This week, our guest is Zhou Bo, a retired senior colonel in the PLA and a senior fellow in the Center for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University. We discuss China’s military presence in Africa, the Houthis, Ukraine, Taiwan, and the South China Sea.
This week, our guest is Zhou Bo, a retired senior colonel in the PLA and a senior fellow in the Center for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University. We discuss China’s military presence in Africa, the Houthis, Ukraine, Taiwan, and the South China Sea.
*The Trialogue Podcast is hosted by the Stimson Center and produced by University FM.
(Transcripts may contain a few typographical errors due to audio quality during the podcast recording.)
[00:00:00] Peter Slezkine: I'm Peter Slezkine, Director of the U.S.-Russia-China Trialogue Project at the Stimson Center. Since the middle of the 20th century, relations among the United States, Russia, and China have had an enormous impact on each country separately and on the world as a whole. The purpose of the trialogue is to better understand this extraordinarily complex and consequential relationship by directly engaging with experts from all three countries.
My guest today is Zhou Bo, a retired senior colonel in the PLA and currently a senior fellow in the Center for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University. Welcome to the podcast.
[00:00:42] Zhou Bo: Thank you, Peter.
[00:00:44] Peter Slezkine: So, to start, could you, perhaps, tell us when and why you joined the military and also how you learned such eloquent English?
[00:00:56] Zhou Bo: Thank you so much. I actually joined the military in 1979. The reason I can somehow speak in English is because I was majored in English in China. So, I got my undergraduate degree of English language and literature. But what makes me somewhat different is that I have been using English since, and I have been to Cambridge, where I did my MPhil degree in international relations. And for over 30 years, I'm directly involved in foreign handling China's mil to mil relations with other countries in different capacities.
[00:01:35] Peter Slezkine: But still, I mean, it's not just a matter of practice. The fact that you were sent to Cambridge at all is highly unusual. So, how did you end up in such an unusual position for a member of your generation?
[00:01:49] Zhou Bo: That was from 1996 to 1997, precisely speaking. At that time, I was already a senior staff officer in the… officer of foreign affairs in the Ministry of National Defense. I was a deputy chief for South Asia. At that time, the British government would provide a chief new scholarship to 50 selected candidates from around China. And I happened to be one of them. But as to which university you will go, it's up to you to apply.
[00:02:24] Peter Slezkine: Interesting. So, this was an English initiative, an outreach to the Chinese military. Very different time. And I also understand that you spent time in Australia as well, right?
[00:02:34] Zhou Bo: Yes, that was in 1999, I was the first honorary fellow to the Land Warfare Study Center of the Australian Army. Again, it's an exchange program. And I happen to be the first Chinese superior officer.
[00:02:49] Peter Slezkine: So much has changed in the relations with both countries since, clearly. But do you have friends and colleagues from that period who you still stay in touch with?
[00:02:59] Zhou Bo: Sort of, but not really, because in my official capacity, we actually do not encourage that much interaction. But now I'm a scholar, I'm much more liberal. Therefore, I can certainly make more friends, like with you.
[00:03:14] Peter Slezkine: Well, I'm very grateful for your newfound flexibility. And then a last bit about the biography. You spent some time in Namibia. Can you tell us a bit about that?
[00:03:23] Zhou Bo: Yes, that was from November 2006 to March 2009. I was selected as a Chinese defense attache through the Republic of Namibia. It's interesting because it is an African country. And before that, actually, I have worked briefly as a deputy director general for West Asia and Africa, which was very short — only six months. So, apart from two visits, I did not have a lot of knowledge about Africa, but since I have worked there as a defense attache, the situation then is different. And I think it is important for me to develop my understanding of Africa, in part because China-Africa's military relationship actually have been very strong. Very few people know that, actually, we have had the military exchanges ever since the 1950s. And we actually have trained more than 10,000 freedom fighters in Africa by sending Chinese instructors to Africa. These freedom fighters were proven to be extremely useful in the independence of more than 50 African countries.
[00:04:36] Peter Slezkine: So many powerful political figures in African countries now have had experiences in China, have received training in China and remained positively disposed to China as a result.
[00:04:46] Zhou Bo: I think so. I can recall five to six African presidents. They include President Mugabe from Zimbabwe and President Elias from Eritrea [sic], and then from Democratic Republic of Congo, Kabila Senior and Kabila Junior. They're all presidents of these countries who are trained in Chinese military institutions.
[00:05:11] Peter Slezkine: So, now, China has a considerable economic presence in Africa, as everybody knows and frequently discusses. And there is some talk of the need for China to provide security for these investments. So, how is China going about that? Is there an increased private Chinese security presence in Africa? Is it hiring outside security? Is it a PLA mission? How are Chinese economic investments in Africa protected?
[00:05:40] Zhou Bo: That is a very good but very grandiose question, because there's a common mission, of course, for all military in the world, is to defend its own territory. That is well-understood. But for major powers, it has two more things to do. One is to protect its overseas interests — this is what you are talking about. Another is to show its international responsibilities.
In terms of China's military presence in Africa, it is extensive. We, every year, would train a lot of African officers and soldiers. So, wherever you go, you would always meet some officers and soldiers who can speak a few Chinese words to you. But our engagement there is basically through providing assistance to these countries. And we also provide assistance through African Union.
And then another way of our presence is because of peacekeeping missions. Most of the peacekeeping missions now are found in Africa. And China has been very active in peacekeeping missions. It is the largest compared with some other permanent members of the Security Council, and is also the second largest financial contributor. And we're also doing counter piracy. Since 2008, we have been sending PLA to attend nonstop to the waters of Horn of Africa. So, we have been operating there since in the Northern Indian Ocean.
[00:07:04] Peter Slezkine: So, on the subject of counter piracy and international responsibility, many in America suggest that China is not ready to assume the responsibility that comes with great power status because it has not done anything about the Houthi activity in the Red Sea. Is that a fair accusation? It's constantly brought up as proof that China is free riding on American global security provisions and isn't ready to step up to the plate.
[00:07:34] Zhou Bo: That is not true because, first of all, part of the purpose of PLA Navy being in the Northern Indian Ocean is to safeguard the international sea lanes. And the Red Sea, of course, is also involved as a freedom of navigation. But the situation is somewhat different because with piracy no one has any disputes and the legal implications is very clear in the UN Convention Law of the Sea.
But when we come to the complications in the Red Sea, we know that it has a lot of things to do with the situation in Gaza. The whole situation in Gaza is complicated. So, it's not just a simple question of safeguarding freedom of navigation.
And there is also a realistic problem. For example, we only have a logistic supply station in Djibouti, where we do not have a storage of these missiles, weapons, whatsoever. And for Chinese warships to sail one way to the Gulf of Aden, it will take two weeks. So, that means to and fro would take about one month. And if you had all these drones keep on coming and you just fire your missiles to defend your ships, the question is how many missiles you would have, right? And it will take you one month to get resupplied. Even Americans would complain about this kind of situation, even if they have the fifth fleet in Bahrain, which is much closer.
[00:09:06] Peter Slezkine: So, that was a two-part answer. On one hand, you're saying that this is a political matter, not a piracy matter. But on the other hand, China just doesn't have the capacity to deal with this issue in this location.
[00:09:18] Zhou Bo: I think it would be challenging. We know that Houthis said they would not attack Chinese ships, right? But, at the same time, if you start to strike on these Houthis, then you get yourself involved in the conflict of the Middle East. That is something China would try to avoid. So, I would say that, even if the Chinese warships have enough ammunitions, the political consideration is the first priority.
[00:09:44] Peter Slezkine: So, you mentioned the Chinese base in Djibouti, which has also been the subject of many headlines over the last number of years in the U.S. Is that the start of a new universe of Chinese overseas bases? Is it an exception? What is the future 10 years hold in terms of Chinese overseas basing?
[00:10:05] Zhou Bo: First of all, we would never have around 750 to 800 military bases.
[00:10:11] Peter Slezkine: I wonder where you get that number from.
[00:10:13] Zhou Bo: I read it. Sometimes, they talk about 800, sometimes they talk about 750.
[00:10:18] Peter Slezkine: No, no, I'm joking. I just meant that it's clear who you're referring to.
[00:10:21] Zhou Bo: Yeah. So, we certainly won't want to have so many. For you to understand how many military bases China would like to have, I think it is essential for us to understand that the PLA has been very careful so far to confine themselves just to humanitarian operations overseas, which basically means peacekeeping, counter piracy, disaster relief, and to some extent, counter terrorism.
So, if, in the future, PLA still sticks to this kind of operations, you don't need so many bases, because having so many bases means to police the whole world. If that is not China's intention, therefore such kind of requirement would be tremendously reduced. But whether it would go beyond one to some more, then the Chinese government has to decide, then there is another point. It's not entirely up to the Chinese government to decide. It’s also up to the hosting nations to decide. And it's also not up to them to decide. Because the two actors will definitely have a huge influence on them. One's the United States, another is India, if it happens to be in the Indian Ocean. So, these two countries will definitely try to actually eradicate this potential Chinese military presence. That is for sure, because of this kind of great power competition between China and the U.S. and because of India's somewhat ridiculous view that they are the net security provider of the Indian Ocean.
[00:12:00] Peter Slezkine: The name of a place provides a lot of power. Trump just declared the Gulf of Mexico to be the Gulf of America. So, the Indian Ocean, I'm sure the Indians lay claim by virtue of the name. But so, you mentioned earlier that the chief job of a military is to provide security of the home territory and the second mission is to protect citizens and investments abroad. So, one base presumably is insufficient for that. And the external constraints imposed by the U.S. in India might be large but isn't infinite. So, if it were entirely up to Beijing, what would be the proper number of overseas bases to accomplish that second mission of assuring the safety of Chinese economic investments in citizenry abroad?
[00:12:49] Zhou Bo: I don't believe we have concluded that we need to have a definite number, so on and so forth. But I would assume that it should be more than one, right?
[00:12:59] Peter Slezkine: And fewer than 800.
[00:13:00] Zhou Bo: Yeah, it should be more than one, and then we may just try to avail a few more. But again, it's not up to us to decide. Djibouti can give us a military base, it can tell other countries, “We’ll also give your bases,” right? So, therefore, Djibouti government would be very comfortable in striking such a balance. And for other nations, they have to think about the pressure coming from United States and India — for example, Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka, actually, has a problem of letting Chinese ships dock at the ports for replenishment. Because the Indian government would warn against them, and sometimes they succeeded. This is ridiculous. Anyway, you see, even if the Chinese ships are so called spy ships, as India would say, this is highly debatable because, for example, China's Yuan Wang ocean survey ships basically are used to track the movements of satellites and any activity in the space. So, it's not there to monitor any activities of the Indian military. So, this kind of function should be clear. But even if our spy ships, they are having water supplies in a third country, which has its own sovereignty, this should not be bothering to the Indian government. But it shows how difficult it actually would be for Chinese to have such kind of basic needs fulfilled.
So, sometimes, I'm wondering about this. When one day Chinese aircraft carrier strike group sailed into Indian Ocean, I don't believe it will be very long before I can see that. How about we directly sail it into the military base of India? To say, “Okay, let me come here for replenishment,” would you welcome that? We seldom complain about Indian military activity in the South China Sea, but whenever Chinese ships are found in the Indian Ocean, they would complain about it.
[00:14:55] Peter Slezkine: It’s interesting to me that you keep mentioning external constraints because, from D.C., I suppose the interpretation of your argument would then be that constraints are constructive, that they work, that the U.S. should just continue to impose more constraints and should incentivize the Indians to do so as well.
But let's remove these external constraints for a moment and say that China could have as many bases as the U.S. Would it have 800? Would it have 500? Would it have a dozen? You don't have to give a particular number, but give us a range that the Chinese would think would actually be sufficient to make them comfortable in the world in terms of security provision for others or for themselves.
[00:15:43] Zhou Bo: Well, I would say that I would believe a few dozens would even be more than enough. Even if it is one or two dozens, I don't believe it's unnecessary because there's no need for us to do that. You see, what I have described is how we can provide the humanitarian assistance to other countries, right? And then, when it comes to protect your own interests, we actually have already used our ships to do that, to stand on guard when we evacuated people from Libya or when we evacuated people from Yemen, in which we have evacuated both Chinese and foreigners. You don't need so many bases. Yeah, you don't need so many bases. It’s a huge waste of money for me. And the military alliance, a lot of American military bases are found on the soil of American allies. And the alliance itself is expensive, and it's not so easy to manage.
I think Chinese military, certainly, is getting strong, but if you look into history, look at Admiral Zheng He, who led his fleet to have seven voyages in the Indian Ocean. Did he venture to establish a base? He didn't. And maybe that's a good example.
[00:16:58] Peter Slezkine: You mean the Chinese admiral under the Ming Dynasty?
[00:17:01] Zhou Bo: Yes, of the Ming Dynasty. So, when people think of him, you see, people actually have some good memory of Zheng He, of China being strong but humble. But actually, it's not quite true, because he also used the force, when he had to. But that was kept at a marginal level. So, basically, people could not remember that. And if you go to Malaysia, you can even find a temple in memory of him.
So, that is people's impression of China when China's military power was actually next to none. So, I understand how you would think China would follow the footprint of the United States of building a lot of bases. So, I don't think this is needed. And besides, China now has a control or partial control over so many commercial ports and harbors. And these ports and harbors could actually be used for the Chinese military in humanitarian operations. I have to stress this word of humanitarian operations.
For example, if you use these bases to attack other countries, your hosting countries may not agree because it will invite danger for themselves. But if you say that, “I need to come here for resupply to do another humanitarian mission,” so why would these governments object to that? For example, when Chinese government tried to evacuate its nationals from Libya, so many countries, including Greece, would help you because they understand that this is a kind of humanitarian aid.
So, my personal hope is, in the future, even if Chinese military is much stronger, we should still continue to restrict ourselves in this area that is only humanitarian operation. In this regard, you don't have to spend a lot of money, right? And you're always welcomed by people, because you're just like a good Samaritan. Isn't this good for us? Is this good for the world? And in so doing, we strike a sharp contrast with American militaries.
[00:19:16] Peter Slezkine: Well, yes and no. So, of course, American hard power is projected all over the world and American military bases are explicitly for the purpose of military projection. On the other hand, much of American military projection is justified in terms of good Samaritan humanitarian response. Responsibility to protect is what led to the Libyan evacuation of your Chinese citizens, right? These are called humanitarian interventions. And you can say that it's a euphemism, and perhaps it is. But nonetheless, once you begin to project power in the name of humanitarianism, it's unclear where it ends and how to define it. So, is the Chinese version of this qualitatively different? Or will humanitarianism just be in the eye of the beholder, but nonetheless, enforced at point of a metaphorical spear?
[00:20:08] Zhou Bo: Well, I think you have come to a very good point, because humanitarian aid and humanitarian intervention is different. I would say Americans and its allies operations sometimes are just a humanitarian intervention that they are not shy about, because the genocide in Rwanda provided the whole world a moment for self-searching. And after that, protection of civilians actually has become a first priority. China has no objection to that. But then, there are actually a lot of discussions about humanitarian operations, yeah? Because you have to be very careful, the UN wishes to send your peacekeepers immediately to an unknown country, which is engulfed by civil war. Then, where is the intelligence? And how can you make sure that your peacekeepers are not endangered? And how can you make sure about adequate logistic supply? These questions have been discussed for years in UN without a clear good answer.
[00:21:19] Peter Slezkine: Okay. Well, let's turn from humanitarian intervention to military conflict, namely Ukraine. What is the Chinese role at this stage in the future? I heard you on a podcast recently discussing the possibility of China and other non-Western countries, perhaps, acting as guarantors to some future settlement. So, how would that look in concrete terms? At what point in this process would the Chinese be willing to participate?
[00:21:50] Zhou Bo: The short answer is, solution to the war in Ukraine has to be resolved through collective security guarantee provided by major powers, including China.
[00:22:03] Peter Slezkine: Do you envision an active role for China in bringing about a ceasefire at the early stages, or will China wait and see what a Trump-Putin negotiation might lead to and then be happy to sign on to whatever comes from that?
[00:22:21] Zhou Bo: I believe Americans’ role is bigger than China's role in this conflict. You see, China could play different roles, but so long as the two sides can accept, I think China would be very happy because of what has really brought a lot of damages to China, especially China and the Europe's relationship. The reason I talk about the United States having a bigger role is because the United States actually is directly involved in providing military assistance.
Some people might argue, China is also involved, like providing economic lifeline to Russia, but that is not an issue. My argument is, China was actually providing all the same thing before the war. So, the only thing that has changed is that China has been exporting more. That is for sure, because first of all, Russia is being sanctioned by the West. Secondly, Chinese economy is not doing that well. So, we need to export more wherever possible, right? So, when we come to this item, it has to be assumed to be civilian products at first before we talk about its military nature.
So, the United States is directly involved militarily. So, Trump actually has a unique advantage because he can talk to President Zelenskyy and say, “If you do not oblige, I want to provide assistance.” And he can then talk to Russia, “If you don't agree, then I will just provide more assistance to Ukraine.” So, he actually has leverage on both ends.
This is not something that China actually have, but if a ceasefire could come earlier, then I believe that China actually can cooperate with the United States in resolving this issue, which is also something good for China-U.S. bilateral relationship, right? This can demonstrate, as a responsive power, they can work collectively to resolve some of the most difficult issues on earth.
And this is precisely what Trump has said. If you just observe Trump's policies, foreign policies, as a Chinese, I find it's quite interesting, in that Trump, actually, has made a lot of waves elsewhere when he talks about Greenland, talks about Panama, all this kind of issues that are really alarming, right? But his remarks on China were previously also very much alarming, disturbing. But this time, even before, he became officially re-elected. He said so many things nice about China, and he made a lot of good gestures to China. And the Chinese are also reciprocating. The Chinese government and even Chinese media are reciprocating. Of course, we don't know about the future. But I think this is a good start, good beginning.
And maybe, rather than resolving difficult bilateral issues, we could incorporate elsewhere to resolve other people's problems. And this is always my argument. For example, when we want to talk about Taiwan issue or South China issue, it's very difficult for China and the United States to have an agreement, let's say, about the South China Sea. When we come to this kind of freedom of navigation, we have different interpretation of international law. I myself led the Chinese delegation to Pentagon to talk about legal implication of freedom of navigation for a couple of days. The only thing we can agree is we all agree to this concept of freedom of navigation but we then disagree on pretty much all other things.
But this is my constant proposal. We can cooperate, even on freedom of navigation, elsewhere. For example, we did in the Gulf of Aden. And then as a two major maritime power, it's crucial for both of us to ensure the freedom of navigation along the critical international sea lanes.
[00:26:31] Peter Slezkine: Why do you think Trump's stance on China seems to be softer this time around? I mean, that's what you just suggested. Do you think that this is the influence of Elon Musk who is economically tied to China and does not benefit from a great rupture? Is it something else? Is it just a matter of experience?
[00:26:50] Zhou Bo: Yeah, that's a very good question, because I just cannot help from thinking about all this issue. And I believe he himself probably has already drawn some lessons from his first term, right? Because he has been dealing with China, and China has also learned some lessons. And what are the lessons from his first term? Maybe, I can only guess, that he should have realized that tariff is not really a useful weapon against China, because this is agreed by almost all economists, that tariff during his first term did not work so well on China. It actually adds to the cost of the American consumers. And then China's economy has actually changed to become less dependent on export to the United States. Because during his first term, we have realized that he's too dangerous. So, therefore, our dependency on export to the United States has actually declined. And then, of course, we certainly know bluffing about something and doing something is different. He would like to play with his unpredictability as a kind of a strategy, but China, this time, should be better prepared.
And then I believe he understand China's growing importance because, in his second term, he should realize that China actually is becoming more attractive to the rest of the world. This is what we have seen, that the expansion of SEO and the expansion of Brits. So, all this have indicated that the world is moving in a different direction. He's not a political scientist, but he should know the shift is being made. So, the conditions for him have also changed.
[00:28:50] Peter Slezkine: Although, the shifts, if, as apparent as you claim, could prompt two different reactions, either you feel that you are in a weaker position, so you should be cautious, or that you're slipping from your perch so you should do your utmost to defend it. And Trump's whole idea is that America is in decline and it should be made great again through vigorous efforts. And tariffs are one of his key policies.
But you were saying that Beijing, this time around, believed that this was mostly a bluff, and now sees him toning down his rhetoric and imagines that the tariffs will not reach the heights that he threatened they might.
[00:29:35] Zhou Bo: You see, I'm not saying that the Chinese government has drawn conclusions that he was only bluffing, because I might suspect this is just like two men on a duel bowing to one another before they take out their sword. So, we don't know. We really don't know. But what I can say is, China, I believe, is better prepared this time for whatever challenges that we have to deal with.
[00:30:03] Peter Slezkine: Well, so, you mentioned both the South China Sea and Taiwan, so let's discuss those two issues before wrapping up. So, Taiwan is obviously the most dangerous area, the stickiest issue. What measures could Beijing and Washington take that might be politically realistic that would lower the temperature over Taiwan? Is there anything that the two sides could do either separately or together that would pull us back from the brink?
[00:30:36] Zhou Bo: Well, this is the most complicated issue, right? But my answer on this issue is mostly simple. I always tell people the same thing, that the best solution to this issue is that the whole world, including the United States, should let China believe that peaceful reunification is still possible. And that's it.
Because, of course, China wants to have peaceful reunification for its own benefit, right? What is the use of a totally battered Taiwan for us? Yes, it might still be useful, but it is much less useful. So, when people talk about Taiwan issue, people always talk about the stick part, not the carrot part. Actually, China also has a lot of carrots, especially the provincial treatment toward Taiwanese in Fujian province on the other side of Taiwan Strait. And before COVID, a lot of the Taiwanese people were living in mainland. So, I would say we have not given up our hope of peaceful reunification.
I think that the world is just becoming smaller as a result of globalization or AI. This is irreversible, right? So, this kind of exchanges between mainland and Taiwan, we also have to speed up. As a result, people would understand each other much more. I actually, sometimes, watch Taiwan's TV. It's very, very surprising to me how these people talk about China's development with a kind of pride. They even talk about China's sixth-generation jet fighters with a kind of pride, how good this is, how better they are already than American aircraft. I can sense a kind of pride in the tone. So, this is an eye-opener for me, even.
[00:32:32] Peter Slezkine: Even though these planes might be directed against them, do you feel like they have a sort of cultural, racial, civilizational pride that people of their same kind have made such cool jets?
[00:32:46] Zhou Bo: Yeah, this is what I have been thinking. Sometimes, I wonder, if China becomes really the strongest nation on earth, maybe Taiwanese would consider, well, we cannot go away. Taiwan island will not move anywhere. And if we are members of the strongest nation on earth, maybe it's not a bad thing. And as a fact, there are so many Taiwanese living in mainland China tell you that they actually don't care that much about living in a different environment, so long as this environment can provide them better economic opportunities, right?
[00:33:23] Peter Slezkine: So, if in D.C., a new China-Taiwan policy was formulated around a much more cautious rhetoric and much more careful symbolic politics, that, you think, would be the most important move. So, let's say that the realists win out, that the U.S. moves some resources from Europe to Asia, that it continues to supply Taiwan with military equipment, that it builds up its own navy in the region, but it reasserts its commitment to the One China Policy. It says that it is perfectly happy to envision peaceful reunification at some point in the future. And it refrains from any provocative political visits or statements. Do you think that combination would be enough to satisfy Beijing, at least in the short term?
[00:34:29] Zhou Bo: I actually consider that President Trump has a unique opportunity in approving our relationship over this issue, because Beijing would not believe what President Biden said about the One China Policy. He covered it about four times and he actually kept sending, not only arms, but also, people to Taiwan for training purposes. So, there is good reason for China to suspect that this One China Policy is being hollowed out.
Then, President Trump represents a new opportunity. He can tell China that, “Okay, you're worried about Taiwan, then, I can help you in this regard by telling them what not to do and by behaving ourselves. At the same time, we expect mainland China to do ABCD. So, if this kind of assurance becomes verifiable, then I think it gives the Chinese government the confidence. And this would be most important, because we really have a great suspicion over the intention of the United States.
[00:35:39] Peter Slezkine: So, you're saying that, if the Trump team were to make it clear that it is communicating with the Taiwanese leadership and it is not counseling any kind of independence movement, that it is telling the Taiwanese to stay within clear limits and that Beijing understood that this was indeed the case, that would be the most significant move that Washington could make at this stage.
[00:36:03] Zhou Bo: Well, I think, first of all, they should say something right, something that is in line with the full communique. We, even the World Cup, Biden's open commitment to One China Policy, we think that is positive. So, on official occasions, they should say all this kind of things. At the same time, between Chinese government and Biden administration, there was already channel of special envoys, right? So, maybe this kind of a mechanism should be maintained.
I think in President Trump's telephone conversation with President Xi, there was a, kind of, mentioning of this importance of strategic communication. They did not touch upon whether a special channel should be maintained, but since it was there, why won't they continue to keep it? So, through this kind of channel, I think they can just talk to one another about verification of what I said.
[00:37:08] Peter Slezkine: But verification of what, in specific?
[00:37:10] Zhou Bo: Verification from both sides. For example, if you talk about One China Policy in the United States, then Chinese would ask you, “So, what have you done for your vow of One China?” United States could say, “Yes, I told Taiwanese ABCD, and I'm not going, at least in my term, to do what you might consider to be provocative, right?” And I really have done that. Then this becomes verifiable.
[00:37:45] Peter Slezkine: But just to make it concrete, so, if the U.S. made it clear to Beijing and it was verified that the Trump administration had told Taipei that independence was not something that Washington would ever condone, so, on one hand, they do this, on the other hand, they send more weapons to Taiwan. On balance, keeping the Taipei leadership within certain political limits is more important to Beijing than the number of munitions that Washington might supply.
[00:38:23] Zhou Bo: No, that actually would make the whole picture more complicated because it's so much mixed. Therefore, you cannot assure the Chinese government. Yeah, I think, what the United States can do is to, for example, yes, we sell arms, we send people to train them. And for example, during my term, I would just not send any people to train anytime in the military. That would be so easy, right? I assume it's just one or two dozen people there. And that would not be consequential to increase the combat capabilities of Taiwanese. So, if he promised, “I would not do that, and I would even recall them,” that is a good world gesture. That is a very tangible offer. So, the Chinese would be happy, then we can talk about many other things in good confidence. So, these are just the things that I mean.
[00:39:20] Peter Slezkine: Okay. And now, so, for the final segment, let's talk about the South China Sea and the Philippines. So, you were mentioning different interpretations of international law that is probably too complicated for the average American reader of newspapers who see headlines about the Chinese navy entering into some conflict with the Filipinos and generally interpret it as big bad China bullying its small neighbor. So, first of all, what do you say to that perception? And second, given China's external context, the fact that it is bound on all sides by complicated neighbors, with the exception of Russia, perhaps, the North, although Russia is obviously plenty complicated in its own right and has a long complicated history with China, why wouldn't China be incentivized to just settle this issue with the Filipinos one way or another? And it seems that that has been the case recently with India, that, for China to have a bit more room to maneuver in a very difficult set of global circumstances with the United States pressing it from all sides, there was an incentive to settle the border issue with India. We'll see where that goes, but why not do the same thing in the South China Sea with the Philippines?
[00:40:40] Zhou Bo: Yeah. First of all, I personally believe that, with the Filipinos, we won't have a conflict, precisely because our military strength compared with that of the Filipino is overwhelming, to the extent that we can actually control the situation. So, we use water cannons that might be impressive, especially on TV. But that is precisely because we do not want to use weapons. So, water cannon probably is just enough to deter the Filipinos.
Many people, this is human instinct, when you are having trouble, for example, you with a child, people immediately become sympathetic with the child. They just do not want to listen to what you said, because he's a child. And the Filipinos, the small size, well, we have a lot of sympathy. But this is ironic. In fact, in history, it is Filipino who actually have killed Chinese. They have killed Chinese fishermen in 2000, 2006, and 2013, on three different years.
It's very interesting. I talked to a lot of people about this, which can be easily Googled. Few people seem to remember that. They just remember you used the water cannon, and that's it, yeah. So, from a Chinese perspective, you can imagine sometimes I have to think about this issue. Why a small country like the Philippines could have killed Chinese time and again? Historically speaking, the Philippines has never been stronger than China from time immemorial. So, how come they could kill Chinese three times? So, I was thinking whether our policy at that time towards them was probably a bit too kind. Then, I have to think about this issue. Dare they kill any Chinese now? The answer, apparently, is no.
But coming back to your original question, I don't believe there will be a conflict between China and the Philippines. When we talk about China-India border, actually, this is the first incident in over 40 years. So, it's most unfortunate, but there is even something positive in it because they didn't shoot at each other. So, that means subconsciously they know they should not shoot at each other. So, this is a good lesson.
[00:43:02] Peter Slezkine: You're talking about the clash where people died or Indians died through, I don't know, people were wielding bats, but not guns.
[00:43:09] Zhou Bo: Yeah, yeah, that’s right. But even that is a good lesson for sides to learn something. So, I do believe they will bear this in mind. And I'm confident, probably, the next 40 years, the border can become peaceful. It is difficult to resolve it because of different understandings. And even China and India do not agree to the length of the border. You see, we believe it is 2,000 kilometers, and they believe it is 3,488 kilometers, because they believe Pakistan has illegally ceded Indian territory to China, you see.
[00:43:47] Peter Slezkine: Yeah, these South Asian partitions are a very complicated bit of history. Well, so, then last comment on your response about the Filipino issue. So, it seems to me that your response would just make Americans more nervous. You compare the Filipinos to children, say that they have been weaker than China since time immemorial, but have been getting away with acting aggressively in recent years. And that is because China has been too soft. And the conclusion seems to be that China is the natural civilizational center of this entire region and should keep control of its unruly children in its immediate neighborhood. This sounds like a positive version of exactly the same sort of narrative that Washington-China hawks repeat every day, as to why the United States must step in and protect these smaller powers from China's designs on them.
[00:44:46] Zhou Bo: It's interesting how you would look at a similar issue in different light, but I don't believe, if that represents American’s general view, that view is correct, because the fact is, even the Filipinos do not want Americans to be involved. And why is that? I believe they have some kind of confidence about the bottom line. That is, that this won't spill over into a conflict. Such conflicts may just come in many ways, but one of them is that China and the ASEAN countries have agreed not to use force to resolve any issues in South China Sea. This was manifested in a declaration in 2002.
It's interesting for me to compare Taiwan issue and South China issue. China has certain conditions for using force against Taiwan, basically three conditions, that were outlined in China's anti-secession law. So, that means that these are three situations we might use force. But you have never heard China mentioning any possible use of force against any country in Southeast Asia. So, I think the Filipinos’ competence comes in part from this.
[00:46:04] Peter Slezkine: Well, very good. Thank you so much for a tour of world policy, Chinese foreign policy, and everything in between. So, I hope to have you on again before too long and to see you in Beijing when I next visit.
[00:46:18] Zhou Bo: Thank you.
[00:46:22] Peter Slezkine: Thanks for listening to the Trialogue Podcast. Make sure to subscribe to the show, so you don’t miss out on any episodes.
The Trialogue Podcast is hosted by the Stimson Center and produced by University FM.