Xiang Lanxin, Distinguished Fellow at the Stimson Center, joins us to discuss Trumpian “kayfabe,” the possibility of a grand bargain over Taiwan, and the US-Russia-China “grand strategic triangle,” among other subjects. *The Trialogue Podcast is hosted by the Stimson Center and produced by University FM.
Xiang Lanxin, Distinguished Fellow at the Stimson Center, joins us to discuss Trumpian “kayfabe,” the possibility of a grand bargain over Taiwan, and the US-Russia-China “grand strategic triangle,” among other subjects.
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*The Trialogue Podcast is hosted by the Stimson Center and produced by University FM.
(Transcripts may contain a few typographical errors due to audio quality during the podcast recording.)
[00:00:00] Lanxin Xiang: I'm Peter Slezkine, Director of the U.S.-Russia-China Trialogue project at the Stimson Center. Since the middle of the 20th century, relations among the United States, Russia, and China have had an enormous impact on each country separately and on the world as a whole. The purpose of the Trialogue is to better understand this extraordinarily complex and consequential relationship by directly engaging with experts from all three countries.
In this show, guests from across the political spectrum and from every corner of the globe share their views in their own voice. While the Stimson Center seeks to provide access to a wide variety of perspectives, it does not endorse any particular position. We leave it to the listeners to judge the validity and value of the views expressed by the guests. I hope you enjoy the podcast.
My guest today is Xiang Lanxin, Professor Emeritus of International History and Politics at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva and distinguished fellow at the Stimson Center. Lanxin is a renowned academic and public intellectual. He may also be the only person in the world who is equally welcome in Washington, Moscow, Brussels, and Beijing.
[00:01:14] Peter Slezkine: So, Lanxin, welcome back to the podcast. You are my guest number one. Now, we're on episode 30 or 31, I think. So, thanks for making your grand return.
[00:01:24] Lanxin Xiang: Well, thank you for inviting me again.
[00:01:27] Peter Slezkine: Let's start, as I suppose everyone does these days, with Trump. What do the Chinese make of Trump?
[00:01:37] Lanxin Xiang: Well, compared with Biden, it's a good news, I will say, generally speaking,
[00:01:45] Peter Slezkine: And this is your individual interpretation, or this is, more or less, the official position, the expert consensus?
[00:01:50] Lanxin Xiang: Well, I will say, a few months ago, it was a minority view among the elite.
[00:01:58] Peter Slezkine: And you are one of that minority.
[00:01:59] Lanxin Xiang: I’m the leading one, in fact, because I was promoting this idea during the campaign even.
[00:02:11] Peter Slezkine: That Trump would be better for China?
[00:02:12] Lanxin Xiang: Well, yes. I put it this way. In the short term, it certainly presented disruption, some chaotic situations. But in the medium and long term, this is, I think, most Chinese — I'm talking about elite, intellectually elite policy people — they are allied with me now, I would say, or at least come to the point to see that Trump has more things to offer. And he is the hope, I will say, the only hope for settling, not just trade, economic issues.
Now, it's secondary. The real issue is geopolitical relationship — in other words, how can you have a bilateral relationship between the U.S. and China that will not inevitably lead to a military confrontation? Now, this has been the assumption by many elite members, both in China and also in the U.S.
[00:03:16] Peter Slezkine: You mean, that conflict is inevitable.
[00:03:17] Lanxin Xiang: Yeah. That's what most people think. I'm talking about elites on both sides. They're worried.
[00:03:24] Peter Slezkine: But what prompted the Chinese elites to come around on Trump? I think this would be a surprise to many in my American audience who will have witnessed the high tariffs, the trade war, and assumed that Beijing was very displeased with Washington. So, why have they come around to your optimistic position on Trump?
[00:03:45] Lanxin Xiang: Well, trade was totally expected, anyway. And we had the first round with Trump during his first term. And we had a real solution there. At that point, China took it very seriously. We had a sincere negotiation with the Trump people. And we end up with, I will say, quite effective and a good deal.
[00:04:09] Peter Slezkine: That’s the so-called phase one deal.
[00:04:10] Lanxin Xiang: Phase one deal, but for COVID and later on the changing political environment. Especially during the first term, the China policy is also driven by those extreme types of anti-China hawks who are in power, who actually took the opportunity of COVID to, somehow, in my view, make their case convincing to Trump. And Trump, of course, at that time, tried to rescue his own reputation for his mishandling of COVID.
So, this has all come together in the end. So, it looks like the phase one trade deal, which should have worked, was destroyed by those cabinet members at the time who had their own agenda, who tried to drive Trump's China policy leading towards confrontation.
[00:05:09] Peter Slezkine: Who were those members, specifically, as far as you're concerned?
[00:05:11] Lanxin Xiang: Pompeo, of course, I will say. Also, the longest serving NSC director.
Somehow, I miss his name. It's a familiar name.
[00:05:24] Peter Slezkine: Bolton.
[00:05:25] Lanxin Xiang: Bolton, yes.
[00:05:28] Peter Slezkine: John Bolton.
[00:05:30] Lanxin Xiang: I apologize. I’m reaching the point where I begin to forget even the familiar names.
[00:05:38] Peter Slezkine: Bolton and Pompeo?
[00:05:39] Lanxin Xiang: And Pompeo, yes. These are the leading figures, of course. So, this is where the bilateral relationship was damaged beyond repair at the end of the Trump administration.
[00:05:53] Peter Slezkine: But that was an accident of COVID and the particular intervention of a few individuals. But the general Trump trajectory during the first administration finishing with the phase one deal was one that the Chinese found productive.
[00:06:08] Lanxin Xiang: Yes, no doubt about it. And it should have worked even. But unfortunately, yeah.
[00:06:15] Peter Slezkine: So, your argument was that, if Trump was to come back, he'd pick up where he left off with the phase one deal and that that would actually be good for China? Or maybe for both countries?
[00:06:25] Lanxin Xiang: Certainly, it’s the assumption, especially because during the Biden administration, remember, Chinese initially had some high hopes, saying, at least, the Biden people will not do the same thing as Trump at the last stage of his administration, right? Basically, even using those racial languages, attacking China.
[00:06:49] Peter Slezkine: When he was talking about the “China virus.”
[00:06:50] Lanxin Xiang: Well, and also “kung flu” and so on, so forth. Remember his language. So, we thought there was hope with the Biden people, but it turns out that the Biden people are basically hopeless, starting with Anchorage, of course, if you recall.
[00:07:09] Peter Slezkine: The first U.S.-China meeting right at the start of Biden’s administration?
[00:07:11] Lanxin Xiang: Yeah. It very quickly dawned upon the Chinese elite at the time that the Biden people are perhaps even more dangerous, because they are really the true believers of ideological conflict. That's why Biden defined great power relations publicly as democracy versus autocracy. So, that means there is very little hope, even in the geopolitical area, where China…
[00:07:44] Peter Slezkine: Because, fundamentally, there is an opposition built into American foreign policy between the U.S. and China.
[00:07:48] Lanxin Xiang: That's exactly the real tension. The Chinese, even more, worry about, on the other hand, trade war and control on technology and so on. In all the other areas, the Biden people have gone even further than Trump. So, there is zero benefit from the Chinese point of view, either in the sense of economic relationship or, even more importantly, the geopolitical relationship. So, therefore, in the Biden administration, during those four years, I think this is the closest moment, in my view, where China and the United States could have encountered each other in some kind of military confrontation. Very risky.
[00:08:33] Peter Slezkine: During the Biden, when Biden, over that period, four times had what they called slips of the tongue, where he said that the U.S. would defend Taiwan.
[00:08:41] Lanxin Xiang: Remember, this is a perfect storm. Then, you have Nancy Pelosi's visit. Then, you have other crises. So, it's really the most dangerous, in my view, since China and the United States, since the rapprochement in the ‘70s. The U.S. and China were very close to having an encounter, I must say, a military confrontation, either over South China Sea or over Taiwan Strait. Then, we have Trump 2.0.
[00:09:07] Peter Slezkine: Wait, before Trump 2.0, why did so many Chinese observers and experts seem to prefer Kamala Harris? Is it because continuity brings predictability and they were comfortable with that? If you say this was the most dangerous period, why were you among the lone voices preferring Trump?
[00:09:25] Lanxin Xiang: No. Remember, there is one thing, the Chinese elite. I'm talking about the policy elite, including the think tank elite. The way they have dealt with American colleagues, I would say, in the past, mostly with the Democrat party and even with the Republican party, they are dealing with so-called establishment figures, including those people who supposedly had a great reputation in national security issues and on China. And they have zero knowledge about Trump and the Trump people, I’ll put it this way. Especially after Trump 1.0 lost the election, nobody thought that Trump had another chance.
And during the campaign, yes, Biden is hopeless, it turned out, but then Kamala turned out to be using a language that the Chinese elite are more familiar with. They think this is going to be another typical democratic established elite which Chinese have dealt with for many years.
Also, remember that they believe Kamala is not going to use the Biden people, because Biden people really worried them. The entire national security team worried Chinese so much, as I explained to you, because of ideology. So, therefore, they think Trump has no chance. But I was the one, from the very saying, Trump has a great chance. We have to be prepared for Trump 2.0.
I turned out to be totally right. And also, during the campaign, I began to study Trump and the Trump team. I know some people who work for Trump. So, it's a different kind of situation.
[00:11:22] Peter Slezkine: First, it's interesting that, even during the worst moments of U.S.-China relations since the early ‘70s, at least in your interpretation, just for, kind of, sociological institutional reasons, Chinese experts’ analysis of the U.S. was still informed by their Washington counterparts, so that shaped their predictions and, perhaps, even their preferences. But then Trump, surprisingly to those in Beijing, prevailed. You were one of the few voices saying that this might happen and that it might actually be a good thing. So, we were talking about how Beijing has come around to your position. How long did that take? And what is their view of Trump now in all of the actions that we have seen in the last six months?
[00:12:06] Lanxin Xiang: Well, I believe the last, probably, four months or so, I think, increasingly judgment was well-taken, let me put it, for a very simple reason. You see, my basic argument is this. In China, I ask my colleagues there, “Tell me, what's wrong with Trump.” Everybody says erratic, of course, unpredictable. You see, my argument, of course, is, first, Trump is very predictable if you understand how he operates. Then, I have to explain very carefully about the professional wrestling concept, KFA concept, which Chinese elite have never heard of. And many American elites have never heard of it, by the way.
[00:12:56] Peter Slezkine: That's absolutely true. I hardly know what that means.
[00:12:59] Lanxin Xiang: I explained very clearly in China, saying, “This is how Trump is going to operate.” Now, very few people are convinced. But then, the trade war started, the liberation day. When the liberation day started, I was the one basically saying, “It has no chance to last. It's not sustainable.” I say, “Give it less than two months.” But actually, it's less than one month, right? So, I said, you know, this is not a trade war, this is just an opening salvo of professional wrestling. So, it has to come down. It makes no sense. Very few people were convinced, I must say. So, I proved to be totally right on that.
So, first, I said Trump actually is predictable. Second, Trump hates ideology. Therefore, we don't have to worry about a long drawn Cold War in the original sense, because the original Cold War is an ideological conflict. And the third thing I want to make is that Trump does not like military confrontation, does not like to be the police of the world. I say, what's wrong with Trump, then?
[00:14:15] Peter Slezkine: Unless he gets a cool fireworks show where bombers fly long distances, drop a few busters and it’s all like a Hollywood movie.
[00:14:24] Lanxin Xiang: Yeah, for traumatic actions. But honestly, I don't think it even knocked out Iran’s nuclear program at all. But that's another issue. But it's a good show. It's a good show. So, it turns out that my argument proved to be valid, at least, I put.
[00:14:42] Peter Slezkine: So, the climax of the liberation day tariffs proved to be the high point. Beijing relaxed, realizing that this was an opening move in what would be a long bout of bargaining and are basically pleased with what they believed to be a constructive course.
[00:15:02] Lanxin Xiang: Yes, we had a very good negotiation in Geneva, and an even better one in London. And you see, the whole point about this so-called trade war is that both sides really need a pragmatic settlement. And the Chinese, of course, now admit the trade imbalances, such as a gap in the bilateral trade relationship, cannot be sustained anyway. So, they accepted the logic that we need to do something, try to reduce the trade deficit for the United States.
[00:15:38] Peter Slezkine: Even the Chinese accepted the American argument that this asymmetry is not good for either side.
[00:15:43] Lanxin Xiang: It's not going to be sustainable for any bilateral trading relationship. It's not going to be sustainable. So, they are willing to make concessions. Then, at the same time, they want to get something back. So, that's what deal-making is all about.
[00:16:02] Peter Slezkine: And something back is lowering of export controls. Nvidia was just allowed to sell H20 chips.
[00:16:09] Lanxin Xiang: Well, yeah. There could be other possibilities, yeah, because it's certainly low tariffs in many areas. And also, I think there are more to come. We are still discussing other issues. You know, if China offers more help with fentanyl, for example, which, you know, we also ask for something in return. So, I think, investment possibilities. I'm talking about the access of the U.S. investment market. It’s another thing.
[00:16:39] Peter Slezkine: You mean the Chinese would invest in the U.S. market.
[00:16:41] Lanxin Xiang: Well, because they are pretty much blocked under the Biden administration.
[00:16:49] Peter Slezkine: And this would be appealing to the U.S. because it would help balance the financial relationship. But presumably, Chinese investment would be subject to all sorts of controls that would be specific to China because of the weariness of the American administration, government, population now.
[00:17:07] Lanxin Xiang: Yeah. But even more importantly is that, both Trump and Beijing are interested in starting some kind of grand bargaining on issues beyond economic relations. Trump has stated several times, if you follow carefully, Chinese also, Taiwan, of course, being the issue. Taiwan has been the only issue that could bring the U.S. and China into a real war here. So, we need to stabilize that situation. With Biden, there is a zero chance, you see, because they link democracy versus autocracy to the Taiwan issue, which means the United States and its allies will defend Taiwan no matter what, simply because it is democracy.
See, that's the logic. That's the dangerous message they are sending to Beijing. That means the interest of the U.S., then, will be the perpetuation of the separation of Taiwan and mainland China. Therefore, the real effect is to encourage the Taiwan independence movement or independence train. Because you abandon the strategic ambiguity, basically, you say that, “I will defend you anyway, no matter what you do.”
So, this is where I think it's a major turning point on the geopolitical issues and that both Trump and Xi seem to have interest in really talking about that, aside from the trade issue. The trade issue turns out to be actually secondary, in my view.
[00:18:44] Peter Slezkine: Are these totally separate checks? Is there a way they’re linked?
[00:18:47] Lanxin Xiang: Well, Trump likes to make linkages. He calls it the art of deal-making. So, China will happily make that link as well if they can work out something. So, I put it in a very simple way. I do believe the Trump Administration 2.0 is, perhaps, the only historic opportunity for China and the United States to settle something that is so precarious, so dangerous, and the only thing that could bring the U.S. and China into a war. I will say, if we can do that in the next two, three years, that would be the greatest achievement, far more important than trade.
[00:19:34] Peter Slezkine: What would such stabilization look like when it comes to Taiwan, perhaps, linked to an economic deal?
[00:19:41] Lanxin Xiang: Logically, it's actually not too complicated. Logically, it would be, the United States firmly rejects any movement on the Taiwan side towards independence. The United States will oppose it. Now, I will say I use the concept of joint communiqué. We have three joint communiqués. We need a number four, which means the United States publicly states, “We oppose any move towards Taiwan.” Under that condition, the Chinese could say, “We don’t need to use force.” Remember, the Chinese are never willing to relinquish their rights of using force. But if the U.S. sticks to the idea of a strategic ambiguity, the Chinese, at least, are willing to not use military threats as such.
[00:20:41] Peter Slezkine: Could that be put on paper? How could that be put into a fourth communiqué? So, if the U.S. publicly declares that it is opposed to a Taiwanese independence movement, or it could be formulated somehow more subtly. China could not possibly take force off the table if it considers Taiwan an internal matter, right?
[00:21:02] Lanxin Xiang: No. I hope that China will publicly promise under that condition. If the U.S. opposes Taiwan independence, we will pursue a peaceful unification process. They can make that promise. Then, that will be a big jump. Remember, there is a common interest here. The common interest is to stabilize the Taiwan Strait.
[00:21:31] Peter Slezkine: So, you could begin with these mutual promises, that the U.S. would not countenance Taiwanese independence, China would promise not to resort to force. And then you could begin confidence-building measures that actually put these into practice, drawing forces back on both sides in ways that are measurable, visible, and controlled.
[00:21:51] Lanxin Xiang: Yeah. That's unthinkable under the previous administration, particularly, under an administration that is focused on ideological conflict in the current world. There is a zero chance. I think the most dangerous thing, which European Union also made the mistake, in my view, to link the Taiwan issue to Ukraine. The logic is today is Ukraine, tomorrow is Taiwan. Now, that link, actually, in my opinion, is a war talk. It's a talk leading to conflict, inevitably. This is a kind of language. You publicly support the perpetual separation of Taiwan and the mainland, which means you support Taiwan independence, de facto independence.
So, this is what Trump is not going to do. So, this is, I think, where the great opportunities, I will say, maybe the only possible opportunity, I don't know. If there is a fourth communiqué, I doubt the next administration, being Democratic or not, will get rid of it because they see the benefit of truly stabilizing Taiwan Strait. So, why would you get rid of that?
[00:23:04] Peter Slezkine: And so, you think that this could be done in the next three years, and you don’t think that it depends on progress toward an economic deal, or at least this could be pursued on parallel tracks.
[00:23:18] Lanxin Xiang: Economic side, which is more or less settled, the basic principle, both sides now accept. China will help the U.S. reduce the trade deficit. There is no question about that. So, the real issue is geopolitical. We need to settle that before we can have a stable relationship.
[00:23:39] Peter Slezkine: So, Taiwan is the key to a geopolitical relationship.
[00:23:41] Lanxin Xiang: There is no doubt about that. There is no doubt about that.
[00:23:46] Peter Slezkine: So, you are saying that the previous administration had linked Ukraine and Taiwan to ill effect.
[00:23:51] Lanxin Xiang: Yes.
[00:23:52] Peter Slezkine: Just last Monday, Trump linked economic relations with China to the war in Ukraine by threatening 100% secondary tariffs on, primarily, India and China if after 50 days the war continues and they persist in doing business with Russia. So, does anybody in Beijing take that seriously?
[00:24:12] Lanxin Xiang: No.
[00:24:14] Peter Slezkine: Do they think that he would torpedo the economic deal that is more or less in place in order to achieve something in Ukraine? How is this seen?
[00:24:19] Lanxin Xiang: Well, of course, it’s a bluff. We called it bluff before. This is almost absurd, after such a hard bargain with China. Just because we buy oil from Russia, will he return the 100% tariff? It's almost absurd, even to think about it. Not just China, but also India. No. Of course, it's a bluff. This is a game with Putin, of course. And if he is really tough on Putin, why give him 50 days, to begin with? This is professional wrestling, the second stage of a KFA, basically.
[00:25:04] Peter Slezkine: So, you think this is less about signaling to Putin and more about signaling to European and other audiences — that he is tough on Putin?
[00:25:09] Lanxin Xiang: Well, it is a signal to Putin as well, but my sense is he knows full well Putin and his people will not take that threat seriously, because Trump likes to make deadlines, and none of the deadlines, so far, seem to have worked.
[00:25:31] Peter Slezkine: Well, except for the one with Iran, as Lindsey Graham tried to remind Putin. Well, that was not the U.S. enforcing it, but Israel, on the 61st day.
[00:25:39] Lanxin Xiang: Nobody can control Israel. That's the problem. So, no, I don't think that Trump is actually capable of doing this.
[00:25:49] Peter Slezkine: Well, since we brought up Israel and Iran, what was the Chinese reaction to that two, three-week adventure?
[00:25:58] Lanxin Xiang: Well, it's certainly not good, of course. Now, remember, the Middle East area is the only region that China has no rivals. You see, China's a friend to everybody. This is very unique in that particular region. China has a wonderful relationship with Israelis and has a wonderful relationship with Gulf countries. And there was Iran. So, any disturbances in that region, because China's investing quite a lot, we have a lot of economic relations with Iran and so on. So, certainly, it's not good. But on the other hand, it has become chaotic. If the United States is willing to return to the Middle East, so be it. They failed before.
[00:26:47] Peter Slezkine: Is there a sense that, perhaps, that's good for China to the extent that there is a rivalry with the U.S, the U.S. will weaken itself by returning to the Middle Eastern morass.
[00:26:56] Lanxin Xiang: If they are really returning to the base, not just, you know, sending a long distance bombing. But I'm not sure Trump is the one who wants to go back to the Middle East. That's the thing. So, on the whole, of course, I don't think it's a positive development, but China cannot do much. They condemn Israel, but Israel, in my view, behind the scenes, knows that Chinese don't really alienate them.
[00:27:23] Peter Slezkine: So, aside from the Ukraine War, how does China conceive of its relationship with Russia, going forward? Is it nervous at all that Russia might return to the Western embrace? Is it nervous about Russian overtures to America over the Arctic?
[00:27:43] Lanxin Xiang: I'm not so sure. There is always a certain level of mistrust of the Russians for historic reasons, of course. Chinese never really trust Russians, throughout history, be it the terrorist period or even communist period. We all know that. The point is that, for geopolitical reasons, Russia, certainly, is the most useful partner. There is no question about that. So far, so good, I think.
[00:28:12] Peter Slezkine: How is Russia useful, precisely?
[00:28:15] Lanxin Xiang: Remember, Trump likes the concept of the grand strategic triangle. He is somebody who believes, “If I can settle relations peacefully with Moscow, Beijing, and Washington, there will be no war, basically, or at least not a serious one. There will be no world wars.” This is what Trump's philosophy has always been.
Personally, I do believe he was influenced by Henry Kissinger on that. Now, of course, for any triangle relationship, you have somebody sitting in the middle manipulating the other two. This is what happened during Kissinger time. But also, you know, that's what Trump likes to do. So, I have zero reason to believe that he will abandon Putin, despite all his rhetoric. So, I am disappointed. My wife told me he cannot be trusted. This is all for the show, I'm sure.
So, China knows that. So, the partnership with Putin is so important. We will not allow Trump to manipulate the two. My sense is China would be happy to sit in the middle, but if it cannot, we certainly would prefer to not allow Trump to place one against another, like during Kissinger time, you see? So, that geostrategic value is very important for China, to think about the grant strategic triangle in the future.
[00:29:48] Peter Slezkine: But what does China do in this case? Does it seek to influence U.S.-Russia relations?
[00:29:55] Lanxin Xiang: No, they don't.
[00:29:56] Peter Slezkine: Or does he make sure, every time that Trump talks to Putin, he will make sure that he has a separate conversation. And so, they are always talking in one ear or the other?
[00:30:05] Lanxin Xiang: Of course. China sees the opportunity to improve relations with Washington in a substantial way. I'm talking about substantial, meaning the idealized approach, and treat each other as equal or more or less. And then China will have more weight on the United States’ policy towards Russia, despite, of course, you know, Trump also wants to deal with Putin on bilateral terms. But what I'm thinking is that Putin has to weigh, what's the benefit? Particularly, in economic terms, because the U.S. and Russia, basically, have no trade. If you see Trump talking about heavy tariffs on Russia, it's almost absurd when you don't have trade. But economically, China certainly have…
[00:31:00] Peter Slezkine: Well, that’s not meant to be a real instrument of leverage. The tariff that is supposed to hurt is the one levied against India and China for buying Russian oil.
[00:31:09] Lanxin Xiang: Yeah. But nobody believes it's going to take place, anyway.
[00:31:14] Peter Slezkine: So, Wang Yi was recently in Europe and said that China could not see Russia lose. So, what did he mean by that? Why do you think he said it now?
[00:31:25] Lanxin Xiang: I don't know. I never think our diplomatic elite, I'm talking about the foreign ministry elite, necessarily have a clear mind, I would say. Sometimes, they're very confused. I don't know why he said that. By diplomatic standards, it's not a wise way of saying things.
Now, using your relationship with third parties, especially the United States, try to gain the confidence of your interlocutor, which here is the EU. This is not the first time, okay? They have done it before. But when Xi Jinping did it, if you recall when he had a conversation with von der Leyen, he made a statement during the Biden period. He said, “Americans (meaning, Biden administration) want to goad me into a fight over Taiwan.” Remember that? That's the statement he made to von der Leyen. Then, he assured von der Leyen, saying, “I will not take the bait.”
Now, that statement has not been taken too seriously. But I want to emphasize once again, you see how close the potential military confrontation is at that time. Now, she used the third party to convince von der Leyen, “I'm not going to do anything in Taiwan.” But von der Leyen didn't get what she wanted to say. Basically, her message is, “You don't have to follow the Biden administration's logic. Jump on that ship,” equating the Ukraine conflict with Taiwan. Jumping on that bandwagon is dangerous for the future of Taiwan Strait’s stability. von der Leyen didn’t get it.
[00:33:16] Peter Slezkine: And so, why is now a top Chinese diplomat, the ranking Chinese diplomat questioned about Chinese support, at least to a certain level, of Russia, especially at a time where Russia's prospects of actually losing the war is essentially new? So, what’s the point of talking about that?
[00:33:31] Lanxin Xiang: Honestly, I don't know why. I see Xi Jinping's logic, which is a right rational logic. I do not see this particular statement has any logic because it will make Russians unhappy, because you basically send a message to Russia, “We are opportunists. If you lose, we may change our mind, because you are no longer useful.” If I were Putin, I’d say, “What do you mean?” So, I don't know. It's just full power or I have great doubts that Xi Jinping has prior approval of that kind of statement. But using that statement to wing over the EU could probably end up with an opposite effect.
[00:34:22] Peter Slezkine: Let’s get to China and the EU. So, it seems like China had high hopes for its economic relationship with the EU, that this was spoiled somewhat or largely by the outbreak of the Ukraine War. And now, there seems to be a Chinese effort to mend relations with the EU using the, perhaps, widening transatlantic rift as an opportunity. So, how energetic has this outreach been? And do you think there are any prospects for real success or ultimately Europe will do what the U.S. wants relative to China?
[00:34:58] Lanxin Xiang: No. Honestly, I don't think they’ve achieved very much so far. The reason is that they became increasingly disappointed with the European Commission and von der Leyen and the group in particular. What von der Leyen people or EU leadership fail to realize is, how do you grasp the real fundamental changes during the Trump administration, even the first few months? There are things that are fundamentally changing in the United States. These European elites, just like American Democratic Party elites, or even the Republican elites, I call them Aspen Hill elite, you see who are there, you know these are the elite establishment, Aspen Forum, right? By the way, I'm very happy to see Trump says nobody goes there. But, you know, they deserve this.
Now, the point I'm making here is these European elites, just like American liberal elites, still fail to understand what's fundamentally changing with Trump 2.0, both domestically, in the U.S., and also in the world. So, they are still doing the same thing, or more or less have the same playbook. Now, you are calling Trump daddy. Does that help? Okay. Make Trump laugh. You know, the NATO secretary. Then, you have von der Leyen in the G7 in Canada publicly saying, “Donald is right,” that China is the number one threat. That only makes Trump laugh again. It’s barking on the wrong tree, in my view. They don't understand what's in Trump's mind.
He tried to compliment Trump, saying, “Let's get together and deal with China.” But things are changing. Trump is the one who does not take it seriously. He didn't pay attention to their argument, basically. Trump is the one who wants to say, “I want friendly competition.” That's what he just stated a couple of days ago, “We will have competition with China, but I want a friendly competition.” Not even Biden people use that word, “friendly competition.” They never do. They never do.
So, elites are losing their grasp of what's really happening. You know, Trump calls it “common sense revolution.” This is what Trump is doing, which actually had very deep roots in American history since Thomas Paine, I would argue, Thomas Paine's famous pamphlet, of course.
[00:37:33] Peter Slezkine: So, the phrase “common sense” goes back to his famous pamphlet.
[00:37:35] Lanxin Xiang: Also, the theme. If you look at the two major themes, Trump basically followed the two themes. The most important theme, of course, is that ordinary people should never allow elites to tell them what's best for them. That's what Thomas Paine said. And Trump played that extremely well during the campaign, and even after. That's what MAGA is all about.
The elite, Europe and the U.S., the Aspen people, never understood this. They failed to understand. They refuse to accept it. We are seeing what is happening is a strange death of liberal America, just like what we saw in the 1930s, the strange death of liberal England. It's the same kind of logic. They are dying, but they refuse to see they're dying. So, this is where the problem is.
So, back to the EU relationship. I think they are totally disappointed. They were even surprised to see von der Leyen people who made such a bad miscalculation during the Biden administration by jumping on a democracy versus autocracy bandwagon. Now, they’re still unwilling to jump off that bandwagon. Where Trump is the one, Donald is the one who does not want that bandwagon. He wants to destroy that bandwagon.
[00:39:01] Peter Slezkine: So, you think that the Chinese are running into roadblocks in the EU, partly because the EU is seeking to curry favor with the U.S. by being hawkish against China, not realizing that the paradigm has shifted in Washington-
[00:39:12] Lanxin Xiang: That's the whole point.
[00:39:15] Peter Slezkine: … and that this argument no longer gains them any discussion capital.
[00:39:16] Lanxin Xiang: Yes. That's what I'm saying. It's a stupid move.
[00:39:19] Peter Slezkine: Kaja Kallas was in Washington and infamously said, “How are we going to confront China if we can't deal with Russia?” So, it was that familiar old linkage. And then not long after that, she was not welcomed at the White House. So, I think that demonstrates how little purchase that argument or that linkage now has.
To finish, you are a broad thinker, a historian. So, I'm going to ask you to think of the full sweep of liberal America, its future. As you say, these old elites may be on their last legs, liberal America in the order that it’s built in the middle of the 20th century, seems to be changing fundamentally. What will happen to the United States, to the West, to the liberal order, going forward? Is this a perestroika that will end with the U.S. losing its entire empire and becoming a provincial power? Is it a reboot that will make the U.S. even stronger? Is the West going to cohere as a separate regional block? What is your prediction?
[00:40:29] Lanxin Xiang: Well, my prediction is the United States will no longer perform the function of the world police. So, decolonization, so to speak, or de-empire actually contributes to the strength of the United States. This, I think, is the fundamental argument. The United States needs, seriously, a major geostrategic retrenchment. And they will have to allow regional players to settle their regional problems, including Asia, Europe, and elsewhere. And eventually, the United States will turn out to be much stronger than they are today. Today, the problem is that you still have a lingering desire among the elite who want to maintain the empire, which is impossible to sustain anymore. And therefore, they have to recognize the reality.
And the Trump people, they are the vanguard, in my view, to realize, this is what the United States must do. This is what I think is losing the empire and also found a role to play. It is important. Unlike the British, when they lost an empire, as Dean Acheson said, the British problem is they lost an empire. They never found a role to play after the Second World War.
[00:41:55] Peter Slezkine: Well, they did. It's called the special relationship. They tried to pass their empire along to the United States and then played an important role within it.
[00:42:03] Lanxin Xiang: But don't forget, the United States never takes a special relationship seriously. It is the British side who is promoting this, when studying Winston Churchill and so on, if you recall.
[00:42:15] Peter Slezkine: Winston Churchill, nobody remembers, in his Iron Curtain speech, he proposed common citizenship for Americans and Brits.
[00:42:24] Lanxin Xiang: Do you think Americans should really care to sink that low to the British level? A special relationship is never an equal relationship, to begin with.
[00:42:34] Peter Slezkine: So, that begs the question. So, Britain gave up its empire, even found an amenable heir to take it up, develop this asymmetrical one-sided special relationship, but nonetheless, it lost its empire. It lost its place in the world. The same with all the other European powers, the Soviet Union. When it decided that the Warsaw Pact was too expensive and, generally, it was overextended. It collapsed much more definitively than Gorbachev intended. I understand the idea that the U.S. is overextended and may benefit from retrenchment, but historical precedence seems to suggest that, when an empire begins to unwind, it doesn't stop until it's reached a pretty low limit. So, how do you actually manage to pull this off?
[00:43:25] Lanxin Xiang: Well, my timeframe is 30 years. That usually takes something like two or three decades for the declining one to realize the reality. It took the British exactly 30 years, basically. And then finally realized we are only owning one place called the British Isles. They used to own one-sixth of the world surface, don't forget.
So, yeah, the United States, I think, will take another couple of decades to finally realize that, “We can make ourselves strong, basically holding onto our space and our competitive advantages.” America, still, is a unique country. It's an immigrant country, most innovative, still has the best higher education system. So, I think this is what will take place.
[00:44:17] Peter Slezkine: One advantage that the United States has over Britain is that it's not a small island. It's a massive continent with -
[00:44:24] Lanxin Xiang: That's for sure.
[00:44:25] Peter Slezkine: population and no, at least, dramatic demographic decline, geographic security, and so forth. So, finally, what is your prediction for the U.S.-China relationship in the next 50 years? Do you think these will remain the two more powerful entities in the international system? Do you think that they will form rival technological economic blocks, or this will be, sort of, a set of pragmatic relationships with partners who will deal with both the U.S. and China, depending on the circumstances?
[00:44:56] Lanxin Xiang: Well, I think, under the Trump administration, my prediction is there will be no war, for sure. Despite all the CIA or the military people predicting war is coming next year or ‘27, my sense is there will be no war now. For that, I think it's already a great achievement.
The other thing about competition, I think I'm very interested in Trump's new language, saying, “We need friendly competition.” Now, if that is the fundamental principle of the U.S.-China policy, the collaboration, even on the technological field, is no longer just a joke, not possible, because under the Biden administration, remember, Jake Sullivan's small garden high fence, which is pure nonsense. Not only will it never work, but it's, kind of, a protectionist policy is almost like autarky, kind of, vis-a-vis China.
[00:45:55] Peter Slezkine: Well, people would say that Trump is much more autarkic with all of his tariffs.
[00:45:58] Lanxin Xiang: Not really. You see, he just released the Nvidia chips with Jensen Huang, H20. Why? Because Trump realized this. Even in the tech war with China, it's not a question of who wins or who loses. The question is several things. The United States is not really in an advantage here. One is a big data. China has a huge capability to collect data, right? Nobody can compete. Second, the talents. Jensen Huang in China, right now, maybe yesterday, he said 50% of the AI people, high tech people are Chinese origin. So, they are talking to each other.
[00:46:48] Peter Slezkine: This is the CEO of Nvidia?
[00:46:49] Lanxin Xiang: He is the one who got the license to sell from China, the more advanced. And the third thing is that they are persecuting a lot of Chinese scholars in the U.S., in universities, labs, and so on. And they are coming back to China en masse. We are seeing 1950 McCarthy recurring, I mean the story, where they’ve driven out the top nuclear scientists, Chinese origin missile experts. And they are the fathers of our nuclear program and missile in the end. So, yes, there are a lot of disadvantages on the American side. Collaboration, eventually, may be the only way.
[00:47:31] Peter Slezkine: I think the persecution of Chinese academics is slightly exaggerated by the Chinese who obviously want to tempt them back to the mainland.
[00:47:40] Lanxin Xiang: No. If you follow the incidents, no. The last few years are incredible, especially in the high tech area. No, it's really become McCarthy. You see, these are trained chair professors in top universities. Do you think they want to go back to China just because they like the Chinese political system? That's not an issue here. The issue is they couldn't do much anymore. They couldn't get funding from the Pentagon, or any of these fundings. No. They're coming back en masse the last few years, particularly, under the Biden administration, in fact.
[00:48:17] Peter Slezkine: So, are you then suggesting that China will become the primary power in the world?
[00:48:23] Lanxin Xiang: No, that's not the issue here. The issue is you have to realize, historically, technological diffusion cross-national borders can never be stopped, no matter how you do it. If the British could do it, the British should still be the leading power today since the industrial revolution. The second thing is that China has a lot of advantages, particularly in areas like AI. The United States probably are not even able to compete in the end.
So, in that sense, I'm not saying Chinese want to… remember, the whole assumption is that, if Chinese acquire the most advanced technology, they want to control the world, dominate the world, or make the whole world a Chinese empire. That's an absurd assumption, to begin with. If we want to do that, we could have done it 1,000 years ago when we had the biggest navy, right? Admiral Zheng He’s famous maritime experience. So, this is, kind of, a historic argument trying to defend a stupid policy of a tech war which is never going to work.
[00:49:39] Peter Slezkine: All right. Well, wonderful. This was fun, as always. Thank you so much for being my 1st and 31st guest.
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