The expiration of New Start on February 5 marks the end of over half a century of bilateral efforts to advance strategic arms control. On February 3, the Stimson Center and the Oppenheimer Project convened leading nuclear experts from the US and Russia to imagine what comes next. The American speakers were Scott Sagan (Stanford University), Rita Guenther (The National Academies), and Matthew Bunn (Harvard Kennedy School). The Russian side was represented by Feodor Voitolovsky (Institute of World Economy and International Relations), Dmitry Stefanovich (Institute of World Economy and International Relations), and Anton Khlopkov (Center for Energy and Security Studies). This episode was recorded as a live online event. *The Trialogue Podcast is hosted by the Stimson Center and produced by University FM.
The expiration of New Start on February 5 marks the end of over half a century of bilateral efforts to advance strategic arms control. On February 3, the Stimson Center and the Oppenheimer Project convened leading nuclear experts from the US and Russia to imagine what comes next. The American speakers were Scott Sagan (Stanford University), Rita Guenther (The National Academies), and Matthew Bunn (Harvard Kennedy School). The Russian side was represented by Feodor Voitolovsky (Institute of World Economy and International Relations), Dmitry Stefanovich (Institute of World Economy and International Relations), and Anton Khlopkov (Center for Energy and Security Studies). This episode was recorded as a live online event.
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*The Trialogue Podcast is hosted by the Stimson Center and produced by University FM.
(Transcripts may contain a few typographical errors due to audio quality during the podcast recording.)
[00:00:05] Peter Slezkine: I'm Peter Slezkine, director of the U.S.-Russia-China Trialogue Project at the Stimson Center. Since the middle of the 20th century, relations among the United States, Russia, and China have had an enormous impact on each country separately and on the world as a whole. The purpose of the Trialogue is to better understand this extraordinarily complex and consequential relationship by directly engaging with experts from all three countries.
In this show, guests from across the political spectrum and from every corner of the globe share their views in their own voice. While the Stimson Center seeks to provide access to a wide variety of perspectives, it does not endorse any particular position. We leave it to the listeners to judge the validity and value of the views expressed by the guests.
Hi, you all. Today’s episode was recorded as a live event on Tuesday, February 2nd. We had three American and three Russian nuclear experts discuss the expiration of the New START Treaty and implications for strategic arms control and nuclear non-proliferation going forward. I hope you enjoy the episode.
We are joined today by Rita Guenther, senior program officer at the National Academies, Scott Sagan, professor of political science at Stanford University, Matthew Bunn, professor of the practice of energy, national security, and foreign policy at the Harvard Kennedy School. And on the Russian side, Anton Khlopkov, director of the Center for Energy and Security Studies, Fyodor Lukyanov, director of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations at the Russian Academy of Sciences, and Dmitry Stefanovich, research fellow at the same institution.
So, I will ask all six of our speakers a series of short questions. They will make their responses. Then the American and Russian sides will pose questions directly to one another and engage in a brief exchange, and then we will field questions from the audience. As Rachel mentioned, the Q&A box is live, so please submit questions there. I will see them and pose them to our participants if you would like them. Questions addressed to a particular speaker, please specify that in your question.
So, Fyodor, I thought I would start with you. A lot has happened over the last four years since the start of the war in Ukraine. Putin has formally suspended Russia’s participation in New START, while at the same time declaring that Russia would voluntarily remain within the limits of the treaty. And recently, I think last September, declared that Russia was ready to stay within the bounds of the treaty for another year after the expiration of New START if the United States did the same.
The U.S. has not made an official response to this offer as of yet, so could you please clarify the Russian position on New START and strategic arms control over the last few years, and maybe let us know what to expect from Russia once this treaty does expire?
[00:03:18] Fyodor Lukyanov: Thank you very much, Peter. First of all, I would like to say that I’m very grateful to the Stimson Center and to the Oppenheimer Project for inviting me to this very interesting roundtable concerning Russia’s position on the expiring START Treaty. It is quite the same as it used to be last September, when President Putin suggested to keep the limits of New START Treaty after the expiration of this treaty.
What does it mean? It means that Russia and the United States would have 1,550 strategic warheads and 700 delivery devices. I think it’s a very rational position because it’s a suggestion to have one more year after the expiration of the START Treaty to think what we can do together in this field to keep strategic stability and to keep dialogue on arms control issues.
I believe that for the Russian side, it was absolutely clear that in current political conditions, so during the conflict in Ukraine, and in the period when relations between Russia and NATO, Russia and the United States, have reached a very low level. I think the worst situation since very bad times of the Cold War, we can restart the dialogue on strategic stability and arms control, and it can become, in some time, one of pillars of building a new system of relations.
Of course, situation is changing. Of course, the United States are facing absolutely different strategic environment, the same with Russia. But I believe that Russian position is still giving a chance for two countries to continue, you know, dialogue and to continue common efforts in this field. Since Donald Trump has expressed his positive reaction to this suggestion in public, but we didn’t see any other promotion of American position on this issue, we are in a quite difficult position because there is nothing to say for Russian side more.
I think that Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Ryabkov has recently reaffirmed the same position during his press conference in Beijing.
[00:06:06] Peter Slezkine: Well, so the treaty will officially expire in two days. When does Russia’s offer to remain within its limits expire?
[00:06:14] Fyodor Lukyanov: I think it’s a good question for President Putin, not for me. I’m just an irresponsible academic. But, I think, I believe that Russian officials are still ready to discuss this suggestion. I believe that Russia’s position on the dialogue on arms control and for possible further steps and strategic stability in general, as the most significant condition of relations between our two countries in the security sphere, is still on the table.
[00:06:54] Peter Slezkine: So, the proposal now is to maintain the status quo. But there has been talk of something larger, a new deal that might be incorporated into a peace deal on Ukraine or come after a deal is reached. What is the consideration in Moscow on this subject?
[00:07:19] Fyodor Lukyanov: I believe that Moscow’s position right now is even more flexible than it used to be in 2022 or 2023. I remember that at that time, Joe Biden's administration have suggested to continue dialogue on strategic stability even during the conflict in Ukraine. In that time, Russia was not ready to continue such dialogue, and of course, to have some preliminary consultations for further negotiations on a new treaty.
Right now, Moscow is demonstrating its readiness to have dialogue with the United States on strategic stability even before the ending of conflict in Ukraine. I believe that both sides are interested in ending conflict in Ukraine with political and diplomatic measures. But even before that, Moscow is ready to discuss its suggestion about a moratorium on limitations on strategic nuclear warheads and delivery devices, but even to go further and to discuss some further steps which can lead us to the new treaty, which President Trump has described as possibly better than the previous one.
[00:08:45] Peter Slezkine: So, finally and briefly, President Trump has also mentioned the possibility of bringing the Chinese into the conversation and crafting a trilateral strategic arms control deal. Are the Russians prepared to engage the Chinese on this subject? How realistic do you think a trilateral agreement might be?
[00:09:05] Fyodor Lukyanov: I’m very skeptical about this position, which previous Trump administration has expressed also, because Chinese strategic nuclear potential is developing, and they are absolutely not interested in any limitations of its development, both in delivery devices and in warheads. They have five times less strategic nuclear warheads than Russia or the United States are having. Also, China and Russia are not having mutual nuclear deterrence. And there is one very significant factor which I would like to mention also.
There is a question about nuclear potential of France and Britain. If it would be included, it would be not trilateral but multilateral nuclear limitations agreement, which also is looking not very realistic in current political conditions. But on a bilateral level, I believe that the United States and Russia could much easier reach progress in the dialogue on further limitations or further steps to maintain strategic stability, because it’s very hard to engage China.
Chinese are not having even a culture of dialogue in this field on strategic stability and arms control, and they’re not interested to any borders, any boundaries for development of their potential, while it’s much less than American or Russian.
[00:10:50] Peter Slezkine: Okay, well, bilateral talks might be much easier than a multilateral alternative, but are difficult enough to require much more discussion from us, at least. So, Matt, let’s turn to you. Do you think the United States should accept Russia’s proposal to extend New START for another year?
[00:11:08] Matthew Bunn: I think that would be a good idea. I think it’s useful to have a strategic pause to explore whether there are options for the more complex and challenging kinds of accords we’re going to need in the future before a buildup gets locked in. And I think even if ultimately it proves that there’s no deal available and the United States decides that it does need to build up, it’s going to take a little while. And so, a year or two years, even three years, doesn’t really interfere with what the United States might need to do in the future.
I do want to say that it’s not just a numbers issue. The process of arms control has, I believe, served American security, Russian security, and world security by reducing the intense hostility and fear between the two sides, by offering predictability and transparency that allowed each side to plan its nuclear forces in a less stressful and hostile environment than existed before, by limiting some of the forces that each side believed were most dangerous.
And the mere fact of being able to talk about your biggest strategic concerns and actually have your adversary be willing to limit their forces if you limit your forces undermined the idea that your adversary was an implacably hostile enemy bent on completely obliterating you. And I think that that reduced the dangers. So, I disagree with the notion that this is the end of the arms control era. I am very hopeful that it’s a pause. It may be we’ll find more complicated and perhaps more informal ways of limiting things in the future.
I share a few doubts about just a trilateral treaty where everybody’s in the same treaty at the same time, but there are many different ways in which the various issues could be addressed with the various parties that they need to be addressed.
[00:13:26] Peter Slezkine: Thanks, Matt. So, what exactly do you think we should be aiming for during this pause? So, we buy ourselves time. We presumably don’t yet include the Chinese. Would a future bilateral agreement build upon this half-century history, or would we need something totally new because of the changes in global conditions and technology?
[00:13:53] Matthew Bunn: I think both. I think we'll need to build on the history, but we’ll need to be creative and come up with some new ideas. We’re in a world where I fear that Fyodor’s view that the Chinese are so far back that we don’t have to worry about them is not shared in Washington. It’s expected that China will have a thousand nuclear warheads, almost all of them strategic, by 2030. And letting the Chinese force completely run free while the United States limits its forces is going to be a real problem in Washington. So, we have to deal with a more multipolar environment than we’ve had before, one way or another.
Meanwhile, we have to deal with a variety of technologies that are making nuclear balances more complicated, that are non-nuclear technologies, missile defenses, precision conventional weapons, cyber, artificial intelligence, space, and counterspace. And we have to deal with the expiration of the limits on intermediate-range nuclear forces, and U.S. or NATO intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe are strategic from a Russian point of view because they can reach major Russian cities, including Moscow. But China has a lot of intermediate-range nuclear forces.
So, anyway, there are a lot of complications that we’re going to have to deal with, but I remain optimistic, not that we’re going to have a 500-page negotiated treaty that’s legally binding tomorrow, but that through a variety of reciprocal informal initiatives, executive agreements, et cetera, we may be able to maintain an era of nuclear restraint.
[00:15:43] Peter Slezkine: Dmitry, if you could turn your camera back on, I would like to turn to you. You are our great technical expert in the group, so I would like to pursue the subject that we just raised with Matt about the technological shifts of recent years that might make any new agreements very different from those that we have had in the past.
So, what developments are these specifically? What problems do they pose? And from a Russian perspective, what are the primary concerns? Is it something like the Golden Dome? Is it AI? Is it strategic non-nuclear? So, if you could address those questions, please.
[00:16:26] Dmitry Stefanovich: Yeah. Well, those are fine questions, and thanks for having me in this room. I think it’s a very timely and useful event to have such a public exchange on these very sensitive and very important topics. Well, I’ll start with answering your last question, which is the Russian principal concerns. Well, actually, the problem is not in something specific, but the combination of sophisticated capabilities that are being introduced in U.S. arsenals, in the arsenals of U.S. allies, and the integration that is being supported by artificial intelligence to make everything work seamlessly.
Basically, this is something that I call sometimes a boogeyman scenario or sometimes strawman scenario is that, there might be a situation where the U.S. and U.S. allied arsenals would be good enough to have a lot of non-nuclear capabilities, lots of allied non-nuclear capabilities, lots of tactical nuclear capabilities, to take out a significant part of strategic targets on Russian territory, then use what’s left of strategic nuclear capabilities to take out everything.
And if anything is being launched during a second-strike scenario, it’ll be intercepted by missile defenses, including space-based missile defenses and so on. I’ve called it something, like, quite far off in the future, but it turns out that there are people in the U.S. who genuinely believe that it might be a good idea to develop such a system of systems that will threaten first- and second-strike capabilities in Russia and China and elsewhere. But back to the technological part. Of course, strategic conventional weapons are on the rage.
We know that they can be used to take out significant targets. Some people in Russia believe that you can take out even ICBM silos with conventional weapons. Actually, some people in the U.S. believe that it is possible, but with totally different implications. But mainly they’re good for so-called soft targets. If we move to more sophisticated capabilities, like, again, there are some things that people are very much concerned here, a combination of different technologies.
For example, you have some sort of hypersonic delivery vehicle that can deploy a number of loitering munitions over a selected area, and they will find a road-mobile ICBM launcher on their own. So, things like that, this combination of all sorts of technologies, there we can observe. But the problem is that, well, you can address any possible technology with your counter-technology or develop the same technology of your own, but this is a path to nowhere. This is basically how arms races are being carried out, and this is actually what we see right now.
I agree that we won’t see a dramatic increase in numbers of strategic weapons immediately, but we’ve seen quite a significant qualitative increase in capabilities for a while. And to move to quantitative racing, I think we lack the absence of annual limits. So, I think it is quite possible that not this year, not the next year, but in five years, if nothing changes, quantitative arms racing will replace a qualitative one, including because of technological developments.
Because, again, this is not really a strategic thing, but it is very important, is that it seems that in the U.S. and elsewhere, people are looking for solutions to address the so-called arsenal depth, to have new manufacturing capabilities, new technologies implemented to produce more and more of both offensive and defensive weapons. And if you couple this trend with absence of limitations on nuclear weapons, we might end up in something not to be happy about.
On Golden Dome, I’m less concerned, actually, because I think most American experts, will agree that it is quite far from any reality so far at the moment, and it really depends on what will be the trends. As far as I understand, even the U.S. Congress has some questions whether there is an understanding in the U.S. government what it should look like. So, it remains to be seen. But missile defense is important.
On space, ISR, AI, everything contributes to the more and more sophisticated first-strike capabilities. And this is the major concern of Russia and probably of China, that folks in Washington might believe that they are capable of a successful first strike against Russia, against China, for that matter.
[00:21:09] Peter Slezkine: So, not only do we have more actors involved, in China primarily, but the technology has become much more complicated since the days of Oppenheimer and Stimson. So, there’s certainly much more to deal with. Rita, you have been leading expert engagements among Americans and Russians for years. Given the moment we’re in now, what do you make of that history, and what are the prospects for productive Track Two and public engagement going forward? What might that lead to? How might it be useful?
[00:21:47] Rita Guenther: Thank you. First, I’d like to thank you and the Stimson Center for including me in today’s excellent panel with my colleagues from Russia and the United States. I’m grateful to be here with all of you to discuss this important moment. The experience that we’ve had at the National Academy of Sciences with our counterparts in the Russian Federation with regard to Track Two has really revealed, I think, a core important element of engagement, and that is that we have to stay engaged, stay engaged through these difficult times, to really understand what the real challenges are.
And the way that I think about it really can be boiled down to three primary elements. One, through this engagement, we can learn. We can learn what one another’s core threat perceptions are, our opportunities for engagement, for further development of solution sets, et cetera. Second, we can explain the thinking from our own capital. It doesn’t necessarily mean that each of the individual participants endorses one policy or another, but we can explain the thinking from one another’s capital.
And three, we can in-depth explore opportunities for addressing these challenges. And I think the primary opportunity going forward is, if we stay engaged, if we really work hard to focus our attention on possible solutions, we can untangle some of the very complicated challenges that Dmitry has rightly pointed out there. It’s very easy to become overwhelmed by the complicated set of problems we have before us, but if we take them one by one, sort through them, look for solutions to address these challenges, we can start to make progress where there are openings.
And I don’t know where that will be going forward because it’s not clear what the policy space will allow at one moment or another. But to the earlier points that both Fyodor and Matt made, one important opening is to accept the proposal by President Putin to allow us both time to further engage, and that can happen constructively through Track Two engagements, as well as other types of engagements. You mentioned public engagements, and here I’d like to make a very clear distinction.
A lot of these issues that we’re discussing today require not only public engagement, and I’m incredibly honored and grateful that there are so many members of the public tuned in today to participate in this event, but some of those require, also, quiet discussions. And so, I think being discerning about the way in which public figures discuss these types of issues can be helpful in making progress going forward. So, I think that there is a distinction between the more quiet engagement of Track Two dialogues as well as the more public engagement with citizens, as well as with public figures.
[00:24:54] Peter Slezkine: Well, thank you very much both for your remarks and for the engagement that you have led. I hope it continues, and that it leads to new discussions and new deals. Scott, what does the expiration of New START mean for nuclear non-proliferation?
[00:25:14] Scott Sagan: Well, we will have the NPT Review Conference in April and May this year, and I predict it’s going to be extremely contentious, but it has been a contentious set of meetings for quite some time. And I don’t think the expiration of New START means that the treaty will be broken. There is, I believe, a widespread myth about the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which is what I call the grand bargain myth, the idea that the core of the treaty is that the non-nuclear states agreed that they wouldn’t get nuclear weapons if the nuclear states enter in good-faith negotiations under Article VI of the treaty.
There’s a tension there, obviously, but that’s not really the core of the treaty in my view. The core of the treaty is a bargain between the non-nuclear states that I won’t get nuclear weapons if you don’t get nuclear weapons. And to me, that means that what happens with Iran and what happens with the nuclear umbrella states that are contemplating getting nuclear weapons is more important than the New START expiration. And that’s going to be the contentious issue.
Will what’s going on in Iran lead to a peaceful resolution, or will there be another attack? I don’t think we know that. The next day, every day, you’re paying attention to what’s happening with the armada in Iran, with the mass killings of protestors, with President Trump’s threats. That and the solution, what happens there, is extremely important. And that’s more important to me, I think, than the expiration of New START in terms of its effects on the non-proliferation machine.
[00:27:08] Peter Slezkine: What sort of deal do you think might be possible with Iran, and what role could Russia play, if any?
[00:27:16] Scott Sagan: Russia can’t play a very important role. We know just from recent reporting that Larijani has spoken with President Putin, suggesting that the Iranians, as they did in the past, might be willing to send some enriched uranium to Russia for storage. There is renewed interest in some kind of possible international enrichment facility somewhere else in the Middle East. That could be a diplomatic way out for Iran to say that they haven’t totally backed down, and Russia could help support that.
Whether that will be enough for President Trump, I don’t know. We have a risk-prone president, one who makes rash decisions and is willing to use force when other presidents have not been willing to use force. There’s even a, I think, pretty interesting discussion in The Wall Street Journal, David Albright yesterday saying that if there is an attack, it’ll be necessary to have international cooperation to try to secure the materials. Now, that’s a pessimistic way of using cooperation, but nonetheless, it’s something that we do need to think about. And I applaud David for raising that question.
[00:28:33] Peter Slezkine: Well, thank you. Anton, let’s discuss the same subject from the Russian side. What is Russia’s current position on non-proliferation, its attitude toward Iran, and has anything changed since Midnight Hammer?
[00:28:51] Anton Khlopkov: Thank you, Peter, and thank you for inviting me to join this panel. First of all, I don’t think that Russia’s policy in the field of non-proliferation has changed recently. It is not in Russia’s interest to have new nuclear arms states, whether it is about friendly states like Iran or unfriendly states, and I hope it is the same for the U.S. So, it’s not only about unfriendly states, to prevent them from improving their nuclear capability. So, the same thing with regard to the Iranian situation. Russia’s policy has not changed during the last few years.
I think Russia is interested to see a non-nuclear Iran, Iran with no nuclear weapon. Russia is ready to contribute constructively to resolve the situation, but the requests and expectations from the other side should be realistic. If this is about surrender, I don’t think Russia may help with that. But if this is about defying a compromise, to have a deal where all sides make necessary concessions, I think this is where Russia could help. And one of the opportunities which has already been mentioned, Russia, in the past, removed excess low-enriched uranium from Iran.
And my personal view is that Russia could do the same if there would be a need to remove highly enriched uranium from Iran. But again, the expectations, the requests from the other side, which means from Washington, should be realistic. And here, again, I would like to emphasize that Russia’s policy has not changed. Russia would like to see the IAEA, which works on a regular basis in Iran, and see the safeguarded materials in Iran.
[00:30:55] Peter Slezkine: To switch from Iran to another friendly state, from Russia’s perspective, why doesn’t Russia just recognize North Korea as a nuclear power? At this point, the Treaty of Alliance has been signed. The fact that North Korea has these weapons is obvious. What is the point of Russia maintaining its previous position?
[00:31:16] Anton Khlopkov: Well, I have a similar question, why should Russia recognize North Korea as a nuclear weapons state? Because NPT says clearly that nuclear-weapons states are those which manufactured and tested a nuclear device before January 1st, 1969. So, again, from that point of view, it’s not Russia’s choice how to categorize the DPRK, nuclear-weapon state or non-nuclear-weapon state. I think the NPT says it clearly.
But what I think is important to keep in mind, if we are serious to engage North Korea on security issues, to have a multinational dialogue in Northeast Asia, I think we should remove denuclearization as a top priority issue, as some countries like Japan still introduce that, because this is not the issue which the DPRK is ready to discuss. And I think it just prevents us from discussing many other very important issues.
So, again, from that point of view, there are realities on the ground. But at the same time, we should not forget about the NPT and the implications our decision may have on the NPT and its other members.
[00:32:27] Peter Slezkine: Well, that’s why we invite the world’s preeminent experts, in order to gain these clarifications to naive questions that I try to channel for the audience. Anton, one final question. It looks as if the U.S. might be retrenching from Europe, which I imagine Russia perceives as a positive, but one possible result would be further nuclearization on the European continent. How big of a concern is that for Russia?
[00:32:59] Anton Khlopkov: Well, withdrawal of the U.S., fully or partially, from Europe, from my point of view, should not mean that new nuclear weapons states we will see in the region. We already have two, France and U.K. And for me personally, other European states, members of NPT, non-nuclear weapons states, and I would expect them to meet their legal obligations from that point of view.
From that point of view, so again, for me, there is no automatism between U.S. withdrawal, fully or partially, from the region and nuclearization of, let’s say, Poland or Germany, as sometimes immediately discussed. At the same time, I should recognize that, again, this is not in Russia’s interest, especially close to Russia’s borders, to have new nuclear weapons states, either friendly or unfriendly states.
[00:33:54] Peter Slezkine: Scott, what do you make of the friendly proliferation possibility?
[00:33:59] Scott Sagan: I’m worried because of statements that President Trump has made. The whole Greenland crisis has made NATO say, "Is the United States still our partner, or is this a potential adversary or a bully trying to get its way?" So, I think that the so-called nuclear umbrella has a couple of big holes in it right now, and they’re holes of our own making with respect to our allies. And I think we have to ask ourselves, you know, why has the Trump administration not accepted Putin’s offer to extend New START? And I think there are three possible reasons, they’re not mutually exclusive.
One is that there are some who would like to load up more nuclear weapons on ICBMs, and they would welcome the expiration because they think that that’s the best way to try to deter China over the long term. Those people are playing for the ear of the president, and I think it is helpful to also remind the president that if that happens, the Russians are going to load up reserve weapons as well. And that’s called an arms race, and that’s in no one’s interest.
The second reason is what President Trump has said repeatedly about New START and what he said about the JCPOA, which is that he could get a better deal. And his quite remarkable interview with The New York Times laid that out. He wasn’t paying attention to the details very much. He just has this insistence that he can always make a better deal. He doesn’t like a New START because it is an old deal that a Democrat made, and he can always do better. And the third reason why I think it hasn’t been accepted is that the White House is busy.
It’s got other things that it’s doing, and it’s not particularly paying much attention to these kinds of issues. And that’s pretty disturbing, too. So, I think that it would be very good if we accepted the deal. I think the most important thing now is to keep talking about all the complications, including complications that a Golden Dome strategy will present for arms control in the future, and not do anything precipitous that would get the arms race going even faster, like loading up new weapons onto American systems.
[00:36:38] Peter Slezkine: Matt, you wanted to respond very quickly?
[00:36:41] Matthew Bunn: Yeah. I wanted to offer a fourth reason, which is they may be trying to think through whether they can push the Russians to make the proposal a little better, and what particularly they would want to ask. The proposal, as it stands doesn’t have any verification or data exchange. And the U.S. intelligence has an extremely good understanding of how many launchers are out there in Russia. But over time, with no inspections, the number of warheads on those launchers will become more and more uncertain.
And so, I think one of the things that I would like to see over time would be a return to data exchanges, which could be done voluntarily even after the treaty expires. And then arrangements to do voluntary visits. Once the treaty expires, there won’t be the same, you know, in-place provisions for all of the specifics of inspections and protection for inspectors from various kinds of, you know, hazards, et cetera. But there are opportunities that could be pursued for voluntary visits to help reduce the uncertainties on both sides.
I think that one thing beyond the numbers that would be quite important to maintain would be the ban on interfering with national technical means of verification. In the discussions that I and others have been having with the Russians, that they, also have been of the view that we should continue not interfering with each other’s national technical means of verification that monitor the numbers of strategic forces. But New START is the last treaty prohibiting such interference, and it will expire in a couple of days.
[00:38:40] Peter Slezkine: Rita, could you perhaps add to this conversation by suggesting a few practical steps that the United States could take in the near term?
[00:38:50] Rita Guenther: Sure. With respect to a new treaty? [crosstalk 00:38:54].
[00:38:54] Peter Slezkine: Yeah. Well, after expiration, what are some immediate actions that the United States could take that you see as positive and possible?
[00:39:05] Rita Guenther: Well, thank you. I think first and foremost, we need to remind ourselves that it is possible to work cooperatively, absent the New START Treaty, to make progress on our central security concerns. One of the things that we can practically do is set a short-term list of priorities that we want to work on together. The security challenges are not reducing, they’re multiplying, as we’ve been discussing thus far. We need to think about, together, what are the first priority areas that we want to work on, and then work through those priority areas in a detailed fashion.
For example, if we want to take the point about returning to data exchanges, what are the issues that we need to do to get to that point? Is it simply a political agreement or political will? That’s one thing. If there are other issues, we can work on those. Any of the issues that have been raised here are good candidates for that. They are all very complicated, and the good news is we have the technical capabilities in both of our countries. We have the diplomatic and military experience and expertise to work through these issues.
So, we need to actually sit down and figure out what are the core issues we want to work on and focus on those. If, for example, we want to anticipate potentially some areas where a future agreement might go, should that be an area that we can focus on? There are many issues that we need to contend with, such as monitoring and verification. We need to think about how we want to address new delivery systems that have been developed since the advent of the New START Treaty.
We need to think about how we want to deal with issues, for example, that may have to do with other parts of a treaty. So, for example, are we going to think about only limiting certain types of weapon systems, or will we expand to include tactical nuclear weapons, for example, which were not part of the New START Treaty? So, again, I think the first priority area, which is very possible, very realistic, is to set a priority list that is palatable to both our political capitals and move forward on working through the details there.
Separate and apart from that, I think that another area that we need to focus on right away is areas that we can make progress in some of the other thorny issues in our relationship that have been mentioned this morning. There are many, and they all have practical solutions that are some easier to reach, and some are more difficult to reach.
But one area that I would like to highlight across all of these areas is the engagement of the technical community that’s going to be needed to understand how we can really present practical solutions that can really be responsive to today’s thorny security environment, which is complicated and becoming more complicated. So, those are some areas that I would throw out first. First and foremost, though, we have to stay at the table with one another to figure out what our priority areas are and then keep moving on those.
[00:42:15] Peter Slezkine: Well, Dmitry is one such technical expert, and he reminded me over chat that he had forgotten to propose solutions to the challenges that he discussed. So, we will let him contribute a positive note at the end of this round. But first, Fyodor and Scott, I think, want to add on to questions that have already been raised. So, Fyodor, you first.
[00:42:36] Fyodor Lukyanov: Thank you very much, Peter. Concerning issues that Rita has mentioned, and other American colleagues have mentioned in their presentations, I think that a very significant challenge, which is, of course, very, you know, concerning Russian side, is the strategy of Donald Trump’s administration towards two very interconnected strategic stability issues. And, you know, the New START Treaty, as the pillar of strategic stability, was much more successful together with INF Treaty.
Since the United States have left the INF Treaty and decided to deploy intermediate-range missiles, ground-based intermediate-range missiles, both in Europe and the Asia-Pacific, Russia has become very concerned about this issue. And the second thing is what the United States will be doing with systems which can be both conventional and nuclear. For example, long-range standoff missiles.
If there will be a deployment of such systems based on modernized B-52s, for example, in Greenland, it will be a very challenging factor for strategic stability, for Russian national security. The same thing with ground-based intermediate-range missiles. If they will be deployed in Europe, not only in Asia-Pacific, but also in Asia-Pacific, it will also be a very significant challenge, which will not drive, I believe, further dialogue between Russia and the United States on strategic stability and arms control, but will cause the reciprocal approach by the Russian Federation.
And I think it will be a very significant accelerator for further arms race for both sides. So, I do not have any clear position from the American side. We do not see it on both of these issues. And since Donald Trump administration is planning to do to realize both of these projects, and together with developing the Golden Dome system of strategic missile defense system, I think it will be a very bad cocktail for strategic stability and arms control negotiations or further deals.
[00:45:31] Peter Slezkine: Well, you raised the specter of a reciprocal Russian reaction. Let’s be more specific about what has already been developed. We have a couple questions, maybe even multiple, in the chat about the Burevestnik and Poseidon missiles. Can you please explain to the audience what they are and what they are a response to?
[00:45:53] Fyodor Lukyanov: I believe that Dmitry Stefanovich can do it much better than I can do.
[00:45:58] Peter Slezkine: Well, fantastic. Let’s have Dmitry answer that question and then immediately propose solutions to all of our technical problems.
[00:46:05] Dmitry Stefanovich: Well, that’s quite a significant task, especially given that we are not having too much time. Well, Burevestnik and Poseidon, and some other weapons actually came into being as a response to unrestrained development of U.S. missile defenses. And now we have even more reasons to believe that it was the right cause, despite the fact that none other than Putin himself called such weapons quite barbaric back in 2008, talking to George Bush Jr., George W. Bush.
So, Burevestnik is basically a cruise missile powered by some sort of nuclear propulsion that is capable of unlimited range and sophisticated trajectories. And Poseidon is basically a nuclear-powered, uncrewed underwater vehicle, which is allegedly capable of delivering multi-megaton warheads to adversary shores or adversary aircraft carriers. It remains to be seen how many of those could be deployed, although there are signs that Burevestnik is nearing the deployment stage.
However it is, even judging by the official statements, it’s still under development. The concept of operations for this weapon is still under development. With Poseidon, we have dedicated submarines for this weapon and other assorted uncrewed underwater vehicles being constructed. Some of them have already been floated out. And this is exactly where technology mates strategic issues and the absence of strategic limitations. So, the problem is that whenever someone tries to get an upper hand, others will follow suit and develop some sort of contingencies against such threats.
What else to say here? I would emphasize that another weapon developed in response to U.S. missile defenses, the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle-tipped ballistic missile, was actually introduced into New START by the Russian side back in the day, when it was still a thing. And even there was a U.S. inspection of this sophisticated weapon. So, it’s a great example that existing mechanisms can be used to address other technologies.
And one of the solutions, speaking about solutions, is that we can get back to the idea of a security equation proposed by Russia during the first Trump administration. That is a combination of unilateral, bilateral, multilateral, legally and politically binding mechanisms that can address all strategic offensive and defensive capabilities, nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities, with a focus on avoiding first-strike incentives.
Because it is impossible to believe that we can have some sort of mega-START that will address everything considered strategic with multiple actors. No, it should be like a system of interconnected capabilities, or interconnecting mechanisms that will help us to make a more stable situation. The problem is that we all like to cherry-pick the stuff that we’re interested in and avoid talking about the stuff that our adversaries or partners are interested in.
And one example actually happened during the previous U.S. administration, when there was this proposal for some sort of unconditional discussions on strategic stability, including within the P5. But at the very same speech, it was said that the United States will ensure its superiority in all other technological domains, in cyber, in space, and so on. And that's not how it works. Like, I cannot imagine a situation where Russia, China, or possibly even France, will acknowledge superiority by some other country.
[00:49:51] Peter Slezkine: Could you really quickly add a couple remarks on another Russian missile, the Oreshnik, which we have now seen twice in action, more or less.
[00:50:04] Dmitry Stefanovich: Okay. Well, actually, it is also quite complicated to do some to have some significant extra information that, apart from what is available in the public domain. I think it is also an example how destruction of arms control mechanisms lead to arms racing and to new capabilities that people get very much concerned with.
Basically, it's an intermediate-range ballistic missile capable of delivering quite significant payloads regionally and probably extra-regionally depending on its deployment areas. The stuff that we've seen used these experiments and then in strikes against Ukrainian targets, it really looks like things that have been under development in the U.S. and other countries for a while, with basically kinetic penetrators to hit targets like airfields and so on.
So, it's not really something very sophisticated, but it does its job. And actually, it's a good reminder that we're definitely not safer without any limitations on INF. But also, it's a reminder that appeared only now that actually Russian post-INF moratorium initiative was a thing. And should it have, should it be embraced by the U.S. or by Europeans, we might have ended up in some sort of another reality compared to what we are right now.
[00:51:28] Peter Slezkine: Scott has a comment, and then Anton has a question for the American side. So, Scott, [inaudible 00:51:33].
[00:51:33] Scott Sagan: Well, I just wanted to make a point that Ben Wilson, the Harvard historian, in his new book, Strange Stability, makes an argument that strategic stability as a term is a delivery vehicle to which different people attach different kinds of weapons and then say that that's okay. This community of outside experts really needs to do a lot more work on figuring out different dimensions of strategic stability with different kinds of weapon systems that are emerging, and the offense-defense relationship. We can be skeptical about Golden Dome as a perfect defense.
I think we should be skeptical, but it is moving forward in one form or another. And the question is, how can that be done in a way that doesn't create the kinds of incentives for other states to overreact? That's a interaction that we've seen in the past and that we are seeing already happening today. I think this intellectual community of outside experts needs to do even more work in figuring out how to make different forms of strategic stability be possible with emerging systems.
[00:52:54] Peter Slezkine: Thanks, Anton.
[00:52:55] Anton Khlopkov: Okay. Most of speakers today, in one form or another, already mentioned today about importance of the dialogue, and I very much agree with that dialogue among experts, intellectuals, but also dialogue among the officials. And here the question I have, who are the people in this U.S. administration to work with on strategic stability issues? Because unfortunately, I personally, and I apologize for my literacy, I don't know many people in this administration who have necessary background to whom Russian side can deal with.
This is first, and second, the same is true with Iran issue because, as we already started discussion, that many technical issues, enrichment, level of enrichment. I know that Mr. Witkoff is the lead person to negotiate the deal, but who are the technical experts with whom related issues could be discussed? Because I personally do not observe many technical experts in his team when he traveled to meet our other colleagues.
So, again, from that point of view, if there are any particular names American colleagues could share, I think it would be very useful because from the Russian side, when it comes to strategic stability, arms control, not all, but many people are still the same, those people who negotiated New START or were part of the negotiation process. And I'm not sure that this is the case from U.S. side. So, I would appreciate, colleagues, if you will share information on that. Thank you.
[00:54:31] Peter Slezkine: Well, it's possible that some such people might even be on this call, so maybe they'll reach out afterwards. But in the meanwhile, Matt, can you supply some names?
[00:54:40] Matthew Bunn: Well, just the official ones. So, we now finally have people confirmed in some of the key posts. So, Thomas DiNanno is the Under Secretary for International Security and Arms Control, you know, the same position that Rose Scott Miller held when she was the chief negotiator for the New START Treaty. At the assistant secretary level, Chris Yao is the assistant secretary for arms control, and he's been involved in strategic issues for a long, long, long time in one way or another.
On technical issues related to Iran, those would mostly be handled at the National Nuclear Security Administration. The person in charge of nonproliferation there now is confirmed. Matt Napoli is the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Non-Proliferation, I believe it is. And over at the Defense Department, we finally have the person, the assistant secretary in charge of nuclear, chem, and bio matters confirmed, Bob Kadlec is in that slot.
So, anyway, those are at least the people who are officially supposed to be in charge of such issues. Now, as you note, the Witkoff team tends to travel without a lot of technical backup support with them, as does the President and the Secretary of State. And so, how plugged in those people are to the real decisions President Trump may make, I do not, I am unable to answer.
[00:56:24] Peter Slezkine: Well, not being able to answer doesn't stop you from posing a question. I know you have one for the Russians, so perhaps you could ask it now.
[00:56:31] Matthew Bunn: So, I just wanted to understand, because the sort of verification and data exchange issues are important politically on the U.S. side for the ability to move forward. I wanted to understand better, at least opinions of my Russian colleagues, under what circumstances might it be possible to return to some of the kinds of data exchanges we've had in the past, or have sort of voluntary visits to help reduce uncertainties about how many warheads are loaded onto different missiles, and so on. I personally think that would help the political case for staying within the limits on the U.S. side.
[00:57:21] Fyodor Lukyanov: If I may. I believe that…. Thank you, Matthew, for this question. I believe that the main conditions for decisions on Russian side about information exchange or verification measures or other confidence-building measures is much less military or technical, they're political.
And I believe that if we would have better situation in bilateral relations, for example, after the end of conflict in Ukraine, and after we would have dialogue on European and Eurasian security, and after we would have some decisions in this field which will not get us back balancing on the brink of direct military clash in Europe, it'll be much more easy to think and to discuss these confidence-building measures and information exchanges. So, I believe that if we would have progress in other bilateral issues, we will get back to the track on strategic stability and all these confidence-building measures.
[00:58:46] Peter Slezkine: Fyodor, do you have a question of your own for the Americans?
[00:58:48] Fyodor Lukyanov: I have asked my own question. I made it in the form of a remark. What do you think about plans of Donald Trump's administration to deploy intermediate-range missiles, which can be both conventional and nuclear, in Europe and in Asia-Pacific, and how it will go together with, for example, other plans to deploy some new systems in Greenland, or in Europe, or in Japan?
[00:59:21] Peter Slezkine: Rita, would you like to address that question?
[00:59:24] Rita Guenther: Actually, I see Matt's hand. I think Matt [crosstalk 00:59:26].
[00:59:26] Peter Slezkine: Okay. Matt.
[00:59:28] Matthew Bunn: So, far, what the United States is planning is not dual-use capable systems, but conventional intermediate-range systems like the Gryphon Tomahawk launcher, or the Tomahawks no longer have nuclear capability, and like the Army's Dark Eagle hypersonic missile. Russia, on the other hand, has already, as Dmitry pointed out, deployed and used a ballistic missile that is dual, that is, INF-range and is dual-capable. I would like to see an accord between us that says neither of us will deploy INF-range missiles in Europe that are nuclear-armed.
I fear that all INF is out of the bag at this point. There's going to be, I think, a lot of countries with INF-range conventional missiles, but I think there's still a chance for coming up with at least some forms of limits on nuclear-armed INF, which are the biggest threat in terms of decapitation, et cetera.
[01:00:39] Peter Slezkine: We have a couple questions in the chat about the possibility of a new strategic arms control agreement, I suppose not a strategic arms control agreement, that would limit tactical nuclear weapons as well as strategic. Dmitry, Anton, would either of you like to address this question?
[01:00:59] Dmitry Stefanovich: Oh, I can start if Anton is okay with that. Well, I believe everything is possible. I mean, it's not some sort of, I don't know, a taboo not to talk about such issues. And actually, we have President Putin on the record, saying this October during Valdai meeting, that he understands that this is a possible topic of discussions, including, and he also mentioned a lot of other things, including Oreshnik, including attack nuclear submarines or cruise-armed nuclear submarines.
So, there is an understanding that if there is readiness to address our concerns, we are ready to address concerns of others. That's how it works. And actually, this relates to a lot of things that have been said here. I mean, arms control is only a means to an end. It works as long as it serves one's national security interests. So, it would be really surprising to ask that country to engage in arms control if there is no deep belief in this country that it is a good tool for its national security.
And this is actually where probably the expert community can do a even better job just explaining that arms control is not something that we are doing because it makes us feel good, because people from other countries will point a finger and say, "Yeah, this is a good guy." No, we are engaged in arms control because we have a mutual understanding that it supports our national security, not because other folks like us to engage in it. So, with nonstrategic nuclear weapons, it's totally possible to engage in this discussion. The problem is, I'm not sure that other countries are ready for this discussion.
For example, there were numerous good proposals, easy proposals, which went nowhere. Like the simplest one is just to turn all U.S. forward-based B61s in Europe to undeployed mode, just move them somewhere to central storage, not host them at the same airfield with their delivery vehicles. Well, it never flew because these are political weapons. These are not weapons that you intend to use. This is the problem.
[01:03:22] Peter Slezkine: Well, so we're approaching the end. Do any of you have final remarks you would like to share?
[01:03:29] Rita Guenther: I just have one that I'd like to contribute, as well as all of the excellent comments of my colleagues today. And that is that as we go forward, there is another element that we need to consider, and that is that over the many decades of working on arms control and other agreements with our Russian counterparts, we've developed a lot of expertise in both countries. I referenced this earlier.
There are, however, elements of that expertise that risk being lost as generations transition, and absent an existing active arms control treaty, some of that expertise might be lost for quite some time, and it will take a long time to develop. Matt referred to one of these elements in particular earlier on, and that has to do with onsite inspections. These are very technical, very detailed types of engagements that happen legally under treaties. There are others.
But beyond that specific example, I think it's important for us all in the coming years to work to share the experience and the expertise that has been gained with new experts so that this whole enterprise of working together on strategic stability can be carried forth with the benefit of all that has been gained by those who have preceded us.
And so, it's an important element that I think we can continue, even absent a formal agreement and even absent some formal strategic stability conversations. We can start on that and continue that process today, and that's a way that we can all contribute from the expert community. So, thank you very much to my colleagues and to Stimson for this excellent event today.
[01:05:11] Peter Slezkine: Well, thank you very much. Fyodor, you are quite young and very accomplished, and as a director of an institute, I'm sure capably passing on all of this knowledge to a new generation. So, would you please share with us your final remarks?
[01:05:25] Fyodor Lukyanov: I'm an optimist by my training. I'm a historian, you know, and we used to have periods when we didn't have any treaties in this field. But what was positive, even during very complicated periods such as the beginning of war in Afghanistan in 1979, and other periods when we didn't have treaties on bilateral level, we used to have negotiations and dialogue between expert communities.
So, I believe that we will have progress in the field of strategic stability and arms control if we would have, on official level and on Track Two level, regular contacts and regular exchanges on these issues. And I believe that the United States and Russia could have much better progress between us two than between us and others.
[01:06:23] Peter Slezkine: Matt, and then Anton.
[01:06:25] Matthew Bunn: I just wanted to reemphasize, especially for American audiences, that arms control is not something you do for its own sake. It's not some absolute moral good. It's something you do to try to improve your security. You're willing to limit your own forces in order to get limits on the forces of other countries that you fear.
We don't bother with arms control with the British and the French because we don't worry about their nuclear forces. But it's totally understandable that Russia would have a different view about the nuclear forces of Britain and France. And so, the notion that, "Oh, we can't do arms control with those nasty Russians because you can't trust them as far as you can spit it, well, they're doing terrible things in Ukraine, blah, blah, blah, blah." You know, that's exactly the kind of people you want to do arms control with in order to limit the forces that are potentially arrayed against you.
And I remain optimistic that ways will be found over, maybe not today, maybe not tomorrow, but over the course of time, to maintain some level of nuclear restraint among the largest nuclear forces on the planet.
[01:07:43] Peter Slezkine: Thank you. Well, let's end with a trustworthy Russian, Anton.
[01:07:47] Anton Khlopkov: Thank you, Peter. It's easy to be a pessimist nowadays when it comes to nuclear non-proliferation, but I think it's neither in the interest of Russia nor the U.S. to see new nuclear-weapons states. And I would like to remind that our countries continue to be depositaries of the NPT, in addition to the U.K. In this context, I hope there would be a space to revive nuclear non-proliferation cooperation between our countries, as we did in the past, because of the reasons I've just mentioned.
And in this context, I would like to remind that the NPT Review Conference is approaching, so hopefully our countries can work pragmatically to try to secure a positive outcome, whatever it means, as a result of the NPT Review Conference. Because I would like to remind that two previous conferences finished with no final document. And I do believe that more kind of experience, like during the two previous conferences we have are more vulnerable the NPT and the whole nuclear regime will be.
So, hopefully our countries will be able to revive cooperation in the field of non-proliferation because it faces so many challenges nowadays. Thank you.
[01:09:09] Peter Slezkine: Well, thank you, Anton. Thank you to all of our speakers. Thank you to our audience for joining us today. The imminent expiration of New START provided a very good reason for us to gather today.
But even after the treaty expires, the conversation will continue. So, we have to have hope to have more of these dialogues. We can even bring the Chinese in. I understand that the likelihood of getting something accomplished on a deal level is low, but conversations online, perhaps, might be a low-stakes start.
In any case, we will continue this conversation, both in public and in private. And so, I look forward to seeing all of you again soon.
Thanks for listening to the Trialogue Podcast. Make sure to subscribe to the show so you don't miss out on any episode. The Trialogue Podcast is hosted by the Stimson Center and produced by University FM.