Zhou Bo, a retired senior colonel in the PLA and a senior fellow in the Center for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University, returns to the Trialogue to discuss China’s calculations about recent events, including the release of the U.S. National Security Strategy, tense Sino-Japanese relations, the situation in Taiwan, and negotiations to end the war in Ukraine. *The Trialogue Podcast is hosted by the Stimson Center and produced by University FM.
Zhou Bo, a retired senior colonel in the PLA and a senior fellow in the Center for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University, returns to the Trialogue to discuss China’s calculations about recent events, including the release of the U.S. National Security Strategy, tense Sino-Japanese relations, the situation in Taiwan, and negotiations to end the war in Ukraine.
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*The Trialogue Podcast is hosted by the Stimson Center and produced by University FM.
(Transcripts may contain a few typographical errors due to audio quality during the podcast recording.)
[00:00:05] Peter Slezkine: I'm Peter Slezkine, Director of the U.S.-Russia-China Trialogue Project at the Stimson Center. Since the middle of the 20th century, relations among the United States, Russia, and China have had an enormous impact on each country separately and on the world as a whole. The purpose of the Trialogue is to better understand this extraordinarily complex and consequential relationship by directly engaging with experts from all three countries.
In this show, guests from across the political spectrum and from every corner of the globe share their views in their own voice. While the Stimson Center seeks to provide access to a wide variety of perspectives, it does not endorse any particular position. We leave it to the listeners to judge the validity and value of the views expressed by the guests.
Hi, y'all! We took a bit of a pause in November and December due to travel, holidays, and other obligations and distractions. We're back now and hope to return to a regular rhythm of releasing episodes roughly every two weeks. We have some great guests lined up, so please keep a lookout for new episodes.
My guest today is Zhou Bo, a retired senior colonel in the PLA and a senior fellow in the Center for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University.
This is Bo's second appearance on the show. So, if you like this episode, you should definitely check out our earlier conversation. We recorded the episode that follows before the United States’ military incursion into Venezuela and seizure of Maduro. But we did spend time discussing China's attitude toward the so-called Trump corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. We also covered the downturn in Sino-Japanese relations, the situation in Taiwan, and China's hope for improved relations with Europe. I hope you enjoy the episode.
Welcome back to the podcast.
[00:01:52] Zhou Bo: Thank you, Peter.
[00:01:53] Peter Slezkine: We're almost precisely 11 months into the second Trump administration. The U.S.-China relationship has experienced some ups and downs, to put it mildly. So, where have we arrived? How did we get here? Can you give us a rough overview of the first year, more or less, of the Trump administration?
[00:02:15] Zhou Bo: Well, I think I would say I start to like him now, because he's totally different from his first term. You see, Trump actually is not so ideological, the legacy he left during his first term. It was precisely ideological, a kind of bipartisan consensus against China, although this might not be what he wanted, right? But during his second term is totally business-like transactional, which is fine. So, sometimes I'm wondering whether he would've need a lasting legacy because he himself is actually surrounded by China hawks.
So, when he is gone in less than three years' time with the other people, still become hawkish toward China. But I believe that with this kind of liberal democracy in steady decline, with him having no interest in ideology, so, his legacy would be, kind of, a competition characterized with a little ideology. That is good for us, for both of us, I mean.
[00:03:23] Peter Slezkine: So, you are overall pleased with the first 11 months of the new Trump administration, and its greatest virtue is the lack of an ideological focus, which you think may return in some future administration. But the tariffs, the trade wars, that is less of a danger, as far as you are concerned, than an ideological standoff. Why is that?
[00:03:47] Zhou Bo: Well, ideology may come back, but not in such an imposing manner. It will become considerably declined, even if other administrations would want to mention this kind of things, because, you know, this kind of binary of democracy versus autocracy, basically, has died. So, I think, as I was reading Rana Mitter's excellent essay in Foreign Affairs, so, maybe in 20 years' time, this kind of talk, first of all, will disappear. And then, probably, this kind of liberal democracy would be a minority. So, in that regard, it suggests that this kind of ideological struggle basically would be gone. When it comes to…
[00:04:33] Peter Slezkine: So, explain why Beijing likes the ideological domain for the struggle least. So, let's say that you can have an economic trade war, you can have security problems based on realist interests, but that is easier to navigate, as far as Beijing is concerned, than an ideologically framed competition.
[00:04:58] Zhou Bo: That's certainly not what Beijing wants, because if we are having this kind of a struggle in ideology, then that is precisely not a Cold War, right? And short of this ideological struggle, when it is just a kind of competition in economic field, that is totally understood. And I believe that, from the tariff war or whatsoever, Trump actually has learned the lesson. So, we're not the one who blinked the first. So, I think his attitudes toward China are different from his attitude toward other countries. He tried his best to impose tariffs on China, but it didn't work. So, I think his [crosstalk 00:05:37].
[00:05:36] Peter Slezkine: So, you think the U.S. blinked first?
[00:05:39] Zhou Bo: Yes, of course.
[00:05:39] Peter Slezkine: And that China is the only country in the world that forced the U.S. to blink in this trade standoff?
[00:05:46] Zhou Bo: Yes. I think, in a way, China is a leader in this war against the United States. I mean, when it comes to this kind of unjustified tariff war on the rest of the world by Trump administration.
[00:05:59] Peter Slezkine: What makes it unjustified? I mean, China also clearly instrumentalizes its economic power for its own good. What's wrong with that?
[00:06:08] Zhou Bo: Well, you see, China is not the one who initiated this war because…
[00:06:13] Peter Slezkine: No, but I'm not talking about this in particular. Just as a matter of principle, there is no law of physics or norm of ethics that makes global free trade inevitable. There are any number of instruments that countries can employ in order to improve their economic situations. Tariffs have long been one such instrument. Why is it unjustified to use them?
[00:06:42] Zhou Bo: Well, because trading essentially is mutually beneficial. And if this kind of trading has been going on for decades, there must be some reasons why this kind of trading are justifiable. And his war is not only against China, it is against the whole world, to different degrees. And people talk about how these threats have so many loopholes. The fact is he would not become very much successful, especially when it comes to such powerful countries like China, who also have their own lethal weapons.
Sometimes I wonder why, if rare earth is such a powerful weapon, why haven't you found it before? I think we were pushed to the corner, and then we found out, "Okay, we also have some weapons like soybeans, you know, so on and so forth." So, that is why, you know, business is mutually beneficial. If you push too hard on someone, he might just backfire.
[00:07:37] Peter Slezkine: Although the contention of these new economists in the United States and the Trump administration, or at least certain members of the Trump administration, is that the trade was not mutually beneficial, or at least its effects were asymmetrical. And just because the tariffs may not have worked or not have worked exactly as the United States desired doesn't mean that it was totally unjustified.
So, again, I'm just trying to figure out whether there is anything wrong with what the United States tried to do on principle, or it just worked with some countries, it didn't work entirely with China because China has its own set of levers that it can pull and did.
[00:08:20] Zhou Bo: Well, I think Trump has a different idea from his predecessors, especially on this kind of trading issues. Yeah, he basically thought the rest of the world is free riding on the United States, and so on and so forth. He has been talking like that. But there could be different situations. For example, I tend to consider his right on NATO to ask them to either share the burden or shift the burden, because as an outsider, I would say, why should the United States, a country far away from Europe, pay 70% of the budget? It doesn't sound logical. And NATO has so many countries, right? So, why can't these European countries pay the lion's share? So, that makes a lot of sense to me.
[00:09:07] Peter Slezkine: So, why does it make more sense to rebalance the transatlantic relationship than to rebalance the U.S.-China relationship? Because the U.S.-China relationship, you might argue, is mutually beneficial in some respects. But if you care about American industry, for example, then clearly, U.S.-China trade has contributed to the rise of Chinese industry and sapped American industrial strength. So, is not some amount of rebalancing in order on the economic front with China and on the security front with Europe?
[00:09:45] Zhou Bo: You know, the background of my central argument is that the United States is no longer as strong as it was before. So, therefore, this kind of retrenchment from the globe is inevitable. So, when you retrench, you still would have to have a focal point. And where is the focal point? The focal point is in the Indo-Pacific. Even before he announced new National Security Strategy, my gut feeling is that he would not move away from the Indo-Pacific region, because in the Pacific region is where the economy is booming. And this is actually the new center of gravity.
So, if this is a focus, then he has to retrain from elsewhere, for example, from Europe, from the Middle East. But it is somewhat surprising for me to read that he said that the United States would try to prevent another hegemon from dominating the Middle East. So, I was thinking of who's the new hegemon, right? Russia would not be that strong to dominate the Middle East. China is doing a lot of things in the Middle East. But actually, I believe China and the U.S. do not have conflict of interests in the Middle East.
But of course, the Indo-Pacific is a focus. I never believe that the United States wants to focus on the Indo-Pacific to contain China. That should not be the primary purpose because it is the most dynamic area, economically. So, therefore, the U.S. also wants to benefit from the dividend of such prosperity. So, that is the primary purpose. But, of course, they do not like something that China is doing. So, for many Chinese, it looks like a containment, but I don't believe that. And even if the United States wants to contain China, it doesn't have enough tools.
[00:11:36] Peter Slezkine: So, you mentioned the National Security Strategy. What was the reaction from Beijing to the publication of the National Security Strategy? Was it viewed positively? Was it received with confusion? Did it seem expected from this administration?
[00:11:51] Zhou Bo: Well, personally, it appears to be a good strategy to me in that it is among the shortest strategy ever published, right? When I read it gave me, kind of, an illusion as if I was reading a Chinese government report, because if you read the Chinese government report, you'll find the language very much concise and straightforward. And this kind of style in American writing is surprising to me because I attend so many Shangri-La dialogues, for example. I can almost tell how the speeches of American Secretary of Defense would look like because this kind of sequence is quite familiar to me.
So, language itself is concise and precise, and it is very much focused just on five core interests. Of course, everybody talks about how the United States is having a donut trend, right? Rather just similar to the Monroe Doctrine. So, again, that is a reflection of the declining American strengths because, historically, yeah, the United States was strong to the rest of the world. And so, this is a reflection of a declining American strength.
But again, on the next four points, much of the same things were repeated when he talked about freedom of navigation, the importance of allies, and the Free and Open Indo-Pacific. So, that's my impression.
[00:13:16] Peter Slezkine: I would quibble slightly with the argument that a focus on the Western Hemisphere is a clear indication of America's declining power. I mean, that is true in some respect, but the argument might be that overextension sapped American strength and that a focus on the United States’ own region might help grow the strength again, that at the late 19th century, when the United States followed such a policy, it was the strongest country in the world by most measures.
[00:13:52] Zhou Bo: Well, to some extent, Peter, you're right. But remember, to say that to make U.S. great again just indicate U.S. is not great now, right? And so, he actually is a large declinist, and he used that to unite American people.
[00:14:08] Peter Slezkine: No, I agree completely. And obviously, the “Make America Great Again” slogan implies that the trajectory that we are has made us weaker than we were before. But precisely that argument suggests that a policy that was less expansive and less universal actually produced greater strength. So, what looks from the outside like a retreat might be strengthening of the United States’ positions if you have a different sense of how American power is actually built.
Just being able to spread your force around the world might come at a greater cost than the benefit it brings, which is the entire crux of the argument we are having now between liberal internationalists on one hand and realists and nationalists on the other. But, in any case, the National Security Strategy was mainly seen as a positive sign in Beijing, is that right? Or was there still concern about what looks ultimately like a policy of containment in Asia?
[00:15:15] Zhou Bo: Well, I don't know how other people would think about it, but for me, this one act in which no competition with Chinese is mentioned is certainly a relief, I would say. So, maybe, both of us can stay focused on the core issues. And given that, we will come to visit China in April. And there are still a few more chances for the two leaders to meet. So, actually, people have some good optimism about what is going to happen next year.
Because President Trump is one of a kind. He certainly is different from any other president in American history, and he definitely has invited the systemic changes to American policy. But whether that would mean something so different in America's whole attitude toward the world, it remains to be seen. I believe that it is a sea change.
[00:16:12] Peter Slezkine: The National Security Strategy, as you mentioned, has a section called the Trump corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. This is obviously a historical American policy, which is being revived, originally directed against the so-called old world, which was Europe. But now the only target, conceivably, is China. What has been the reaction in China to this declaration of a new Monroe Doctrine? Is there a sense that China's positions, its economic investments in Latin America, will now come under assault from the United States?
[00:16:50] Zhou Bo: I do have some doubts about whether Trump could actually drive away Chinese economic influence in Western Hemisphere because he mentioned how he would not let China invest in the key infrastructure, so on and so forth. But those kind of things are purely economic activities welcomed by the recipient donations. For example, if Chile wants to sell more cherries to China, and if we want to make the farms in Chile able to produce more cherries, it would not affect American national security.
So, I believe China would be very careful to be involved militarily with these countries in Western Hemisphere, since it has already placed it as a top priority. But China is never really interested in expanding military activity in Western Hemisphere. It makes no sense. So, I don't believe there would be a clash of interest between China and the U.S. in Western Hemisphere.
[00:17:53] Peter Slezkine: But one can imagine American governments, with these declared priorities, exerting political pressure on governments in Latin America to do business with American companies instead of Chinese companies. So, you mentioned Chile. They just had an election. A right-winger won. Just across the Andes, you have Javier Milei, who was a great Trump darling. So, there seems to be somewhat of a swing, at least in the Southern Cone. And, again, business is not immune to political influence and machinations. So, is China not worried that there's going to be a concerted political effort driven from Washington to push Chinese business interest out?
[00:18:40] Zhou Bo: Well, yeah, it could happen because when we talk about China, we're actually talking about global China now. Chinese influence is everywhere. But I just wish personally that China's activities elsewhere would be focused in economic fields.
For example, in Central Asia, which is Russia's traditional sphere of influence. I think China is very careful not to do too many things military there. So, most of the security issues are left to Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. If you look at the China's periphery, actually, I would say Central Asia is where China had had the least of problems, but because of Russia's influence, we are very much careful. So, I think, in the Western Hemisphere, we will be equally careful.
[00:19:26] Peter Slezkine: You're saying that the way that China has operated in Central Asia, being careful not to step on Russian toes, where Moscow believes it has a traditional sphere of influence, especially by avoiding military presence, that provides a model for Chinese investment in Latin America that would not necessarily ruffle American feathers.
[00:19:50] Zhou Bo: I think so. Yeah.
[00:19:52] Peter Slezkine: So, let's pivot to Japan. The new Prime Minister, Takaichi, made some remarks about potential Japanese involvement in a war over Taiwan that Beijing perceived as scandalous. Trump and Xi had a phone call in late November, followed by a Trump-Takaichi phone call. Can you give us an overview of the Sino-Japanese relationship and where it currently stands, and what role the United States might play in that dynamic?
[00:20:26] Zhou Bo: Well, the current China-Japanese relationship certainly is not good, and it is because of Takaichi's remarks at the Japanese Diet. But I personally believe that her remarks would just disappear like ripples. They would not be so, so consequential. She's certainly wrong when she argues that, okay, the Taiwan situation is essential to Japan. Remember, Taiwan is not a foreign country, even according to Japanese.
So, let's imagine the Western scenario. If there is an attack by the Chinese mainland against Taiwan in the Western scenario, and if a few rocket bomb shells fall into the Japanese water accidentally, would that constitute existential threat to Japan? I don't think so, because in 2015, actually, a few bombs from Myanmar government fell into Chinese territory and injured a few Chinese villagers.
But we resolved that quietly because we do not believe that it was intentional, right? So, that was resolved. This is exactly what I mean when it comes to Japan, because if the Japanese government doesn't believe China is doing that intentionally, why would it react as if it is kind of an essential threat to Japan? And besides, even if they act like it is an existential threat, could Japan prevail over China militarily? There's no way Japan can win over China. So, why make such a fuss? So, this is an example, the tail wagging the dog.
[00:22:14] Peter Slezkine: So, Japan is trying to involve the United States. But you mentioned that China didn't react to a few rockets from Myanmar that landed in China, that Japan can't do anything militarily to China, even if it wanted to. So, given this apparent level of self-confidence, why did the Chinese government, Chinese population react so acutely to Takaichi's statement? Why not just brush it off?
[00:22:46] Zhou Bo: Well, you see, Japan is certainly different from Myanmar, because she is a Prime Minister, she has described this kind of situation as an existential threat to Japan, which suggests that Japan would actually use military means against China.
[00:23:05] Peter Slezkine: And situations… just to be clear what she said, if there were a war over Taiwan, if there were mainland attack on Taiwan, she implied that Japan would become involved because it would be an existential issue for Japan, right?
[00:23:19] Zhou Bo: Yeah. Something like that, yes, because even Japanese government recognized Taiwan being part of China. And China certainly would just take military attack as the last resort. So, only talking about hypothetical scenarios. There's no guarantee that a war will definitely occur in the Taiwan Strait.
So, you see, I've been talking about the three ambiguities, three strategic ambiguities. The first one actually comes from China because China has never talked about a timeline of such an attack. And why is that? Because China still has hope for peaceful reunification. Yeah. So, it would not talk about the so-called timeline. And this is why so many American generals and admirals have been guessing. So, short of China mentioning a timeline, then the United States, of course, would be ambiguous. And then comes American allies, including Japan and Australia. And their participation can only be conditional. That is to support Americans and military intervention.
So, that's why I'm saying that this is an example of the tail trying to wag the dog. Because if the United States hasn't made clear if they would intervene militarily or not, how could Japan say that we definitely will become involved? So, that is why she's too stupid in this case.
[00:24:48] Peter Slezkine: But what is your motivation? So, why would the tail want to wag the dog in this instance? You think that Takaichi, by making this declaration, hoped to make the American position on Taiwan more forceful?
[00:25:03] Zhou Bo: Yeah. Well, I think she probably didn't realize what she was saying when she was pushed on that question, because what I was saying is a logic that should be followed, and in violating this kind of logic, her remarks would not make sense. Because even before her remarks, Japan and Australia were pushed by Pete Hegseth to talk about this scenario, whether they would come to fight PLA should there be a war in Taiwan Strait. And both Australian government and the Japanese government refused to answer this kind hypothetical question. And that makes a lot of sense, because if America’s policy itself is a kind of strategic ambiguity, why would Japan and Australia be clarifying their position at this moment?
[00:25:56] Peter Slezkine: So, in that case, perhaps, Takaichi just misread the American message that she thought she was being asked to clarify. She clarified, and then it turned out that perhaps that wasn't quite what Washington wanted after all.
[00:26:10] Zhou Bo: Well, I don't know what she was thinking, but she certainly was criticized, and she got a call from Trump himself, right, with some warnings. Although the Japanese government denied that. But I'm sure they will try their best to deny that. But that certainly has happened after call between President Xi and President Trump.
So, I think that the United States was frustrated because there are so many mistakes in maintaining this important relationship with China, and with President Trump definitely coming to China in April, with issues pending in economic interactions. So, all of a sudden, this kind of disturbance would make Trump unhappy, I would say.
[00:26:55] Peter Slezkine: So, how were those two calls understood in Beijing? Was this crisis management and emergency averted? Or was this a sign that the relationship has stabilized, that China has a concern? The two leaders talk. Trump then relays the message to Tokyo. And this is a demonstration that these two great powers actually understand one another's red lines and is the foundation to build on going forward.
[00:27:28] Zhou Bo: You see, American policy was a kind of a strategic ambiguity, but if this is a pendulum, so to which direction would it swing to in the future? I think there was a kind of a possibility, as some American scholars mentioned, in the future. A kind of a strategic clarity probably is moving in the direction of no support, a clear declaration of no support to Taiwan's independence. In that regard, actually, the United States is sending a signal to its allies. So, the things are moving in a total opposite direction. From China's point of view, you can see that China is still having patience.
As a rule of thumb, I believe in the future China will have more confidence in China-U.S. relationship, and this kind of a Taiwan issue would still be resolve by the lot peacefully because Taiwan is on our side and the Taiwan cannot move away. So, even American allies are not stupid. They won't necessarily fight along with American soldiers, even in the Western scenario. So, this is my guess. To imagine Japan and Australia being involved in a direct confrontation with a nuclear weapons state like China, so this would be a very, very difficult decision for them to take.
So, basically, I believe whether U.S. would be involved or not, well, it is not a sure thing. And even if the U.S. has to be involved, probably this is just a kind of a duel between two titans with no other supporters standing on each side. There aren't many countries who would follow either China or the United States.
[00:29:22] Peter Slezkine: I mean, there are any number of calculations, I suppose, that come into play. But given the apparent trajectory in the United States away from a fully integrated effort to protect Taiwan, does that afford China more time to pursue peaceful reunification? Or does this perceived weakness or reticence, which may not last, provide an opportunity to strike now?
[00:29:54] Zhou Bo: Well, to answer this question, actually, I've been arguing with China becoming stronger. There are actually two different approaches that China can actually take. One is you become more confident over eventual peaceful reunification because you are stronger. Another direction that is totally different is you become more impatient because you are getting stronger. Which one serves China's better interest? Of course, peaceful reunification. So, that is why we are, in spite of the provocations from DPP, from Taiwan, I think the Chinese government is still talking about peaceful development. Although I believe Chinese patience is probably running a little bit thinner, but it was still having patience.
[00:30:38] Peter Slezkine: What affects Chinese patience more, American policy, the policy of U.S. allies in the region, or Taiwan's own attitude toward the mainland?
[00:30:53] Zhou Bo: Well, I think both of them matter, but my hope is my government would still have utmost patience because of two things I mentioned. Taiwan would not move away, and Taiwan is on the side of the Chinese mainland, right? So, you see, when it comes to this island, I think we are almost having the worst situation because two authorities are all from DPP. And who knows whether the next one would still be DPP or not? But I don't believe the Taiwanese people are stupid, because in this so-called great recall to the legislature, actually, the DPP had a landslide defeat. So, that means the legislature is controlled by Kuomintang. So, I think the Taiwanese people are very clever to strike such a balance. So, we still have confidence in their confidence.
[00:31:46] Peter Slezkine: But if forced to choose, what would you find most meaningful or most reassuring, a slight change in American policy or in Taipei policy?
[00:31:59] Zhou Bo: Well, I think the American government has already changed, yeah, at least in terms of a Trump administration. But whether the next one would be the same or slightly different, it remains to be seen.
When people talk about the situation, people like to use this word, “status quo,” right? But I always argue that nothing is static. Status quo actually is not something static. It is constantly changing. Thanks to Nancy Pelosi's visit, the situation in the Taiwan Strait, actually, has changed for good because nowadays the Chinese war planes would just fly to the other side regardless of the so-called middle line. So, that is a new status quo, which is already irreversible.
[00:32:45] Peter Slezkine: So, Nancy Pelosi's visit was a great boon for the Chinese position.
[00:32:51] Zhou Bo: Oh, of course, it is constant to China. Because we had a four, you know, consecutive days during the exercise around the island. Without Nancy Pelosi's visit, how can you do anything like that, right? Well, you have to think of a big, big excuse for you to all of a sudden do that. So, I think that is exactly result.
[00:33:12] Peter Slezkine: Okay. From a potential conflict to one that is currently ongoing and hopefully ending, what do you make of the war in Ukraine? Europe gathered in Brussels with the hope of confiscating Russian frozen assets. It did not do so. Witkoff has come to Moscow yet again with a 28-point plan. There have been any number of other moves in this area. Do you think that we are on the final stretch, or is this just a beginning of a very long, drawn-out negotiation process that could take years?
[00:33:54] Zhou Bo: Well, I think the situation is becoming clearer, but now the Europeans decide to intervene. So, that makes the whole picture more complicated, right? So, according to what I heard from some Russian experts, they like the peace plan proposed by Donald Trump, although they believe that it will still take them a few months to iron out vital differences. But in general, they're happy with the plan. But the point is, now Ukraine, together with Europe, they're not happy with the plan.
And the latest development is that Europe is talking about sending troops to the soil of Ukraine. Do they really want to do that? Or do they really want to fight for Ukraine? I have some doubts. So, generally speaking, I think Russia is having an upper hand. So, that is why President Putin would not be in such a hurry. So, he cannot afford to wait, because even if two guys are bleeding at the same time, but the bigger guys certainly can afford more than the short one. So, that is the situation.
[00:34:58] Peter Slezkine: Does China care much about the details of a deal? So, let's assume that Russia doesn't collapse, neither does Ukraine, that there is marginal movements one way or the other, and then a whole series of compromises that are put on paper. Does China care about Ukraine's military potential, whether Russian language has a status or not, whether borders are moved this way or that way, officially recognized or de facto acknowledged? Does any of this matter, or does China just want the word to end?
[00:35:36] Zhou Bo: I think it's the latter. China just don't want the war to be finished as soon as possible, no matter how. Because, you see, even if the war is still going on, we are seeing some kind of results already. One is NATO’s expansion is coming to an end, because there aren't many countries who are outside NATO anyway. And the second thing is that I believe NATO has come to realize that the security landscape of Europe is eventually how Russia and NATO could coexist. So, Russia has been in the mourning NATO expansion ever since the Soviet time.
So, this time, NATO is really hitting on something solid. So, I think this is Russia's way of saying, "Enough is enough." So, they are ready to fight back, no matter how costly it might be. So, these two results have already appeared. So, this kind of proposal from the United States is very much what I thought in the beginning, that is, Russia would definitely get on hold of Luhansk and Donetsk, while leaving to other regions, yeah, for negotiation or for ceasefire or whatsoever. Yeah. Let's see how things will unfold.
[00:36:52] Peter Slezkine: Why does China want peace? Why not just let the war continue indefinitely? Russia remains dependent on China, ultimately continues to sell cheap energy. What's wrong with a continuation of war from a strategic perspective?
[00:37:07] Zhou Bo: Yeah. You see, European Union has 27 countries, and because of this war, yeah, China's relationship with Europe has turned sour. This is unfair for China, who is not involved in this war. People accused us of supporting Russia economically, but that is not the case, because look at what China has exported, the same item before the war and after the war. The only difference is that we're selling them in larger quantity, because they cannot buy things from Europe. And I know we have been very careful not to sell any, you know, military equipment to Russia.
[00:37:49] Peter Slezkine: You say that the Chinese relationship with the European Union has soured as a result of the Ukraine war because the Europeans perceive the Chinese as supporting Russia's war effort. Is there a real sense, given that you use policy and ideology, that were the war to end tomorrow, in six months, China's relationship with the EU would substantially change? Do you think that is realistic?
[00:38:19] Zhou Bo: Well, I think the European countries have already realized that it is not very much useful to put pressure on China. I think, in the first two years, they very much had this kind of illusion of cutting China off of Russia. But now, they have come to realize that it's not realistic. So, anyway, because this will has nothing to do with China.
So, if the war comes to stop, I think the China-European relationship will improve further because this relationship has already improved somehow after, you know, JD Vance's speech at the Munich Security Conference, right? So, even this transatlantic relationship itself has become more complicated. So, therefore, what we're seeing, and there the two sides, I mean, China and the European Union, inching closer.
[00:39:12] Peter Slezkine: So, your hope is that, with the end of the war in Ukraine and the deepening of the transatlantic rupture, the EU will be more inclined to do business with China, because an alternative argument is that, within of the war in Ukraine, the United States will seek to normalize with Russia, will try to fragment the EU, and perhaps hollow out NATO, and create a new transatlantic relationship that is directed more toward technological and trade competition with China.
[00:39:49] Zhou Bo: Well, you, you are portraying a very complicated picture involving all parties, but I would basically believe, if the war comes an end, the Chinese relationship with Europe will improve tremendously in the political sector. But economically speaking, it’s a much more complicated picture because Europe has been in China overdumping Chinese products in Europe. That is something very much complicated.
So, that is why, even countries like Germany are changing their policies, for example, to have more research and development in China in the car industry, because certainly things are done in a much more efficient manner here in China. What takes Chinese less than a year would take more than three years in Germany. So, that is why they find they have to change the policies, and the change is to have things done here in China.
[00:40:42] Peter Slezkine: So, the story, as far as I understand it, is that Volkswagen and other German companies made great returns on investments in China for decades, but eventually were surpassed by Chinese automakers who studied that technology, were subsidized by the state. And now these German automakers are totally uncompetitive in China and will soon be uncompetitive at home unless there is a massive policy of state protection against these superior and cheaper Chinese vehicles.
[00:41:20] Zhou Bo: When it comes to China, we all know one concept, you know, China being the world factory. But there are two dimensions of this now. So, one is that China is still the world's factory. Another is China, actually, is building factories elsewhere in the world. But then there is another new concept that is actually China is also an innovation center in the world. So, that is why these big car manufacturers from Europe are setting up a joint research center in China because of China's progress in AI and so on and so forth. So, this is a new concept.
[00:41:58] Peter Slezkine: So, explain briefly to end, how this benefits these foreign companies, instead of just selling their own products in China, they seek to benefit from China's technological successes by engaging in joint projects that somehow were done to their own benefit in the end? Why wouldn't China just keep all the best technology? And okay, they can share something with Volkswagen, but I imagine China still wants BYD that produce the best cars.
[00:42:29] Zhou Bo: First of all, China is really selling more cars in Europe, right? But at the same time, the Western companies also still want to sell in the largest Chinese market. So, I think this kind of requirement is mutual. So, that predetermines that they too have to have a cooperation to maximum, as benefits. Yeah. I think it's just as simple as that.
[00:42:53] Peter Slezkine: Okay. Final question. Is AI the foundation of state power in the future or the death knell of human civilization globally?
[00:43:07] Zhou Bo: I think AI will change everybody's life, and it is already doing that. The only thing is we are not fully sure how it might evolve itself to make our life unpredictable. For example, I have been arguing that in the future, the international arms sales will be dominated just by two countries. One is the United States. Another is China. Right now, China ranks the fourth. The international arms sales of United States, France, Russia, and then it comes to China.
In the future, I believe still a lot of countries would have to buy American weapons because, first of all, they’re reliable, combat-tested, but also expensive. And the American allies would have to buy them for being correct politically. But then, Chinese weapons are also reliable, and in some cases, they are also combat-tested, like in the Middle East. I mean, the drones or the Chinese fighter aircraft in the war between India and Pakistan.
But what is in common between China and the United States is that they're all dominant in AI application. So, you haven't heard much from Japan or Europe. So, that is why, in the future, the war will be conducted more and more with drones. So, we are already seeing official video from Chinese Air Force showcasing the best Chinese fighter jet, J-20, flying with a electronic airplane and a drone in formation.
Yeah, so you see Indonesia is buying Rafale and the Chinese J-10. But I'm wondering how soon they could get you know, Rafale, probably in five years, and then it would probably take the Indonesian pilots another five years to be well trained. So, altogether, in 10 years, will be gone, and in 10 years' time, probably one third of the aircraft. So, just drones.
[00:45:04] Peter Slezkine: Well, if there's no humans on the battlefield, that's good news. If there's no humans necessary for any part of social endeavor, that's a little bit worse. So, let's end on that note. Let's hope that robots do all the fighting for us, but we do all the living.
[00:45:18] Zhou Bo: Thank you. Yeah, Peter, thank you for this interview.
[00:45:20] Peter Slezkine: All right, well, thank you for your time. Thanks for coming back.
Thanks for listening to the Trialogue Podcast. Make sure to subscribe to the show so you don't miss out on any episode. The Trialogue Podcast is hosted by the Stimson Center and produced by University FM.