28] Andrey Kortunov: You know, I think the...
[00:21:28] Peter Slezkine: ... do what he thinks it needs to do.
[00:21:31] Andrey Kortunov: You know, I think the issue here is that we don't know what reaction we can expect from Donald Trump. If he feels that he has been fooled and that his expectations have not been met, his reaction is unpredictable. I think it's important for Russia, it's important for President Putin personally, to preserve good relations with President Trump to make sure that he's not frustrated, that he's not disappointed with his relationship with Moscow. That is a priority. And I think that they will do whatever they can in order to preserve these positive dynamics in the bilateral dialect. Whether they can manage it or not remains an open question.
[00:22:21] Peter Slezkine: Well, so, let's now have Emma interpret the Trump administration's objectives for us. To what extent do you think Trump's outreach to Russia is about Ukraine, about stopping a stupid war, as Trump has described it? And to what extent is it part of a broader geopolitical picture that prioritizes China, or at least U.S. relations with China, managing those relations, and therefore requires a recalibration of the U.S. relation with Russia?
[00:22:57] Emma Ashford: Thanks. Yeah. So, great, great to be here and with guests from all three countries. So, I mean, look, I think there is some domestic politics to the Trump approach to Ukraine, right? We saw this in the campaign, lots and lots of Republican advertising, campaigning around the idea that the war in Ukraine as a stupid war, that Biden got us into this war, that it's costing too much, et cetera, et cetera.
I have no doubt that this is something that many inside the administration sincerely believe, but I do not think it is what is motivating them to actually try and find a settlement in Ukraine. Instead, I guess, you know, what I would point to here is that there are two, let's say, two broader strategic logics in the Trump administration. There's, kind of, two groups.
There's the people that want to pursue a very Jacksonian, Hawkish, kind of, expeditionary foreign policy, you know, we're going to go out and we're going to... the U.S. will go out and smash down the Houthis you know, if they threaten global trade, but, you know, but we're not going to nation build overseas, et cetera, et cetera, right? That's one wing people like Steve Bannon or others. And then there's the second, sort of, set of folks who are prioritizers, which is what they've, sort of, been branded in the media and who want to pivot to Asia.
And what I think is really important to note is that those groups disagree over, like, a lot of things. They disagree over Iran, for example. They disagree over Israel, Gaza. They do not disagree on Europe or Ukraine. They agree on that question because in both cases, either of those strategic logics, you want a less confrontational relationship with Russia or at least one that does not center on Ukraine. So, you know, actually, to your comment, Peter, that Ukraine is perhaps the most important issue in the U.S.-Russia relationship, I mean, I think it certainly was under Biden. I think that was... you know, it was very much put at the center and everything else was subordinated to it.
My sense is that the Trump administration wants to change that, that they do want to move to a position where Ukraine is, kind of, one issue among many that they can talk to Russia about. And at the same time, you know, either way, whichever of these groups we're talking about, again, they agree on restructuring the U.S. relationship with Europe in some sense in a security setting, right? So, Ukraine fits into that broader picture, right?
It's not just that the U.S. wants out of the war in Ukraine. The U.S. wants to pull back from being the primary guarantor of European security in general. So, what I would say here is that I think all of the Trump administration folks are, kind of, pointing in the same direction on this question, and that is trying to deemphasize Ukraine or take off the table so that they can focus on these other issues. And I mean, again, I really haven't talked about China at all, but you can sense that China is what is underlying almost all of this.
[00:25:54] Peter Slezkine: So, you mentioned two groups with different foreign policy frameworks. Is it fair to add a third, maybe it's a version of the first one that you described, that is... takes a civilization in this approach and actually has affection for Russia, assumes that it is part of Western civilization and should be, not only neutral or neutralized in a future U.S.-China competition, but on the Western side? And you hear this in every other Tucker Carlson interview. Steve Bannon, I think, has made similar points. So, how important is that strain?
[00:26:33] Emma Ashford: I mean, look, I think this faction is definitely there. If you think about U.S.-Russia relations in a partisan sense, where we are today is that, for a variety of reasons, whether it's the Russiagate stuff from the first Trump administration, whether it's the increasing focus of the Democratic party on democracy at home and abroad, Democrats are extremely unlikely to be Russia favorably, for a variety of reasons. Republicans have long viewed Russia, have long viewed Russia as the Soviet Union, right?
We regularly get Congress folks on the Republican side of the aisle accidentally referring to Russia as the USSR, but there is also this civilizational frame. And you're right, it pops up on the new right among people like Steve Bannon, Tucker Carlson. And what they focus in on is basically conservative values, right? It's Russia's hostile to LGBTQ, whatever, and so is, so is Trump's America, you know. Russia is an orthodox faith country.
We're all Christians here. And many, sort of, Christian-leaning Republicans can see that as a good thing. But I really do think it's important not to overemphasize that. I think it's actually a fairly... It might explain some of why republicans are willing to move towards talking to Moscow, but I really don't think it's actually driving the agenda. And I would add a word of caution here for anyone, sort of, particularly in Moscow, looking at this, which is this can play in the other direction, too.
If we look at the debates over Ukraine aid last year, one of the things that ended up playing a major role was the ability of the Ukraine lobby to persuade, to persuade Speaker of the House, Mike Johnson, that Ukraine was a oppressed Christian nation and that Russians were committing atrocities against churches. And so, this, kind of, plays both ways. And I think, you know, again, relying on this as the rationale for why you would want to improve relations with Moscow, it doesn't strike me as a viable approach.
[00:28:25] Peter Slezkine: Well, so, then let's come back to China, which seems to be the focus for every part of the coalition here in Washington. So, what does the administration expect or hope of Russia in relation to China? How far does it think it can pry Russia away from China?
[00:28:45] Emma Ashford: Yeah. I mean, this is a good question. And, you know, a lot of the focus in Washington has been on, let's just say, debunking the notion of the reverse Kissinger, right? So, but as far as I am aware, you know, this is the very strong version of this thesis, right, the idea that Trump is going to somehow get a settlement in Ukraine, he's going to, you know, chip the Russians away from the Chinese, and it's... you know, we are, we are going to suddenly be friends with the Russians, and they'll work with us against China.
And that is not what I hear the administration talking about. It's not what I hear anyone talking about. Who knows what they're talking about? And frankly, that's because it's very [inaudible 00:29:23] to be debunked because this isn't going to happen, but I do think, you know, what you could instead paint the administration's approach as is they're trying to make sure that that Russia-China access, friendship, alliance, whatever you want to call it, does not solidify further.
And the idea would be, again, a view, frankly, much more similar to that, you know, that we hear from Russians about multipolarity, about many polls, about flexibility that you would try to sustain some, kind of, relationship with Moscow, where they didn't always necessarily side with China on every issue. So, for me, I think that is what we're talking about here. That's, kind of, the best we can hope to achieve, but again, in Washington, the debate is very black and white on this issue.
[00:30:12] Peter Slezkine: So, Andrey, how far would the Kremlin shift on the China issue? I mean, what American concerns regarding China would Russia be willing to address?
[00:30:26] Andrey Kortunov: Well, first of all, I think that there has always been a certain inconsistency in the U.S. approach to Russia-China relations because, on the one hand, we heard more than once that, you know, Russia should somehow distance itself from China, but on the other hand, from time to time, they say that Russia should use its assumed leverage or influence, let's say, to bring China to the arms control negotiating table.
You cannot have your cake and eat it at the same time. If you assume that Russia has a certain influence in China, then you should not oppose the Russian -Chinese partnership. If you wanted to break this relationship, then you cannot expect Russia to have an impact on China's policy. But frankly, in my opinion, this whole discussion about break in the Russia-China alliance is a bit metaphysical because it's not clear what specific actions Moscow should or should not take in order to meet concerns of the United States.
First of all, we should keep in mind that China and Russia are neighboring countries. We have a very long border. We have, kind of, natural complementarity of economic capacities. And everyone wants to take a bite out of the Chinese market. Russia is not an exception. The United States wants to increase its trade with China, to increase its exports to China. You know, the United States is not concerned about Australia selling gas to China. So, why should the United States be concerned about Russia selling its gas to China?
So, this partnership would exist even without the United States. However, I don't think that there is any prospect for a more formal Russia-China alliance. Traditionally ,China has never been eager to join alliances with foreign countries. And let's face it, there are many questions on which Russia and China's positions do not completely coincide we have different views on Ukraine. Definitely, China is not a country which supports Russia against Ukraine. There are differences in opinions on India.
Again, I think that it is impossible to reconcile Russia's and China's positions on India. There are divergence of opinions on many other issues. So, I think that there is a natural trend in Russia-China relations. It's not a relationship without problems. There are complications. I think, right now, for instance, we have to deal with some economic difficulties that we're likely to face this year.
We have to change the structure of this partnership. If there are concerns, specific concerns, about particular dimensions of Russia-China relations, then these concerns should be articulated. For instance, are there any particular dimensions of Russia-China military cooperation that, in Washington, they perceive as anti-America? I frankly don't see them, but I can imagine that there might be perceptions in the United States that Russia is assisting China in building its nuclear or ballistic missile capacities.
And this is a topic that can be discussed within maybe a trilateral format, but I don't think that we should take it for granted that China and Russia are moving to a strategic alliance which will be specifically targeted against the United States. I don't think it will happen anytime soon.
[00:34:59] Peter Slezkine: What about the Arctic? Is there a possibility for Russia to welcome American investors in and perhaps reduce Chinese presence somewhat both on the economic plane? And on the military side, we've seen joint Russian-Chinese exercises that got all the way up to Alaska. So, Russia, as the guardian of the far north, would keep China from entering those strategic waters.
[00:35:31] Andrey Kortunov: Well, first of all, I would not overestimate the current China's presence in the Arctic region. In theory, China could use the Arctic maritime route to bring its cargo to Europe, but so far, I think it would be at least premature to think that this route can successfully compete with the Southern Silk... maritime Silk Road. I think it is something that might happen only in a rather remote future. China might explore some mineral resources in the Arctic, but I don't think that it is likely to happen anytime soon because these resources are not easy to extract. They will be expensive.
So, China is present in Arctic region, but mostly for research exploration. And of course, Arctic is also an opportunity to get access to Russian energy resources of West Siberia primarily. Now, talking of the U.S.-Russian cooperation in the Arctic region. The big question is what can be accomplished in the bilateral format if we assume that the Arctic Council, where we have all the Arctic... literal states of the Arctic Ocean, are present, if the Arctic Council remains more or less dormant?
Because again, traditionally, and you are absolutely right, the position within the Arctic Council was that literal states should stick together and they should prevent non-literal states from getting too much access to the Arctic region. Of course, if the Arctic council remains paralyzed, if there are no substantial success stories in U.S.-Russian Arctic Corporation, Russia might be tempted to give China more access, but not only China, maybe other non-literal states, like, India, for instance, which is also an observer member of the Arctic Council.
So, Russia might be tempted to represent interests of non-literal states within the Arctic region. However, I think that, so far, this option is more or less theoretical because neither China nor India are really committed to investing in this region on a large-scale basis if we exclude very targeted investments into repositories of natural gas in Yamal and in some other places, which are not offshore drilling, but rather continental Russian territory in the far north.
[00:38:32] Peter Slezkine: But the reduction in the importance of the Arctic Council could also be a boon for U.S.-Russia bilateral relations in the Arctic, presumably, because the Arctic Council is restricted in what it can discuss. It doesn't deal with security matters or even economic matters and it privileges, as you say, the electoral states, including all sorts of Canadas and Scandinavian countries with which the Trump administration is not getting along splendidly and which it does not consider actors of primary importance. So, sideline, the Arctic Council presumably would not only increase Russia's desire to bring in India and China, but could smooth the way for Russia-U.S. cooperation in the Arctic.
[00:39:18] Andrey Kortunov: Well, I think that, in theory, this is possible. Traditionally, in the Arctic region, we had two superpowers. And these were Russia and Canada. The United States, in relative terms, was less interested in exploring opportunities in the Arctic region. If you look at the U.S. icebreakers or at the U.S. shelf claims in the close to the Alaska coastline, you'll see that the United States has always been more interested in the South rather than in the North.
If it changes, if the United States invests more in its own Arctic programs, if the United States is successful in claiming Greenland from Denmark, if the United States becomes a real Arctic superpower, definitely it would be natural for Russia to rely on cooperation with the United States especially because Canada remains one of the most consistent critics of the Russian Federation.
And I don't think that any Russian-Canadian partnership in the Arctic region is likely to take place anytime soon. So, you know, if Trump is committed, definitely, this interest will be appreciated in Moscow, and probably Russia and the United States can do something together, especially if global warming creates new commercial and transportation opportunities in the Arctic region.
[00:41:01] Peter Slezkine: Okay. Well, so, we may return to the Arctic and other specifics in U.S.-Russia relations toward the end when we get to questions, but Lanxin has been sitting silently, observing quietly in the traditional Chinese fashion as the Americans and Russians bicker and banter.
So, Lanxin, what are you and your compatriots make of the developing U.S.-Russia relationship? Are they concerned that China will... or that Russia will turn away from China? Because every time I go to Beijing, I hear Chinese say that this closeness with Russia is perhaps a bit unnatural, that Russians are Westerners, that they're going to go back to the west at the very first opportunity. So, is there a worry that this is now happening?
[00:41:53] Lanxin Xiang: Not really, not really. Well, first, first of all, the so-called the reverse Nixon stuff is a total nonsense, of course, I mean, it used to be a neocon, a fantasy, of course, peeling China from Russia, you know, then reverse now, you know. Forgetting the basic history, when Kissinger-Nixon start rapprochement with China, 1971, China already had a war with Russia, Soviet Union. There is absolute no need... Russia was number one enemy, worse than the United States at that time. There is not even need of peeling off.
So, this is a, kind of... Well, first of all, it's a misreading of history. Secondly, of course, the dynamics, which I think Andrey already explained, but I want to emphasize further, you know, this is incredible story of the 21st century or 20th century, late 20th century, that is China and Russia actually become so much integrated in the way not just, you know, in the, in the political sense, but in the way of they share a lot of... in common, the worldview, their position on international system. Now, remember, one thing that bind China and the Russian together is that the common fight against Western hypocrisy, hypocrisy represented by...
[00:43:42] Peter Slezkine: Wait. So, when you say that China, when you say that China and Russia share a worldview, is it a positive worldview that is easily defined or is it just a common antipathy-
[00:43:50] Lanxin Xiang: No.
[00:43:50] Peter Slezkine: ... toward Western hegemony and hypocrisy?
[00:43:53] Lanxin Xiang: No. The common view against Western sense of hypocrisy, basically. Now, what I mean hypocrisy is the... they are playing, still playing, Westphalian rules of the game, which means balance, power, power relations, so on and so forth, but not [crosstalk 00:44:12].
[00:44:13] Peter Slezkine: You mean U.S. and Russia or Russia and China are playing Westphalian?
[00:44:15] Lanxin Xiang: Oh, both. Yeah. China cannot do it. Russian cannot. Sphere of influence, you know, whatever you call it, which is the Westphalian stuff, but the Western power, NATO and the American Alliance in Asia, they are doing the Westphalian thing, but they justify it at the high monograph, therefore, so-called the rules-based international order for both Moscow and the Beijing is actually my way or the highway. Now, this is the common sense both Chinese and the Russians share. Now, whether or not they share other things, it's difficult to say, but, you know, economic compatibility, which Andrey already mentioned, which has also happened during this period. So, there is...
[00:45:05] Peter Slezkine: But wait. So, now, Russia and China share that worldview with the U.S. Trump doesn't like the rules-based order any more than Russia and China do. He likes spheres of influence as much as the next guy.
[00:45:15] Lanxin Xiang: That's what I said. In longer term, we may. Remember, converging theory. I will say that view may converge. Okay. Trump, you're making that argument, basically saying American first market view. Okay? But when you think about China, every country has a market anyway. So, it's not surprising to me the United States, Russia, and the China eventually will come down to the same consensus.
Now, but what I'm trying to say about Trump, Trump provide two messages during his inaugural address, which many people don't take seriously. I'm one who actually take very seriously. Two messages. One is, "I'm doing a Common Sense revolution," which is an argument taken from Thomas Paine. I know, you know, many people say Trump is too stupid to be a philosopher thinking that way. No, he has intuitive sense. The only world leader that got what Trump is trying to say is Putin, by the way. That's their first telephone call.
If you read Trump's social media, Trump said, "Putin actually mentioned my Common Sense. That's Thomas Paine." Okay? But Thomas Paine say two things, which I think Trump understood intuitively. Thomas Paine, you go back to read that pamphlet, Common Sense. Two things Thomas Paine says. One is don't underestimate common people's understanding what's good for them, you know, what's their interests. Don't tell them what you think that's important, which is exactly what's wrong with Democrats.
Now, the second thing is Republican system do not fight or prefer not to fight. It's, kind of, precursor of a democratic, whatever, peace theory, I mean, all the way back to Thomas. So, Trump doesn't like war. He repeated, repeated, no matter what, he wanted peace, right? He said, "I want to achieve peace through strength," okay, via MAGA. Now, that's a... you know, I think that philosophy, if you can call it philosophy, actually, is consistent, makes sense, totally to me.
So, this is where I think, you know, this is... The second thing Trump said, message, he said, you know, "Forget... you know, we are no longer want to be world police anymore, right? Let everybody take care of their own stuff." Yeah. Take care of their regional security as well. Basically, this is what he tried to say. So, he start talking about Latin America, talking about his own neighborhood. So, totally, in my view, Trump understood this. Putin understood him intuitively, extremely well. Xi Jinping understood him I don't believe as well as Putin, by the way, so... but they can sit down, talk about their worldview no matter how you criticize it. This is not something for war. This is something for peace.
[00:48:40] Peter Slezkine: What is the difficulty for the Chinese in understanding Trump's approach? Are the Chinese too attached to the UN system as the basis of legitimacy of the action in the world?
[00:48:54] Lanxin Xiang: I think it's more a cultural thing. Now, here, again, I have been telling, you know, Chinese, you know, no matter what Russians are Christians. You know, they are part of the Christian world. The Ukraine war, from a Chinese point of view, it's like you are watching something happen like European Civil War for centuries. It was just one of the episodes, right, from a Chinese point of view, because that war has nothing, zero cultural relationship with China. No, it's a cultural thing.
Chinese think about the world... think about the United States very, very differently. Here, well, we have to take a much longer time to explain. My recent book is about political legitimacy. You need to understand the difference between what Chinese think what is legitimate, what Western or the Christian is thinking about what's legitimate, then you can explain. Trump is not so easy for Chinese to understand. So, in that sense-
[00:49:59] Peter Slezkine: But partly, it's a matter of presentation.
[00:50:01] Lanxin Xiang: ... intuitively, they understand each other. Yes.
[00:50:03] Peter Slezkine: So, Emma, speaking of books recently published, about to be published, you have one coming out about a multipolar world. Lanxin and Andrey just described the multipolar order as seen from Moscow and Beijing. Trump seems to have a similar worldview. What's the problem? How do we get to this convergence where everybody is happy in a harmonious world?
[00:50:30] Emma Ashford: I never said the multipolar world would be harmonious. I think, you know, again, there's some really interesting literature on this, much of it from back at the start of the, you know, start of the Cold War period, and so... but it doesn't say it's going to be more peaceful. What it does say is that we may find that if great powers, regional powers, can work together, find areas of common accord, that maybe there is a lower risk of great power war. And that's a good thing.
And from my point of view, I think that that would be a good thing. You know, I do think that, you know, Lanxin is fundamentally correct about Trump's worldview. It is very much a notion of, you know, the U.S. as a great power acting in concert with other great powers to secure the world to prevent stupid wars, that, kind of, thing. In my mind, in the context of, sort of, U.S. history, it actually comes closest to, I think, the vision that Franklin Delano Roosevelt had for the United Nations initially, the idea of the four policemen, right, that there would be these great powers and they would police their own areas of the world, spheres of influence, if you want to say that, and that that would be the way that we would avoid major wars going forward.
And I think that does ring true to Trump. And I think, again, as Lanxin says, I think there is some commonality here with views in Moscow and Beijing in ways that could potentially work well if the sides were able to come together. I think there are a few problems, right? I mean, one is, very clearly, the United States is going through... has been going through a period of foreign policy flux, and Trump's views are certainly not hegemonic in Washington D.C.
Even within his own administration, there are many people who would disagree with the President and some of his advisors on this and who are pushing him to do things like, you know, dial up sanctions on Russia, for example. So, I mean, I think again, we cannot underestimate that, kind of, opposition the way that the media plays into this and how, you know, you may end up in a different place because of that. The second point is I think, you know, we could talk again about Ukraine in this context, but it is not that Trump is simply willing to give up everything in exchange for a more peaceful concordant between the great powers, right? The details do matter to some extent, right?
This president, more than most, I think, hates to be taken for a ride. He really hates to be viewed as stupid or getting taken advantage of. And so, you know, when you put that personality trait in the context of negotiations, conversations between the great powers, you know, it can be quite risky, right? There are plenty of situations in which Trump might see whatever deal is being offered is not good enough if he thinks it makes him look bad.
What he is looking for fundamentally is to solve these problems, but also to look like a statesman, right? I think the thing that attracts him to a vision of the world with spheres of influence is not the idea of getting to carve up the world. It's the idea of, you know, the leaders of the great powers taking a picture at Yalta or Tehran as they discuss matters of great import.
I think, for him, that is what is very important. And so, you know, again, just to use the Ukraine example as an obvious one here, right, I think, you know, there is absolutely a deal that could be reached that would stabilize Ukraine, that would leave Europe more able to move towards strategic autonomy. This would be good for the U.S. I think this administration would absolutely accept that, but if they are pushed too far towards something that seems like it's a really, really bad deal for the United States, I think they're probably more likely to take their ball and go home, right? They'll leave the Europeans to it in Ukraine.
They will strengthen sanctions on Moscow instead because they don't want to be made to look foolish. And so, again, I mean, I think this negotiation framework is certainly more promising than where we were in the Biden administration, which was, you know, a very hard line, moralistic view of the world as good and bad. So, I think this is more likely to be productive in terms of negotiations, but there is absolutely this risk, if pushed too far, that the administration will overreact.
[00:55:11] Peter Slezkine: Well, so, you just mentioned Europe. So, let's turn to that. And you are, Emma, representing the American side, but as your accent gives away, you are, yourself, somewhat European. So, let's start with you. To what extent is the administration's approach to Russia and Ukraine a function of its restructuring of its relations with Europe? Because we already asked that question in reference to China. How much of the U.S. revision of its relations with Russia is a product of its relations to China?
How much of it is a function of its relations to Europe? And then we'll turn to Andrey and ask about Russia's vision of Europe and the extent to which it might align, in some sense, with the United States' objectives in the area. And then Lanxin, you can tell us the extent to which China might be rubbing its hands, hoping for a transatlantic rift that could open up economic opportunities for China and Europe. So, Emma, kick us off.
[00:56:14] Emma Ashford: I mean, this administration, I think, has been fairly open that they want to pull the U.S. back from Europe, but it is interesting because, in the context of the war in Ukraine you know, this is what bogged the Biden administration down in Europe as well. They wanted to dial down the U.S. commitment to Europe and push Europeans towards more strategic autonomy, and then the war in Ukraine sucked them in.
And I think, in the Trump administration, we are seeing similar dynamics in some ways, which is that the war in Ukraine becomes so central to policy debates that it prevents the administration considering the other issues on the table. And I think, again, this administration has gone much further in trying to push Europe to do more and trying to encourage them to do more, but right now, it is this Ukraine question that is, that is front of stage.
I think there are other complications here, too, right? As with everything this administration does, they are pursuing policies that might actually work against one another. And so, you know, it's not just that the U.S. changing its position on Ukraine might harden opinions in Europe and push them to be more supportive of Ukraine undercutting a settlement. It's that pursuing a trade war with Europe, putting a bunch of tariffs on them, may also make them less likely to cooperate with the U.S. on the Ukraine question.
And we've started to see some divisions inside the administration on this. We've seen Elon Musk, in particular, talking about, you know, how we need better trade relations with Europe, which I think is a very valid position to take here, but it all really does come back to Ukraine. The administration would like to decenter Ukraine from the U.S.-Russia relationship, from the U.S.-Europe relationship, but we need to resolve Ukraine in some way that is more stable than a frozen conflict, a grinding conflict, because if that's still going on, then you really can't achieve either of those things.
[00:58:18] Peter Slezkine: But in the administration's imagination, does the resolution of the conflict require prior understanding with Russia that the Europeans will have to adjust, too, or does this mean that, ultimately, the Americans and the Europeans need to find common ground on Ukraine in order to then restructure their transatlantic relationship in accordance with the administration's preferences?
[00:58:43] Emma Ashford: You know, what we've seen over the last couple of months is, I mean, a clear shift from the Biden administration where it was very much you get the allies on board first, and then you take a unified position to talk to Moscow. They were very, very careful always to do that first. The Trump administration is doing the exact opposite, right? They are basically saying, "Europeans will tell you once we've sorted something out," but what has become clear in the last couple of months is that that is not going to work.
At least as a practical issue, you need to have side conversations with the Europeans about what they're going to provide because the Trump administration fully intends for Europeans to bear the burden of any either continuing conflict or more likely a peace settlement in Ukraine. And so, this is where we've seen all these very confused discussions about security guarantees and the UK and France and trip deployments and stuff like this.
So, I do think the administration is, sort of, missing one key element here, which is I think they really do need to engage the Europeans a little more even if it is... you know, I'm not suggesting they should necessarily take the European position because I think they're absolutely right, that's not going to happen, but at the very least, they could steer those discussions on what Europeans are going to do for Ukraine if a settlement is created and use that in the context of negotiations with the Ukrainians and the Russians.
[01:00:00] Peter Slezkine: So, Andrey, on one hand, the Russians must love the developing U.S.-Europe rift, the fact that Washington has approached Moscow directly over the heads of the Europeans or sidelining the Europeans. On the other hand, if the U.S. were to really pack up and leave and Europe were to truly re-arm, that might cause security problems in its own right for Russia, not to mention what we were discussing previously, that perhaps it's wonderful to have bilateral discussions with the Trump administration, but if Trump cannot then convince the Europeans to go along with whatever he agrees to, nothing much will come of it as far as Moscow is concerned.
So, to what extent are Moscow and Washington aligned on the subject of Europe, and where is there tension or conflict or disagreements here or at least different motivations and objectives?
[01:01:01] Andrey Kortunov: Well, let me start with saying that there is a lot of skepticism in Moscow about the current state of the European project and about its future. The predominant perception is that Europe is in a deep crisis. And this crisis has many dimensions. It is an economic crisis, or at least a, kind of, stagnation that we observe right now in a number of European countries.
There are many social problems which remain unresolved and which slow down European social and economic development. Definitely, there is a policy crisis. And in Moscow today, they really love to refer to the most recent developments in countries like Romania or even France, which are interpreted as a clear deviation from the European norms of democracy. So, there is a lot of criticism of what is going on in Europe. The big question, which is debated in Moscow, is whether Europe is in a position to restore, at least partially, its strategic autonomy from the United States.
And I think that the predominant view is that this is not likely to happen anytime soon, that Europe is divided on what is desirable, what is feasible in terms of its strategic autonomy. And in the end of the day, maybe reluctantly, but still many European nations will have to follow the U.S. leadership even if they dislike this leadership and even if they disagree with this leadership.
So, if you look at the current situation, I would say that there are practically no contacts between Moscow and Brussels these days. I don't think that there are any even second-track consultations between Moscow and major European powers. I think that the position in Moscow is a, kind of, wait and see, to maybe wait until something similar to what happened in the United States will happen in one or two or three major European nations.
And so far, they interact with a number of dissenting powers in Europe, like Hungary and Slovakia and some opposition leaders in Western Europe, but not more than that. And let me say that, since we're talking about the triangular relationship, I think that this is one of the differences between Moscow and Beijing because my take is that, in Beijing, they're a bit more optimistic about the European strategic autonomy, about the ability of Europe to act independently of the United States, and on certain issues, maybe even to align with China against the United States, like it happened, for example, at the last artificial intelligence summit in Paris where the European Union voted together with China and India against the United States and the United Kingdom on the future global artificial intelligence governance. So, I think that, here, Moscow stays much more skeptical on the strategic autonomy of the European Union than Beijing does.
[01:04:55] Peter Slezkine: Well, Lanxin, let's have you respond to that. So, the U.S. is restructuring its relations with Europe. Russia has written off Europe. Is China making a big bet on the status quo?
[01:05:07] Lanxin Xiang: No. It's not status quo at all. EU...
[01:05:11] Peter Slezkine: Well, the prevailing powers in Europe.
[01:05:13] Lanxin Xiang: No. Under Biden administration, during Biden administration, EU made a major geopolitical miscalculation vis-a-vis China. They decide to jump on the ship, so to speak, of democracy versus autocracy. And of course, that idea was driven also by the war in Ukraine. And eventually, EU abandoned what they... I'm talking about the von der Leyen regime, particularly, made a huge mistake about China because they start... Remember, the first term of von der Leyen, she said, "I want to build a strategic autonomy. I want to build geopolitical commission," so on, so forth.
Chinese got very excited. Finally, finally, Europeans talking about autonomy, right? Whatever autonomy is good from Chinese point of view, but then, of course, very quickly, that hope dissipated because the, you know, EU jumped on that ship... You see, what mistake they made, of course, is to make ideological argument about China, relationship with China. And the worst, I think, that make EU commission, in particular, lost the credibility is to equate Ukraine with Taiwan, which EU actually signed on it. It's almost so absurd.
I think EU, in that few years, lost credibility with China. Now, Chinese cannot help say, "We told you so, you know. Now, you see what's happening with you." So, NATO issue is less a concern for China because NATO has no direct, you know, relation or threat, you know, with China. The real issue is will EU restart a serious strategic autonomy, meaning economic, political, almost everything? Now, it doesn't sound, you know, credible.
I believe, if... You see, the EU-Chinese summit is coming. I believe Xi Jinping does not seem... even want to go there. We had, instead, number two. That is a very clear indication. And the EU also, last a couple months, tried to, came to China, talk about trade, but then they went to Washington first, then was humiliated by Commerce Secretary Lutnick, then came to Beijing. The Chinese say, "Why would I want to talk to you? You think, you know, talking to Washington is much more useful even though you didn't get anything?"
So, there are a lot of things I think that EU has lost its own credibility. Now, is EU important? Absolutely. Just a few years ago, EU has risen to the number one at one point. When we were discussing mutual investment treaty, at that point, EU stake actually is a number one Chinese agenda, then quickly, everything... you know, remember how that investment deal disappeared because of human rights issues. This is where, you know, the perfect world Biden is, so to speak, right? So, I think EU is now learning its own lessons and has to rebuild its own credibility with China.
Now, starting point would be economic cooperation. EU is also, you know, counter-attack against American terrorists in a limited way, but China certainly did straightforward. Are they going to, you know, coordinate better this time vis-a-vis international trading system? That will be the real test for now, for now. Let's see what EU opinion about Taiwan is. If they repeat that nonsense, today is Ukraine, tomorrow, Taiwan. That nonsense, it goes nowhere with the relationship between China and EU.
[01:09:34] Peter Slezkine: Well, let's tackle the Taiwan question we have in the chat, one question about whether this new world we're entering will be one where border revisionism is more frequent. And with Taiwan, obviously, the formal question of borders is tricky, but nonetheless, we're talking about de facto control. And then there's another question about Xi's timeline for Taiwan. So, Lanxin, if you could tell us if there is more or less pressure to resolve the Taiwan issue under Trump's second and presumably final term.
[01:10:15] Lanxin Xiang: Well, so-called Xi's timeline, I haven't, I haven't got any evidence. This is invented by U.S. mainly, I think. American have three deadline. You know, the Air Force General, we have CIA director, then we have Navy. Okay. That's their imagination. I don't see it. I don't see the necessity to have that. Now, the common... again, here, we're talking about U.S.-China common interests, if they agree this is common. Common interests over Taiwan is to have a peaceful, whatever, unification in the future, right?
Nobody encourage either side to use force. Okay? Now, under Biden administration, I believe that we came almost closest to a military confrontation, which is not even intended by Biden administration or by other side. You can follow the sequence of events since the Nancy Pelosi... You know, it's a very dangerous moment. And the Biden Taiwan policy is more dangerous because they're sending totally wrong signal. Again, the most dangerous signal is the Ukraine was Taiwan, right?
So, remember, from Chinese perspective, if you're using that analogy, you're sending a signal to Chinese leader that the United States will defend Taiwan just because it's a democracy. And Biden actually had a thought, maybe they're called tongue slips, but four times, it's not tongue slip, right?
He said, "I'm committed to defend the..." Trump never did. Yeah. So, in that sense, my sense is there is no timeline on Xi's side, there is no timeline on Trump's side, and that Trump does not think Taiwan is America's vital, vital interest. And the Trump's appointees in Pentagon, they don't think it's a vital interest, which I think is a... fits MAGA philosophy pretty well.
You cannot have a vital interest. You cannot even seriously defend, really, just a militarily, right? So, you have to make a deal at some point. The deal will be a peaceful no commitment on both sides. I call it. I've been proposing this for a number of years. I say, we need a fourth signed U.S. communiqué to stabilize Taiwan Strait. Now, whether it's going to happen or not, but I see, at least under Trump, we have a hope. And...
[01:12:56] Peter Slezkine: Well, maybe a fourth communiqué, maybe a fourth communiqué, maybe a fourth communiqué on Taiwan in exchange for economic accommodation from Beijing.
[01:13:05] Lanxin Xiang: Well, yeah. Trump is a deal maker, whatever he wants, right? And I think-
[01:13:09] Peter Slezkine: So, Andrey, do you have any...
[01:13:10] Lanxin Xiang: ... everything's on the table, right, I guess. This is not official view. In my view.
[01:13:19] Peter Slezkine: Very good. Andrey, do you have any questions for either of the other two participants?
[01:13:23] Andrey Kortunov: May I have a question to Emma? And I'd like to share my concern about the future of U.S.-Russia relations. Just imagine that the Ukrainian crisis is somehow resolved, just imagine that the diplomatic relations are restored in full, but what I fail to see is a new foundation for this relationship because, historically, this relationship, at least for the last 50 years, was based primarily on strategic arms control. That was the skeleton of...
Everything else was subordinated to the central dimension of U.S.-Russian relations, but my impression is that the Trump administration is not particularly interested in arms control. It was not interested during its... Trump's first German power. And I'm not sure that Trump has discovered this interest right now.
Besides, it's not very likely that strategic stability will depend primarily on the bilateral U.S.-Russian interaction. We need to get China to the table at some point, sooner or later. So, the question which I have for you, and I don't know whether you have an answer, but do you see any new foundation for this relationship except for the magnificent performance of Alexander Ovechkin?
[01:15:00] Peter Slezkine: Well, thanks, Andrey, for a fantastic question. I should have seeded moderating duties much earlier. Emma, given time constraints, I'll just give you the final word.
[01:15:09] Emma Ashford: Yes, no. And I will say that the members of the administration were in the audience last night or two nights ago as Ovechkin, you know, beat the record. So, there's something there. But yeah. So, look, I mean, I think you're correct. There is really not a strong interest in strategic arms control in this administration. To be frank, the strategic arms control community in the United States is weaker than it has been in, I mean, a very long time, in decades. I don't think that's viable.
I mean, look, I think again, when we start to flick through the other issues, right, economics, energy, more competitors than cooperating, you know, working with Russia vis-a-vis China, we've talked about this, there's not a lot of prospects there. I mean, look, Iran. Iran might be the one issue where I think there's some potential for cooperation, but I guess what I would say more broadly is I don't think the Trump administration has in mind some end state here that is a, if you'll forgive my British expression, special relationship with Russia, right?
This is not going to be a U.S.-Russia relationship that builds on a foundation of strategic arms control to build some broader, you know, important relationship. I think this is more about turning Russia into a country like the others, right, that the Trump administration wants to be able to treat Russia the way that they think about India or China or others, right? They don't want to be locked into the status quo that has been created by Ukraine, by sanctions, et cetera, but they're not necessarily planning to build some foundation for geopolitics on a U.S.-Russia relationship. At least that's how I'm interpreting it.
[01:17:02] Peter Slezkine: Wonderful. So, I guess Ovechkin had done all the work for us before we even began. Kash Patel, I think, was sitting next to Gary Bettman when Ovechkin tied Gretzky's record, after which Gretzky said that his grandfather was Russian. I think, at various points in Gretzky's career, he has claimed different nationalities for his esteemed grandfather, but the fact that he has now become Russian in Gretzky's accounting and Gretzky says that his grandfather would have been proud that he lost his record to a Russian is maybe or maybe not an indication of where things are going.
So, I think we can go ahead and wrap up. As I said, at the top, we are hoping to make these trilateral discussions a recurring series of events. So, look out for announcements. Sometimes, they will be wide ranging as our discussion was today. Other times, we will focus on specific narrower topics such as outer space, nuclear, and other strategic... arms control, UN Reform, and so on.
And sometimes, they'll even be in-person. Stimson Lanxin was supposed to come to D.C., which was the impetus for this entire occasion, but then was held back in China. And our colleague, Yun Sun, will also be a frequent contributor to these events. So, with that, thank you, everyone, very much for listening.
And thank you, Andrey and Lanxin, for joining us from afar, Lanxin especially. It's now almost midnight, so take a well learned rest. So, thank you very much, everybody. Goodbye.
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The Trialogue Podcast is hosted by the Stimson Center and produced by University FM.