Zhao Long, Deputy Director of the Institute for Global Strategic and Security Studies in Shanghai, returns to the Trialogue to discuss Beijing’s perspective on a slew of recent high-profile summits, in the context of China’s complex relations with Russia, the United States, India, and North Korea. *The Trialogue Podcast is hosted by the Stimson Center and produced by University FM.
Zhao Long, Deputy Director of the Institute for Global Strategic and Security Studies in Shanghai, returns to the Trialogue to discuss Beijing’s perspective on a slew of recent high-profile summits, in the context of China’s complex relations with Russia, the United States, India, and North Korea.
Listen and subscribe on Apple Podcasts or Spotify to stay updated with the latest episodes!
*The Trialogue Podcast is hosted by the Stimson Center and produced by University FM.
(Transcripts may contain a few typographical errors due to audio quality during the podcast recording.)
[00:00:00] Peter Slezkine: I'm Peter Slezkine, Director of the U.S.-Russia-China Trialogue project at the Stimson Center. Since the middle of the 20th century, relations among the United States, Russia, and China have had an enormous impact on each country separately and on the world as a whole. The purpose of the Trialogue is to better understand this extraordinarily complex and consequential relationship by directly engaging with experts from all three countries.
In this show, guests from across the political spectrum and from every corner of the globe share their views in their own voice. While the Stimson Center seeks to provide access to a wide variety of perspectives, it does not endorse any particular position. We leave it to the listeners to judge the validity and value of the views expressed by the guests. I hope you enjoy the podcast.
My guest today is Zhao Long, Deputy Director of the Institute for International Strategic and Security Studies in Shanghai. Long is one of China's top experts on Russia, BRICS, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. This is Long’s second time on the podcast.
Long, welcome back to the podcast.
[00:01:11] Zhao Long: Well, thank you for inviting me back.
[00:01:13] Peter Slezkine: So, we'll cover the massive military parade in the big SCO Summit in a moment, but let's start by discussing a different summit. What did Beijing make of the Trump-Putin meeting in Anchorage?
[00:01:23] Zhao Long: So, I think everybody knows that was a game of signaling. Both sides walked away with very different interpretations of wings. On Trump's side, he acted mostly with instinct and transactional logic, which he wanted to show that U.S. still can be a third influence or Russia, but without looking like he was giving Moscow a free pass. Putin, meanwhile, I think got exactly what he wanted. This is a very significant diplomatic achievement. That was his first visit over a decade to United States and also the first time he set foot in a NATO country since the war outbreak. So, I think this is, of course, a huge PR win back in Moscow.
On the other hand, I think it is also quite clear that there's no substantial agreement on how we can resolve the Ukraine crisis, but the basic consensus there. So, Ukraine might have to make up some tough concessions compromise on the territories. On the pulse of NATO membership, maybe some kind of, also, security guarantee in return.
And also, I think, why I believe this summit should be regarded as Putin's wing because Trump agreed that we shouldn't put ceasefire in the first place and everybody should be engaged in comprehensive negotiations on the peace deal, which is exactly what Moscow wants. But from Beijing's perspective, Beijing isn't exactly losing sleep over this summit, right? Because although there is headlines screaming that this, kind of, return or reset of U.S.-Russia relationship could somehow impact on China's partnership with Russia, but, I think, there's still very significant structural limits set by Trump. Trump may want a warmer relationship with Moscow, but the politics at home are brutal, right? He will face the midterms. He will face the pressures, from both parties on Russia's policy.
So, I think there's also very obvious deficit in mutual trust. Look at Alaska itself. There was supposed to be a one-on-one summit, right? But it turned out to be three-on-three, with very short notice though — no joint statement, no binding agreement. So, I think all this evidence that there's still a long way to go for this kind of rapprochement between Moscow and Washington. And that's why…
[00:04:16] Peter Slezkine: So, your takeaway is that Putin scored a big PR victory-
[00:04:20] Zhao Long: Yes.
[00:04:20] Peter Slezkine: … and also got a significant concession from Trump, at least, in principle, when Trump agreed with the Russian position that an immediate ceasefire is unconstructive and that a comprehensive piece must be the priority.
[00:04:40] Zhao Long: Yes, exactly.
[00:04:41] Peter Slezkine: And do you think that we're any closer to a settlement in Ukraine? Do you think that the two sides behind closed doors really did find significant areas of overlap? Or, was it mostly a show?
[00:04:56] Zhao Long: No, I think both sides have this kind of inspiration to achieve, at least, some substantial outcomes in terms of ceasefire or peace agreement. But unfortunately, it is not totally dependent on Moscow or Washington's position, right? It really matters how Europe thinks and how the Ukraine could compromise.
But I think, in the near term, nobody wants to be the target of Trump. Nobody wants to pissed off him, right? Nobody wants to disappoint him. So, I think both sides, including Russia and Ukraine, should show some goodwill in terms of negotiation. So, I think that's why Putin just proposed that he would invite, actually, Zelinsky to go to Moscow for negotiations. But I think this is almost impossible. But again, I think both sides will figure out what kind of high-level meetings should be set up in the coming weeks that show this kind of a goodwill to Trump. But substantially, I don’t…
[00:06:02] Peter Slezkine: So, do you still think that we're stuck in a performative cycle where everybody is seeking Trump's favor and attention? Or, does Beijing believe that we may be entering the final stages of the war, not an immediate conclusion, but that some process has begun, which will eventually bring about serious peace talks?
[00:06:28] Zhao Long: I think this is, kind of, both sides of the coin. On the one hand, first, both sides are trying to, you know, get tension of Trump. But on the other side, of course, there could be a regard as the very first step of the long process of negotiation. At least, for now, both sides agreed that there should be, kind of, a framework of peace negotiation rather than the ceasefire monitoring or other things. But I think that it requires a very comprehensive package of negotiation, including the process of ceasefire, including the territory issues, including the… you know, I think the most difficult part is security guarantee. What kind of a security guarantee would meet the expectations of Kyiv, meanwhile, not so proactive to Russia? So, I think we could anticipate by the end of this year starting process of this peace negotiation. But I'm a bit pessimistic about reaching a substantive peace agreement in the coming months.
[00:07:38] Peter Slezkine: Would China consider playing a role in guaranteeing Ukrainian security or signing on to an eventual peace settlement? I know Putin mentioned China as a potential guarantor. I think China officially said that it might consider such a proposition. What is your take?
[00:07:59] Zhao Long: Well, my interpretation is, of course, Putin proposed that, and not once. I think, previously, he also mentioned this kind of idea. But the problem here is Beijing has no history of acting as this, kind of, a security guard in tour in Europe. So, any willingness to step into that role would be highly conditional and carefully calculated. So, I think, at least, Beijing will maintain so-called strategic neutrality. And they insist on staying above the fray, that any role must reaffirm the commitment to diplomacy, dialogue, or respect for sovereignty, but meanwhile, will be extremely cautious about repetition risk, which means it would not back guarantees that could backfire if the ceasefire collapse, or endure some territorial concessions that violate international norms. So, I think China is willing to play, but only on the nonpartisan or risk-managed basis.
[00:09:11] Peter Slezkine: So, what would that look like? So, almost assuredly, no Chinese troops in Ukraine. Or, do you think that that might be a possibility?
[00:09:18] Zhao Long: No, I don't think there's a possibility that China will put our boots on the ground in Ukraine. The traditional peacekeeping model doesn't work here because thousands of kilometers of the contact lines requires the huge number of deployment. I don't think that could operate under the UN Security Council as old model of peacekeeping. And I think China favors more indirect engagement, whether to use technological or observational tools, satellite imagery, UAV surveillance, you know, fix the monitoring post, and et cetera.
So, I think this, kind of, a technical diplomatic guarantor, without putting boots on the frontline, would be something that China may consider. And, of course, all those should be conducted on transparent rules, defined boundaries, and the mechanisms for intervention that both parties agreed on. So, I think Chinese rule will be very cautiously calculated. And I don't think the so-called old model of peacekeeping worked here.
[00:10:32] Peter Slezkine: Are you and your colleagues and Chinese officials and, perhaps, their Russian counterparts having conversations now about what this might look like once peace is finally in the cards?
[00:10:48] Zhao Long: Yeah. Internally, we very frequently have this kind of discussions, dialogues, even debate on whether China should step in or not. There are different scenarios and possible plans being discussed. And also, I think China cannot automatically resolve this kind of a trust deficit between Kyiv and Moscow. So, nobody could be the real guarantor for the possible restart of the war, right? So, that's why China believes that it is not in Beijing's interest to play such a role, which could force Beijing to be directly involved in the next possible war in Europe. So, I think the majority of Chinese expert community believes that there certainly should be some kind of role for China, but should not be equivalent to the role of U.S., Europe, or other directly involved parties.
[00:11:54] Peter Slezkine: Okay. So, let's turn to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Summit that just took place in Tianjin. It was a big affair. Modi came in person. At what point did Beijing receive the message that Modi would participate?
[00:12:12] Zhao Long: Well, let's look at the grand picture here. The recent thought in India-China relation isn't a certain strategic shift or something, because we have seen this carefully collaborated convergence of ages, right? First, I think both sides are facing the risk management fatigue, right? Years of border standoffs, patrol face-offs. I think both sides are really tired of this kind of high tensions in a border area. So, that's why I think China wants to avoid prolonged confrontation with our neighbor. And that's why I think Modi has the similar interest that both sides’ interests are converged on this point in changing.
And second, I think those are some, let's say, external factors played a very significant role here, which, of course, Washington's position, Washington's approach towards India, when Trump post one of the highest level of tariffs on new Delhi, of course, we could expect the shift of policy of India towards China because China could be one of the leverage that Modi could use in this kind of game, a great game with Trump.
So, there is a very clear strategic hedging and the balance of multiple relationships. And for Beijing, we can avoid the so-called two fronts of strategic squeeze. And also, China, India, Russia's gathering also increased the consensus or strategic understanding between three parties on the overall Eurasia continent’s framework in the future. So, this is, let's say, the invitation to put Modi and his participation in the SCO Summit in Tianjin is more tactical and focused on the risk reduction. But I don't think we can anticipate full alignment of India with China, because still, there's some structural problems between two sides. I think that couldn't be resolved in the near term.
[00:14:36] Peter Slezkine: So, there has been a steady softening of tensions between India and China over, perhaps, the last year, maybe beginning with Xi and Modi's meeting at the BRICS Summit in Russia. But Modi's appearance in China just now, do you think, is mostly, if not totally, a product of Trump's pressure on India, and that this is Modi showing Washington that he has other options? So, does Beijing, then, regard this with a certain amount of distrust? Is China worry that it is being used as leverage in India-American relations?
[00:15:25] Zhao Long: Partially, I think it is true, that his visit to China could be regarded as product of Trump's pressure. But I don't think Beijing's too much worried about it because we always consider the grand picture of great power competitions and the interactions. So, from New Delhi’s point of view, this is their nature to use the relationship with China as a leverage. And for Beijing, we could also use our relationship with India as a leverage, too. So, it's not necessary for us to hesitate to say that.
But again, I think, in terms of the comprehensive or substantial collaboration or the long-term perspective, I still quite thought about the consistency of Modi's approach towards China because you've noticed that he didn't participate in second to third military parade. He just visit Tianjin and attend SCO Summit and then back home.
So, I think, still, we have to work on confidence building measures between two sides and continue to reduce those misperceptions, reduce the tensions on borders. Still, I think the Indo-Pacific strategy is there. Modi wouldn't just withdraw with the grand strategy and Xi would continue to use this as a tool in this interactions with China. So, Beijing would not be too naive to think that this is the turning point of India's policy towards China.
[00:17:05] Peter Slezkine: So, the little handholding huddle between Xi, Putin, and Modi was the iconic image of the SCO Summit. But you also had normal business proceedings of the organization. So, tell us a little bit about those. What is the SCO? It's been around for quite a while now, but it has gotten much larger. So, is there a grand Eurasian vision that this organization somehow represents? Or, is it, sort of, a forum to discuss ad hoc issues and have meetings on the margins?
[00:17:46] Zhao Long: I think Tianjin Summit of SCO signals much more than ceremonial fuddles or just the gathering, because it marks a quite substantive evolution in how the SCO positions itself economically, institutionally, and strategically across Eurasia, because first, the parties agreed to establish financial infrastructure. So, almost 15 years ago, China proposed the idea of SCO Development Bank. Then, more vision about institution building. And today, the party agreed that connectivity projects, energy initiatives, and industrial park developments demands long term, low cost, and reliable financing.
So, I think this is a big achievement at the Tianjin summit that parties agreed on SCO Development Bank. I think this is similar to the new development bank of BRICS. And we could anticipate very positive interactions between this SCO Interbank, and BRICS Development Bank, and AIB. So, I didn't think this is one [crosstalk 00:18:59].
[00:18:59] Peter Slezkine: So, China now, as an alternative to the Western financial institutions, has the Asian Infrastructure and Development Bank, this BRICS Development Bank, and now an SCO Development Bank. And there is overlapping membership in all three, but they each have slightly different rosters. Do they also have different, sort of, mechanisms and purposes? Or is it mostly just that these banks cover somewhat different lists of countries?
[00:19:26] Zhao Long: Well, I think they are, of course, complimenting to each other on those specific projects. But I don't think the parties are aiming for some alternatives of existing global or regional financial structure because there's still many obstacles within those countries’ financial systems.
I think the main purpose of establishing those banks is trying to increase our resilience of our financial settlements and financial cooperation. And they increase the overall amount of local currency settlement. So, I think all parties agreed that the U.S. dollar dominated the global financial system are facing enormous challenges, in particular with those intellectual sanctions on different countries. So, I assume members and other stakeholders are considering that there should be the plan B in those critical moments that we could use this as the complementing platform to have this financial corporation. So, I think this bank is aiming for the long-term corporation rather than just some response to the ad hoc issues.
[00:20:49] Peter Slezkine: When will the bank begin functioning?
[00:20:53] Zhao Long: It is not clear yet, but, I think, in the declaration, in the joint statement of SCO Summit, all sides agreed that they will speed up this process of establishing the bank. So, I think, given the past experiences, I think, in the next three or five years, we could anticipate a new bank under the SCO framework.
Grand Strategy Sessions Trailer
[00:21:17] Peter Slezkine: I'd like to take a moment to highlight a new offering from the Stimson Center that should be of interest to fans of the Trialogue Podcast. My colleagues in the Reimagining US Grand Strategy Program have a new limited-run podcast called The Strategy Sessions, featuring senior fellow Emma Ashford in conversation with a variety of foreign policy thinkers from across the political spectrum about the future of U.S. foreign policy. Enjoy this trailer for preview of the new series.
[00:21:47] Emma Ashford: The Reimagining US Grand Strategy Program at the Stimson Center presents the Strategy Sessions Podcast, a limited-run series that explores the diversity of opinions about the future direction of U.S. foreign policy. At a time when America's role in the world is contested and unclear, these conversations shed light on the exciting debates happening within the U.S. foreign policy community.
[00:22:11] Guest 1: Absent the United States, the two directions that Europe can go is one consolidation and the other disintegration. I tend to believe that it's going to be the latter one.
[00:22:22] Guest 2: The defense industry is so far from a free market. It is a fantasy to pretend that these are truly private enterprises.
[00:22:34] Guest 3: Which is this idea that, in the absence of U.S. leadership or U.S. participation in a given problem, there will be instability, chaos, or just worse outcomes. This is, I guess, sometimes true, but it's not ipso facto true.
[00:22:52] Emma Ashford: I'm Emma Ashford, a senior fellow at the Stimson Center. And I'll be your host, as we dig into the big questions surrounding the future of U.S. grand strategy, from progressivism to prioritization, and techno industrial strengths to alliances. Find us beginning on September 15th, wherever you get your podcasts. And make sure to subscribe now so you don't miss any episodes.
[00:23:17] Peter Slezkine: So, another big piece of news that came out of the summit and Putin's visit to China was the announcement that a legally binding memorandum had been signed, that the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline would be built. So, gas that used to go from Russia to Europe would go through this pipeline to China. And this pipeline has been in the works for a while, but the two sides have not been able to agree to terms. Has that hurdle been cleared? Because it seems like this memorandum does not actually solve the price issue. Nobody's actually agreed to who pays for what and how much the gas is going to be sold for. So, is this mostly just a signal to the West that Russia's going to continue to export energy to Asia? Or is this a substantial step toward the actual physical construction of this pipeline?
[00:24:19] Zhao Long: Well, I think you have readily pointed out. Although this is a significant step forward, that we have signed the memorandum, but still, it remains as a memorandum. It's not final deal. So, I think this project, Power of Siberia 2, has been described for years. Although Putin is really pushing this corporation with China by his own meetings and the interactions with Xi at the highest level. But I think a problem here still at the technical level still remains.
But in general, I think this represents, you can call it strategic pivot for Russia, to the East and to China on the energy sector. But also, you can feel that it's part of a long-term strategy of energy security of China or Beijing, because let's imagine if this product's being built up, there will be more than 50 billion cubic meters per year of Russian gas to China, or Mongolia. So, this is a substantial volume and enough to shape the regional and even the global energy geopolitics, right?
But, I think, currently, there's still some challenges and constraints. First, there's a risk, the transit risk through Mongolia, because I think the domestic politics are quite unpredictable in Mongolia and the country is trying to balance not only between Russia and China but also trying to involve some Western perspectives, right? I think this, of course, could be served as one of the uncertainties. And secondly, of course, it is related to pricing and the cost sharing, right? The gas price, the delivery points, the transit fees remain unsolved. So, I think Mongolia's limited fiscal capacity means that Russia and China will likely need to shudder the financing responsibility, in particular, China. But how we can deal with this gas price? Can we get some preference from Russia?
[00:26:38] Peter Slezkine: Well, Russia has been offering preferences for a while. And you say that this signals a pivot in strategy toward energy export to Asia. But as you also said, Putin has desired to make this pivot for years now, and even more so, obviously, since the start of the war in Ukraine and Europe's cutoff of Russian gas. So, what is stopping a deal from being made? Why is China playing hardball to such an extent to the negotiations? And has any progress really been made if the issue of price has not been resolved? Because that, in any negotiations, seems to be the paramount problem.
[00:27:20] Zhao Long: My reading here is, currently, the problem lays not only on strategical level, but also on the technical level. So, as I mentioned, the price is one thing. Another thing, of course, is sanction. The sanctions on Russia may hinder the financing process and the access to the key technologies. As you know, those state-owned giants and companies are really cautious when it comes to the sanctions from Europe or U.S. on Russia. So, I think, in short period of time, I think this is the biggest challenge for this negotiation.
But I will be more optimistic about the future, because, let's say, if we can anticipate even the temporary agreement on ceasefire or even the peace deal in Ukraine, so, in that condition, I think China will be more proactive with negotiation on the pipelines. But currently, I think, we are still stuck in those technical problems and negotiations with Russia.
[00:28:29] Peter Slezkine: Does China not worry that Russia's leverage would increase if the conflict in Ukraine is at least partially settled? Leveraged, I mean, in negotiations over the pipeline and prices? Because right now, obviously, it's desperate to sell the energy that it can't export anywhere else. And obviously, this pipeline wouldn't be built and then gas wouldn't start flowing for years. But if a contract could be made now, Russia would probably give substantial preferences, as you put it, to China. But if, in a few months, relations with the U.S. are normalized, Exxon is back in the Arctic, then perhaps, Russia will have good reason to ask for a much higher price.
[00:29:15] Zhao Long: Well, to be honest, I'm not quite worried about that. The reason is quite simple. Let's just assume that there is some peace deal reached on Ukraine and some kind of sanctions relief on Russia. But the key here is there's no equivalent alternative as China's market or China's demand to Russia's energy. So, I don't think, in the near or middle term, that Russia and Europe could restore their energy like the times before the war. So, without European market, I don't think, for Russia, for Moscow, they have other options to do rather than deepen their cooperation with China. So, this is something that’s determined by those supply and demand side, not only by the sanctions or the geopolitical situation here.
[00:30:11] Peter Slezkine: So, China knows that Russia has all this gas to sell and nobody to sell it to and China is basically the only customer that provides the proper scale, so they're holding Russian feet to the fire and waiting for the best of terms and the safest of conditions. So, ithe SCO Summit was followed by the 80th anniversary celebration of China's victory over Japan. And after seeing Putin, Xi, and Modi at the SCO Summit, we saw Putin, Xi, and Kim at the Victory Day celebration. Was that the first time that they'd been together at all or in recent years?
[00:30:59] Zhao Long: I think it is the first time for them to be together in one same photo, all three of them.
[00:31:04] Peter Slezkine: So, what was the significance of that for China? How was that covered? Was it meant to be a big moment? How were these three leaders described? And then how was their relationship characterized?
[00:31:16] Zhao Long: They are the three people that Trump most wanted to meet, right? They're sitting together in Beijing. And it drives a lot of media attention. The immediate backdrop for this picture is Beijing wants the 80th anniversary of victory in the war to be remembered and to be promoted to the world media. The curtain was the historic memory, not black politics here. So, I think, China, Russia, and DPRK are all emphasized learning from the history. I do think we share the desire for regional peace and stability.
[00:31:58] Peter Slezkine: So, get back to history, you said that the core message was shared history and a particular memory of World War II. Trump wrote a post, saying that the U.S. played a key or the crucial role in the defeat of Japan and should be remembered but was being ignored. So, is there a competition of historical narratives? In what way does China's narrative diverge from the United States? Do the North Korean, Russian, and Chinese narratives synchronize? So, what is the historical representation of World War II, or I guess it's not even World War II, because from a Chinese perspective it begins in the early ‘30s with the Japanese invasion. But tell me the story that was represented a few days ago at the celebration.
[00:32:47] Zhao Long: I think there is some kind of competition of narratives on the World War II, on what kind of a role that each country played in the victory against fascism. But that kind of competition was not generated by China. Because China felt that Beijing's role has been undermined of our victory against Japanese aggression, right? So, the global narrative usually concentrated on the European side. The U.S., the Soviet Union, and other European countries, the so-called Eastern front, are somehow being ignored. This is one reason why China, at this point, especially this year, are trying to emphasize and rebuild China's image as one of the key players or contributors to the peace and to the whole victory against fascism.
Another one, of course, there is clear historical linkage between those three countries. Basically, they fight together in the same front against Japan, right? So, at this current geopolitical situation, besides those real politic or the substantial interest, on the ideological level, the historical linkage could be very useful tool for those three countries to reach some consensus on the regional frameworks or on how they envision the future international or global order. What I want to emphasize here is I don't think this kind of gathering that's trying to signal that Beijing is willing to rebuild big triangle, right? The China, DPRK, Russia against the U.S., Japan, South Korea. No, not at all, because we don't have the similar political realities in that region and it’s certainly not in the interest of China to be more engaging and confrontational structure with U.S. states in Korean Peninsula. So, I don't think this is something that China is trying to send the signal to Washington.
[00:35:07] Peter Slezkine: Who's closer to Kim, Putin or Xi? Kim was just in Russia not too long ago. They signed a treaty. What that treaty actually binds each country to do is uncertain, but obviously, North Korean troops were fighting in course. Kim got into Putin's limo in Beijing. So, is there any fear in China or anxiety about this triangle becoming a little bit lopsided?
[00:35:33] Zhao Long: Well, not too much, I would say, because this kind of relationship is not where one replace others by nature, right? DPRK needs both Russia and China. And in the various dimensions, perhaps, in the security or military corporation dimension, the Moscow and Pyongyang getting more closer, there's no such room for China to do this kind of a policy. And China has no interest to be involved in war in Ukraine. But on the economic side, on the technological side, I think Beijing still enjoys significant advantage in this cooperation with Pyongyang.
So, [unintelligible 00:36:20] yesterday Xi hosted meeting with Kim Jong Un, and they spent quite a long time, not only for the official meetings. They had together the coffee break and dinner. So, I think that shows that Beijing is aiming for more stable and reliable relations with DPRK and are trying to find the positive sentiment of the Russian-DPRK’s relations to contribute the regional stability, rather to worry about Moscow and Pyongyang’s collaboration in the military dimension.
[00:36:58] Peter Slezkine: So, we've discussed three triangles — the U.S.-Russia-China, India-Russia-China, and North Korea-Russia-China. I imagine the U.S.-Russia-China triangle predominates or the ones closer to home are acquiring greater importance.
[00:37:16] Zhao Long: To be honest, I'm not big fan of this triangle. I more preferred the trilateral dialogues or interactions rather than so-called concept of triangle, because the concept of triangle we inherited from the Cold War. So, that's very easily to generate…
[00:37:38] Peter Slezkine: Actually, wait, just to interrupt quickly. I don't think there's a concept of triangle in the U.S. history of the Cold War. Is the actual term “triangle” used in China? I think it is, right?
[00:37:52] Zhao Long: Yes. Yes. We use the term “triangle” very frequently.
[00:37:58] Peter Slezkine: To refer to [crosstalk 00:38:00]
[00:38:00] Zhao Long: To refer to the Cold Wars relationship, USSR, China, and United States. So, that why I'm not quite big fan of this so-called triangle.
[00:38:10] Peter Slezkine: Because it evokes memories of the Cold War. And China's position now is that the Cold War was not a wonderful state of affairs and should be avoided in any configuration in the future.
[00:38:21] Zhao Long: Yeah, I think, now, the relationship becoming more complicated rather compared to the old times in Cold War. So, that does not reflect the reality. And I think, if we compare those three trilaterages, let me put it this way, the China, Russia, DPRK’s relation is more stable, because I think there's more consistency in the policies and strategies. And there are more united vision about regional stability and regional structure. Of course, the U.S.-Russia-China relationship has more impact, not only on the regional issues, but on the global world order. And that will certainly determine the future trajectory of major power competition.
And in the middle, the China-Russia-India relationship, I'm still quite skeptical about this composition of this framework, because as you know, we had such a mechanism of dialogue on the foreign minister's level, even on the head of states level, between the three countries before the pandemic, right, and before the border disputes between China and India. But still, until now, this mechanism has not restored yet. So, although Modi was here in Tianjin and then it seems like the two leaders are trying to normalize their relationship, at the middle level or on the ministerial level, I think there's still a standstill and a lot of obstacles that we should tackle in the future. So, basically, this is my understanding in this kind of a comparison of three trilateral relations.
[00:40:16] Peter Slezkine: So, the U.S. shouldn't worry too much about having lost to India just yet.
[00:40:20] Zhao Long: Yes. I don't think you should avoid that at all, because, you know, India always plays like this, trying to navigate himself among all the major players and trying to build the image that India is the key part of this great power rivalry. But let's look at the reality. India seems like, it's trying to… he’s welcome the U.S. strategy of containing China into Pacific strategy and others. On the other hand is trying to maintain their comprehensive partnership with Russia, meanwhile, to reduce the risk and the tensions with China. So, it's always trying to play a game on [unintelligible 00:38:53] major powers. I don't think the U.S. has the capacity. It has India on their side in the confrontations with China or Russia. But for China and Russia either, so, we couldn't count on India's role in this grand competition. So, I don't think U.S. should be worried about that.
[00:41:30] Peter Slezkine: What was the coolest piece of technology or military item that you saw on display at the parade the other day? What were you most impressed by?
[00:41:42] Zhao Long: Whoa. Well, technically speaking, I'm not the military guy. So, I couldn't just name a few of them, the new weapons systems.
[00:41:54] Peter Slezkine: But you can just go by category. Did you like big missiles?
[00:41:57] Zhao Long: Yeah,
[00:41:59] Peter Slezkine: Slick submarines, or heavy artillery?
[00:42:01] Zhao Long: Well, in general, I think my understanding is the unmanned technologies, the UVs, the drones will determine the future war. So, I am more interested in that particular directions, the advancement of China's technology of the big drones, the unmanned ships, even the helicopters, if you noticed. So, I think, in that particular sector, I think China is really advancing and enjoys significant advantage, compared to other major powers.
[00:42:39] Peter Slezkine: Yeah. It certainly seems to be true that drones are the future of warfare and that China produces the best drones at the moment. Although it is an irony that the country. with the biggest army in the world is producing the most unmanned craft. But I suppose, on that note, thank you very much for joining me once again on the podcast.
[00:42:59] Zhao Long: Thank you. Pleasure to be here. Thank you again.
[00:43:05] Peter Slezkine: Thanks for listening to the Trialogue Podcast. Make sure to subscribe to the show so you don’t miss out on any episode. The Trialogue Podcast is hosted by the Stimson Center and produced by University FM.