This week, we discuss China-US-Russia relations with Xiang Lanxin, Distinguished Fellow at the Stimson Center and Professor Emeritus of International History and Politics at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva. Time Stamps: 00:01:17 The Xiang family’s four centuries in the Chinese military 00:07:38 Lanxin’s experience during the Cultural Revolution 00:18:00 Graduate school in the United States and the start of an academic career 00:23:01 A history of Western misperceptions of China 00:34:05 The recent decline in US-China relations 00:39:39 Russia’s relations with the West 00:47:55 Russia-China relations 00:51:56 Taiwan
This week, we discuss China-US-Russia relations with Xiang Lanxin, Distinguished Fellow at the Stimson Center and Professor Emeritus of International History and Politics at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva.
*The Trialogue Podcast is hosted by the Stimson Center and produced by University FM.
**The first twelve episodes of this podcast were published by the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.
(Transcripts may contain a few typographical errors due to audio quality during the podcast recording.)
[00:00:00] Peter: Hi, I'm Peter Slezkine, Director of the Monterey Trialogue, a program hosted by the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey. Since the middle of the 20th century, relations among the United States, Russia, and China have had an enormous impact on each country separately and on the world as a whole. The purpose of the Monterey Trialogue is to better understand these extraordinarily complex and consequential relationship by directly engaging with experts from all three countries.
We are very pleased to have Xiang Lanxin as our guest. Xiang Lanxin is Professor Emeritus of International History and Politics at Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva, the Founding Director of the Institute of Security Policy, China National Institute for SCO International Exchange and Judicial Cooperation in Shanghai, and a fellow at the Stimson Center in Washington, D.C., as well as a regular participant in the Valdai Conference in Sochi, Russia.
Lanxin is one of the very few people in the world who is equally welcome in Brussels, Beijing, Washington, D.C., and Moscow. So, we're very happy to have you here with us today.
[00:01:13] Lanxin: Thank you very much, Peter. Very happy to be here.
[00:01:17] Peter: So, your given name is Lanxin. “Lan” means blue. Why are you blue?
[00:01:24] Lanxin: Well, it's, it's related to my father's side. The origins, of course, is the Qing Dynasty's founding clan, known as bannerman class. So, those days, of course, the Qing Dynasty, or the Manchu Dynasty, was organized in what they call the banners, which means different ethnic or different military groups by color. So, you have yellow, blue, white, and red. So, it's all together eight banners. Blue is one of the groups. I will say, basically, it means these are the people who are responsible for taking over Beijing or China, 1644. So, they originated in Manchuria. They entered the Great Wall. They conquered Beijing. So, they are the ones who established the regime, you know, from 1644 to 1911. So, that means my family is there in Beijing since 1644, as part of the military aristocracy.
[00:02:38] Peter: And the blue banner were the Han Chinese.
[00:02:42] Lanxin: Well, each banner, each color has three ethnic groups, actually — Manchu, Mongols, and Han. Now, Manchu and the, and the Mongols are the original partners as a minority, the ethnic minority in China. The Han banners were assigned to defend the empire, the Ming dynasty, in Manchuria. That's their job. But in the last stage of the Manchu conquest, they decided to collaborate with the Manchus. So, this is the group, also, given the title. But you have to be verifiable, you have done that, before the conquest, 1644.
[00:03:29] Peter: So, your father's ancestors had already been military.
[00:03:32] Lanxin: We are the Ming generals.
[00:03:35] Peter: So, Ming military generals stationed in the north to defend against the Manchus.
[00:03:40] Lanxin: Yes, yes.
[00:03:42] Peter: But then as the dynasty degraded, they saw an opportunity to switch sides, and they served Qin faithfully for the next 300 years.
[00:03:51] Lanxin: Not, not that glorious, if you think about it, you know. It's very much like… well, French would call during this, you know, German occupation, they would've called collaborators, right, collaborators.
[00:04:04] Peter: Well, glorious enough in that they-
[00:04:06] Lanxin: Well, you know, they-
[00:04:06] Peter: … did help take Beijing.
[00:04:08] Lanxin: … they are on the winning side, at least, for, you know...
[00:04:12] Peter: 300 years as opposed to just a couple.
[00:04:13] Lanxin: Yeah, yeah. But eventually, they are losing in 1911. So, the bannermen disintegrated.
[00:04:23] Peter: But that was not the end of your family's military connections.
[00:04:27] Lanxin: That's true. Well, as far as I can recall, my family has always been the military, right? At least, Ming dynasty, probably even earlier. But after the republic is established in 1911, we become more or less, you can say, refugees, because bannermen, as a class, they have a government, you know, the subsidy for every family. But after 1911, they lost everything. So, they have to look for jobs, so to speak, as everybody else.
Now, why reconnected with the military? That is because the Japanese invasion, in the early ‘30s Japanese bombing of Shanghai. Japanese eventually invade Shanghai. My parents, at the time, are the patriotic young students. They, of course, obviously, influenced very much by left wing ideology. They decide we cannot take this anymore. They joined the New Fourth Army almost at the same time, you know, as a teenager, basically.
So, yes, both of my parents end up in military careers. And so, they began resisting the Japanese, and then carried on during the Civil War all the way through, all the way through, even after the revolution. But, you know, on my mother's side, I would say even more interesting, because my mother's side, they are among the first group of Christian converts because this is the coastal area where the Christian missionary, Western missionary activities are very, very strong.
So, my family, my mother's side was converted into… by American missionaries into something, I believe it's called Episcopal Church. So, my grandmother, my mother, my mother grew up a devout Christian, singing in choir. It's a very, very serious Christian family. Until she joined New Fourth Army or the Communist Party, she has to give up the faith, obviously, I would say until she was 95. I took her to the church for the first time. So, it is quite interesting. It symbolizes the interaction between United States and China, in a way. But, you know, with a very, yes, interesting career and interesting family history, yes, yes.
[00:07:14] Peter: So, your father's family was shaped by interaction between the Han and the Manchu invaders and eventual rulers. And your mother's family by the next wave of, of foreigners who came in from the sea
[00:07:26] Lanxin: Barbarians.
[00:07:29] Peter: Different-
[00:07:30] Lanxin: Yeah, it's very different.
[00:07:31] Peter: … kinds of barbarians. And then your siblings are also all in the military. They followed their parents.
[00:07:38] Lanxin: Yes, it is a customary thing here in China. After 1949, when your parent is in the military, yes, usually children chose a military career. Not always, of course. But my siblings did it. I believe it also had to do with the Cultural Revolution. At that time, people after high school, they can no longer go into university because the university system was destroyed entirely during the early years of Cultural Revolution. I'm talking about ‘66 to ‘69, you know, for three years.
Now, either you go to countryside, which most Chinese, you know, high school graduates, because Mao decided to kick them into countryside. They are part of the Red Guards movement. They helped Mao to overthrow the old guards, but then, you know, after that, Mao thought them being useless, even dangerous. So, most of them go to the countryside. But if you have a good connection with the military, of course, you prefer not to go to the countryside, you go to the military, which is a much better career.
So, yes, we have five siblings. Well, I'm the youngest. All my brothers, sisters, went into military, yes, in the different services.
[00:09:04] Peter: And so, you as the youngest eventually did have an opportunity to go to university and then…
[00:09:10] Lanxin: Well, not. That is a total surprise. You see, at that time, I was a rebel in the family. I had the opportunity to go to the military, as, you know, everybody else. I was the one who decided, “No, I want to see the countryside.” I actually volunteered to go to the countryside. The government policy is, if you have siblings, they're all in military or elsewhere, not in the same town, with your parents, the last one is automatically you can stay in the city. They will find a, let's say, factory job or some kind of, you know, paid salaried job for you. I was the one who rejected that option, which surprised everybody, including my parents. My parents were not told when I made the decision. So, my parents actually went to the high school to ask them, why, why he has to go to countryside. School authorities said, “He said he wants to go.” Yes, I'm the one who volunteered. You can say, yeah, teenage rebellion. I was 17, but also driven by this, kind of, idealistic thinking saying, I want to see countryside. I want to see how Chinese people at the bottom of the society, how they live. I want to learn things.
[00:10:38] Peter: So, where did you go?
[00:10:38] Lanxin: I go to one of the poorest places in China, which has a nickname or the reputation being so poor, it’s called Little Siberia of China. The earth, for growing, you know, agricultural products is so poor, for historical reasons, because these are… the sediments of the Yellow River, when the Yellow River changed since Tang Dynasty, changed direction, they left a lot of alkalines and the salty earth. You cannot grow wheat — very, very difficult. You cannot grow cotton. So, the people live on potatoes, basically, you see. It's very, very poor.
I was actually excited. I was… I want to see how dirt-poor people are, but even so I'm psychologically fully prepared. I'm willing to fight. I'm still shocked. Because even drinking water, you know, I, I cannot believe drinking water tastes salty. And then we don't have rice, you know. We're from south of China. We're rice country. We don't have rice. And we don't have that. Cooking oil, it's much, much harder than I thought. But I… you know, I'm still in good spirit.
[00:12:00] Peter: Well, what about the people? You wanted to see the people from the bottom of society. What did you discover?
[00:12:05] Lanxin: Well, the people there, the ordinary people, the farmers, the main problem is that they don't have any chance to get cash, the money. But remember, at that time, the system is called people's commune system. We work together collectively. You know, every day, we start 5:00, maybe, in the morning, end at 7:00 in the evening, about 13 hours a day, at least. I think they are not starving, but they cannot have a high-quality food, and hardly any vegetable. I couldn't believe how long I have to deal with turnips. Government, actually, gives us a little subsidy, some cash, some… but they have nothing. They have nothing.
But I was quite impressed by the particular village I'm in, because they… the peasants there, my particular unit there, they refused to, you know, surrender to nature. They fight the alkaline and the salty earth with enormous courage. By the time I arrived, that village already become a model village, in the sense, they really fight the way using physical labor to do it. Of course, we participate in that campaign immediately. The idea is to get the earth dirt with sour, you know, with with, you know, what do you call these?
[00:13:33] Peter: Acid.
[00:13:33] Lanxin: Yeah, acid, yes. With those particular earth, you know, talk about, you know, miles away, carried by, you know, with a cart or carry, we all do that to bring those earths back to our earth, then to mix them together. This, inch by inch, is quite amazing hard work.
[00:13:55] Peter: Alkaline is basic, and you need acid to even it out.
[00:13:58] Lanxin: Yes, yes, yes.
[00:14:00] Peter: So, by hand, you're mixing different kinds of earth.
[00:14:02] Lanxin: Right, you’re basically using your hard labor to forcefully, you know, change the nature of the character of the earth. But that's really inch by inch work.
[00:14:14] Peter: Well, that is the Chinese way for thousands of years, is human force.
[00:14:17] Lanxin: It is. I was, I was impressed by the, you know, the farmer's determination not to, you know, surrender to the nature. So, that's how I say it. When we arrive, these conditions already began to improve because they have, you know, better earth condition. I spent a whole four years there. After two years, we can see they can even grow wheat and other stuff. So, it's quite an experience. Yes, I'm very impressed by the farmers, yes.
[00:14:50] Peter: So, after four years fighting the land alongside the farmers, you returned to the city and went to Fudan.
[00:14:58] Lanxin: Well, that's a total… totally surprise. Nobody even know. You know, Deng Xiaoping came back, we all have a saying, we know Deng Xiaoping want to make economy better, but the biggest surprise is the first thing he did is to announce… this is 1977. I believe it's fall of 1977. Suddenly, government announced, “We're going to restore universities.” Now, university, how they recruit university students? National exams, which has been there forever, you know. Every Asian country has that system. Let's say everybody can try.
We're all excited, but as you know, when you spend so many years on land, you know, working, how can you manage to remember the mathematics? Because there's so many subjects you have to deal with. And the government are not giving us free time, saying, you can stop, you know, start and review what you have learned in high school. So, yes, the majority couldn't do it. Even though given, you know, they were given the opportunity, they failed in the end. But still, it's quite an equal opportunity. It's amazing scene at that point, because you remember the people who went to the countryside, the several group of people, you have people 10 years older than me because they were there earlier, right? Then, you have people a little bit younger than me. I'm actually in the younger group. I was 21 at the time. So, we all try. We all do whatever we can.
But fortunately, I don't want to brag. Of course, I was a top student in senior high school. For some reason, I managed to pick up mathematics and English and, well, the other subjects I don't have a problem. I always loved, you know, politics, Chinese literature, because I read all these… or geography, history. I don't have a problem. The key problem is English and the mathematics. But I managed to pick up my mathematics within two months, actually. So, when the exam day come, Chinese actually made a movie about that. It's simply called 1977. Because every young people is so excited. But I didn't realize I was, I perform quite good, because Fudan is one of the top universities. I didn't realize I end up getting into Fudan, yes, and also, a top program in international relations.
But just to give you a profile, we,all together with city slickers, we work together as a group, all together 52 people. Only two managed to pass that exam.
[00:18:00] Peter: So, that wasn't the last time you were part of a trailblazing minority. So, you were the first crop after the Cultural Revolution to go to university in China. And then you were the first crop to be sent abroad for further education.
[00:18:14] Lanxin: Yes, yes, yes. Well, that, that is, also, you see, yeah, we, we, we are the pioneer, in that sense, yes. As a senior in college, and the government suddenly, without any indication, the government decide, “We're going to send students to study abroad.” Again, they set up the system for national exam system, just for entrance. I believe the whole country, at that point, they give less than 2,000 scholarships for the first group, but the majority are, you know, science technology because that's what Chinese need, you know, desperately. Only a small fraction of them are human, social sciences, and so on and so forth. So, I was lucky to be one of those chosen. Oh, I did well with the exam and chosen eventually to go to the United States for studying international relations.
[00:19:13] Peter: And you were at Johns Hopkins.
[00:19:25] Lanxin: I believe I look at other universities, Stanford, I look at JFK, maybe Princeton, as well. I feel, at that point, my feeling is I don't want to do theory, IR theory, you know, that, kind of, in fashion in those days. But I want to, you know, to study the real stuff. So, then, I discovered Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. They are very practical. They also have the top-notch scholars. So, it fits my, yeah, fits my interests perfectly.
[00:19:49] Peter: And you studied European politics and history.
[00:19:52] Lanxin: Yes, but that's quite a struggle. That's quite a struggle, yes. Because we are the first group, when we arrived, the SAIS administration automatically assumed I will study China. So, they threw all my files into China studies. Then, I discovered a week later, I protested. I said, I was young, yes, maybe a little bit abrasive. Without being considerate, I basically said, why should I fly 10,000 miles or so to come to a foreign country to study China with a foreign scholar, right? Which makes the China program director, who is a well-known China expert, at the time, make him really, really unhappy. But then the administration said, “What do you want to study?” I said, “I want to study transatlantic relations. I want to study Europe.”
I look at the profile of the faculty. I found the director of European studies, Professor David Collier. I read a couple of chapters of his new book at that time. I immediately said, well, this is somebody I want to study with. He's a European expert, but also, the expert on transatlantic relations, NATO and so on. So, this is how I ended up… but still, the administration rejected me, even then. They basically threatened me, saying, “For European studies master’s degree, you need two foreign languages.” Chinese is not included. English, of course, is not. Meaning two European languages. So, I said, “Can I try?” They said, “Okay.” They said, “It's your responsibility. You're on government scholarship, right? If you fail, don't blame us. You have to talk to your own government.”
Well, I was determined, you know. So, I end up, actually, with three foreign languages, European languages. So, yes, I did study extremely hard in those days. But I like languages.
[00:22:09] Peter: Well, so then after a quick stint as a young professor in South Carolina, you ended up in Geneva, Switzerland where you can put all of those languages to use.
[00:22:17] Lanxin: That is also accidental development. Yes, you're right, my first job is in Clemson University, yes, as an assistant professor. I like Clemson, but it's a little bit too narrow kind of cultural environment for me, sorry to say. American South is, I can feel, you know, they are, you know, all these Christian evangelists, which I cannot, even though I came from Christian family, I cannot deal with those Bob Jones and so on type. So, when I have a chance to go to Geneva, of course, I take it. I'm very happy ever since. So, yes, you're right. Yes, my language actually helps me.
[00:23:01] Peter: Yeah, from an all-English environment in South Carolina to a multilingual country in the heart of Europe. So, after a long career in Geneva, many great books, constant connection with the policy world. So, let's turn to policy questions now. You've written quite a bit about Western misunderstandings of China, which go back a long way. The Jesuits, you think, made an honest effort and actually got quite a long way to understanding the Chinese, but almost all of the barbarians who arrived thereafter have fallen short of the Jesuit standard.
[00:23:42] Lanxin: Well, yes, I tend to believe the Jesuits are the only barbarians who actually made a serious effort to understand China, I mean, or Chinese culture. You know, they came to China, Ming dynasty. They immediately plunge themselves into language, culture studies. But that's a typical Jesuit, you know, philosophy. But another important thing about Jesuits is they are accommodationists. That is, philosophically, I think it's extremely important. They are not dogmatic. You never see Jesuits being dogmatic, messianic, exclusive, saying, you know, either black or white, good versus evil. You know, that's what the Jesuits reject.
But then, you know, Christianity, especially after European Enlightenment, I would say Jesuits are the Renaissance man. But after Enlightenment, Enlightenment for me is a counter-revolution against Renaissance, in a sense. Then, you have different kind of attitude towards other culture beyond the Christian world. Well, you have this, the most dreadful type, which I spent a lot of pages criticizing, for example, Count Montesquieu type, power can be divided, actually, into three sectors and so on, so forth, you know, that kind of thing. Of course, Montesquieu has never been to China. He spent so much talk, you know, in his book, The Spirit of Law, attacking China, basically, using China as a counterpoint.
So, this is, of course, it's become orthodoxy today. If your system is not democracy, or it's not following a Western value, it has no legitimacy, it should not exist. This is where the framework of policymaking in the West, particularly, I would say, in the United States and the Biden administration, in particular, less so and the Trump administration. So, I would say conflict between China and the U.S. is almost inevitable if they insist on that approach.
[00:26:05] Peter: But that approach, you're saying that, since the Enlightenment, essentially, China has occupied a special place in the Western imagination as the, sort of, centralized despotic state par excellence.
[00:26:17] Lanxin: Well, that's true. But since China, after Opium War, you see, after, you see this, Chinese economy and the Chinese state is declining so dramatically. Let's say, you know, before Opium War, we talk about 1830s, which most Western scholars prefer to ignore the fact that China is still a leading economy, okay? The only study that proves it is OECD, of course, grand historian, Angus Maddison, who trace that history, economic history, called the Chinese Economy in the Millennia or something. He discovered, you know, Chinese economy occupied 32.5% of global GDP before the Opium War. But when you think about after the Opium War, when communists took over in 1949, it's less than 2% of global GDP. That's almost like a free fall.
[00:27:14] Peter: What is it now?
[00:27:15] Lanxin: Now, it's about less than 20. So, you see, for the West, I'm tired with these outcries saying Chinese have taken over. Everybody, the rise of China threatened everybody. From a Chinese point of view, well, there is no rise of China, right? This is just a return to prior super economic stardom. It's a restoration. You see, Chinese prefer to use that word. Xi Jinping himself used that word, “restoration.” But that is a message nobody would accept. See, they say…
[00:27:50] Peter: Although, in the Chinese narrative, it seems like restoration would imply, sort of, a focus on the prior era of economic superstardom and a return to that rightful place with the century in between being an anomaly. But the century of humiliation is a strong focus in the Chinese narrative.
[00:28:06] Lanxin: Well, yeah, but remember the return to previous glory means what? Today, it is interpreted as a global ambition of conquest even displace superpower like the United States. But Chinese historic status would be a regional, relatively, you know, there is no question being regional. You can say hegemon, a regional leading power. But it's never beyond… There is no proof for projecting its power beyond the Chinese cultural sphere. In the West, it's called colonialism, which means you project your power overseas, which is far away from your own homeland. You've never seen that in Chinese history. Then, you are making the argument that Chinese want to conquer the world, behave like a European, you know, colonial power. In European history, in my view, it's historically inaccurate and, also, just a political argument, has no historic evidence that Chinese will conquer the world.
Paul Kennedy made that point so clearly when he wrote his Rise and Fall, you know, Great Powers. Chapter one is Ming China. We had the world's number one navy at the time. 12-something, 1,250. Now, Paul Kennedy said, what if Chinese began to think about conquering the world? Who is going to discover America or even Australia? You don't have all these Columbus, Vasco da Gama nonsense. The Chinese will take over everything at that point. No. Paul Kennedy said, you know, we'll change the course of history.
[00:29:54] Peter: Wait, let's dwell on that for a second, because I was going to bring up that same moment.
[00:29:58] Lanxin: Oh, go ahead.
[00:29:59] Peter: So, this is the classic example that China, to use, sort of, the modern terminology, had the capability to dominate the global order during the Ming dynasty, it had this extraordinary Navy, and then pulled back voluntarily. It didn't have the mindset to go discover all these new worlds and colonize them. Now, of course, China, once again, has one of the world's largest navies. It makes sense in modern conditions and faced with American presence in the Pacific, Chinese trade, obviously, is extraordinarily important. Chinese ships take goods across all the world's oceans. So, what was true before of a giant land power that briefly experimented with naval power and then retreated is no longer true. So, perhaps, the mentality is the same, but the material conditions have shifted. China is now an enormous naval power.
[00:30:57] Lanxin: Yes, but it's not really prevailing, you know, far from being a leading Navy power. No, far from being that. We also have to understand that, if you want to have a global reach with your Navy power, you have to have this mentality, or you have to become Mahan strategist, which I doubt Chinese have reached that point. I doubt it will ever reach that point, because if you want to control most of the ocean routes, that's what, you know, if you want to become a hegemon, the maritime hegemon, you have to take a lot of responsibilities.
United States is the one, they can say, well, U.S. Navy people, they told me many times, we can choke off any points, any, you know, critical points on the ocean, within 24 hours. And well, that's why Americans are doing these things. They have to build so many bases all over the world, spend so much, you know, money doing this. And you have to take all the responsibility in the policeman of the world.
Now, do China have the intention of being policeman in the world? Because you have to take the responsibility. I see zero intention on that. It does not mean they are not worried about their protection of the trade rules as a trading, you know, leading trading nation. Of course. But on the other hand, that also means it's always a better idea to have a peaceful relationship with other great powers instead of have an arms race, even in the navy area.
But it looks like the United States, at least from a Chinese point of view, with this new containment strategy the last 10 years, I would say, since Obama, they called pivot to Asia, which is, essentially, it's a containment, new containment strategy. Yes, Chinese was sufficiently stimulated that we have to have a serious Navy.
Most people don’t remember that. Let’s say 15 years ago, when people try to define Chinese Navy, they go, “Is this a blue navy? No. It is a yellow navy? No.” Yellow navy means coastal, you know. The maximum they can define is called a brown navy. It's in between blue and yellow. Now, yes, Chinese is building a blue navy, but they were driven, in my view, more by the geopolitical reality, which Americans seem to be establishing, you know, that kind of containment system. So, they, they were more, at least, at the beginning, more passive. For example, we never had a Coast Guard until a few years ago, you see. We never even had the concept of Coast Guard, right? So, if you tell me Chinese are too ambitious to take over everybody's… come on, that's an exaggeration. I don't see it. I don't see it.
[00:34:05] Peter: So, what explains the deterioration in U.S.-Chinese relations over the last 10 years? Is it purely a function of China's rise in the United States, worry about its position, or is there something else?
[00:34:14] Lanxin: It's a relative decline of the West. Relative, I emphasize. Relative decline of the West is one important thing, particularly, the United States, which is obvious. Paul Kennedy said that a long time ago. But there is another important reason, is that the economic competition, which remember the Chinese economic development last four decades, more or less followed principles which are not, historically, typically, Chinese way of doing things. Because Chinese economic thinking, I'm talking about throughout history, internal circulation, meaning supply-demand for the domestic economy is the key. They never believed that foreign trade is that important. Chinese created the first international trading network, actually, 2,000 years ago. But Silk Road never played an important role to help the emperor to build the legitimacy of his rule or even stabilize the domestic economy. It's a marginal factor for Chinese economic development.
Now, four decades ago, China's opened up to the world. They found themselves in the cutthroat, kind of, internet trading competition. So, they, they use their historic spirit and assets. But they combine with imported – you can say predatory thinking, which is, well, starting with the British Industrial Revolution, at least, right? You have to beat everybody or you, you want a mass product. You can make yourself a factory of the world. So, we have a comparative advantage, obviously. Cheap labor, you know, and the number, pure number of the labor, plus the quality of the labor, okay? So, all these put together, yes, we enjoy enormous comparative advantage, which began to gradually undermine the edge of Western economy.
So, Western country, for quite a while, they're content with that, because they enjoy the benefits of cheap products from China. Then, they can only make money from other areas. We're talking about Wall Street and the Silicon Valleys, even make more money there. But the problem is the majority of Americans not necessarily benefit from Wall Street and the Silicon Valley. This is where you see the rebellion of the middle class. And this is, by the way, internal U.S. crisis externalized into foreign policy, particularly, under Donald Trump. Donald Trump message is loud and clear.
[00:37:05] Peter: It seems like the concern with China comes from two quarters in the U.S. On one hand, there's Trump's electorate that blames China and globalization for the loss of their jobs and security. On the other hand, there are the liberal internationalists, a very different crowd, who see China as a threat to the liberal order. So, these are our politically opposing factions in the U.S. who, for different reasons, converge on China as the principal problem.
[00:37:34] Lanxin: You're absolutely right. This is why they call it bipartisan consensus.
[00:37:38] Peter: But do you think that will last?
[00:37:40] Lanxin: I have doubts, but it's…
[00:37:41] Peter: Superficially, they both focus on China, but for such different reasons that, in policy terms, maybe they will disagree to such an extent that the thing will unravel.
[00:37:50] Lanxin: Yes, but you're right. I mean, you know, liberal side and including trade union and, you know, right wing extreme, they suddenly found a consensus, you know, saying, you know, the leading problem is China. Everything wrong is because of China. Now, that logic cannot last very long because it's simply not sustainable argument. Besides, it also reflect weakness of American system.
If the only bipartisan consensus is to get tough with China, that means American system is in deep, deep trouble or American democracy in deep trouble, because this is the only handle both parties can hang on, saying, “We still have a bipartisan agreement.” And the reasons China, not only exaggerate China's role, that's, you know, reality, but also means they don't have any other handle to hang on. American voters disagree profoundly with each other on almost everything else. There is no bipartisan consensus. American Montesquieu system is more or less collapsing, especially since January 6th, right? I mean, you can see Montesquieu model, which is, American model is a pure version of Montesquieu. It's collapsing.
So, I hope the rational political elite, eventually, will realize focusing on China or blame China for everything, you certainly can blame China for a lot of economic practices, but not everything, right? It's not going to work. It's not going to save American system.
[00:39:39] Peter: Let's bring Russia into the picture. So, you say Americans blame China for everything. But they don't only blame China. Russia is obviously considered a big problem, a big threat to the liberal order. The national security strategy gives separate sections to each of these two countries. And although there is much discussion of a possible confrontation in Taiwan, so far, thank God, it hasn't happened. But the U.S. and Russia are in, more or less, direct conflict in Ukraine. So, how do you see Russia entering this picture?
[00:40:12] Lanxin: Well, the U.S.-Russian relationship, or Western-Russian relationship is, I would say, is more a psychological problem. It's more a tragedy within one culture, one civilization. That's, of course, as a Chinese, I can say that.
[00:40:32] Peter: So, China is perceived as an alien, separate culture; whereas, Russia is part of the West.
[00:40:37] Lanxin: Yes, you had a problem, the Cold War, and so on, so forth, but historically, Russia has been part of the West, part of the Christian world. However, you want to exclude Russia because it's Orthodox Church or other Euro-Asian, you know, position. You cannot deny Russia being part of your civilization. This is very different from U.S.-China relationship, actually.
[00:41:04] Peter: But just to go back to that point, Russia, elite Russians were all speaking French, maybe even better than Russian. And then, Napoleon invaded. They all loved Goethe and Schiller, and then Hitler invaded. So, you can be part of the same culture while geopolitically being at odds for a number of centuries. So, those two, the push-and-pull was, was there from the beginning.
[00:41:26] Lanxin: Sure. But even with Hitler's invasion, it's still part of the European power game within one cultural sphere. We all know the rules of the so-called the Deutsche, the German problem. Hitler was driven by German problem.
[00:41:41] Peter: But Hitler had a very different conception of Western civilization. He treated the French and the Slavs quite differently because he assumed they were different categories.
[00:41:51] Lanxin: Well, that's true. But remember, Hitler also considered Japanese differently from… you know. But that, that actually is not, to me, it's not the big issue. I don't think even Hitler is launching a racial war against Russia. That's not the reality. The reality is the geopolitics. He has to take over in order to build his empire.
Napoleon, of course. Napoleon, you know, conqueror Russia, it's the same, you know. Basically, now, from Chinese point of view, you have to understand, this is almost like, I use the word “ecumenical” peace concept, which is you should be able to reach a peaceful relation between Russia and the rest of the Western Christian world, especially after Russians admitted they were failing during the Cold War and they are saying, “We want to join, the whole great European home.” What is it?
[00:42:51] Peter: From Lisbon to Vladivostok.
[00:42:52] Lanxin: Yes, and so on and so forth. For me, it's a great opportunity of achieving ecumenical peace within the Christian world that was failed, not so much by Russia, but it's by the West. That, I think, is my view.
I do believe it's the Chinese leader's sense about this, you know. We talk about why the Chinese refused to declare the Ukraine war an invasion, even today, because NATO enlargement is something that nobody should be oblivious, saying this means nothing. It's nothing to do with the Russian behavior. That's absurd. Remember, the other part, again, as a Chinese watching the internecine war in Colosseum, let's say, between, you know, you guys are fighting. If we're watching this, we're also, we're rather puzzled by the fact that Russians, they are talking about, you know, balance power and the West, United States. They all talk about the language of Westphalian language – balance power, you know, keep, maintain equilibrium, blah, blah, blah.
[00:44:08] Peter: Sovereignty.
[00:44:09] Lanxin: Everybody talking, this is your talk. You know, Chinese don't even know this concept until British force us to. But then, somehow, the Russian talk the same thing is considered aberration and a deviated view, unorthodox. But the American or the Europeans talk about it is considered morally correct. Whatever Russian says, we also need our… maintain our sense of national security, if you push too far to our frontier and so on. I thought, you know, Putin tried his best, no matter what, as an outsider of the European civilization. I look at it. Putin tried. You cannot say Putin did not try. And I very much doubt to say Putin want to conquer entire Europe or take back every piece of Soviet Empire. I really don't see, make any sense. But it is hubris. It is arrogance on the part of the West, particularly, the United States, to launch that dangerous move of NATO enlargement. It is the trigger of the whole thing. Then, you can say, you know, a serious event. We have to look at that conflict from that perspective.
Having said that, I don't defend Putin. I'm one of the few Chinese, actually, use that word in public, “aggression,” against Ukraine. I actually use that expression. It is clearly aggression, certainly, violating UN Charter. There is no question about that. But the roots of the problem, nobody should ignore. So, this is why Chinese, not just elite, but including scholars like myself, I have certain sense, you know, grudging sympathy, you can say, with Putin's position there. He was pushed into a very awkward situation.
[00:46:06] Peter: So, Russia, in some sense, has been part of the West, part of the Christian world, although a slightly different kind of Christian world, heir to Constantinople as opposed to Rome.
[00:46:17] Lanxin: Also, ethnically, they are the Caucasians, don't forget.
[00:46:21] Peter: Well, Caucasians is a funny euphemism to use, in regard to Russians, right? Because there's real Caucasians in Russian and then Russia, right?
[00:46:28] Lanxin: But they are, yes.
[00:46:28] Peter: White Northern Europeans, because the Russians call the Caucasians black. I mean, Russia could be part of the West or of Christendom, I suppose, although there was, certainly, a divide in Europe in many wars to prove that they don't quite belong. But Russia has never been part of the free world, of the liberal order. So, insofar, as the U.S. order is not confined to the West, there doesn't seem to have been much of an opportunity for Russia to integrate itself within that structure. And Putin certainly tried, was very happy to get into the WTO, and so forth. But now, whatever the possibilities of that might have been, the rupture is clear. There is the liberal order on one side and Russia very definitely on the other side of a bright red line. Where that line will be drawn, we will find out.
But so, you say that, from the Chinese perspective, this looks like an intra-West conflict, and you can observe from the sidelines a bit bemused. But now Russia and China have been lumped together by the U.S. and its allies, and Russia itself has declared itself a civilization state, which is clearly an attempt to put itself on the same level as China and India.
Is this new partnership between Russia and China entirely contingent? Is it entirely a function of American pressure? Or do you think there is a long-term strategic alignment that might even produce a, sort of, civilizational rapprochement.
[00:47:58] Lanxin: Well, it started as a marriage convenience, no doubt, because there is no real love between Russians and Chinese, historically. At least since Catherine the Great, there is nothing that… you can call it a friendship between Chinese and Russians. We even have a particular name for Russians, old hairy men, compared with our universal name for all the Europeans, it’s called barbarians. We think the Russians are even inferior to the barbarians.
But, yes, we were driven together by the U.S. containment strategy, in general. Because the U.S., think about this, post-Cold War, U.S. policy gradually turned into a new containment strategy against Russia, no matter what you interpret, the purpose of NATO enlargement. Then, of course, since 2010, under Obama, the so-called pivot to Asia, they also established another containment strategy in the Asia-Pacific. Recently, of course, even more so, they called Indo-Pacific. So, they are building a real containment line around China. So, this is only natural the two countries were driven together for geopolitical reasons.
But on the other hand, I will say, marriage of convenience of this nature usually not last long if there's something changes systematically, you know, with the international order. But it looks like it's not going to change very much. This is something I do not understand American approach, is, for the first time, American's policy-makers decide to alienate Russia and China at the same time, which is against, of course, the Kissingerian or Kissinger's view. Even Donald Trump. Donald Trump is more Kissingerian in that sense, saying that's stupid, no matter what, tactically, it’s a bad thing to do. But it looks like it's very well-established. They're willing to fight two fronts , basically.
So, obviously, the marriage of convenience turned into some kind of love story now. But that love story not just sustained by economic, but by the geopolitical concerns, economic side. We, we all know that’s the Russian pivot to East, which is not because of the Ukraine War, because Putin already started 2018. I recall I was there, the East Economic Forum at Vladivostok 2018. That's the only one Xi Jinping also attended with Putin. I remember listening to, yeah, at that time, the statistic for, I think, 2018 data shows that the Russian trade already majority of trade with the East rather than with Europe.
So, economic relations, of course, is strengthened further by the war in Ukraine and so on. So, you have a multiple dimension of that relationship to keep that marriage going. So, yes, I have no doubt the relationship is going to be quite solid.
Will Russia change again? Historically, if the West — Europe, in particular — extend the olive branch or, some reason, Russia's priority is the crawling back to the West, right? The so-called Euro Asian complex, Euro side is always a guest priority. So, we don't know. But it looks like it's not going to happen on the Western side next 10 or 15 years. I don't see it. So, yes, relationship is quite well-established between Russia and China.
[00:51:46] Peter: And what if the West offers an olive branch to China in order to further constrain Russia, the Chinese won't believe that it is authentically offered?
[00:51:56] Lanxin: Really, what Chinese need is to resolve the Taiwan problem. Okay, if you reduce tariffs, which is nice, but that's not convincing enough for China to abandon that solid relationship with Russia. If they really change their attitude towards Taiwan, that means removing the only potential cost for a war between the United States and China. Taiwan is the only potential reason for that. Then, China, probably, have to think about, you know, the value of a solid close relationship with Russia. But I don't see American administration will do anything. What they do now is called the salami slicing approach, pushing for Taiwan independence. It's obvious, very obvious.
[00:52:53] Peter: How far do you think that can go before…
[00:52:56] Lanxin: We don't know. I will say they are, at this moment, the direction of the trend is moving towards plan B of Taiwan independence. Taiwan independence movement had plan A, which is straightforward declaration of independence. That's something, you know, Pompeo and U.S. Congress, you know, anti-China people, that's what they advocate. But that means war, right, immediately. So, they probably wouldn't do that. They would not follow Pompeo, kind of, suggestion. So, plan B is de facto, basically, what they called one China, one Taiwan, or the Taiwan leadership called the pro-independence leadership called country-to-country relations.
[00:53:45] Peter: How would that be different from the current situation, where it already is de facto more or less?
[00:53:49] Lanxin: They obscured the concept of de jure sovereignty here, you see. That's what's called one China, one Taiwan. Basically, saying Taiwan does not really belong to China. But we are not to claim that's a plan B supposed to be, we don't claim de jure sovereignty right away, but it is, obviously, it's a transition, you know, model, which this is what the U.S. are pushing for, and not just U.S., but also rally, Western, you know, Democratic Alliance. Even NATO get into that, you know, jump into that thing. I think it's very, very dangerous for Europeans to jump into something they don't understand very well. This is a war and peace situation. China cannot accept Plan B. If Plan B becomes obvious, clear, or declared, that also means war. So, this is where I think… personally, I do not see there is any chance Washington will change the course. Taiwan is the thing that is going to lead to military confrontation. I will say, at this stage, as I see it, sooner rather than later. How long? A year or two. I wouldn't want to make a clear prediction here. My sense is we are close to a real confrontation.
[00:55:14] Peter: And you think it's likelier than not?
[00:55:16] Lanxin: I would say, yeah.
[00:55:18] Peter: Of an actual direct clash between China and the U.S.?
[00:55:21] Lanxin: Government, yes, in some form. I wouldn't say, necessarily, a declaration of war between U.S. and China. I would say some kind of, including possibility of accidental clash militarily over Taiwan, which will, under the current circumstances, will escalate. It's very difficult to control once you have this, because of this atmosphere in both countries, political, domestic atmosphere. So, it is dangerous, yes. Very, very risky. You look at the recent, just finished, the exercise. You look at the PLA exercise, that’s a real war game here. It's not even an exercise, per se. Very clear what the PLA is going to do.
[00:56:11] Peter: Well, what would you tell American policymakers, or what do you tell them, that is actually politically possible in the current situation that would avoid such an outcome?
[00:56:20] Lanxin: Well, I would tell them, first of all, you have to realize that there is a real danger there. Don't discount that danger by believing, which is many policymakers, including congressional leaders, the logic Americans, including the top China policymaker, like Kurt Campbell, what they believe is deterrence. They think, if we deploy troops, we rally the democratic alliance around, China will be sufficiently deterred. So, we don't, we're not worried. As long as the deterrence works, you know, sufficient, China dare not do it, even if we push further, the salami slicing. That approach failed to understand, this is what I would explain to them in Washington, I tried to explain to them even in Washington, that is to say, don't underestimate Chinese leaders’ determination of take military action because that issue is so domestically explosive. If the United States push further, the Chinese don't take action politically for any leadership, Xi Jinping or not. That's almost like a suicidal. In the sense, you know, you're losing prestige. Popular feeling is that Xi Jinping is chicken, basically.
Last year, Chinese bloggers spent a whole night without sleep watching Nancy Pelosi's, you know, flight. Majorities at that point…
[00:57:56] Peter: Hoping for something exciting.
[00:57:57] Lanxin: Oh yeah, oh yeah. Or, at least, shoot down maybe, or do something. But nothing happens. Total disappointment. No, no. Politically, the Taiwan issue, if you don't react, if Americans push too far, there is no deterrence it's going to stop. You see what I mean? Because from military point of view, this is the PLA calculation or Chinese high command, it is not a real problem for Chinese to launch a very quick operation against Taiwan. Americans, they couldn't really come to the rescue, no matter how they built what they call the Integrate Deterrence System. Too far away. Well, the closest would be Okinawa, and then you have other places.
And allies are totally unreliable. Can you imagine Japanese will automatically get into war with China? Japan will not commit suicide, if you're doing this because… on behalf of Taiwan. Australia, come on, British? These alliances usually has no deterrence value from a Chinese point of view. And then the hard-core military conditions, including logistics, distances, and the technology, everything, yes, PLA can do it. We have overwhelming power.
Now, whether successful, you know, they can do it in three days, four days or, or maybe make some mistake, that's another issue, you know. Actual military operation, how it goes, I doubt you will see the same situations. Putin's military planning about the Ukraine, you know, rather…
[00:59:44] Peter: Why not?
[00:59:45] Lanxin: Yes, because it’s shameful.
[00:59:46] Peter: Well, the same things that make it difficult for the U.S. to come to Taiwan's aid, the fact that it's an island make it difficult to successfully invade. To cut it off, I guess is easy, but to take it over might not be.
[01:00:02] Lanxin: Well, you see, first of all, the Chinese military knows Taiwan defense system inside and out. I'll put it in a very simple way.
[01:00:14] Peter: The Russians knew the Ukrainian systems. They were all Soviet for the most part.
[01:00:19] Lanxin: No, but their organizational skill is really, even logistics, they couldn't provide. Chinese have no logistic problem across Taiwan Strait. Come on. I mean, it's right. We don't have a logistic problem. Well, my imagination would be the first hour would be knock out all the defense structure there around. Then they block each port. Then, you know, amphibious landing. Unless Americans directly engage, unless, but I don't believe Americans will directly engage, meaning fighting with the Chinese. Amphibious landing means you have to have sufficient troops on the island to do it. Or, you directly hit the Chinese, let's say, Navy or Air Force or something, without provocation. See, you see the point is this. We are not going to attack Okinawa first, as American military used to believe. It's called D2, A2. Remember that that's the American strategy. They would thought, when Chinese strategy is before they launch attack on Taiwan, they would knock out American bases.
No, not necessarily. We will not… that's my view, why should we provide casus belli, you know, like, a Pearl Harbor, kind of, action against Okinawa. No, it doesn't make sense. We just only focus on Taiwan, straightforward. Even by international law, we can do it, and extremely popular with the population. Fighting spirit, I'm sure, it’s high. So, we don't have a logistic problem. So, when you think in that direction, blindly believing in Americans’ belief in deterrence alone, not going to work. They will be surprised
[01:02:14] Peter: Because the returns diminished as a result of Western sanctions on Russia, because one of the disastrous outcomes, it seems, of a war in Taiwan, is the ruin of the global economy. Right. But perhaps China. Has had time to look at how sanctions work to create alternative payment systems with Russia. And they think, okay, this will be a huge hit, but that with Russia, Africa, and so on, the Middle East in a huge domestic market, they can survive economically, no matter what financial weapons are used.
[01:02:47] Lanxin: Yes. Yes. I think yes, that's for sure, That's for sure. I mean the Chinese has studied the Russian methods of dealing with, you know, unprecedented sanctions. They learned a lot, but the Russian model cannot be, of course, easily copied because the Russians have only, you can say, a one-dimensional economy. They sell something everybody needs, everybody wants. And they have insatiable demand in the world market. Now, that's a different situation, but I would not say the threat of sanction actually sufficient enough to be a serious deterrence on Chinese determination of dealing with Taiwan.
[01:03:30] Peter: And just the natural crisis in the global economy that would occur the day that the war began, that all the stock markets would collapse.
[01:03:37] Lanxin: Because the Chinese believe the economy between China and the West, including United States, is still very much intertwined, sanctioned against China because of Taiwan, let's say, as severe as what they did with Russia, kicking China out of SWIFT and so on, whatever.
It will hurt Western economy even probably even worse, in some sense. German economy will probably collapse in certain way and American economy certainly will into a lot of crisis. So, I doubt, you know, they will do the same thing as they did with Russia. Besides, as you already mentioned, you know, the Belt and Road Network, which actually provide a Plan B, at least, you know, for our manufacturing goods, Latin America and so on and so forth. Unless the West decides to blockade the entire world's sea lanes, declare war on China. Now, unless that happens, that's a different story. But I just don't see it. I don't see that Taiwan, actuall, is worth that much energy and efforts. Despite all the rhetoric, including Stoltenberg, NATO people, this nonsense they, they say about Taiwan makes no sense. I think the Chinese actually can afford to ignore what a statement they are making. They cannot really do anything, the NATO countries. So, it doesn't mean very much. So, deterrence, it will not work, in other words. No matter what. Deterrence itself is not a word.
[01:05:18] Peter: So, then, final question. Why wouldn't China invade just with 100% certainty in the next few years? If the situation is as you described…
[01:05:26] Lanxin: No, I would not say that.
[01:05:28] Peter: No, but let me ask the question. So, the way you described it, it seems like an invasion is very likely to succeed. It can be done without hitting American targets. So, it can be sold as a legal, domestic police action. The economy probably will not collapse. Deterrence isn't effective, and so forth. The alternative to this brutal resolution to the longstanding Chinese problem of Taiwan is greater or lesser salami slicing. Taiwan has existed separately for a long time now. It seems like the trends, basically, are bad for the mainland. So, the status quo seems to be allowing inertia to take Taiwan in a different direction, even if the U.S. restrains itself slightly from Biden's more flamboyant positions. So, why wouldn't it just be a done deal China invades if the situation is as you described?
[01:06:26] Lanxin: What kind of done deal you mean here? You mean what the done deal?
[01:06:31] Peter: Well, it's sort of, like, the Ukraine problem for Russia, that, at some point, it seems like Putin understood that if Ukraine continued on its current trajectory, there would be no Russian influence there remaining at all within a few years. And the situation, I mean, Ukraine would be a bastion of, of, sort of, anti-Russian forces. It didn't work out for him, his solution, but nonetheless. And it seems like, in Beijing, they could assume that time is not on their side, that absent a radical move now, Taiwan will effectively become more and more separate and independent, almost regardless of what Washington does. That is the current trajectory.
[01:07:12] Lanxin: Well, in a sense, yes, yes, it does. Taiwan question has acquired a sense of urgency now in Beijing. Remember the original thinking has always been maintaining status quo. De facto separation of the two political entities is not a problem for Beijing. I'm talking de facto, not legal, you know. They do their thing. They self-rule, you know, they do their things. Even more than the Hong Kong model. Of course, the Hong Kong model is that the British army has to… the Royal Garrison has to be pulled out. You know, mainland never asked for sending PLA for a future, let's say unification, you know. They were even able to maintain their own military. The problem is, is not status quo. It is the intention. It looks increasingly clear on the American side. They want to push this legally, as well as a permanent separation of two Chinese entities that give the mainland no hope that status quo, eventually, will turn into some form of peaceful unification.
See, remember Chinese? Even during Mao time, that's the standard policy there. We don't worry about Taiwan that much, okay? Still a Chinese territory, you know. Chiang Kai-shek Taiwan? Fine. Chiang Kai-shek will never call Taiwan independence. Because either way, that's what the joke is. Where's Chiang Kai shek when we need him today, right? Because Chiang Kai shek will say, I also own mainland. That's perfect. If you have a leader who say that, that's great. Then we're not worried.
[01:09:07] Peter: Yeah, Taiwan will be a separate country a long time ago, if Chiang Kai shek hadn't wanted to come back to the mainland.
[01:09:12] Lanxin: You see, that's the irony here. American politicians, they only try to do this serve their geostrategic interests. The idea in Washington today is we will maintain Taiwan independence, no matter what it takes, we have to do it. And they say it, you see?
[01:09:32] Peter: But if they were more careful in their formulations, if there was no threat to the formal status of Taiwan as a part of, legally a part of China, then Beijing would be happy to wait 50 years, 100 years, if necessary [crosstalk 01:09:46].
[01:09:46] Lanxin: Mao used to say 100 years is fine. I mean, it's not, it's not a problem. You see, they, this is a stupidity. I'm thinking about American policy, is even Kissinger at the time, the friend of China, never give in to Chinese during the first negotiations of the Shanghai communique to recognize the PRC is the owner of Taiwan, right?
But we don't have a problem with that Shanghai communique. Even though, interpretation, you can always have two different interpretations. We think, automatically, Taiwan should be part of China, but we don't have to use force. We don't have to do anything else. As long as we have a prospect that Taiwan will not drift away one day, had legal support by international community or the West saying, “We declare independence,” that prospect should not be there. What Biden's regime, or what America is doing these days is give every indication this is what they're going to do. You see, this is why Biden's four-time tongue slip is so damaging here. It's publicly commit U.S. saying if China does something to Taiwan, I'm going to commit to defend Taiwan.
See, this is the point that I'm talking about. This is what's called strategic ambiguity. Strategic ambiguity provides the best deterrence. That's my view. Meaning, I will not tell you what I'm going to do, but I'm not going to push to encourage Taiwanese to have a de facto or even de jure independence.
At least, you have to convince Beijing, this is not your intention. Then, Beijing will be at ease to accept status quo. That's called ambiguity. Then, you say, it's called strategic clarity. Now, say, if China do something, I will defend Taiwan. So, there is no ambiguity. This is very, very stupid. This is the reason I believe, we are closer, much closer to a military confrontation because they removed the only mechanism that sustained these psychological game about Taiwan.
[01:12:09] Peter: Let's hope we can keep playing the game for a bit longer and that both sides-
[01:12:14] Lanxin: I hope so. I hope so.
[01:12:15] Peter: … show some patience.
[01:12:17] Lanxin: Yes, you don't have Anthony Blinken congratulate Taiwan leaders inauguration. This is… think about this. This is amazing, also. Then, what's next from a Chinese point of view? Maybe, Blinken will want to visit Taiwan, maybe, at some point, Call him President of Taiwan? Okay. At least he doesn't call president of the Republic of China. That would be too provocative, but he's still called, Title, you know, to congratulate him, so on and so forth. So, every step American is taking, indicating the Chinese, they are moving in the direction of de facto Taiwan independence. This is where the problem is.
[01:12:55] Peter: So, then the very last question. Do you think that the Chinese just have not been able to convey clearly the cost of making these sorts of statements? The Washington policy makers understand very clearly that they are bringing themselves closer to a confrontation and many of them don't mind or even might prefer a clash?
[01:13:16] Lanxin: Well, the problem is, it's impossible to convey a clear message with each other now, with the current adversarial atmosphere. In the old days, when, you know, they have a common enemy, you know, which is the Soviet Union and so on and so forth, they, you know, they overlook these differences. Remember, the key difference here is Americans prefer to call it one China policy. Chinese call one China principle, policy and the principle, if you check dictionary, as I did, totally different concept, right?
[01:13:52] Peter: Policies can change and principles don't.
[01:13:54] Lanxin: Yes. And, and also, policy usually serve a particular self-interest purpose, right? Principle means you have a moral dimension there. This is something, you know, everybody agree in it, unless say UN Charter, you know, that's a principle, right? American refused to accept the Chinese concept that one China should be a principle.
So, they are talking today, with a very bad relationship that becomes so tense, they are basically talking past each other. Neither side is convinced the other side's talking, you see. Biden may be mentioned so many times, saying, “We stay with one China policy.” Now, in the old days, Chinese are happy. Even though you say you stay with one China. Because with good intention, we thought that's okay. That's okay. Today, of course, it's totally different. We know what you are doing is against one China principle. So, the old one China policy means nothing to us. So, this is the charade they're playing.
For great power relations, if I'm reading from history, when the two major powers start to play a word game, a charade, that's a prelude to a military confrontation. Usually, that's the case, because neither side accepts the other side's interpretation of almost, like, the same concept, but they have zero in common. They don't interpret that. And they never accept the other side's interpretation or logic. Well, that's the dangerous…
[01:15:36] Peter: The Americans and the Soviets didn't share language and played plenty of word games and avoided the very worst.
[01:15:43] Lanxin: The difference is they actually had the hard stuff they can negotiate on the nuclear weapons. That, they did not play charade. That's why they have arms control.
[01:15:53] Peter: Well that took a while. Took 15 years before they started talking.
[01:15:57] Lanxin: But it worked. It worked. There's nothing works.
[01:16:02] Peter: So, maybe, we can muddle through the next 10 years and then we get to Sino-American détente.
[01:16:07] Lanxin: I really doubt, yeah. Hoping, hoping.
[01:16:10] Peter: Well, let's hope.
[01:16:15] Outro: Thanks for listening to the Monterey Trialogue Podcast. Make sure to subscribe to the show, so you don’t miss out on any episodes. I’m Peter Slezkine. The Monterey Trialogue Podcast is hosted by the Middlebury Institute of International Studies and produced by University FM.